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Summary 
European internal security has become increasingly relevant in recent years. Various incidents across EU Member 
States have demonstrated the transnationalisation of terrorism and organised crime as well as the need to work 
together to safeguard security in a progressively borderless Europe. Governments and citizens have consistently 
called for a growing role of the EU and coordinating at this level. In this light, it appears striking that different 
cooperation initiatives continue to mushroom inside and outside the EU framework. Their parallel emergence 
duplicates efforts at best but can also obstruct information exchange and produce security failures. This dissertation 
sets out to investigate why Member States acknowledge the benefits of integration, yet advance differentiation as 
well.  
Concretely, it studies the formation of state preferences in the still largely intergovernmental field of EU police 
cooperation. It asks which factors shape government positions and how they drive Member States to favour 
integration. In particular, the influence of cross-country interdependencies, politicisation and policy 
entrepreneurship might help explain processes of integration and differentiation in this policy area. Their relative 
importance as drivers of state preferences is studied across the institutional development of EU police cooperation 
between 1976 and 2016. The analysis is organised around four ‘milestones’ in the integration of this field: 1) the 
1976 intergovernmental Trevi Group; 2) the 1995 Europol Convention establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol); (3) the 2009 Europol Council Decision establishing Europol as official EU agency; and (4) the 2016 
Europol Regulation. 
This dissertation finds that interdependencies in the fight against common threats mattered most as driver of state 
integration preferences in the early stages of European police cooperation. More recently, supranational policy 
entrepreneurship has emerged as key influence of pro-integration attitudes among Member States and can be 
expected to grow in importance. Politicisation, against it, provides windows of opportunity to this end and acts 
rather as amplifier of integration pressure from interdependencies and policy entrepreneurs. In sum, the 
asymmetrical effects of all three drivers explains the formation of diverging governmental attitudes towards 
integration and can thus help account for the persistence of parallel processes of differentiation and integration. 
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 2 
1. Introduction 
On 13 November 2015 more than one hundred people were killed and over 350 injured in six coordinated 
terror attacks instigated in Paris by the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS). In the following days, French President 
François Hollande called the attacks an ‘act of war’ and declared a national state of emergency, which would 
be extended six times by Parliament and remain in place for almost two years (Hollande, 2015). The attacks 
were not only deeply unsettling from a human point of view, they unearthed fundamental albeit long-
standing questions about European cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Belgian authorities had 
for instance possessed evidence of a concrete threat since mid-2014: plans for an “irreversible act” by the 
Abdeslam brothers who were significantly involved in the Paris attacks (Paravicini & Cerulus, 2016). 
However, comprehensive surveillance of the suspects did not occur due to a lack of capacity, and information 
exchange with the French authorities failed accordingly. When this became known in the aftermath of the 
attacks, it gave rise to a heated debate about internal security cooperation in the European Union (EU) and 
how to improve it.
There can be no doubt about the significance of EU internal security and particularly police 
cooperation. Events like the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin seem to demonstrate time 
and again the urgent need to strengthen common efforts and collective action on a transgovernmental if not 
European level. Additionally, public polls show consistently high citizen support across EU Member States 
for a stronger role of the EU in internal security (European Commission, 2008a; European Commission, 
2015a). Finally, EU heads of state or government have likewise reiterated the importance of this undertaking. 
They largely agree that coordination and cooperation at EU level are vital in related issue areas, especially 
with regard to information exchange (Bigo et al., 2015; Council of the European Union, 2015a). Streamlining 
communication channels and integrating approaches have been especially emphasised by policymakers with 
a view to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of European internal security governance and police 
cooperation. What is more, the latter has increasingly become associated with EU policy venues. This can be 
seen in the expanding role for supranational actors in police cooperation, most notably the European 
Commission and of course the European Police Office (Europol)Nevertheless, many different formats and 
types of police cooperation coexist and continue to mushroom, causing inefficiencies at best, duplication and 
waste at worst. Informal networks grow side by side with, but are often not linked to, official institutions and 
formalised platforms for cooperation. Similarly, intergovernmental modes of working together coexist with 
transgovernmental and supranational ones but are for the most part neither integrated nor coordinated 
sufficiently or at all. It appears puzzling that EU Member States should on the one hand agree on the merits 
of enhanced cooperation and an integrated EU approach, and at the same time advance an incredibly complex 
governance environment with overlapping and diffused structures that often make cooperation let alone 
governance rather inefficient and difficult. This is arguably even more striking when considering that police 
cooperation is a predominantly operational policy domain, and related issue areas should be primarily driven 
by effectiveness concerns.  
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Against this backdrop, this dissertation sets out to investigate which causal factors drive the national 
preferences of EU Member States on integration in the area of EU police cooperation. While the analytical 
focus lies on the explanatory power of the factors that shape state integration preferences, the qualitative 
nature of this research and its relatively long temporal outlook might additionally shed light on trends and 
patterns behind institutional choice and differentiated integration (DI)3 in this policy domain. Drawing on 
existing theories of European integration, the role of interdependence, politicisation as well as supra- and 
subnational policy entrepreneurship are traced throughout the institutional evolution of EU police 
cooperation, beginning in the 1970s. While there is high confidence that these factors play a substantial part 
in shaping state preferences and thus integration outcomes (cf. Anderson, 1989; Anderson et al., 1995; 
Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Benyon, Turnbull, Willis, Woodward, & Beck, 1993; Bigo, 1996; Busch, 1995; 
Knelangen, 2001; Leuffen, Rittberger, & Schimmelfennig, 2013), few studies have actually unpacked to what 
extent they do so and how precisely they function as causal conditions. This dissertation consequently 
attempts to unpack how and to what extent these conditions affect state preferences within EU police 
cooperation at the example of concrete institutional ‘milestone’ agreements.  
In the following, it first provides an overview of the state of affairs in EU internal security and 
concretely EU police cooperation. Chapter two comprises a brief account of the historical development of this 
policy domain as well as a summary of the relevant empirical and police literature. It sketches the evolution 
of this policy domain along three ‘waves’ of institutional development. Chapter three complements this 
historic and empirical perspective with theoretical explanations for state behaviour. On the basis of key 
theories of European integration, it identifies three potential driving factors of governmental integration 
preferences that serve as this dissertation’s theoretical framework. They are respectively: issue-specific 
interdependencies, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship from above and below. Additionally, the 
theoretical chapter describes the research design and methodology. This dissertation analyses EU police 
cooperation through four comparative case studies. Each one was conducted through a qualitative, process-
tracing approach and supplemented by problem-oriented expert interviews. The case studies encompass 
instances of significant change in the nature of European police cooperation and the degree of EU integration. 
Accordingly, chapter four studies the initiation of the Trevi Group in the 1970s, the first semi-formal 
cooperation venue comprising all Member States. Chapter five resumes a few decades later, tracing the 
process that led to the creation of Europol in the 1990s. The third case study – investigated in chapter six – 
comprises Europol’s institutional development in the early 2000s, particularly its integration into the EU 
framework and subsequent establishment as the EU’s official law enforcement agency. Seventh, the time 
frame between 2010 and today is studied by the last analytical chapter. Amongst other things, it investigates 
the adoption of the Europol Regulation in 2016 – an institutional milestone that changed the organisation’s 
legal framework yet again, barely seven years after the previous change. All four case study chapters, that is, 
chapters four to seven, trace the role of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship, and 
assess their importance as shapers of state preferences in each case. Finally, the concluding chapter 
 
3 the simultaneity of differentiation and integration processes that ultimately result in integration in the long run, cf. 
chapter 3. 
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summarises the findings from its analysis of EU police cooperation between 1976 and 2016. It lists a number 
of broader conclusions that can be drawn from the case studies with respect to drivers of state preferences as 
well as differentiation and integration processes in this policy domain. 
Having sought to explain which factors drive the integration preferences of Member States on EU 
police cooperation and how, this dissertation argues that interdependencies primarily shape governmental 
preferences in favour of integration. While external interconnectedness in common threats acted as largest 
driver to this end in the early stages of European police cooperation, internal institutional linkages have 
become increasingly important since at least the mid-1990s. Both challenge Member States with collective 
action and coordination problems and thus produce functional pressure on governments to cooperate if not 
integrate.  
Whereas interdependencies seem to constitute a necessary causal condition for pro-integration 
preferences, this dissertation finds that politicisation acts as enabler of other driving factors rather than 
having an independent effect. At the same time, its impact is presumably relatively strong in the area of EU 
police cooperation. However, whether high politicisation affects state preferences negatively or positively 
hinges on other factors, most notably the framing by EU and subnational actors. In this context, the single or 
aggregate effect of ‘politicising events’4 frequently presents a window of opportunity for policy 
entrepreneurship. Particularly shocks and crises generate high salience and visibility of related topics and 
issue areas in EU police cooperation. In doing so, they often illustrate existing interdependencies and produce 
significant public pressure and political momentum that tends to push states to act on their preferences. The 
case studies demonstrate that high politicisation more often than not yields pro-integration preferences, 
especially in conjunction with supranational policy entrepreneurship. Politicisation thus appears to present 
a sufficient condition as part of a set of causal factors shaping state preferences in favour of integration. 
By comparison, policy entrepreneurs harness the functional and public pressure from 
interdependencies and politicisation in their efforts to drive state preferences towards integration. Whereas 
subnational officials from domestic law enforcement and security authorities initially rather pushed Member 
States towards differentiation, their advocacy is progressively moving from bureaucratic resistance towards 
the promotion of integration within EU police cooperation today. However, this dissertation found no strong 
evidence for the universal influence of subnational policy entrepreneurship on state preferences. Its impact 
was highly asymmetrical in line with the different security cultures and political systems of Member States. 
By contrast, the research clearly demonstrates the significant and growing role of EU actors as shapers of pro-
integration preferences. They have benefitted from rising internal interdependencies within the EU. Spill-
over effects and a gradually emerging path-dependency increasingly enabled supranational policy 
entrepreneurs to successfully promote integration within European police cooperation. Especially since 2010, 
EU actors have harnessed functional and public pressure to cultivate spill-overs and shift state preferences 
towards centralisation in this field. Whether they will be able to maintain and expand their influence into the 
future and thus advance further integration within EU police cooperation remains to be seen. 
 
4 events that significantly raise the salience of an issue, sparking public and political debate 
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Finally, instances of DI – instead of straightforward integration – seem to be driven by asymmetry 
in the effects of driving factors across governments and integration dimensions. When interdependence, 
politicisation and/or policy entrepreneurship do not generate similar levels of functional or public pressure 
across Member States, their asymmetric effects prevent preference convergence. This may likewise be the 
case when they produce different integration pressure on the three cooperation dimensions: the extent of 
centralisation, territorial extension, and functional scope. Where asymmetrical levels of ‘affectedness’ lead to 
diverging state preferences, yet generate enough pressure on some Member States, the latter favour instances 
of DI. The case studies demonstrate how governments and practitioners deliberately advocate temporary 
differentiation when lack of preference convergence prevents full integration. Rather than presenting an 
explicit preference, flexible integration and avant-garde group approaches seem to constitute temporary, 
operations-driven strategies in EU police cooperation. While Member States often employ avant-garde 
groups as short-run tactics to cope with the relatively stronger effects of driving factors at home, this 
dissertation finds that they rarely prefer differentiation but usually advocate it with the aim of achieving 
some degree of long-term integration through flexible, ‘multi-speed’ models. 
 Since its beginnings in the 1970s, EU police cooperation has evolved significantly. While it has 
become increasingly integrated over the years, especially in the past decade, it continuous to be marked by 
differentiation and variable geometry. However, the study of this policy domain suggests that these trends 
do not necessarily conflict with integration, even present a tool for advancing police cooperation among 
European Member States in the long run. How exactly this will play out in the future ultimately hinges on 
the impact of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship on state preferences concerning 
vertical and horizontal integration as well as the functional scope of EU police cooperation.
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2. EU Internal Security Cooperation: Now and Then 
Since its creation the EU has grown steadily and developed into an unprecedented showcase of 
supranationalism5. Yet, today differentiation rather than straightforward integration appears to have become 
a key concept in many areas of EU governance. Apart from the increasingly complex institutional reality, the 
political situation in Europe requires not only recognising but politically incorporating this phenomenon, 
and seeking ways to reconcile differentiation with further integration instead of making them mutually 
exclusive. This is now perhaps more important than ever before, as recent developments demonstrate such 
as the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum in the United Kingdom (UK), in which the public voted to leave the EU, or 
the widespread surge of right-wing populist parties that generally oppose European ideas. Some argue that 
this does not concern the area of internal security as much, because it remains a competence of national 
Member States rather than EU institutions or supranational regulation (Block, 2011; Friedrichs, 2008; 
Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs, & Kraft-Kasack, 2013; Kirchner & Sperling, 2007). Yet, European cooperation on 
issues of internal security has intensified tremendously over time and has arguably developed more and 
more of an integration dynamic, especially in recent decades. 
Internal security may be understood and conceptualised in many different ways. Definitions vary 
not only within the theoretical literature but also across national systems, depending on the domestic judicial 
or political tradition. Over the years, the area of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has undergone significant 
changes and along with it the different approaches to and understandings of components and issue areas 
falling within the domain of internal security. While broader concepts of internal security exist and may 
undeniably be well-justified in some regards, for the purpose of a focused, comparative study of the drivers 
behind the integration preferences of Member States, this dissertation employs a more narrow, traditional 
definition. With a view to EU internal security cooperation, it limits itself to the aspects of police and policing 
activities that include enforcing laws as well as fighting and preventing crime. EU police cooperation 
especially demonstrates the integration trend in the area of JHA and thus lends itself to an analysis of 
integration drivers. A continuously growing number of common channels and fora, often at EU level, enables 
Member States to work together on a wide range of topics, including international terrorism or serious and 
organised crime. The empirical literature clearly illustrates that increasingly dynamic developments have 
been at work in the field of EU police cooperation since at least the 1990s, and have led to modes of 
cooperation that go beyond mere intergovernmentalism through formally established channels. However, 
even in this smaller area of JHA, different understandings and interpretations persist, deriving from 
diverging national security and police cultures. The chapter on theories of European integration as well as 
the case study chapters elaborate further on the importance of these ‘cultural’ differences and how they 
matter for integration preferences within EU police cooperation. In the following, this chapter provides an 
overview of the current state of affairs regarding integration in the fields of police cooperation and internal 
security more generally. It first gives a brief historic overview, followed by a closer look at the empirical 
literature and existing studies on this policy domain. 
 
5 the shift in power from the national to the supranational level 
Chapter 2 │ EU Internal Security Cooperation: Now and Then 
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2.1 Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?  
Many accounts have been written on the evolution of European policing and EU internal security cooperation 
(Anderson, 1989; Anderson et al., 1995; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Bigo, 1996; Bowling & Sheptycki, 2015; 
Busch, 1995; Fijnaut & Hermans, 1987; Knelangen, 2001; Sheptycki, 2002). Therefore, this dissertation limits 
itself to the provision of a brief historic overview at this point. This section highlights the broader trends, 
milestones and major developments of cooperation in the EU, which it structures along three ‘waves’ (see 
figure 1). Leuffen et al. (2013, p. 222 ff.) summarise in a similar manner how internal security cooperation 
gradually developed across multiple stages from a state of no EU-level policy coordination before the 1970s, 
through a period of enhanced intergovernmental coordination, first outside the framework of the European 
Economic Community (EEC6), then within the EU pillar of JHA in the 1990s, to finally become increasingly 
integrated into EU modes of joint decision-making and the community method in recent decades.  
When evaluating the historic evolution of internal security cooperation in the EU, two observations 
stand out. Although retrospectively European intergovernmental and police cooperation may seem like a 
rather linear, piecemeal process at first, these developments were neither clear-cut nor straightforward at all. 
Instead, and this ties into the second observation, the history of internal security cooperation consists of 
multiple, often reciprocal processes of differentiation and integration that occurred simultaneously and 
interacted on various levels of governance (police, governments, institutions). Or, as former Europol Deputy 
Director Willy Bruggeman (2016, p. 30) reflects: “Looking back, police cooperation emerged as a series of ad-
hoc developments, best characterised as ‘a crowded police space’.” For the sake of clarity and brevity, the 
historic developments of EU internal security cooperation are subsequently divided into three broader 
‘waves’ of cooperation momentum (see figure 1). The first occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with the 
establishment of the first substantial intergovernmental cooperation arrangements among Member States, 
albeit outside the EEC framework. This period is marked by a beginning regularisation of cooperation. A 
second wave of cooperation developments can be observed around the 1990s, including the formal creation 
of a JHA pillar as one cornerstone of the EU legislative framework and the foundation of Europol and its 
predecessor the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU). Finally, this section discusses a third wave in the evolution of 
EU internal security cooperation, which began around the turn of the century with the Amsterdam Treaty 
and an increasing shift of cooperation into the EU framework as well as towards supranational fora and 
modes of decision-making. 
 
The First Wave: Beginnings of European Police Cooperation 
EU police cooperation can be said to date back to the 1970s. A wave of national terrorist acts across a number 
of EU Member States in the late 1960s and early 1970s – mainly Germany, Italy, France and the UK –sparked 
 
6 also referred to interchangeably as European Community (EC) 
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various intergovernmental meetings on the topic (Anderson et al., 1995, pp. 170–171; Bunyan, 1993; 
Knelangen, 2001, p. 97). The rather nationally oriented terrorism of that time differs significantly from the 
more recent international ‘fourth wave’ terrorism that it is often religiously motivated and confronts EU 
Member States with new threats such as radicalisation and ‘homegrown terrorism’ respectively (Rapoport, 
2013; cf. Bossong, 2013; Bures, 2011, pp. 59–84; Cronin, 2003; Rapoport, 2001). Yet, radical separatist groups 
as well as left- and right-wing extremists like the French La Gauche Prolétarienne, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in the UK or the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany provided an until then unprecedented 
momentum for European intergovernmental cooperation on terrorism (Bell, 2013; Crelinsten & Schmid, 1993; 
Hürter, 2015b; Von Hippel, 2005). 
Accordingly, a multitude of different initiatives were established throughout the 1970s (see figure 2 
for an exemplary albeit not exhaustive overview), ranging from the Club de Berne and the Pompidou Group 
to the Vienna Club and – arguably the most significant for EU police cooperation – the Trevi Group. When 
TREVI was created in 1976, following the initiative of British Prime Minister James Callaghan at the Rome 
European Council meeting in December 1975 (European Council Summary, 1975; Bunyan, 1993, p. 1; 
Knelangen, 2001, p. 90), it was deliberately kept outside the EEC framework, largely due to sovereignty 
concerns of some Member States, first and foremost the UK (Bunyan, 1993, pp. 4–5; Knelangen, 2001, pp. 90–
91). Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Trevi Group laid the foundation for enhanced European police 
cooperation and thereby EU integration in the policy domain of internal security, since it presented a path-
setting European functional response to terrorism where the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol) had been unwilling or unable to react (Ahnfelt & From, 1993, p. 192; Busch, 1988; Fijnaut & 
Hermans, 1987; Giering, 1997, p. 117; Hebenton & Thomas, 1995, p. 70 ff.).  While TREVI was initially merely 
one of many cooperation arrangements, its semi-institutional character and degree of formalisation make it 
a historic milestone of European internal security and police cooperation – the first attempt at regularised 
cooperation between macro-levels of security governance in addition to informal cooperation between micro-
levels (Fijnaut, 1987, p. 40, 1992b, p. 103; Knelangen, 2001, p. 98). 
For almost two decades EEC Member States frequently met and cooperated on different levels 
(ministers, senior officials, police officers) in the framework of the Trevi Group, particularly in the working 
groups (WGs) Trevi 1 on terrorism and Trevi 2 on police technical matters and police training (Benyon et al., 
1993, p. 154; Bunyan, 1993, pp. 2–3; Fijnaut, 2016). Already during this period a gradual expansion in 
functional scope can be observed from terrorism to drug trafficking, as the so-called TREVI Ministers  (JHA 
ministers) in 1985  agreed to create a third WG under the umbrella of TREVI, tasked with transnational crime 
(Aden, 1998, pp. 77–80; Fijnaut, 2016, p. 51; cf. Bigo, 1996, p. 266 ff.). 
 
The Second Wave: Associating Police Cooperation with the EU 
The second ‘wave’ of security and police cooperation in Europe subsequently emerged in the 1990s, ushered 
in by the Maastricht Treaty. Signed in 1992, Title VI of the Treaty, also known as Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), established JHA, including police cooperation, as one of the central pillars of the EU (Kaunert, 2011; 
Kaunert, Leonard, & Occhipinti, 2015; Monar & Morgan, 1994).  Although  this Third  Pillar  remained  on  an  
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intergovernmental basis, the decision of European policymakers to move JHA cooperation into the EU’s legal 
and single institutional framework presents a remarkable change compared to the cooperation of the 1970s 
and 1980s. This development marks the beginning shift of EU police cooperation away from TREVI as a single 
intergovernmental cooperation platform, and towards a first formalisation of working and coordination 
arrangements at European level (Peek, 1994). Initially, EU bodies and supranational actors had little or no 
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say in related matters and JHA policies, especially in the early 1990s (Kaunert et al., 2015). The European 
Commission for instance only had a right of initiative in areas defined by Article K.1 of the TEU. Overall, EU 
actors remained excluded from decision- and policymaking in this field, which stayed a Member States’ 
competence (Art. K.1 & K.3, Maastricht Treaty, 1992; Monar & Morgan, 1994; Müller-Graff, 1994, p. 33). Yet, 
the Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for the further institutional developments and cooperation 
structures that exist today in European internal security governance (Siegele, 1992). Article K.1 for example 
stipulates the creation of Europol by listing as an area of ‘common interest’ for all twelve EU Member States:  
“police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects 
of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for 
exchanging information within a European Police Office.” (para. 9) 
Accordingly, an additional Ad-Hoc WG on Europol (AHWGE) was founded and mandated with its 
realisation as part of TREVI. The first step in the process subsequently was the inception of the EDU, a 
Europol forerunner which was operational by January 1994 and marked the institutional beginnings of the 
second wave of centralisation of police  cooperation in the EU (European Commission, 1993, p. 9; Europol, 
2016, pp. 14 & 27; Joint Action of 10 March, 1995; Ministerial Agreement, 2 June, 1993). The AHWGE was 
however also responsible for preparing and drafting the Europol Convention that formally established 
Europol. It was signed by all twelve Member States on 26 July 1995 and debatably presented the provisional 
culmination of the second-wave formalisation and institutionalisation process that had been initiated at the 
end of the 1980s (Europol Convention, 1995). As stipulated by Art. 43(5) of the Europol Convention, the EDU 
consequently seized its activities and its resources were integrated into the new institution. Europol under 
the Convention was still an inherently intergovernmental body with a rather vague and limited mandate that 
was still to be implemented and further developed by the Member States, most notably through their 
representatives in the Management Board of Europol (Europol, 2016a, pp. 32–35). 
In the context of the historic evolution of EU police cooperation, two other significant events must 
be mentioned in addition to the entry into force of the Europol Convention in the late 1990s: the Amsterdam 
and Lisbon Treaties. When the Amsterdam Treaty was signed by the European Council on 2 October 1997, it 
effectively amended the TEU, most notably through envisaging the establishment of an EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), under which polices of justice and home affairs would fall (Art. 1(5) & (11), Treaty 
of Amsterdam, 1997). The Amsterdam Treaty thus further strengthened the role of the EU in the transnational 
governance of internal security (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007). A significant number of policy areas were 
transferred from the intergovernmental third to the supranational first ‘Community pillar’ (cf. Art. 61-64). 
The focus of Title VI – previously cooperation in the area of JHA – was dramatically narrowed and renamed 
to Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) (Art. 1(11), Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; cf. 
Lavenex, 2010a; Schütze, 2015, pp. 28–29). This change matters because it presents a substantial move away 
from purely intergovernmental to more joint modes of decision-making in the wider area of EU internal 
security (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 222 ff.). Yet, it should take another ten years and another treaty before Member 
States would make a major institutional choice that advanced EU police cooperation into its third and most 
recent wave of developments.  
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The Third Wave: Moving Police Cooperation into the EU Framework 
The Lisbon Treaty presented a ‘game changer’ for EU police cooperation. It dissolved the former pillar 
structure and merged the supranational first with the intergovernmental second and third pillars under the 
consolidated single framework of the EU (Lisbon  Treaty,  2007). This opened the floodgates to a rising trend 
towards supranationalisation, for example through the application of community decision-making methods 
to internal security governance such as the ordinary legislative procedure rather than unanimity 
(Herschinger et al., 2013, p. 210 ff.; Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 222 ff.). Lavenex (2010) additionally highlights the 
according emergence and persistence of a multitude of ‘semi-autonomous’ agencies and bodies in the AFSJ, 
including in the area of police cooperation (cf. Aden, 2015). With regard to the EU itself, it obtained legal 
personality under the Lisbon Treaty, a significant gain in power for a ‘construct in between state and 
international organisation’ (Leuffen et al., 2013, pp. 8–9). 
Of course, this process was not a linear one and accompanied by instances of differentiation and 
flexible integration. For example, on 27 May 2005 merely seven of the 25 Member States at the time signed an 
intergovernmental convention on intensifying cooperation on terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration. When the so-called Prüm Treaty was signed that year by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain, it already contained as concrete target the expansion of the 
provisions to all EU Member States through the transfer of the agreement into the EU framework within three 
years (Art. 1(4), Prüm Treaty, 2005). While various Member States had already joined the Treaty in the 
following years, in 2008 – roughly twelve months after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty – a number of 
provisions were indeed formally integrated into the structure of PJCCM through the ‘Prüm Decision’ 
(Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, 2008; cf. Balzacq, Bigo, Carrera, & Guild, 2006; Niemeier & Zerbst, 2007; 
Schober, 2017). This development is relevant for the overall course of EU internal security cooperation, 
because it marks a role model case of DI, a concept that has become ever more important since the Lisbon 
Treaty and arguably constitutes a core element of the third wave of EU internal security and police 
cooperation (Tekin, 2015).  
Two more ‘milestone’ decisions must be mentioned here, as they were taken in the aftermath of 
Lisbon and form part of this third wave. They are the Europol Council Decision (ECD) and the Europol 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/794) respectively. The ECD was adopted by the Council in 2009 and 
replaced the intergovernmental Convention that had governed Europol before. It established the institution 
as the EU’s official law enforcement agency, making it subject to the Union’s legal framework and budget 
(Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, 2009; cf. Europol, 2016a, pp. 36–39). Not only did this decision formally 
integrate Europol into the supranational institutional structure of the EU, it further expanded the role for EU 
actors in relation to police cooperation. The Commission, for example, gained a regular seat on the otherwise 
intergovernmental Management Board of the organisation (Art. 31(1), Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, 
2009). Likewise, the ECD (Art. 48) granted the European Parliament the power to request hearings with the 
Presidency of the Council, the Chairperson of the Management Board and the Europol Director on matters 
in relation to Europol.  
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Whereas other developments have unfolded as well since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the ECD, this dissertation limits itself to finally mentioning the Europol Regulation adopted on 11 May 
2016. Compared to the changes from the Europol Convention to the ECD, this regulation does not represent 
as much of a substantial (institutional) transformation. Nonetheless, the choice of a regulation – a legal 
instrument that is binding throughout all Member States – presents a remarkable step-up. It can be argued to 
continue the institutionalisation process of European police cooperation, illustrated for example by the shift 
in voting rules of the Europol Management Board from two-thirds majority voting to the regularisation of 
majority voting (Art. 15(1), Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016). Other than that, the Europol Regulation 
embodies a macro-level reaction to new and operational security requirements, perceived as ‘European,’ 
which is reflected in many of its provisions. For example, under the Regulation Europol gains flexibility to 
act in response to changing circumstances. Concretely, this means that the European Commission may 
authorise measures by taking ‘adequacy decisions’ in response to arising needs as pointed out by the Council 
and the Europol Management Board (Art. 15(1), Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016). While these provisions 
imply a greater role for the Commission, they of course also leave considerable room for further institutional 
development of the organisation by Member States and in relation to operational requirements. In line with 
the three waves of EU police cooperation, the analytical chapters of this dissertation elaborate further on these 
institutional milestones in its assessment of integration preferences in this policy domain. Before turning to a 
closer study, however, the remainder of this chapter examines the empirical state of affairs to date. 
 
 
2.2 An Empirical Overview of the State of Affairs 
With the narrow understanding of internal security as police activities in mind, a few observations may be 
highlighted with regard to the empirical literature on EU JHA. The vast body of highly specialised empirical 
accounts on this topic ranges across different issues, policy areas, theoretical models and numerous actors, 
structures and Member States. Yet, the literature overwhelmingly demonstrates that the nature of internal 
security governance is changing in the EU. Concretely, it produces five main observations. First, integration 
in this domain of ‘core state powers’7 creates a growing tension between EU cooperation and national 
sovereignty. Second, no consensus exists regarding in which direction EU governance is evolving: towards 
intergovernmentalism or supranationalism, differentiation or integration. Third, the policy domain of EU 
JHA is increasingly open to the influence and scrutiny of private actors and the public sphere. Fourth, hard 
and soft modes of governance8 are evolving in parallel and continue to co-exist in an increasingly crowded 
policy space where states are more and more sidelined by sub- and supranational actors. Fifth, integration 
preferences are asymmetrical and variable; they differ across states, issues and time. In line with these 
findings, the literature additionally demonstrates that politicisation, interdependence as well as sub- and 
supranational actors matter as driving forces in the area of EU internal security and police cooperation. 
 
7 “core functions of sovereign government” (cf. Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014, p. 1) 
8 ‘Hard’ governance is based on enforceable, often rigid rules and legal regulation, as opposed to ‘soft’ governance through 
non-binding, informal and flexible arrangements (cf. Maggetti, 2015; Trubek, Cottrell, & Nance, 2005). 
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Creating Tension? EU Security Cooperation and National Sovereignty 
Many scholars explore the inherent tension between integrating policing and internal security policies in the 
EU context on the one hand, and state sovereignty and the monopoly on the use of force (Andreas & 
Nadelmann, 2006; Bigo, 1996; Busch, 1999; Deflem, 2002; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2017; Herschinger et al., 
2013; Jachtenfuchs, Friedrichs, Herschinger, & Kraft-Kasack, 2008; Rittberger, Leuffen, & Schimmelfennig, 
2014; Sheptycki, 2002). Like many others, Johnston and Shearing (2003) observe that security has for a long 
time been a core power and responsibility of the state but is recently more and more becoming an area of 
pluralistic governance, thereby challenging traditional conceptions of the state as such. For example, policing 
practice has been transformed by the option to privatise security governance and the technological capacity 
for large-scale and cross-border monitoring, both of which go against entrenched ideas of state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (Sheptycki, 2002). Integration in this domain of core state powers thus creates a 
growing tension between EU cooperation and national sovereignty. 
 
Lack of Consensus: Towards Intergovernmentalism or Supranationalism? 
Although there is widespread agreement in the literature that internal security governance is changing in 
practice, no agreement exists with regard to what this means for the nature of EU governance more generally 
and the wider relationship between EU actors and the Member States. On the one hand, many studies argue 
that national interests and governments still primarily drive (and correct) European and transnational 
cooperation developments as well as the process of internationalisation of EU internal security (Friedrichs, 
2008; Herschinger & Jachtenfuchs, 2012; Herschinger et al., 2013; Kaunert, Léonard, & Pawlak, 2012; Van 
Buuren, 2012). Others argue that EU police cooperation is moving towards supranationalism with a 
progressively “expanded operational role and greater autonomy” for EU actors like Europol (Occhipinti 
(2015, p. 239; cf. Busuioc, Curtin, & Groenleer, 2011; Occhipinti, 2003). It remains unclear in which direction 
EU governance is evolving in this policy domain: towards intergovernmentalism or supranationalism, 
differentiation or integration. 
 
A Growing and Ambivalent Role for the Public Sphere 
The literature discusses the evolving role of the public sphere in the governance and scrutiny of JHA policies. 
Some studies assess the role of politicisation9 in European integration dynamics more generally (Leuffen, 
Rittberger, & Schimmelfennig, 2015; Zürn & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2013). Others investigate the construction of 
security, and the relationship between discourse, securitisation and identity in particular policy areas (Baker-
Beall, 2016; Balzacq & Léonard, 2013; de Graaf, 2010a, 2015; Lange, 1999; Selchow, 2016), for example the 
politicisation of drugs and terrorism (Friedrichs, 2008; Herschinger et al., 2013). Nonetheless, few accounts 
prioritise or primarily target more general, theoretical conclusions about the implications of this trend for 
 
9 understood here as social contestation and deliberation processes 
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European integration. Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013, 2015) argue that the interplay of 
politicisation, interdependence between countries and state preference compatibility determines the degree 
of differentiation or integration in a policy field. The empirical literature confirms this statement, and 
simultaneously questions the theoretical relevance of politicisation as a driver or obstacle. Counterterrorism 
is for instance regarded as an area of limited supranationalism and few formal institutions. It is frequently 
highly politicised and relies on the distinct national cultures of security and intelligence specialists (Bures, 
2011, 2012; Fägersten, 2010; Occhipinti, 2015). All of these factors appear to pose obstacles to integration. Yet, 
police cooperation on this issue has been pushed strongly towards a more integrated approach in recent 
years, including the creation of a specialised common counterterrorism database and institutions such as the 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). In a similar manner, Carrapiço and Trauner (2013, p. 357) show 
how the “different legal systems and policing traditions” of Member States have impeded EU police 
cooperation on organised crime but simultaneously enabled Europol to establish itself as ‘point of reference’ 
and successfully ‘Europeanize’ national policies. The policy domain of EU JHA is perhaps increasingly and 
visibly open to the influence of politicisation and scrutiny of private actors and the public sphere.  
 
Parallel Trends of Formal and Informal Modes of Governance and Cooperation 
The empirical literature extensively documents the parallel evolution and existence of hard and soft modes 
of governance in EU JHA. Zooming in on the progressively crowded policy space, many accounts particularly 
observe the growing, often practical involvement and relevance of sub- and supranational actors in areas and 
levels of cooperation previously reserved for states. However, most studies remain relatively practice-
oriented and evaluate policing methods and single cases of cross-border cooperation rather than the nature 
of European police cooperation and the politics thereof (cf. Frevel & Rogers, 2016; Jones & van Steden, 2013).  
The literature clearly demonstrates the influence of subnational levels on internal security 
cooperation. It underlines how the latter may shape collective action on their own or jointly through 
horizontal transgovernmental cooperation with equivalent levels. Bigo (1996) and Busch (1995, 1999) for 
example show this with regard to police networks, while others such as Anderson (1989) or Nadelmann 
(1993) look more closely at the political impact of international police cooperation and police networks in 
Western Europe (cf. Anderson et al., 1995). Contrary to those who argue that national governments are the 
primary drivers of European integration in the area of internal security and policing, these scholars assert 
that executive stakeholders such as security professionals and police officials also shape this process. 
Although empirics show varying degrees of influence, there is agreement that ‘grassroot 
transgovernmentalism’ acts as intervening variable and plays a role in the formation of state preferences. In 
other words, these accounts look at international policing in the light of organisational self-interest and 
considerations of bureaucratic autonomy and survival vis-à-vis the state (Deflem, 2002; Elvins, 2003; Lavenex 
& Wagner, 2007; Sheptycki, 2002). A particular focus in this context lies on the role of security experts in 
agenda-setting and how they complement or drive high-level agenda-setting from ‘above’ (see for example 
Princen & Rhinard, 2006, on EU anti-bioterrorism policy).  
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A large part of the empirical literature especially looks at the network character of this 
transgovernmental cooperation in the area of JHA and suggests that a sharp distinction between hard and 
soft modes of governance may not be practical (Cross, 2011; Den Boer, 2014; Den Boer, Hillebrand, & Nölke, 
2008).10 In fact, these accounts observe a common trend towards a “diffusion of responsibilities, either inside 
or outside government, through the generalization of network structures” (Dupont, 2004, p. 87). In addition 
to the influence of transgovernmental networks (TGNs) on state preferences and agenda-setting in 
international security cooperation, the empirical literature likewise deals with their influence on each other 
and the implementation of agreed collective action. Fägersten (2010, 2016), for instance, concludes that very 
different bureaucratic cultures and interests often inhibit cooperation in intelligence-sharing. Likewise, for 
the realm of counterterrorism, Bures (2012) notes that a lack of trust, diverging bureaucratic channels and 
varying modes of working may cause counter-productive duplication and crowding in the field. However, 
relatively little work has been done on the concrete impact of these differentiated networks on security 
governance or policy outcomes at EU level. There are as well clear gaps with regard to the drivers or effects 
of the changing composition and conditions of security networks (e.g. designed versus spontaneous 
networks). Many studies focus either on supranationalisation and institutionalisation processes or horizontal, 
informal intergovernmental arrangements to explain the emergence of practical problem-solving and day-to-
day cooperation within the EU AFSJ. A multitude of accounts demonstrates that it is not practical to 
distinguish sharply between formal and informal cooperation, as the lines between both are increasingly 
blurred and both progressively occur within ‘formal’ institutions such as Europol (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013; 
Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Wolff & Mounier, 2012). Kahler (2009, p. 17) for example lists three modes of 
networked governance that may evolve in parallel and interact with one another:  
• “Governance through networks that emerge from state membership in formal 
intergovernmental organisations (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2009); 
• Governance by transgovernmental networks, cross-border networks of government 
agencies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2009); 
• Governance that includes a role for private or NGO networks in particular issue areas 
(Cowhey & Mueller, 2009).” 
All three types can be found in many structures of EU internal security governance. For example, Europol 
itself has emerged as a consequence of state membership in the EC/EU, and numerous networks have since 
emerged from state membership in Europol. In addition, Europol embodies operational police networks and 
transgovernmental cooperation between interior ministries, taking place in fora like the Europol 
Management Board. Finally, there is a role for private and other non-state actors at Europol. The number of 
crime-fighting alliances with academia, think tanks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
corporations exemplify this, for example in the area of cyber and financial crime including internet and 
communications providers, financial institutes and banks. 
Next to the emergence of informal, networked and horizontal forms of governance alongside the 
influence of subnational actors, the empirical literature clearly captures the growing relevance of formal 
 
10 building on Keohane and Nye (1974), and Slaughter (2004), amongst others 
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institutions and supranational actors in EU JHA. Similar to the asymmetrical diffusion and power of informal 
modes of governance across areas of internal security, the literature maps issue-specific variation in the 
relative strength of (different) institutions in this emerging European policy domain. Block (2011) for instance 
claims that Council instruments had little or no effect on national policing practices, and argues that the 
impact of institutions is directly related to whether instruments are developed on the basis of police 
rationality and input. By contrast, Friedrichs (2008) finds that institutions related to cooperation on terrorism 
are comparatively stronger than in the domain of drugs. Others have assessed the areas of money laundering 
and extradition (Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs, & Kraft-Kasack, 2011), or have evaluated the importance of 
institutions in the AFSJ overall (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013; Kaunert, 2011; Lavenex, 2010b). However, few 
accounts go beyond a chosen issue area and seek to develop a wider theoretical framework that can generate 
broader explanations for the growing role of supranational actors.11  
At the same time, functionalist explanations (implicit and explicit) of cooperation – and variation in 
its degree of institutionalisation – are quite frequent. Among the most prominent ones are of course common 
threats and spill-over effects across policy areas (Friedrichs, 2008; Monar, 2011). Others further underline the 
functional utility of common institutions that help establish certainty about expectations, provide information 
about other states’ behaviour (Herschinger & Jachtenfuchs, 2012; Knelangen, 2001, 2006), can address 
efficiency concerns and solve collective action problems (Herschinger et al., 2011; Mitsilegas, Monar, & Rees, 
2003). Nonetheless, “institutional issues have been relatively neglected overall,” especially the recently 
emerging role of EU agencies in the area of JHA (Kaunert, Léonard, & Occhipinti, 2013, p. 274). More research 
is particularly needed on interest shapers and ‘institutional dynamics’ driving the emergence and further 
development of supranational actorness in internal security (ibid.). This includes a closer look at the 
relationship between formal and less hierarchical institutions as well as multi-level governance structures, 
for which few studies exist.12 At the same time, the empirical literature clearly demonstrates that hard and 
soft modes of governance are evolving in parallel in EU police cooperation, and continue to co-exist in an 
increasingly crowded policy space where states are more and more sidelined by sub- and supranational 
actors. 
 
Asymmetrical Integration Preferences 
Finally, the literature shows that integration preferences on JHA are asymmetrical and variable; they differ 
across states, issues and time in line with diverging degrees of cross-country interdependence. 
Interdependence in this context may be understood as the interconnectedness in the causes and effects of 
security threats and thereby in the governance of internal security. A large body of empirical research 
scrutinises government responses to similar problems across different countries, and shows that 
interdependence varies and is issue-specific (Dahlke, 2011; Darley, 2010; de Graaf, 2010b; Leruth, 2014; Virta, 
 
11 see for example Kirchner and Sperling (2007) with their liberal intergovernmentalist study on the evolution of EU 
institutions despite the persistence of strong state prerogatives in the area of security. 
12 see for instance Müller (2015), who argues that TGNs increase in strength and importance for EU security cooperation, 
because they respond to and best govern the transnational network character of serious organised crime. 
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2013; cf. European Police College, n.d.). For the areas of terrorism and drugs, Friedrichs (2008) observes 
significant variation in both the substantive scope of cooperation and the degree of institutionalisation across 
countries and cooperation phases (cf. Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs, & Kraft-Kasack, 2011). In the area of 
cybercrime, cross-country interdependence is quite high because this issue lacks a clear territorial basis and 
thus possesses the potential to equally affect all states (Carrapiço & Farrand, 2018; Clemente, 2013; Schjolberg, 
2014; van der Meulen, A Jo, & Soesanto, 2015). Additionally, cybercrime is comparatively less politicised, 
which would suggest an easy path towards integration. Yet, there is a comparative lack of EU cooperation 
arrangements in this policy area, and supranationalisation is evolving relatively slowly with the creation of 
the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) only as recently as 2013. Statistics confirm that asymmetry clearly 
matters when it comes to internal security. Some states simply seem to be less affected by terrorism (Europol, 
2016b, pp. 10–21), cybercrime (Europol, 2016d, p. 5) or trafficking in human beings (Europol, 2013a, p. 24). 
Considering the asymmetric effects of security threats, it hardly comes as a surprise that cooperation 
preferences vary across Member States and policy areas. Although the empirical literature provides vast 
evidence for the importance of issue-specific interdependence, it rarely investigates how asymmetrical 
interdependencies shape state preferences on European integration more generally. While some studies 
consider the role of common threats, few accounts look at the impact of institutional links: when European 
integration, institutions and cooperation arrangements themselves alter interdependence relationships and 
structural interconnectedness among Member States (Cross, 2011; Dalferth, 2008; Den Boer & Wiegand, 2015). 
The literature nonetheless illustrates the relevance of interdependencies, and that integration preferences are 
asymmetrical and variable across states, issues and time. 
 
What Studies Can and Still Cannot Tell Us 
In sum, the empirical literature clearly demonstrates that EU internal security governance and police 
cooperation are changing in practice. This becomes manifest in altered governance structures and 
arrangements with implications for national sovereignty. It can be seen in the on-going, parallel 
institutionalisation and informalisation of cooperation, and it is reflected in the divergence of preferences 
across states, issues and time. Yet, underlying assumptions about integration dynamics are rarely made 
explicit or are often not contextualised and critically assessed against the backdrop of the theoretical literature 
of European studies. Many accounts still seem to regard integration as the ultimate goal of security 
cooperation or assume that a ‘supranationalisation’ of internal security may be against the will of EU Member 
States. Accordingly, Occhipinti (2015, p. 258) asserts that states “may be trying to steer [cooperation] in an 
intergovernmental direction, but [that] they are doing so against a current that is gradually moving them in 
a supranational direction anyhow.” More research is needed to analyse whether this really is the case or states 
are perhaps indeed still in the driver’s seat and are deliberately opting for degrees of supranationalisation 
and networked politics. This could potentially explain increasingly more flexible modes of governance and 
integration in this area as well as newly emerging cooperation formats. Empirical accounts already indicate 
that states might in some instances consciously design and utilise security networks with the intention of 
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creating multi-level governance in order to manage complex interdependencies (Awesti, 2007; Hooghe & 
Marks, 2000, 2001; Peters & Pierre, 2004).  
What is more, next to highly specialised studies that prioritise concrete practical problems, policies 
and operations, the empirical literature comprises a large number of descriptive accounts on the historic and 
de jure evolution of security cooperation. These predominantly focus on particular structures or arrangements 
of cooperation rather than ‘the bigger picture’ of international police cooperation of European integration in 
the AFSJ. For example, a large number of studies assess the evolution of Europol (e.g. Bures, 2013; Busuioc et 
al., 2011; De Moor, 2012; Occhipinti, 2015), and the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (Mackenzie, Bures, 
Kaunert, & Léonard, 2013). Although some police research indeed poses questions about integration and 
demonstrates the increasing influence over time of EU security strategies on Member States (Schober, 2017), 
most accounts often take a legal Europeanisation perspective of sub-constitutionalism13 (cf. Den Boer & 
Wiegand, 2015). The predominant focus of much of the empirical literature thus lies on functional mapping 
of different governing arrangements (Dupont, 2006) or tracing the historic evolution of cooperation 
arrangements (Crelinsten & Schmid, 1993; O’Neill, 2011) rather than making inferences about European 
integration (cf. Bigo, Bonelli, Chi, & Olsson, 2007; Den Boer, 2015; Mitsilegas et al., 2003). 
While descriptive and technical practice-oriented studies undeniably contribute to operationalising 
EU internal security governance and may benefit practitioners, they are of limited value for generalisable 
analyses across issue areas and Member States as well as in the wider context of theory-building in the field 
of European studies. Historic-evolutionary accounts rarely tend to question how states strategically interact 
on police cooperation in international organisations, or how networked politics emerge and evolve in the 
area of EU internal security. In this vein, Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl (2014) assert that networked security 
governance leads to effective and legitimate problem-solving, similar to many ‘police enthusiastic’ accounts14. 
Few studies actually challenge this optimism about police cooperation (Friesendorf, 2007; Friesendorf & 
Daase, 2010 on the pathologies and unintended consequences of security governance).  
What becomes clear from the empirical literature is that EU internal security governance and police 
cooperation are evolving increasingly, and that both have become much more crowded policy spaces over 
recent years, leaving more and more room for non-traditional actors and even public deliberation and 
contestation. At the same time, much uncertainty and disagreement remain regarding not only the extent and 
ways in which this process is transforming the nature of security governance and traditionally 
intergovernmental cooperation but also concerning the driving factors behind this transformation. While 
many factors are scrutinised in the literature, the most prominently discussed influences on the evolution of 
JHA seem to be cross-national interdependence, the politicisation of previously less visible issue areas and 
the role of sub- and supranational actors. This dissertation attempts to make a contribution in this respect by 
studying the relevance of these factors at the example of the evolution of EU police cooperation from a 
European integration perspective. Its three waves of institutional development – beginning as rather 
 
13 the existence of an overarching ‘superstate’ with a ‘superconstitution, and simultaneously multiple ‘substates’ with their 
own ‘subconstitutions’ (e.g. federal models) 
14 see Block (2008) on the effectiveness of European police cooperation in day-to-day practice, and Brady (2008) on the 
European criminal intelligence model as a non-state response to organised crime. 
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informal, network-based cooperation of an inherently intergovernmental nature, which gradually shifted 
towards the EU framework and is today marked by increasing centralisation and supranationalisation – can 
help shed light on what drives the formation of state preferences in the dynamic area of JHA. The next chapter 
complements this empiricism-informed outlook with a theoretical perspective on EU police cooperation, and 
provides an overview of its research design and methodological framework.
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3. Putting Theory into Perspective: State Preferences, 
Institutional Choice and the EU as a System of 
Differentiated Integration 
Depending on state preferences and the policy area in question, institutional choice and policy outcomes can 
vary considerably. They range from fully supranational solutions, partial delegation of power and authority 
to the creation of new bodies, the professionalisation of intergovernmental or even informal cooperation and 
the strengthening of soft and networked modes of governance outside or paralleling the EU framework. 
Leuffen et al. (2013) describe the EU as a system of DI in which centralisation and territorial expansion vary 
across policies. This model is known by many other names: a Europe at multiple speeds, variable geometry, 
or à la carte Europe. Conceptualising the EU in such a way acknowledges that it has simultaneously become 
more integrated and more differentiated in the course of its history. Accordingly many definitions exist for 
the concept. Dyson and Sepos (2010, p. 4), for instance, define DI as “the process whereby European States, 
or sub-units, opt to move at different speeds and/or towards different objectives with regard to common 
policies, by adopting different formal and informal arrangements, whether inside or outside the EU treaty 
framework, and by assuming different rights and obligations.” This definition arguably very well suits the 
area of EU internal security and police cooperation with its many different formal and informal structures 
for cooperation.
Generally, DI understands the EU as a construct between state and international organisation (IO) 
that varies across policies. Hence, one could draw a parallel here to the new institutionalist perspective of the 
EU as “less than a federation, more than a regime” (Wallace, 1983). DI research asks: which policies are taken 
up by the European enterprise and when? Why does differentiation increase over time? How can we explain 
the temporal dynamics of European integration more generally? Leuffen et al. (2013) seek to answer these 
questions by applying a three-dimensional framework based on the premise that theories of European 
integration must explain both growth and differentiation in vertical, functional and horizontal integration 
(see figure 3). These three dimensions of EU polity types – against which integration outcomes may be 
measured – are respectively: 
1. The level of centralisation, also known as vertical integration or ‘deepening.’ This dimension 
assumes that, depending on the policy area, the EU construct varies between rather centralised, 
hierarchical authority (resembling states) and a more anarchical, decentralised authority 
(resembling IOs). 
 
2. The functional scope of the EU – again varying across policies – can either be minimal 
(authority over a single issue), maximal (authority over an entire range of policies), or anything 
in between.  
 
3. The EU’s territorial extension is variously known as horizontal integration or ‘widening.’ This 
dimension distinguishes between minimum territorial extension (a single political territory) 
and maximum territorial extension (universal membership covering the entire world). 
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Concerning vertical integration, state preferences and respective institutional outcomes may range from 
assigning the EU wide-reaching competence or even executive powers to limiting EU actors to a narrow, very 
limited mandate, a mere support role or none at all. With regard to the functional scope of EU cooperation, 
governments may favour arrangements that exclusively focus on single topics or a fixed number of issue 
areas or may promote a wider scope that allows the inclusion of all relevant policy questions in a given field. 
Finally, Leuffen et al. (2013, pp. 15–18) distinguish between four types of horizontal differentiation that 
Member States may advocate: a) no differentiation, b) external differentiation (when rules apply uniformly 
to EU Member States but vary for outside participants), c) internal differentiation (variation in rule-
application among EU Member States through opt-outs etc.) d) internal and external differentiation. 
 Of course there are other DI models than the one put forward by Leuffen et al. (2013) – over 30 in 
fact15 (Koenig, 2015). However, most models agree on common factors, including the categorical distinction 
between time, space and matter (cf. Stubb, 1996). In this context, “[t]he distribution of preferences, bargaining 
power, formal voting rules, and the externalities of differentiation have been established as core ingredients 
to a theory of differentiated integration” (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012, p. 14). Differences between 
models arise mostly from the degree to which studies integrate normative and institutional factors into their 
theoretical framework.  
 This dissertation chooses the DI approach developed by Leuffen et al. (2013), because their three-
dimensional model is especially suitable to evaluate preference formation and integration outcomes in EU 
police cooperation. First, it encompasses core assumptions of rationalism and is highly compatible with state-
centric theories of European integration, which debatably hold in the area of JHA where decision-making is 
still predominantly intergovernmental. Second, DI theory accounts for multicausal explanations beyond 
intergovernmentalist tenets and is open to theory-synthesis, as it studies the EU as a political system of its 
own rather than merely a construct built around national Member States (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 10). And it 
brings a third element into the equation: EU cooperation as a conglomerate of different, often simultaneous 
and overlapping processes of integration and differentiation rather than a linear development. While many 
theories still regard integration as the end goal, a DI approach allows for variation because it sees the EU as 
a system of differentiated integration in which centralisation, functional scope and territorial expansion vary 
across policies. Thus, a DI perspective perhaps best captures the political reality of the area of EU internal 
security and police cooperation. Its theoretical lens allows for a more in-depth qualitative assessment of 
European integration than single-theory based frameworks, because it is open to potential theory synthesis. 
Additionally, DI theory incorporates flexible modes of governance and integration that seem particularly 
prevalent in the area of JHA. In fact, it departs from the assumption that “[d]ifferentiation is here to stay on 
the condition that exogenous and endogenous interdependence continue to grow” (Leuffen et al., 2015, p. 
17). DI thus conceptualises integration and differentiation outcomes both historically and politically: as 
 
15 Among the most well-known ones are for instance: "Two- or Multiple-speed Europe” (Grabitz, 1984), "Avantgarde 
Europe" (Club von Florenz, 1996) or “Core Europe” (W Schäuble & Lamers, 1994), "Flexible Integration" (Giavazzi et al., 
1995; Heuser, 1997), and “Europe à la carte” (Dahrendorf, 1979). 
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governance tools for managing heterogeneity and institutional deadlock and to cope with uncertainty and 
risk (cf. Dyson & Sepos, 2010).   
 
 
Figure 3. The EU as a Construct between State and International Organisation. 
 
THREE-DIMENSIONS OF EU POLITY TYPES 
(VARIATION ACROSS POLICIES) 
 
1. level of centralisation (vertical integration: ‘deepening’) 
centralised, hierarchical      anarchical, decentralised 
authority (state-like)  authority (IOs) 
 
2. functional scope  
authority over a single issue     authority over an entire range 
(minimum scope) of policies (maximum scope) 
 
3. territorial extension (horizontal integration: ‘widening’) 
single political territory      entire world/ universal 
(minimum extension) membership (maximum extension) 
 
Source:   Author, based on Leuffen, Rittberger & Schimmelfennig (2013). 
 
This dissertation employs the three-dimensional DI approach to situate state preferences across the levels of 
centralisation, functional scope and territorial extension respectively – and thereby enabling wider inferences 
regarding institutional choice and integration outcomes. The multicausal model with its openness to theory 
synthesis practically lends itself to an analysis and comparison of the influence of different explanatory 
factors deriving from key theories of European integration. At the example of liberal intergovernmentalism 
(LI), supranationalism and social constructivism, Leuffen et al. (2013, p. 259 ff.) demonstrate how their model 
helps to uncover ‘common ground’ among these theories. Without going into detail, this synthesis places the 
different theories and their main tenets where they work best, to then connect the different explanations 
across the divergent dimensions of European integration. For instance, Leuffen et al. (2013) argue that purely 
intergovernmental negotiations and unconstrained bargaining are most relevant at the beginning of the 
integration process and at low levels of centralisation, but that integration preferences generally become more 
endogenous and ideational as integration progresses; thereby, they synthesise LI and constructivist 
explanations to complement not contradict one another. This dissertation thus employs the DI framework 
put forward by Leuffen et al. to assess the formation of state preferences on integration in the dynamic field 
of EU police cooperation. The following section elaborates on the choice of explanatory factors that have been 
derived from different theories of European integration. They are tested and compared in the case studies of 
the subsequent chapters. 
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3.1 Explaining EU Police Cooperation: Theories of European Integration  
While European Studies have long been an independent field of political science and international relations, 
a focus on the area of JHA has only recently emerged. Notwithstanding the empirical reality which 
demonstrates that the EU AFSJ has developed into “[...]one of the most dynamic and complex fields of 
European integration in recent years” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 243), it has received strikingly little attention 
from the theoretical literature on European integration. Although a rich supply of theories seeks to explain 
European integration – some especially lend themselves to an analysis of integration in the area of EU internal 
security and police cooperation – few studies exist on this policy domain. Presumably, it is often still 
considered a case of intergovernmentalism rather than part of larger integration processes in the EU.  
EU internal security policy has only recently begun to be turned into a testing ground for traditional 
and newer theories of European integration. Particularly over the past decade, academia has increasingly 
investigated the evolution of the AFSJ, in line with the swift development and expansion of this ‘crowded 
policy space.’ On the one hand, some accounts underline the evolution “from weak community competences 
and largely horizontal or voluntary coordination mechanisms into an increasingly regularized or hierarchical 
field of ‘supranational governance’, with a growing role of supranational institutions” (Bossong & 
Hegemann, 2018, p. 23; cf. Ette, 2018; Kaunert, 2010b, 2011; Kaunert et al., 2013; Santos Vara, 2018). By 
contrast, the other end of the spectrum comprises studies highlighting the prevalence of the Member States 
as principals in this EU policy domain (Guiraudon, 2000a; Kaunert & Léonard, 2012; Maricut, 2016; Monar, 
2003; Wolff, 2015). However, theoretical explanations of European JHA integration have long transcended 
the classical intergovernmentalist-supranationalist divide. They have opened up to discussions of new and 
flexible modes of governance or cooperation that appear to be emerging in this area. These include for 
instance theoretical approaches to DI (Leruth, 2014; Leuffen et al., 2013, 2015; Monar, 2001, 2010; Peers, 2018; 
Rittberger et al., 2014; Tekin, 2015) as well as to networked governance and transgovernmental policy 
networks (Balzacq, 2008; Bigo, 2014; De Goede, 2008; Huysmans, 2006; Kahler, 2009; Lavenex, 2010a; Léonard, 
2010; Slaughter, 2004). Time and again, studies have shown the importance of  acknowledging “the AFSJ as 
a hybrid area of EU activity that encompassed different decision-making modes and dynamics between 
institutions developing throughout time” (Maricut, 2016, p. 241). 
 This dissertation situates itself amidst these different theoretical debates and explanations of 
integration in the area of JHA. For its analysis of EU police cooperation and the drivers of state preferences, 
it comparatively assesses the main explanatory factors stipulated by both rational-choice, state-centric 
theories but also other theories of European integration. This undertaking is as much an attempt to identify 
commonalities and bridge the gap between different perspectives as it seeks to generate a holistic account 
that can most adequately explain integration preferences in EU police cooperation. To this end, the 
dissertation draws primarily on LI and new intergovernmentalism (NI) – which remain highly relevant, 
especially for the area of JHA – and, on the other end of the spectrum, neofunctionalism and social 
constructivism to capture and disentangle the complex dynamic shaping this policy domain. On the basis of 
a comprehensive study of the empirical and theoretical literature on JHA and police cooperation in the EU, 
three main explanatory factors have been identified whose relevance in the formation of state preferences 
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this dissertation seeks to assess: interdependence, politicisation, particularly crises or external shocks, and 
policy entrepreneurs both from the supra- and subnational level. They are further discussed below in the 
context of the respective theories. Of course, other explanatory factors exist beyond these three. Yet, for the 
reasons outlined in the following, this dissertation chooses to focus on interdependence, politicisation and 
policy entrepreneurship. Whether and to what extent each of these independent factors shapes state 
preferences – and by extension institutional outcomes – in European police cooperation is subsequently 
scrutinised in the four historic case studies. After providing an outline of this dissertation’s theoretical 
concepts, the remainder of this chapter discusses the research design and methodology. 
 
Interdependencies 
A number of theoretical accounts highlight the influence of growing interconnectedness in certain issue areas 
as key driver of the behaviour of EU Member States and their integration preferences. Among them, are LI 
and its recent adaptation NI. The core assumption of LI is very similar to the one of rational choice theory: 
European integration can be understood as a series of rational choices (Moravcsik, 1998). However, LI differs 
with regard to who makes these rational choices. It assumes that national leaders and governments generally 
sit in the driver’s seat of decisions and processes of European integration (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 
2009), thereby ‘rescuing’ the nation-state (Milward, 1992). Consequently, national state preferences 
(particularly economic interests), goes the argument, lie at the heart of EU politics but are themselves shaped 
by issue-specific interdependencies of globalisation, as states are embedded in a domestic-transnational 
dichotomy (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998, 2008). The core explanatory variables are consequently national state 
preferences and issue-specific interdependence, including problems of distributive outcomes and collective 
action. 
In The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik (1998) divides the process leading to integration outcomes into 
three causal sequences (see figure 4). This dissertation is most interested in the first stage: national preference 
formation, which is – according to Moravcsik – defined by pressure from domestic constituencies and 
underlying national long-term goals. Based on these independent variables, it is argued, states define their 
preferences before entering negotiation. This stage is generally open to any suitable explanatory theory of 
preference but works best with rational choice theories. Given particular national preferences, the second 
causal sequence consists of interstate bargaining or formal negotiation. Here, LI assumes that the relative 
power of each state (impacted by asymmetrical political interdependence and cost-benefit calculations) can 
best explain distributional outcomes. Finally, following a particular bargaining outcome, the third stage then 
comprises institutional choice to secure achieved agreements in one way or another. The explanatory factor 
in this context is broadly the structure of international institutions and whether existing institutions suffice 
to ‘lock in’ bargaining agreements, or states decide to adjust them or create new ones. 
While all sequences are open to multicausal explanations and different theories, Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdis (1999) assert that the main explanatory factor shaping all stages is issue-specific interdependence. 
Issue-specific interdependence, they claim, acts as fundamental determinant of national preferences; states 
act rational and respond to relatively stable issue-specific domestic-transnational pressures by seeking 
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agreements that function most efficiently to realise these preferences. Given those preferences and 
strategically determined negotiating positions, asymmetrical interdependence may likewise explain 
interstate bargaining outcomes. Some states, for example, might be more dependent on cooperation for 
realising their preferences, or policy externalities might pressure states towards particular agreements. 
Finally, given those substantive bargaining outcomes, LI argues, institutional choices are made according to 
the same logic, depending on the need for credible commitments. This need is crucially shaped by the degree 
of issue-specific interdependence among all and each of the Member States. 
LI has been challenged by rival theories and criticised in some aspects. Yet, it remains highly relevant 
for the field of European studies and explanations of EU integration (cf. Kleine & Pollack, 2018). LI practically 
lends itself to an analysis of the persistently intergovernmental area of EU police cooperation due to its focus 
on states as the main actors. Whether and how its understanding of issue-specific interdependence can 
explain (part of) state behaviour and integration outcomes in this policy domain is further investigated in the 
analytical chapters of this dissertation. The focus in this regard lies particularly on the first causal stage: the 
formation of state preferences. In this context it primarily assesses the role of external interdependence, 
including collective action and distribution problems and how both impact states in the formation of their 
integration preferences. Although the analytical emphasis of this dissertation is preference formation, the 
historic process orientation of the case studies necessarily also touches upon the other two causal stages, 
especially on institutional choice. The following chapter on methodology further elaborates on and clarifies 
this aspect.  
 
Figure 4.  A Tripartite Framework of National Preference Formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Author, based on Moravcsik (1998). 
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Whereas Moravcsik (1998, pp. 15–16) asserts that “[...]the pursuit of economic interest is the fundamental 
force underlying integration,” this claim does not hold for the area of internal security and police cooperation, 
where different concerns matter as well if not more. Nonetheless, this dissertation likewise assesses the role 
of distribution problems for integration preferences in this field. Concerning collective action problems, LI 
understands them as the manifestation of asymmetrical interdependence (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 63). That is to 
say, not all EU Member States might be similarly affected by common threats and therefore do not have 
equally strong incentives to seek cooperation and common institutions in order to realise policy goals 
(Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999, p. 61). Or, in other words, some states may be ‘more interdependent’ than 
others and thus more eager to solve collective action problems through cooperation. Asymmetric 
‘interconnectedness’ in the causes and effects of security threats thus shapes state preferences with regard to 
integration or differentiation (Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, & Moon, 2014). 
Yet, this focus of LI on exogenous driving factors and conceptualising preferences as exogenous has 
been criticised by others for omitting the feedback loop between integration decisions and spill-over effects 
that might in turn affect state preferences and become endogenised in the long run (Schimmelfennig, 2015, 
p. 112; cf. Pierson, 1996). Next to interdependence as external factor, these scholars argue, it should likewise 
be considered as internal factor (Leuffen et al., 2015). By this logic, external interdependencies comprise an 
interconnectedness in causes and effects of security threats that produce negative externalities for states that 
act alone. Against it, internal interdependencies constitute spill-over effects from previous integration 
decisions; an interconnectedness in cooperation structures or institutions makes unilateral action difficult at 
best and produces serious coordination problems at worst. Member States thus develop a preference for 
integration when an “increase in exogenous or endogenous interdependence produces demand for more 
integration” (ibid, p. 9). 
Recently, LI has been complemented by the emerging strand of NI (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 
2015b, 2015c; Puetter, 2012). Focussing rather on the institutional choice of Member States rather than the 
driver of their preferences, this branch of intergovernmental theory recognises the on-going 
communitarisation16 of JHA policy and attempts to reconcile it with the state-centric tenets of LI. In this vein, 
NI scholars assert that “Member States pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further 
supranationalism” (Puetter, 2012, p. 168), resulting in an ‘integration paradox’: “integration without 
supranationalism” (Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 703). An ever-growing increase in the activities of the EU since 
the Maastricht Treaty supposedly collides with unaltered legal powers of the Union and “the absence of 
supranational decision-making” (Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 704). This gap, NI argues, is bridged by the pursuit 
and institutionalisation of enhanced policy-coordination among Member States by means of deliberation and 
consensus, and by the delegation of tasks to ‘de novo’ bodies rather than EU institutions (cf. De la Porte, 
Pochet, & Room, 2001; Trubek & Mosher, 2003). Whereas NI has so far emphasised the nature of this 
integration paradox, and focussed comparatively little on the driving forces behind states preferences in 
favour of integration without supranationalism, it shares the key assumptions of LI; the degree of 
 
16 the shift towards supranational (‘Community’) policy venues and their rules of decision-making (cf. Dehousse, 2011; 
Trauner & Servent, 2016) 
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(a)symmetrical interdependence in a particular issue area or at political and administrative level is regarded 
as main explanatory factor that makes enhanced EU policy coordination necessary (cf. Wolff, 2015; Schout & 
Wolff, 2016). Similarly, NI highlights the importance of the domestic context for the formation of state 
preferences. However, in contrast to LI, which attributes some explanatory power to influential national 
constituents in conjunction with interdependencies, NI asserts that “problems in domestic preference 
formation have become standalone inputs into the European integration process” (Bickerton et al., 2015a, p. 
714; cf. Schmidt, 2009).” Consequently, issue-specific interdependence and aggregated domestic interests are 
no longer exclusively seen as positive preconditions for European integration but the domestic context can 
likewise affect state preferences in favour of integration to solve national problems and constraints. 
This angle on EU cooperation as negative rather than positive integration, shaped by domestic 
instead of transnational issues, has perhaps been most prominently captured in the ‘venue shopping’ 
approach of Guiraudon (2000, 2003). At the example of migration policy, Guiraudon demonstrates how 
governments deliberately move to European ‘policy venues’ (cf. Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 32) to avoid 
national constraints. ‘Europeanising’ migration policy entails the advantage of a more favourable 
institutional environment for migration policy officials with limited judicial scrutiny and less opposition from 
the national level (Guiraudon, 2000a, p. 252 ff.). She further illustrates how initially informal settings of 
transgovernmental cooperation opened up a new European policy space and created opportunities for the 
evolution of more institutionalised and “new organisational settings not previously available” (Guiraudon, 
2000a, p. 260 f.). The venue-shopping and NI approaches thus similarly emphasise the role played by 
domestic constituencies and the institutional dynamics of different (national and European) venues. An 
escape from national controls to the EU level with diverging rules and actors may in this way offer different 
relative bargaining and power positions to Member States but likewise requires alternative strategies and 
resources (Ette, 2018; Guiraudon, 2000b; Immergut, 1992; Maricut, 2016). Venue shopping and the interplay 
among different policy venues and constituencies can of course develop a dynamic of its own, leading to 
unintended consequences and the blurring between high and low politics across policy areas and time (cf. 
Maricut, 2016). The following sections elaborate further on these aspects and their theoretical relevance as 
explanations of European integration. 
In sum, the intergovernmental, rational-choice end of the spectrum of European integration theories 
highlights the importance of issue-specific interdependence and domestic interests as drivers of state 
preferences. High interdependence and aggregated domestic interests (positive or negative) are argued to 
shape the behaviour of Member States, ultimately producing a convergence of preferences in favour of 
European integration. With regard to EU police cooperation, we can accordingly formulate the following 
hypothesis about the findings we should expect if these explanations were to hold: 
H1: The higher the interdependence in security issues, the more likely Member States are to 
favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
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Politicisation 
Politicisation may be described as the process by which topics not previously in the eye of the public become 
the object of societal deliberation and public discourse (Hay, 2007, p. 81; Zürn, 2013, p. 19). This comprises 
different elements such as the salience of an issue, the degree of polarisation and the range of actors and 
audiences involved (de Wilde et al., 2016, p. 5). Especially since Hooghe and Marks' (2009) well-known work 
on the politicisation of European integration and the growth of Euro-scepticism over the past decade, many 
accounts have investigated the role of public and political contestation, and shown its rising importance in 
different EU policy domains (de Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016, 2018; Grande & Kriesi, 2016; Kriesi, 
2016; Leupold, 2015; Rauh & Zürn, 2014). Even in the JHA area a “dramatic increase in politicization and the 
involvement of top politicians” can be observed since the Lisbon Treaty (Bossong & Hegemann, 2018, p. 23). 
Thus, postfunctionalism and its focus on EU politicisation unsurprisingly constitutes the “most recent and 
arguably most fundamental challenge” to the theoretical explanations stipulated by LI (Kleine & Pollack, 
2018, p. 1495).  Postfunctionalist studies conceptualise politicisation as a constraint to European integration. 
They focus on its negative impact, for instance when societal deliberation transforms a public ‘permissive 
consensus’ into a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Usherwood & Startin, 2013). On the other 
hand, neofunctionalists highlight that public support, the ‘permissive consensus,’ can provide the backbone 
to early regional integration (Lahr, 2002, p. 248; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; Schmitter, 1969). In fact, various 
recent accounts have demonstrated the relevance of neofunctionalist tenets in the EU: that positive 
politicisation often helps to strengthen or even advance European integration (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015; 
Diez Medrano, 2003; Leupold, 2015; Wonka, 2015; Zaun, 2018). However, the literature still largely focuses 
on the postfunctionalist understanding of politicisation, although most studies have likewise shown that it is 
difficult to clearly categorise the effect of politicisation as either ‘permissive consensus’ or ‘constraining 
dissensus,’ and that politicisation in fact differs across topics and Member States (Börzel & Risse, 2017; de 
Wilde et al., 2018; Hutter, Grande, & Kriesi, 2016; Maricut, 2016). It can act as both driver or obstacle to 
preference convergence and European integration.  
The current academic, theoretical debate on politicisation in the EU is gradually evolving beyond 
the post-/neofunctionalist divide towards a more differentiated theoretical approach. Multiple contemporary 
theories of European integration now address politicisation as a key explanatory variable in its own right, 
including NI (Bickerton et al., 2015b; Maricut, 2016; Puetter, 2012) and DI theory (Leuffen et al., 2013, 2015).  
Schmidt (2018) for example observes how the ‘new’ theoretical approaches to EU governance concur in their 
emphasis of the role of ideational factors, especially the importance of discourse and deliberation, and their 
analytical focus on discursive institutionalism and constructivist ideas respectively. This differs from LI with 
its strong focus on rational, economic self-interests. In the following, this section therefore takes a closer look 
at politicisation theories of European integration. To this end, the dissertation follows the same structure that 
it likewise employs in its later analysis of politicisation as an explanatory factor. It first assesses the possible 
actors and audiences in the EU (who politicises?), second, the shape that politicisation can take (how to 
politicise?), and third, the role of crises and shocks. With a view to studying the impact of politicisation on 
the integration preferences of EU Member States, this dissertation focusses on politicisation understood as 
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increased salience and public debate of a topic rather than polarisation or deliberate conflict and social 
contestation. For the purposes of its analysis and testing the explanatory power of this factor, it is less 
important who politicises (albeit this is likewise discussed) rather than what the effects are on state 
preferences. 
Politicisation emerges across multiple domestic and European levels and ultimately widens the 
range of actors involved. Especially in the EU, politicisation processes often encompass various actors and 
audiences (cf. Kaunert & Yakubov, 2018; Wolff & Mounier, 2012). Building on existing literature, this 
dissertation distinguishes between governments, EU actors and the public sphere. On the state-centric end of 
the theoretical spectrum, LI and particularly NI both acknowledge the importance of politicisation and 
deliberation as shapers of state preferences amidst state-society relations and the domestic-European divide 
(Bickerton et al., 2015b; Leuffen et al., 2015; Moravcsik, 1998). In this vein, policymakers deliberately engage 
in politicisation to maintain a ‘permissive consensus’ over the appropriateness of their policy choices (Boin, 
’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005, p. 92; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Schmidt, 2018; Van 
Asselt & Renn, 2011, p. 440). Publicly framing situations in one way or another often is an effective means for 
policymakers to manage expectations.  
Traditionally, however, Member States or the national level are the audience of politicisation over 
EU governance; sometimes they are even both: actor and audience. Less rationality-focused, organisational 
and constructivist studies underline that political actors are influenced and shaped by their environments. 
Politicisation thus forms part of the structure in which agents act. Governments respond to the saliency of an 
issue and pressure from the public sphere, because they base their actions on social norms and a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ or follow a ‘logic of consequentiality’ that revolves around weighting possible consequences 
and practical results of particular policy options (March, 1982; March & Olsen, 1989, 2006, 2008; March & 
Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947, 1955). In this context, postfunctional scholars emphasise the importance of the 
public sphere and mass politicisation as drivers of state preferences and shapers of policy options (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2009; Usherwood & Startin, 2013). The public sphere encompasses constituencies, the media and 
other relevant civil society actors at domestic, European and international level. While these of course provide 
the socio-normative framework for policymakers, this dissertation is more interested in how and when 
politicisation in the public sphere explicitly influences state preferences, including through discursive 
practices and active framing (Kratochwil, 1991; March & Olsen, 1995, pp. 30–31; Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014; 
Wendt, 1992, 2001). If the public sphere is dissatisfied with a certain political action or lack thereof, 
intensifying public pressure could pose a ‘constraining dissensus’ to the authority and political standing of 
governments and thus influence their preferences (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003; Drabek, 1994; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 
Schmidt, 2018, p. 1546). 
While the state-society linkage with regard to preference formation and politicisation is perhaps 
relatively uncontentious, the theoretical literature likewise increasingly acknowledges the importance of EU 
actors (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998). More and more, EU institutions and agencies have recently engaged 
in politicisation themselves or have become subject to public debate (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015; Bossong 
& Hegemann, 2018; de Wilde et al., 2018; Grande & Kriesi, 2016; Hutter et al., 2016; Kriesi, 2016; Leupold, 
2015; Maricut, 2016; Wonka, 2015). Schmidt (2018, p. 1548) asserts that theoretical models characterising the 
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EU as “apolitical and/or technocratic” are no longer fully adequate; “Politicization has affected all EU actors’ 
actions and interactions, making for a ‘new’ dynamic of EU governance that is more political in every way.” 
In view of the large range of different audiences and principal-agent relationships at EU level, supranational 
actors – arguably more so than Member States – seek arrangements that are acceptable to all. Framing and 
policy narratives thus tend to vary widely depending on the issue area, topic and the audiences involved or 
represented. Consequently, EU actors often struggle between an active and a passive role in public debates, 
as well as between depoliticisation and politicisation respectively (Baker-Beall, 2009, 2016; Bello, 2016; 
Maricut, 2016; Puetter, 2012; Zaun, 2018). This holds especially true with regard to JHA agencies like Europol, 
because many are purposefully created with a focus on operationalisation and soft modes of governance to 
avoid institutional constraints and political deliberation (Busuioc, Curtin, & Groenleer, 2012; Kaunert et al., 
2013; Rittberger & Wonka, 2012; Wolff, 2008; Wolff & Schout, 2013).  
Regardless of ‘who’ politicises, different theoretical camps of European integration are increasingly 
recognising the impact of politicisation on state preferences. Schmidt (2018) convincingly shows how new 
approaches to intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and parliamentarism all underline the relevance of 
‘ideas and discursive interactions.’ Amidst the triangle of the reciprocal relationship between governments, 
society and supranational players, it is crucial to understand how Member States, the public sphere and EU 
actors interact as audiences and ‘politicisers,’ thereby creating politicisation around a particular issue. Since 
this differs across countries, actors and policy domains, scholars have been calling for more qualitative 
research on the process itself and its various levels (de Wilde, 2007; de Wilde et al., 2018; Dolezal, Grande, & 
Kriesi, 2016; Kriesi, 2016; Maricut, 2016; Wood, 2015). This dissertation situates itself alongside these accounts 
and seeks to contribute to the politicisation literature by investigating the effects of ‘issue-specific 
politicisation processes’ (de Wilde et al., 2018, p. 10) in EU police cooperation. It asks when, how and with 
which aim actors themselves politicise or become subject to politicisation and to what extent politicisation 
shapes state integration preferences. 
Second, and closely related to the actors and audiences, politicisation can take different forms. It 
could be a deliberate strategy of public-political actors to reach certain goals and outcomes, or it can be the 
more random result of the growing saliency of an issue through a biopolitical process among different societal 
actors and audiences. Similarly, it may create a positive or negative societal basis for European integration, 
depending on whether politicisation outcomes favour or hamper EU collective action. Issues may however 
not only be publicised, they can also be framed as technical or administrative matters, thus being 
‘depoliticised.’ Finally, securitisation – that is, framing an issue as a matter of security rather than politics – 
presents a special form of politicisation. It goes without saying that this might be of particular relevance for 
the field of JHA. 
The growing salience of a topic often acts as driver and legitimising force for political action, 
including with a view to European integration. When strong emotions are involved and further politicise an 
EU topic, societal concerns and expectations must be managed not only nationally but across the perceived 
domestic-European dichotomy (Barnett & Sikkink, 2008; Boin et al., 2005; Drabek, 1994, p. 32; Grant & 
Keohane, 2005; Kahler & Lake, 2003, 2004). This process is not necessarily a linear one or the product of 
deliberate political strategising.  
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Be it in the form of a deliberate or organic process – that is, strategic narratives or changing salience 
of an issue – politicisation may affect state preferences and integration outcomes negatively or positively. 
This ultimately depends on the type of politicisation, concretely, the type of frames employed. Framing a 
topic, or the EU for that matter, in one way or another empowers different actors and thus may facilitate or 
inhibit further public debate and ultimately European integration (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015; Boswell, 
Geddes, & Scholten, 2011; de Graaf, 2015; Diez Medrano, 2003; Leupold, 2015; Wonka, 2015). Policy and 
public narratives could for example attempt to ‘depoliticise’ a topic rather than to make it more political and 
fuel deliberation. Guiraudon's (2000, 2003) venue-shopping approach constitutes an example of strategic 
depoliticisation on the part of Member States to shift decision-making into more technical or informal policy 
venues so as to avoid domestic, institutional or public constraints. Especially in the area of JHA, scholars have 
highlighted the importance of depoliticisation in the security discourse of both governments and EU actors 
(Aradau & van Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2002; De Goede, 2008; Dolezal et al., 2016; Herschinger et al., 2013; 
Huysmans, 2006; Rauh & Zürn, 2014; Wolff, 2015; Zürn, 2013). Yet, the theoretical literature likewise 
acknowledges the limits of linking security to depoliticisation and has begun to study politicisation in this 
policy domain (Ehrhart et al., 2014; Fierke, 2015; Hegemann & Kahl, 2016, 2018; Joachim & Dembinski, 2014; 
Rüger, 2012). This dissertation seeks to contribute to this field of research, by tracing the impact of issue-
specific politicisation on state preferences throughout EU police cooperation. 
Despite its depoliticisation focus, securitisation theory provides a suitable point for departure to this 
end. Securitising a topic or policy area essentially means to frame it in terms of security, which often moves 
it into more operational, rational or technical policy venues where social and political contestation are 
possibly less present and swift action can be taken. In line with the growth of politicisation research in the 
area of EU JHA, securitisation approaches have gained prominence in studies of internal security policy and 
police cooperation since the Lisbon Treaty (Baker-Beall, 2009; Bakker, 2006; Balzacq, 2008; Balzacq & Léonard, 
2013; Bello, 2016; Bigo, 2014; Diez & Squire, 2008; Huysmans, 2000; Léonard, 2007; Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; 
Loader, 2002; Monar, 2007). Assessing when, how and why issues are framed as a matter of security between 
Member States, EU actors and the public sphere – thus effectively demanding or justifying a particular policy 
and course of action – may help to better explain state preferences and integration outcomes. To this end, the 
role of speech acts and discursive securitising moves is of special importance (Balzacq, 2011; de Graaf, 2015; 
Kaunert & Yakubov, 2018; Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008; Stritzel, 2007).  
Needless to say, the political context matters tremendously regarding how security policy is framed 
(Léonard, 2007, 2009, 2010; Léonard & Kaunert, 2018). Consequently, the issue-specific interaction between 
securitisation and (de-)politicisation must be scrutinised carefully. Certain types of frames and policy 
narratives may for example be conducive to particular securitising moves and concrete action at EU level, 
while others might make securitisation more difficult by fostering a more differentiated, controversial or 
polarised debate. Here, a connection to the crisis management literature can be made, as “crises and shocks[...] 
heighten the perceived need for action” and acceptance of related policy responses (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 
276; cf. Boin, 2005; Kamradt-Scott & McInnes, 2012). The next sub-section details this link in more depth. 
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CRISES AND SHOCKS 
Many examples illustrate the deepening nexus between EU security policy and crisis management. Crises 
induced by large-scale terrorist attacks on European soil have provided important momentum to 
Europeanisation17 in the area of counterterrorism and police cooperation (Bakker, 2006; Bossong, 2013; Bures, 
2011, 2018; De Vries, 2008; Edwards & Meyer, 2008; Monar, 2007). Politicisation scholars similarly observe 
how European crises may shape state preferences and integration outcomes, because they “constitute 
exceptional moments of politicization” (Kriesi, 2016, p. 34; cf. Grande & Kriesi, 2016). Crises can be 
understood as significant shocks caused by external or internal occurrences that create a sense of crisis or fear 
and foster the need for public leadership (Boin, 2005; Kaunert et al., 2013). The crisis management literature 
emphasises that crises demand political responses, as they always entail elements of perceived threat, 
uncertainty and urgency (Boin et al., 2005). This is arguably nowhere truer than in the area of internal security 
and policing where shocks appear directly threatening to personal and national security, thus playing on 
emotions and the biopolitics of fear. The sense of urgency and uncertainty additionally opens the floodgates 
to framing and politicisation in an attempt to manage the crisis and respond to public concerns (König, 2015). 
 Crises and shocks may thus be described as ‘politicising events’ and can shape the interests and 
policy options of governments. Depending on the political and domestic context, Member States may choose 
particular speech acts and frames in response to public pressure. In the face of the 2015 refugee and migration 
crisis, politicisation flared up across the EU in the form of highly polarised debates, including predominant 
security frames (Bourbeau, 2013; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017; Krzyżanowski & Ledin, 2017; 
Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, & Wodak, 2018). Many governments consequently opted for national 
securitising moves that ran contrary to a common European course of action (Maldini & Takahashi, 2017; 
Moreno-Lax, 2018; Scipioni, 2018).  
At the same time, crises may also open ‘windows of opportunity’ for preference convergence and 
positive integration outcomes. In this vein, Member States could make use of the perceived need and demand 
for action to advance their policy goals, following the theme ‘never waste a good crisis’ that is often found in 
regulation theory (Yandle, 2013). Crises can similarly act as demonstrators of insufficiently managed 
interdependencies in the EU and “magnify the importance of challenges associated with the spillover-
enlargement effect” (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 276).  The influence of crises and shocks on the formation and 
adjustment of state preferences and integration is acknowledged across different theoretical camps, ranging 
all the way from intergovernmentalism to neo- and postfunctionalism (Bigo et al., 2015; Börzel & Risse, 2017; 
Fabbrini, 2013; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2017; Rittberger, Biermann, Guérin, Jagdhuber, & Weiss, 2017; 
Schimmelfennig, 2017a, 2017b). In the area of JHA, crises do not only provide windows of opportunity for 
Member States, they have increasingly become a means of public support and legitimacy for the EU. While 
polarised politicisation has been observed to hinder cooperation in the AFSJ (Maricut, 2016), politicisation in 
crisis situations can also help to overcome national reluctance and legitimise authority transfers to EU 
institutions or venues (Zaun, 2018). The recent terror attacks and subsequent collective action at 
 
17 the impact of the European level on national structures and subsequent domestic adaptation (cf. Vink (2003, p. 63): 
“domestic change caused by European integration”) 
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supranational level exemplify how politicising events may facilitate preference convergence and produce 
positive integration outcomes (Maricut, 2016). 
In sum, theories of European integration have increasingly acknowledged the role of politicisation 
in the formation of state preferences and as influencer of integration outcomes, including in EU JHA. 
Traditionally, increasing domestic politicisation and salience of EU governance have been regarded as 
obstacles to integration. Yet, recently emerging, ‘new’ dynamics of politicisation have yielded diverging 
preferences across Member States. Against the backdrop of the theoretical literature, this dissertation 
scrutinises the role of politicisation as an explanatory factor of state preferences on European integration in 
the area of police cooperation. It does so by asking first, who politicises in each case and how, that is, what 
form of politicisation emerges, second, to what extent this draws on a sense of crisis and third, whether it is 
initiated deliberately or arises as the result of a less targeted, biopolitical process. Rather than limiting itself 
to asking whether ideas and salience can offer the most adequate explanation for state preferences, this 
dissertation seeks to understand how exactly both affect preferences and potentially interact with other 
factors to shape a concrete outcome. The primary analytical focus lies on the overall role of politicisation and 
its effect on state integration preferences. Since the literature comprises three main, different understandings 
of politicisation and does not agree on its impact, the following competing hypotheses may be formulated as 
a starting point for such an analysis: 
H2.1: The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the more likely Member States are to 
favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
 
H2.2: The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the less likely Member States are to 
favour EU police cooperation and integration, and the more likely they are to prefer 
differentiation and decentralised, informal modes of cooperation. 
 
H2.3: The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the less likely Member States are to 
favour any police cooperation at EU level. 
 
 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
The concept of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ from the sub- and supranational level and their role as interest shapers 
is being increasingly applied to the area of JHA. Policy entrepreneurs can be described as actors employing 
their resources to shape policy processes and outcomes in order to further their own self-interests (Kingdon, 
2003). A growing body of literature for instance explores the role of EU actors as maximisers of competence, 
agenda-setters and promoters of supranational policy venues (Guiraudon, 2000b, 2003; Kaunert, 2007, 2011; 
Pollack, 1994; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Zahariadis, 2013). Here, rational-choice institutionalist, 
organisational and intergovernmentalist theories concede that state preferences may indeed be influenced 
through the strategic actions of supranational policy entrepreneurs and their integrative initiatives (Bickerton 
et al., 2015b, 2015c; Kaunert et al., 2013; Pierson, 1996). What is more, as integration evolves and the range of 
involved actors expands, the theoretical literature observes how Member States may gradually lose control 
over the process (Guiraudon, 2000b; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Ikenberry, 2001; Pierson, 1996). While security is 
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often argued to form a core state power and therefore remain tightly in the hands of sovereign governments, 
policy entrepreneurs above and below the national level can undeniably play an important role and are 
driven by both rational self-interests and values, as the literature demonstrates. Consequently, this 
dissertation assesses the influence of sub- and supranational policy entrepreneurs on state preferences in EU 
police cooperation. The next sections elaborate further on these two types of policy entrepreneurship.  
 
THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL: INSTITUTIONS, PATH-DEPENDENCY AND CULTIVATED SPILL-OVERS 
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) completes the predominantly state-focused perspective of LI through 
a stronger emphasis on, or at least acknowledgement of, the role that institutions play in the determination 
of social and political outcomes. RCI is only one of various sub-branches of new institutionalism that evolved 
in the 1970s (Hall & Taylor, 1996; cf. Hay, 2008; Mackay, Kenny, & Chappell, 2010). RCI itself was originally 
created with a view to the behaviour of the United States (US) Congress. This matters because it arose from 
a paradox that traditional rational-choice theory could not explain: the relative stability of congressional 
outcomes despite contrary expectations in the light of “the multiple preference-orderings of legislators and 
multidimensional character of issues” (Hall & Taylor, 1996). A similar paradox can be observed in EU internal 
security governance, where issues are likewise multidimensional, and preferences are not fixed and can vary 
greatly with regard to the extent of cooperation. Yet, institutional structures and generally, both informal and 
formal cooperation arrangements have continued to develop, at least in numbers, with relative stability (more 
so in some areas than in others). 
RCI, like LI, attributes a key role to states and conceptualises them as rational actors that use and 
design institutional structures deliberately and purposefully (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001). However, 
it differs in the extent to which it recognises the role of institutions and IOs, including not only as an outcome 
but potentially as an independent factor with the power to influence and shape state behaviour and 
preferences, for example through rules and the ‘new economics of organisation’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Koremenos et al., 2001). Ikenberry (2001), himself rather a proponent of institutions as an endogenous factor, 
calls this the ‘logic of (institutional) binding’. Institutions as stipulated by RCI can accordingly matter as both 
principal and agent, and are thereby understood as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North, 1990). 
As a great strength of RCI, Hall and Taylor (1996) name its emphasis on the role of strategic 
interaction in the determination of political outcomes. Here again, a parallel can be drawn to LI, whose second 
causal sequence during the analysis of political outcomes is interstate bargaining. This comes as no surprise, 
if one considers that both theories draw heavily on rational-choice theory. However, this classic ‘calculus 
approach’ to state behaviour assumes that states are the voluntary initiators of institutional creation and 
design in order to ensure gains from cooperation. This assumption neglects the role of alternative causal 
factors, including social ones such as domestic and transnational pressures, and insights from group theory. 
Yet, proponents of institutionalism would argue that this ‘neglect’ is in fact another strength, or as Jupille and 
Caporaso (1999) put it:  
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“From this perspective, it matters less whether politics occurs within or among nations. What 
matters more is that politics occurs within a framework of mutually understood principles, 
norms, rules, or procedures—that is, within an institutional context. Institutionalism [...]can 
unify the analysis of politics and policy making at and across levels of analysis, contributing to 
the increasing transcendence of the traditional comparative-IR divide.” 
RCI thus understands politics as a “series of collective action dilemmas” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 945) and 
institutions as “rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors face” (Koremenos et al., 
2001, p. 768). RCI has progressed on many fronts in recent years, including its methodology and a gradual 
opening up to other less strictly rationalist variables (Pollack, 2009, 2019). Although Koremenos et al. (2001) 
attribute a key role to states as rational actors that use and design institutional structures deliberately and 
purposefully, RCI now increasingly also considers institutions as exogenous variables which can have an 
independent effect. Regardless of whether they are seen as endogenous or exogenous to state preferences, 
institutions may be conceptualised as key shapers of integration outcomes, because they present platforms 
for structuring the strategic state interaction of actors’ preferences. They offer practical solutions to collective 
action and distribution problems arising from interdependence and the uncertainty about the behaviour of 
other states. Institutions may act as policy entrepreneurs and affect state preferences indirectly or directly. 
Kaunert et al. (2013, p. 277) call this the “institutional dynamics” that influence national positions and 
negotiation outcomes. 
 At the passive end of the spectrum, institutions impact Member States through spill-overs and path-
dependency. In line with neofunctionalist tenets, they may produce functional spill-overs from integration 
within the same or different policy areas (E. B. Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). The 
initial decision to create a common institution or charge a particular EU actor with a task or portfolio that 
was previously nationally administered can trigger a structural need for further institutionalisation and thus 
integration. In the policy domain of JHA, Kaunert et al. (2013) term this the ‘spillover-enlargement effect,’ 
which  they attribute to “the real and perceived criminal justice challenges presented by the Common Market 
and the Schengen area that have been magnified by the expectation of the widening membership of the EU.” 
(p. 276). Additionally, EU institutions – once established – may have “shaping and constraining effects” on 
the Member States, thus leading to path-dependency (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 278; cf. Argomaniz, 2011; 
Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998). This could occur in a relatively passive manner, as the sunk costs and 
practical value of common institutions increase and it becomes progressively more uneconomical for 
governments to invest in or move to new policy venues. Neofunctionalists thus attribute integration 
preferences and preference convergence or variation across Member States to levels of transnational 
interdependence and supranational capacity at a given point in time (Schimmelfennig, 2017a, p. 970). 
Supranational institutions can however also pro-actively assume a role as policy entrepreneurs so as 
to advance integration and make themselves indispensable (Zahariadis, 2013). Contrary to the indirect impact 
of institutions via functional spill-overs and path-dependency, they may also directly shape government 
preferences through cultivated spill-overs: the provision and promotion of integration initiatives (Niemann, 
2006; Niemann & Schmitter, 2009; Schmitter, 2005). In this vein, supranational policy entrepreneurs offer and 
incentivise policy options that advance normative, institutional or policy settings in their favour, thereby 
often towards ‘more EU.’ Such entrepreneurship can take the rather soft form of promoting certain norms 
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and practices, but may also manifest itself in hard measures like making available earmarked funding for 
integration initiatives (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 278; cf. Kaunert, 2007, 2011). The theoretical literature shows 
that cultivated spill-overs in the EU have become more frequent and more important recently; studies 
demonstrate especially the role of the Commission in this regard (Bossong, 2013; Caviedes, 2016; Kaunert, 
2010b, 2010a; Niemann, 2006; Zaun, 2018). Borrowing from organisational theory, these developments may 
be explained in part by the achievement of a good reputation of supranational actors (Waeraas & Maor, 2015; 
cf. Carpenter & Krause, 2012, 2014). Reputation – be it in the practical form of a positive track record or as 
abstract as trust – may be a source of power for EU institutions when they seek to influence state preferences 
and raise their own transactional authority. Farrell and Héritier (2007) observe this with regard to the relative 
bargaining power of EU actors and interstitial institutional change: the gradual formalisation of informal 
rules and alteration of the policy role of supranational players. 
The (growing) role of supranational policy entrepreneurship as driver of European integration is 
recognised across different theories. Institutions shape and constrain state preferences indirectly via 
functional spill-overs and path-dependency, and they do so directly via cultivated spill-overs. These 
observations are not only compatible with intergovernmental theoretical claims, they strengthen them in two 
main ways.  First, supranational policy entrepreneurs owe much of their role to interdependencies. In 
addition to issue-specific interdependence outside of the EU integration process (e.g. arising from 
globalisation), functional interdependence and institutional locking may push Member States to continue and 
expand the path of integration (Schmitter, 2005, p. 268). The more they have invested in an institution or the 
more an institution has been able to establish itself, the more governments tend to depend on it. This internal 
or institutional (inter-)dependence might, on a second note, lead to a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’ As states seek 
to manage the interconnection in challenges via common institutions, they likewise become interconnected 
in power and capacity; once supranational actors become increasingly empowered and may act as policy 
entrepreneurs, Member States lose some of the control over an integration dynamic that might seem more 
and more self-sustaining (Guiraudon, 2000b; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Ikenberry, 2001; Pierson, 1996). 
The interplay of supranational policy entrepreneurship and issue-specific interdependence thus 
seems vital in the context of European integration. Conceptualising and studying interdependence as both 
exogenous and endogenous factor allows to complement the frequently criticised exogeneity-focused 
perspective of LI and scrutinise the long-run ‘feedback loop’ between state preferences and institutional 
choice, or – put differently – between integration decisions and spill-over effects (Kleine & Pollack, 2018; 
Leuffen et al., 2015, p. 9; Pierson, 1996; Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 112). It could even be argued that 
interconnectivity in causes and effects reflects exogenous interdependence, while interdependence in power 
and capacity may often embody a form of endogenously acting interdependence among Member States. 
Supranational policy entrepreneurs, path-dependency and spill-overs are not classically associated 
with core state powers and policy areas such as internal security. Yet, the expanding role and influence of EU 
actors in JHA arguably provides evidence that supranational institutions can and do shape state preferences 
in this policy domain. If supranational policy entrepreneurs do indeed substantially affect integration 
outcomes in EU police cooperation, we should be able to make the following observation: 
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H3: The higher the supranational policy entrepreneurship in a given issue area, the more 
likely Member States are to favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
 
 
THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL: POLICING CULTURES, EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND BUREAUCRATIC 
RESISTANCE 
Policy entrepreneurs may also be found at the (sub-)national level. Intergovernmentalist theories for instance 
attribute domestic constituents a role in shaping state preferences and observe how domestic politics can act 
as driver of European integration (Bickerton et al., 2015b; Moravcsik, 1998). Functionalist studies similarly 
highlight the importance of the domestic political context for the formation of national preferences and 
favoured policy options (Grande & Kriesi, 2016; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; 
Niemann & Schmitter, 2009; Schmitter, 1969). Finally, institutionalist and Europeanisation theories emphasise 
that the failure or success of integration initiatives ultimately hinges on how compatible new practices, norms 
and structures are with local ones (Heritier & Knill, 2000; March & Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1995; Olsen, 1997; Risse, 
Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001). The connection between the (sub-)national context, state preferences and 
European integration is thus relatively well-established in the theoretical literature.  
At the same time, these accounts often focus rather broadly on the integration process in Member 
States, and devise top-down and bottom-up approaches to explain how integration unfolds. To this end, they 
overwhelmingly either point to national and European political elites or grassroots movements and the 
lowest societal levels, with few studies in the middle ground. While various accounts have investigated the 
top-down effect of integration, and thus tend to treat subnational bureaucratic and administrative actors as 
dependent variable (Héritier et al., 2001; Page & Wouters, 1995; Wright, 1994), the explanatory power of 
subnational policy entrepreneurship in relation to states’ integration decisions remains relatively little 
researched. This appears particularly striking in the field of security and police where domestic actors are 
substantially involved at most stages of cooperation, begging the question when, why and how they might 
independently shape state preferences and contribute to the success or failure of integration initiatives. 
Whereas the theoretical literature increasingly recognises the potential of the supranational level as shaper of 
state preferences, particularly institutions, a similar body of studies has not yet emerged to investigate how 
subnational officials might act as policy entrepreneurs to constrain and influence the behaviour of Member 
States. This dissertation understands subnational policy entrepreneurship as the direct and deliberate intra- 
or intergovernmental policy advocacy by formal subnational actors such as police officials and civil servants. 
It thus differs from broader societal politicisation emerging at the domestic level or generated by the domestic 
public sphere. It is also distinct from studies that assess the integration effects of domestic structures and 
traditions to explain institutional or bureaucratic persistence and resilience, although these may of course 
shape the strategic action of subnational actors.  
Subnational policy entrepreneurship assumes that actors at the lower and local policy and 
implementation levels assume a (pro-)active role in driving the integration preferences of their national 
governments. This appears especially relevant in the area of JHA and police cooperation, where policy-
making relies heavily on the expertise of subnational security professionals as well as law and order officials. 
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The remainder of this section therefore takes a closer look at the theoretical state of affairs concerning the 
subnational level as shaper of state preferences and driver of European integration. Concretely, it elaborates 
on domestic cultures, especially police cultures, epistemic communities and bureaucratic resistance. 
A growing theoretical discourse is acknowledging the role of domestic cultures and institutional 
adaptation at the subnational level with regard to European integration. This includes intergovernmentalist 
approaches, which recognise domestic politics and national executives as inputs if not driving forces of state 
preferences and European institutional choice (Bickerton et al., 2015b, 2015c; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; 
Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). In fact, “preference formation and EU 
integration are not neatly separated in space and time” (Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 707). Growing ideational 
convergence as well as intensifying “political and administrative interdependence” collide with the 
institutional diversity of Member States to varying degrees in different policy areas (Wolff, 2015, p. 129; cf. 
Bickerton et al., 2015a, p. 709). They thus render cross-country institutional adaptation, if not further 
integration and formalisation, highly necessary. What is more, national executive officials often actively push 
for new cooperation and governance frameworks in the area of JHA. New intergovernmentalists argue that 
this leads to an inherent political tension between the functional need to further cooperate and the reluctance 
of Member States to delegate additional authority to supranational actors (Bickerton et al., 2015b, 2015c; 
Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015a). Institutionalisation or cooperation without supranationalisation 
therefore frequently occurs in the form of the creation of de novo bodies and the transfer of power to informal, 
horizontal and more flexible forms of governance. Needless to say, these decisions in turn additionally 
empower subnational actors as policy entrepreneurs. 
Europeanisation accounts (Börzel, 2000, 2002; Heritier & Knill, 2000; Pollack, 2019) likewise 
acknowledge the role of executive and administrative officials, and emphasise the question of cultural 
compatibility or ‘goodness of fit’ between the supranational and domestic level (Olsen, 1996; Risse et al., 
2001). They observe how policy implementation – and thereby integration and convergence in different areas 
– varies depending on the respective national bureaucratic and administrative structures (Héritier et al., 2001; 
Page & Wouters, 1995; Wright, 1994). Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006) underline the importance of (sub-
)national preferences and beliefs in this context. They assert that the “relationship between the status quo and 
the response to the EU is spurious, as both variables are contingent upon the preferences or beliefs held by 
domestic political and administrative actors” (p. 331).  
Social constructivist and institutionalist accounts as well as organisational theory agree with this 
notion. They advocate socio-cultural aspects of institutions and policymaking as independent variables that 
affect political convergence and regional integration outcomes (Hay, 2008; Pollack, 2009, 2019). 
Organisational theory likewise acknowledges the relevance of institutional adaptation, the “long-term 
substitution of existing practices and structures with new ones” (Olsen, 1997, p. 159; cf. March & Olsen, 1984, 
1989, 1995). Integration preferences of Member States may thus not only be driven by rational cost-benefit 
calculations or institutional constraints at the international level, they are additionally influenced by domestic 
cultures and customs that interact with and shape processes of institutional change and policy convergence. 
Across the board, the literature demonstrates that (sub-)national administrative cultures and traditions 
matter when it comes to explaining integration and differentiation processes, and that domestic adaptation 
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to EU cooperation and institutional change occurs gradually and varies depending on the distinct 
bureaucratic cultures and norms (Kickert & Meer, 2011; March & Olsen, 1989, 2008; Meyer-Sahling & 
Yesilkagit, 2011).  
However, what is less investigated by the theoretical literature is the explanatory power of these 
cultures and traditions with regard to state preferences on European integration. Koenig-Archibugi (2004) 
for example shows the importance of political cultures, particularly understandings of sovereignty and 
authority, as an influence on Member State positions towards EU integration. In the area of JHA, the empirical 
literature clearly demonstrates that domestic law and order officials do play a role as subnational policy 
entrepreneurs in the EU policy process and in the “emergence of a European ‘homeland security’ culture” 
(Wolff, 2015, p. 141; cf. Awesti, 2007; Cross, 2007; Den Boer, 2010; Den Boer, Hillebrand, & Nölke, 2008; 
Fägersten, 2010; Kaunert et al., 2013; Lavenex, 2010; Occhipinti, 2003, 2015). In this context, theory-focussed 
research on European security governance increasingly observes the emergence of new modes of governance 
beyond traditional, state-centric forms (Bossong & Hegemann, 2018; Rhodes, 1996; Sperling & Webber, 2014; 
Stoker, 1998; Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff, & Krahmann, 2004). The EU has therefore been described as 
“an ideal case of modern governance” (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006), a phenomenon that can be found 
more and more in internal security as well (Bossong & Lavenex, 2016; Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, & Lucarelli, 
2010; Kirchner & Sperling, 2007; Schroeder, 2011). 
Although formalisation, institutionalisation and supranational forms of governance have progressed 
significantly with regard to EU JHA since the Lisbon Treaty, soft modes of governance, informal horizontal 
networks as well as executive and administrative elites have similarly gained influence in this area (Bossong 
& Hegemann, 2018; Guiraudon, 2000b; Kaunert & Léonard, 2012; Lavenex & Wagner, 2007; L. Paoli, 2014; 
Wolff & Mounier, 2012). European studies, especially JHA research, have thus recently taken a “public policy 
‘turn’” to explain what influences the preferences of Member States and can help explain integration 
outcomes (Rhinard, 2018, p. 42 ff.). Accordingly, this literature investigates the role of executive and 
administrative officials by assessing epistemic communities, policy networks, and advocacy coalitions. 
Epistemic communities may be described as a particular form of policy network with an emphasis on 
knowledge, or phrased more elaborately as “‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’ within that 
domain or issue area” (P. M. Haas, 1992, p. 3; cf. Rhinard, 2018, p. 44; Dunlop, 2013; Niemann, 2006; 
Zahariadis, 2013). 
Regarding EU internal security governance, and police cooperation in particular, law and order 
officials present an important example of such communities. Within domestic and transnational contexts they 
form knowledge-and expertise-based networks that are relevant on multiple levels to policymakers in this 
area (Cross, 2011, 2014; Wolff, 2015). The rising prominence of policy and practitioners networks in the area 
of European police cooperation, especially cross-border networks of security professionals, has been 
increasingly observed by the literature (Balzacq, 2008; Bigo, 2014; De Goede, 2008; Den Boer, 2010; Dupont, 
2004; Huysmans, 2006; Léonard, 2010). Empirical studies for instance clearly demonstrates the importance of 
horizontal TGNs among different national government (sub-)agencies and police authorities, while the 
theoretical literature has likewise increasingly picked up the concept of ‘networked politics’ (Börzel, 1998; 
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Den Boer et al., 2008; Kahler, 2009; Rhodes, 1996, 2008; Richardson, 1996). Examples of the growing role, if 
not influence, of subnational officials and networks as policy entrepreneurs in the EU policy process range 
from pro-active mobilisation around certain topics to indirect interest-shaping through bureaucratic 
resistance (Awesti, 2007; Fägersten, 2010; Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Kaunert, Léonard, & 
Occhipinti, 2013; Lavenex, 2010; Marks, 1993).  
Studies of EU JHA overwhelmingly show the cumulative presence of TGNs and ‘intensive 
transgovernmentalism’ and often present this as functional responses to growing interdependence in this 
policy domain (Kahler, 2009, p. 195; cf. Bossong & Hegemann, 2018; Lavenex, 2010; Lavenex & Wallace, 2005; 
Slaughter, 2004). Accounts vary with regard to whether they assess TGNs as dependent structures and mere 
outcomes or as independent actors with the power to influence national preferences and international policy 
choices (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2009; Kahler, 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). They also vary concerning why and 
when TGNs impact formal policymaking and cooperation at the EU level positively or negatively. On the 
‘active’ end of the spectrum, subnational policy entrepreneurs are treated as independent drivers of state 
preferences and institutional choice in the area of EU police cooperation. Here, the self-interest and 
integration initiatives of knowledge-based policing networks act as drivers of national positions and EU 
policy outcomes (Boswell et al., 2011; Bures, 2012; Den Boer, 2010; Wolff, 2015). Franko and Gundhus (2015) 
especially observe the “importance of physical action, excitement and informal connections, rather than legal 
regulatory frameworks and formal and technological connections.” At the same time, they underline the 
persistence of “internal divisions, cultural differences and divided loyalties within what might at first appear 
as a unitary culture of transnational policing.”  
Shifting to the ‘passive’ end of the scope, this means that subnational actors may likewise shape state 
preferences and integration outcomes indirectly in the form of bureaucratic resistance. Such resistance 
transcends the institutionalist notion of the ‘inefficiency of history,’ whereby institutions, national systems, 
structures and practices become progressively more robust towards changes as they evolve and time passes 
(Börzel, 2002, p. 23). Rather, bureaucratic resistance describes diverse domestic cultures and bureaucratic 
interests across Member States, and the “potential gap between decisions on policies or agencies and the 
actual outcomes” (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 278). Especially in areas such as JHA which fall within core state 
powers and predominantly intergovernmental modes of governance, policymaking tends to follow top-
down channels and little leeway seems to exist for subnational influence. 
Bureaucratic resistance to integration decisions arises when top-down decisions or high-level 
governmental preferences collide with the status quo of national executive and administrative officials that 
should ideally support and implement policy choices. Where domestic bureaucratic or policing cultures and 
traditions diverge too strongly, subnational actors may passively or even deliberately resist and hinder the 
evolution of new cultures, networks and practices, including at European level (Kaunert et al., 2013). 
Similarly, (sub-)national executive and administrative structures are not easily transferred to the inter- or 
supranational level, irrespective of state preferences and integration decisions (ibid.; (Fägersten, 2010; Page 
& Wouters, 1995). This may be argued to be especially relevant in the area of EU police cooperation and 
internal security governance, where governments often opt for networked governance or policy outcomes 
that follow the agencification and operationalisation trend (Kassim & Le Galès, 2010; Wolff, 2015; Wolff & 
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Mounier, 2012). EU police cooperation thus hinges to a large extent on the domestic ‘cultural’ dimension and 
willingness of subnational actors to implement decisions. Since this – in conjunction with the growing role of 
security professionals at the EU level – gives national executive and administrative officials considerable 
power in internal security governance, they may use this position to blur the lines between implementation 
and policymaking. Subnational actors can thus act as policy entrepreneurs to impact state preferences and 
advance or hinder integration. 
On the basis of the theoretical literature, this dissertation embraces the notion that subnational policy 
entrepreneurs matter with regard to shaping state preferences and integration in the field of EU police 
cooperation. Accordingly, it conceptualises subnational policy entrepreneurs as local executive and 
administrative officials who act within some relation to the respective national governmental context and 
might form part of transnational advocacy coalitions, TGNs or epistemic communities relevant to EU police 
cooperation. Similar to supranational policy entrepreneurs, subnational actors may seek to influence state 
preferences – and thereby affect institutional choice – in a way that benefits their role in the policy process. 
Depending on the policy area and topic, this could take the shape of a negative or positive impetus towards 
integration. Subnational policy entrepreneurs might influence governments to favour informal, soft modes 
of governance, but they might just as well promote formalisation of cooperation or differentiated forms of 
integration where it suits their aims. However, contrary to EU institutions, they can be expected to rather 
advocate outcomes that delegate power to local executive and administrative officials. If subnational policy 
entrepreneurs do indeed drive state preferences in the area of EU police cooperation and the theoretical 
literature is correct, the following hypothesis should hold true: 
H4: The higher the subnational policy entrepreneurship in a given issue area, the less likely 
Member States are to favour EU police cooperation and integration, and the more likely 
they are to prefer differentiation and decentralised, informal modes of cooperation. 
 
 
3.2 Research Design and Methodology 
The overarching research question studied in this dissertation is: which factors drive the integration 
preferences of EU Member States, and thus shape institutional choice and DI in the area of EU police 
cooperation? The relevance of this question derives, amongst others, from its timeliness. Internal security 
cooperation within the EU has evolved constantly since the 1970s and especially rapidly in the past decade, 
including a clear trend towards increasing institutionalisation. EU Member States demonstrate strong, albeit 
often varying, interests to work together on related issues. Additionally, DI has developed into a core 
characteristic of European integration and is one of the main factors shaping the Union today.  
While the concept as such adequately captures the complexity of European integration dynamics, 
with simultaneously occurring processes of integration and differentiation, it poses a number of significant 
challenges to researchers who intend to analyse this phenomenon. First, numerous models and concepts of 
DI exist but have not been reconciled and often conflict (Dyson & Sepos, 2010; Stubb, 1996). This 
‘overconceptualisation’ has debatably been counterproductive to a coherent use and understanding of DI. 
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The great variety of categorisations makes it difficult to grasp or agree on the concept both analytically and 
theoretically. Second, and very much related, DI remains to be further developed theoretically in many 
regards (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leruth & Lord, 2015). The lack of conceptual consistency has to 
date largely prevented DI from being reconciled in one theoretical framework as well as from being better 
connected to and embedded in established theories of integration. Third, DI has accordingly not been 
sufficiently ‘operationalised’ with a view to enabling comprehensive studies of the functional reality of DI as 
a process or system (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leuffen et al., 2013). Lack of agreement on how to 
define and measure DI has complicated data collection and rigid empirical analysis, which in turn prevents 
empirical research from providing a basis for better theorising the phenomenon. In addition, many studies 
have focussed only on high politics or grand bargains of European integration rather than day-to-day politics. 
The latter, however, represent an important part of EU policy-making, if not the lion’s share, and thus 
constitute a component of European processes of integration and differentiation. 
These challenges of DI beg the question how to manage and reconcile them in a nonetheless solid 
methodological framework. This dissertation attempts to do so by studying DI through the lens of well-
established European integration theories. It sets out to test the explanatory factors of these theories with 
regard to their influence on state preferences on integration (or differentiation) in the realm of EU police 
cooperation. Leuffen et al. (2013, p. 1) describe the EU itself as a ‘system of differentiated integration’ in which 
centralisation and territorial expansion vary across policies. This implies that analysis is not centred around 
the ‘nature of the beast’ but rather around the processes of both vertical, horizontal and functional DI in EU 
internal security. The main aim is to understand how precisely interdependence, politicisation and policy 
entrepreneurship play out in this policy domain to shape state preferences on the degree of vertical and 
horizontal integration as well as the functional scope of integrated policy areas. In order to circumvent the 
problem of conceptual overabundance this dissertation adopts the DI framework put forward by Leuffen et 
al. (2013) who study DI as both system and process.   
Conceptualising DI in such a way makes it ‘operationalisable.’ The three-dimensional model 
provides fertile ground for an empirical analysis intended to find or confirm patterns and regularities of DI. 
The case study chapters of this dissertation focus on the way in which Member States form their preferences 
and make according institutional choices, thereby ultimately shaping differentiation or integration in the area 
of internal security. They particularly assess the explanatory power of three independent factors 
(interdependence, politicisation, policy entrepreneurship), that is, how and to what extent they drive state 
preferences on EU police cooperation. These explanatory factors derive from established theories of European 
integration, and are tested with regard to their relevance for DI, and with the aim of contributing to better DI 
theorising. While it is rather uncontested that interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship 
play a role in integration outcomes, the extent to which they do so and the manner in which they shape the 
integration preferences of Member States is not yet well-understood. How exactly these explanatory factors 
influence state preferences and possibly function as causal mechanisms, as well as whether they can 
sufficiently account for preference formation with regard to DI in the area of EU police cooperation is the 
object of study of this dissertation and its contribution to the theoretical literature on European integration. 
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The respective theory-grounded explanations are compatible with state-centric understandings of 
EU policymaking and rational-design perspectives. They have been chosen, because the area of EU internal 
security is still largely an intergovernmental policy domain, and as such, due to its sensitive nature and 
relevance for national security, relies on rational decision-making in response to risk assessments and 
intelligence reports. Since states are de facto and de jure still in the driver’s seat of EU internal security 
governance, this dissertation investigates the formation of national preferences of Member States, and how 
these in turn shape institutional choice and differentiated integration.  
While Member States (or rather their preferences) remain the main unit of analysis, the analytical 
approach is informed by the understanding that a strict isolation or separation of analytical levels is not 
sensible. Moravcsik himself (1993, p. 482) advocates the importance of disassembling the process behind 
international policy outcomes. Any concrete explanations, he holds, must depart from the processes shaping 
domestic state preferences. This dissertation assesses the emergence and evolution of state preferences within 
EU police cooperation. In line with Windhoff-Héritier (1983) and Scharpf (1985), this dissertation studies 
them primarily as dependent factors whilst bearing in mind that they may act as both determinant and 
outcome of the interaction between structure/polity, process/politics, and function/policy. This means that 
– as integration progresses – state preferences may themselves play a role as determinants of institutional 
choice and processes of DI. Several scholars have stressed the importance of not only studying preferences 
as exogenous to European integration but additionally considering processes of preference endogenisation 
through the ‘feedback loop’ of spill-over effects across time (Pierson, 1996; Schimmelfennig, 2015). In the 
same manner, the causal conditions evaluated in this study – interdependence, politicisation and policy 
entrepreneurship – may appear as both exogenous and endogenous factors to European integration. Leuffen 
et al. (2015, p. 9) for example argue that interdependence can shape integration preferences as an ‘external 
factor,’ namely negative externalities that make unilateral action unattractive, or as an ‘internal factor’ in the 
form of spill-overs from other integration decisions on different issues that create demand for more 
integration. In other words, structure and agency are both important (see table 1). 
In a nutshell, this dissertation seeks to shed light on the factors driving national preferences of EU 
Member States on integration in the area of EU police cooperation, and thus shaping institutional choice and 
DI (processes of differentiation and integration). In particular, the analytical chapters assess how and to what 
extent interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship from below and above affect the formation of 
preferences. The research question this dissertation poses is accordingly: 
How and to what extent do interdependence, politicisation and supra-/subnational policy 
entrepreneurship shape the integration preferences of Member States in EU police 
cooperation? 
Each chapter evaluates how these factors play out over time, impacting state preferences and yielding 
different integration outcomes that diverge in their degrees of centralisation and territorial extension as well 
as the respective functional scope of cooperation (see table 2). In this context, the dissertation not only seeks 
to investigate how and to what extent each explanatory factor shapes the preferences of EU Member States 
but moreover how the relative importance of each driving factor potentially varies across time and with 
regard to the three dimensions of DI. While more research is of course needed, the findings of this study 
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should additionally allow for some overarching conclusions about the drivers of differentiated integration in 
the area of EU police cooperation and how we might explain processes of differentiation and integration 
respectively. 
 The object of analysis remains the Member State-level of EU internal security cooperation, that is, 
national governments embodied by high-ranking officials, executives and senior civil servants (cf. Benyon et 
al., 1993). The analysis itself is conducted through a qualitative causal case-study approach that compares the 
processes around a number of institutional ‘milestones’ in the evolution of EU police cooperation since its 
inception in the 1970s until today. It particularly focuses on four cases (see table 1). In line with the ‘waves’ 
of EU internal security cooperation, these constitute substantive integration outcomes over time that changed 
the nature of internal security and especially police cooperation in the EU. Among them are respectively: (1) 
the creation of the Trevi Group in 1976 as an intergovernmental network between twelve Member States of 
the EEC; (2) the 1995 Europol Convention establishing the European Police Office; (3) the 2009 Europol 
Council Decision which established Europol as official EU agency; and (4) the 2016 Europol Regulation that 
represents the most recent change of the organisation’s legal framework and entails a number of further 
powers for EU actors, especially the Commission. 
 These milestones may well all represent significant qualitative ‘quantum leaps’ of EU police 
cooperation. Yet, they display variation with regard to their contextual conditions and respective state 
preferences across the three dimensions of DI, thereby leading to divergence in the concrete institutional 
choices or integration outcomes. The case studies differ in their degree of centralisation and territorial 
extension as well as in the functional scope of EU cooperation. European police cooperation in the 1970s 
comprised predominantly informal or semi-formalised arrangements including several transgovernmental 
counterterrorism networks and the intergovernmental Trevi Group. Instances of increasingly 
institutionalised, yet still highly decentralised cooperation only emerged around the 1990s, for example in 
the form of the Europol Convention. By contrast, the two more recent case studies on the Europol Council 
Decision and Regulation of the past decade demonstrate institutional choices that move EU police 
cooperation towards stronger centralisation and a rapidly widening functional scope.  At the same time, each 
case likewise contains examples of differentiation preferences. However, sometimes these were never 
reflected in the ultimate institutional outcome, because they had to give way to integration preferences. 
Against it, some instances of differentiation have increasingly emerged in parallel with integration structures, 
especially since the early 2000s, and have debatably led to the development of an interesting, ever closer 
relationship between formal and informal forms of governance in the area of EU police cooperation. Finally, 
the cases differ with regard to the Member States most relevant for each integration outcome. Whereas 
Germany, France and the UK mattered most for the creation of the 1970s TREVI Group, the establishment of 
Europol in the 1990s was most influenced by Italy, the UK and Germany. From 2000 onwards, an increasing 
number of different Member States acted as initiators of EU police cooperation on different occasions, leading 
amongst others to the transformation of Europol into an EU agency in 2009 and to the adoption of the Europol 
Regulation in 2016 respectively. In its analysis, this dissertation focusses not on all EU Member States 
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but on the preference formation of the most important governments for each ‘milestone’ who initiated 
or significantly shaped the integration process in each case. 
Process-tracing presents an appropriate method to this end, as it enables the precise identification of 
‘key players.’ Because the main research interest lies on how interdependence, politicisation and policy 
entrepreneurship impact preference formation, process-tracing furthermore allows for reaching an in-depth 
understanding of the causal processes leading to the respective state preferences and integration outcomes 
in each case (Bennett & Checkel, 2015; cf. Brady & Collier, 2004; Caporaso, 2009; Collier, 2011; George & 
Bennett, 2004). With a view to reaching a broader understanding of how these factors function as causal 
conditions that ignite particular causal mechanisms in the larger process of DI, conclusions may be drawn 
comparatively across the different causal case studies and  the  findings  from  process-tracing  in  each  case  
(Beach  &  Pedersen,  2016; George & Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2007; Ragin, 1987; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). 
As this study seeks to test the relevance of different explanatory factors or causal conditions, process-tracing 
allows opening up the black box in which these factors are active and scrutinising how exactly they operate 
via particular causal mechanisms in a causal process (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). Or, in the words of Frank 
Schimmelfennig (2015, p. 100): “[...]theory-testing analyses of European integration require process tracing 
for both theoretical and methodological reasons.” In a similar vein, Barton and Lazarsfeld (1979, p. 83 ff.) as 
well as Mayring (2010, p. 23 f.) stress the importance of qualitative methods in the context of theory- and 
hypothesis-testing. 
 
Table 1.  Drivers of State Preferences from a Structuration Perspective.18  
Structural factors Asymmetrical interdependence 
Reluctance to integrate in areas of core state powers 
Contextual factors 
‘windows of opportunity’ 
Politicisation 
Crises and external shocks 
Agency 
 
 
Supranational entrepreneurs 
Prefer classical integration 
(Sub)national policy entrepreneurs 
Prefer differentiated, decentralised integration 
Assumptions about agents Motivated by rational self-interest and/or by norms (e.g. European 
security cultures) that are empirically manifested into preferences 
 
Source:   Author, based on Giddens (1986). 
 
  
 
18 The author would like to thank Adina Maricut-Akbik for suggesting this table. 
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Consequently, the techniques applied in the process-tracing analysis comprise qualitative content analysis 
and problem-centred interviews. For every case, an in-depth study of each process leading up to the specific 
preference and outcome was carried out. This was done in a backward manner, departing from the particular 
outcome and then tracing the process backwards by identifying the most relevant Member States, their 
individual preferences, concrete underlying causal mechanisms and the original scope conditions. The 
primary focus lay on detecting the possible presence of the explanatory factors under scrutiny. The analysis 
was based on the following theory-grounded assumptions: If the explanatory factors act as causal conditions 
of EU police cooperation, they should be empirically observable in the form of entities or actors engaging in 
concrete activities that transmit causal forces from the scope condition to the integration outcome. Put 
differently, it should be possible to trace the effects of interdependence, politicisation and policy 
entrepreneurship by observing particular causal mechanisms moving along causal forces (‘mechanistic 
evidence’) from the explanatory factors to pro-integration preferences and perhaps even positive integration 
outcomes (Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Bennett & Checkel, 2015). This in turn should provide evidence to either 
confirm or reject the theoretical hypotheses formulated for each driving factor (see table 3). 
 For each causal case study, process-tracing was done in the form of content analysis of primary and 
secondary sources revealing information about national preferences in the process. These include ‘hard’ 
primary sources such as policy documents and official government and EU documents, but also formal legal 
texts, political speeches and press statements. To this end, archival research was conducted in national and 
EU archives in Brussels, Koblenz, London and Paris where over 400 archival sources on the chosen case 
studies were extracted. These comprised formerly undisclosed internal policy documents, communications, 
letters and briefings, mostly from national ministries of the interior or justice but also pertaining to other 
ministries, national government officials and EU institutions. Additionally, secondary sources were assessed 
wherever relevant, ranging from media and academic accounts to publicly available political and historic 
records. All documents were evaluated qualitatively through structured content analysis with an analytical 
focus on mentions of the explanatory factors, mechanistic evidence thereof or data falling within these 
categories (Gläser & Laudel, 2010; Mayring, 2010, p. 67 ff.). 
While part of the process likewise comprised summarising information so as to trace and recreate 
the process leading to a particular preference or integration outcome, the main aim of the content analysis 
was to detect mechanistic evidence for the presence and relevance of interdependence, politicisation and 
supra-/subnational policy entrepreneurship in the formation of state preferences. Accordingly, for each 
category a number of rules and criteria were previously defined that needed to be fulfilled for the respective 
explanatory factor to qualify as demonstrating a certain degree of presence and potential influence.19 If for 
instance an archival record exhibited recognition of excessive demands on single government efforts and 
unilateral solutions in the area of internal security and police work, this was marked as evidence of ‘high 
interdependence.’ The causal mechanism at work here could for instance become manifest in functional 
pressure to cooperate in order to cope with increasingly interconnected threats.  
 
19 see annex A for an overview of the criteria 
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Table 3.  Drivers of State Preferences and Theoretical Hypotheses. 
Issue-specific Interdependence 
H1:             The higher the interdependence in security issues, the more likely Member States are 
to favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
Politicisation 
H2.1:         The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the more likely Member States are 
to favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
H2.2:         The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the less likely Member States are  
to favour EU police cooperation and integration, and the more likely they are to 
prefer differentiation and decentralised, informal modes of cooperation. 
H2.3:          The higher the politicisation in a given issue area, the less likely Member States are to 
favour any police cooperation at EU level. 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
Supranational 
H3:              The higher the supranational policy entrepreneurship in a given issue area, the more 
likely Member States are to favour EU police cooperation and integration. 
Subnational 
H4:             The higher the subnational policy entrepreneurship in a given issue area, the less  
likely Member States are to favour EU police cooperation and integration, and the 
more likely they are to prefer differentiation and decentralised, informal modes of 
cooperation. 
 
Source:   Author. 
 
 
In addition to archival documents, semi-structured, problem-centred interviews complement the analysis. 
They were conducted with high-level senior officials, executives and practitioners from the national and 
European level, as well as with security experts from the field of EU police cooperation and internal security. 
In total, 46 qualitative interviews were carried out over a period of 16 months, including 13 women and 33 
men (see table 4). The results were summarised strategically in the form of comprehensive interview 
summaries (Gläser & Laudel, 2010; Mayring, 2010, p. 67 ff.). The reduced findings were analysed qualitatively 
according to the same criteria applied to the archival document analysis. Where interviewees for example 
underlined the strong presence or involvement of supra- or subnational actors in the decision-making phase 
or policy process of an integration outcome, this was coded as ‘high influence of supra-/subnational policy 
entrepreneurship.’ At each step of the assessment of the interview data, the content summaries and 
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preliminary results were continuously re-evaluated with regard to whether they were still authentic to the 
original content. Following this constant feedback loop in the data reduction and summary phase, the final 
conclusions from the interviews were comparatively analysed and checked against the findings and data 
extracted from the archival document analysis. All results were ultimately analysed in the context of the 
broader historic process and with regard to the evidence they provided for causal mechanisms at work, 
linking state preferences and integration outcomes with explanatory factors. 
The combination of these techniques aims at methodological triangulation through the synthesis of 
findings from process observations, document analysis, and interviews in each causal case study. Of course, 
certain limitations to the application of these methods remain nevertheless. While archival research and 
document analysis may work rather well for the first two case studies – the TREVI Group of the 1970s and 
the inception of Europol in the 1990s – many policy documents related to the other two, more recent cases 
are not publicly available (yet). On the other hand, elite interviews may only be possible for the more recent 
case studies, as eye witnesses of the creation of TREVI may no longer be available or not be able to reliably 
reproduce a process that occurred almost fifty years ago. Therefore, this dissertation places the 
methodological emphasis for the first case study (1970s) on archival document analysis rather than 
interviews, for the second case study (1990s) on both archival research and interviews, and for the remaining 
two cases (early 2000s) mostly on elite interviews supplementing the analysis of publicly available 
documents. 
On the basis of the DI model put forward by Leuffen et al. (2013), this dissertation studies the 
explanatory power of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship as drivers of state 
preferences on European integration in the area of police cooperation. In the following case study chapters, 
it traces the influence of these three factors on the formation of integration preferences across the three 
dimensions of DI: vertical, horizontal and functional scope. While the analytical focus lies on the impact on 
state preferences and the causal sequence of preference formation, the historic process-tracing approach of 
this dissertation necessarily likewise touches upon institutional choice and integration outcomes respectively. 
 
Table 4. List of Elite Interviews. 
 
No. Date  Affiliated Institution / Organisation 
 
1-5 August 2017 European Police Office 
6 October 2017 European Commission 
7  February 2018 European Drugs Unit/European Police Office 
8-11 Participants at the European Police Congress, Berlin 
12-13 European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs 
14 March 2018 European Drugs Unit/European Police Office 
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15 European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs 
16-20 Participants at the Security & Counter Terror Expo, London 
21 April 2018 European Drugs Unit/European Police Office 
22 State Office of Criminal Investigation Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany 
23 Think Tank/Academia 
24 May 2018 German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) 
25-26 CYBERSEC European Cybersecurity Forum 
27 Europol Management Board 
28 European Police Office 
29 European Police Office 
30 Think Tank/Academia 
31 June 2018 European Police Office 
32 July 2018 European Police Office 
33 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG Justice and Home 
Affairs 
34 European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs 
35 August 2018 Europol National Unit 
36-37 NATO Communications and Information Agency 
38 Dutch Ministry of General Affairs 
39 European Police Office 
40  September 2018 German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)/Federal Ministry of the  
  Interior (BMI) 
41 October 2018 Think Tank/Academia  
42 Berlin Police Office 
43 European Police Office 
44 European Police Office 
45  November 2018 European Vehicle and Driving License Information System (EUCARIS) 
46  European Vehicle and Driving License Information System (EUCARIS) 
 
 
Source:   Author. 
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4. The Trevi Group: Birth Hour of European Police 
Cooperation 
This chapter takes a closer look at the influence of the different driving factors on the formation of state 
preferences regarding EU police cooperation in the 1970s. It seeks to investigate how and to what extent cross-
country interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship impacted preferences in the process that 
ultimately led to the initiation of the Trevi Group that was launched by the EC’s Interior Ministers as semi-
formal platform to facilitate police cooperation on terrorism TREVI. To this end, it focuses on the preference 
formation of Germany, France and the UK – the key initiating countries of the Trevi Group. 
Interdependencies arguably played a key role as necessary condition and starting point for the development 
of pro-cooperation positions. The process leading to the creation of TREVI furthermore demonstrates the 
ambiguous impact of politicisation as both reinforcement and deterrence of preferences in favour of 
European cooperation. Finally, subnational policy entrepreneurship – primarily by domestic police officials 
– likewise mattered as influencer and amplifier of national preferences. However, the extent to which this 
factor was able to shape governmental positions differed greatly across national security systems and 
cultures. Supranational policy entrepreneurs, by contrast, were completely absent from the preference 
formation of Germany, France and the UK; they only mattered as passive actors in the policy process. The 
influence of these driving factors additionally diverged across the three dimensions of DI. High 
interdependence acted as primary influence on positive state positions concerning vertical and horizontal 
integration. Subnational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation, by contrast, had the highest impact on 
state preferences regarding the functional scope of cooperation. Before turning towards a critical analysis of 
the role played by interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship, in the following this chapter 
provides an outline of its structure alongside a brief historic overview of the main developments leading to 
the creation of TREVI.
The Trevi Group was launched at a Council meeting of EEC interior ministers in June 1976. Although 
TREVI was designed exclusively intergovernmental in nature and deliberately situated outside the official 
EC framework, it can be argued to constitute the first real attempt at developing European structures in this 
area and presumably presents the predecessor of EU police cooperation (Ahnfelt & From, 1993, p. 192; Busch, 
1988; Fijnaut & Hermans, 1987; Giering, 1997, p. 117; Hebenton & Thomas, 1995, p. 70 ff.). To this end, it 
arguably formed the first step towards DI in the policy domain of policing and internal security. Although 
its horizontal extension comprised all nine EC Member States at the time, vertically one can hardly argue 
there to have been any kind of ‘deepening’ initially, since TREVI was established as an intergovernmental 
group strictly outside the framework of the Community. Yet, a certain degree of centralisation and 
formalisation had occurred with the launch of TREVI as first practical format for European police 
cooperation, thus laying the foundation for future vertical integration, including through the Group’s close 
association with the EC in its structure, regularity and ways of working. Nonetheless, TREVI’s original 
functional scope was limited to a single issue area: counterterrorism. TREVI consequently constituted an 
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early form of European police cooperation that, albeit of inherently intergovernmental nature, already 
comprised certain characteristics situating it between a mere state-driven body and the EC.  
This chapter traces the process leading to its establishment as well as marking its early years. This 
process exhibited conflicting state preferences on the degree of (until then non-existent) integration in this 
issue area. Germany, France and the UK particularly shaped the policy process in this respect and were most 
vocal about their preferences on police cooperation, which can be summarised across the three dimensions 
of DI: the envisioned level of centralisation, the functional scope and the territorial extension (see figure 5; cf. 
Leuffen, Rittberger, & Schimmelfennig, 2013). While Germany had a strong preference for a high level of 
centralisation, the UK and France vehemently opposed plans for a rather hierarchical structure with a certain 
authority of its own. It thus does not come as a surprise that Germany was unable to assert its preference, 
and TREVI was ultimately established as an informal, strictly intergovernmental body for the exchange of 
information and best practices instead of binding political and operational cooperation. Concerning its 
functional scope, Germany and – at least initially – the UK advocated a range of internal security issues to be 
covered by European cooperation. However, France demonstrated an outspoken reluctance for TREVI to 
cover more than a single issue. When the UK eventually likewise shifted its preference to focussing on the 
fight against terrorism, TREVI was launched with the latter topic as its single priority. Finally, on territorial 
extension, the three countries concurred; they aimed for universal membership, ideally via the United 
Nations (UN) or Interpol. Since this was not possible, Germany, France and the UK agreed on the framework 
of the Community for membership in the Trevi Group.  
While the main focus of this dissertation lies on the explanation of state preferences, this chapter 
with its historical process-tracing approach necessarily also touches upon the implications for the final 
institutional outcome. The analysis shows that the ultimate institutional choice – a cooperation format with 
inherently intergovernmental characteristics but a strong potential for DI – reflects an asymmetrical influence 
of different driving factors across these countries. This asymmetry caused different degrees of integration 
pressure in each Member State, which in turn translated into different preferences and bargaining positions 
in the negotiations. The concrete choice to launch TREVI as a semi-formal cooperation format outside the EC 
framework but strongly linked to the latter would present a stepping stone for deeper integration in the 
future, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate.  
 
Sketching the Process: First Steps Towards a European Conference on Internal Security 
The first vision for a common European approach can be argued to go back to the Summer Olympics of 1972 
(see figure 6). Held in Germany, they were overshadowed by an attack from a Palestinian terrorist 
organisation on the Israeli team, which subsequently became known as the Munich Massacre (cf. German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1972, 1973, p. 3; Oberloskamp, 2012). Eleven members of the Israeli Olympic 
team were taken hostage and killed after failed negotiations, alongside one German police officer and five 
terrorists. One week after the attack, German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel called for the collective fight 
against international terrorism at an EEC meeting in Frascati on 12 September 1972 (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 47; 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b, p. 3). Consequently, three WGs were established in the 
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framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)20 and tasked to deal with questions related to 
terrorism and surveillance of foreign nationals (MR Merk, 1973a). However, cooperation in this format never 
took off and already petered out a few months later (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975a).  
Germany launched a new attempt at instigating European internal security cooperation in early 
1973, this time outside the EPC format (see figure 6). The impulse came from top political levels. Hans-
Dietrich Genscher himself, Minister of the Interior, initiated the process towards a European conference on 
internal security (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975a). In the light of the 1972 experience with failed 
counterterrorism action in the EPC framework, Germany deliberately chose to adopt a more flexible, 
piecemeal approach. Consequently and contrary to its original intentions, Germany did not inform all nine 
EEC Member States of its plans for a European conference on internal security but established bilateral 
contact with France in the beginning of 1974 to discuss ideas (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1974b). 
First talks with senior officials at the French Ministry of the Interior (FMI) in February revealed a general 
willingness on the part of France to develop European cooperation further (MR Merk, 1974a). In view of the 
‘aggravated security situation in Western Europe’ and the ‘internationalisation of organised crime,’ France 
concurred with regard to the need for a European conference on internal security (ibid., p. 2). Interestingly, 
while both countries emphasised the increase in international interdependencies and the subsequent need to 
strengthen interstate cooperation on internal security, they differed with regard to the exact scope and extent 
of such an endeavour.  Germany, for various reasons, favoured a new initiative among EEC Member States 
in the hope of prompting sustainable, long-term cooperation not only on the fight against organised crime or 
terrorism but on the entire area of internal security (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b). What is 
more, Germany envisioned this comprehensive cooperation as an important building block in the context of 
European integration and intended for it to become a core pillar of the latter (German Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, 1973b; MR Merk, 1973a; MR’n von Rottenburg, 1973). By contrast, France made very clear that it was 
not prepared to create a new multilateral initiative, as several attempts to spur similar action on a global level 
– for instance at the UN or the CoE – had proved cumbersome at best, if not unsuccessful. Instead, France 
expressed a preference for the bilateral intensification of cooperation among EEC Member States (MR Merk, 
1974a-b). 
The bilateral Franco-German WG on ‘general questions of internal security’ that was established in 
September 1974 can be seen as a first step towards a European conference on internal security (see figure 6; 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1974b; MR Merk, 1974c). While this group’s initially declared 
purpose was the improvement of Franco-German cooperation, beginning with the fight against transnational 
organised crime, Germany was keen on clearly situating these efforts within the larger context of preparations 
for a common EEC policy on internal security (MR Merk, 1974b). The results of the WG and the experience 
from bilateral cooperation were to form the basis for discussing multilateral EEC cooperation at the 
envisioned conference on internal security (MR Merk, 1974c). After a number of transgovernmental and 
ministerial  meetings,  the French and German  Ministers of the  Interior  agreed  on  22 August 1975  that  the  
 
 
20 political cooperation between Member States in the area of foreign policy 
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European conference would require thorough preparations of at least a year. They decided to announce their 
plans at a meeting of EEC Interior Ministers in October (MinRat Streicher, 1975; RD Bracht, 1975). 
 
Speeding Up the Process: The United Kingdom’s Involvement 
The situation changed when the UK became involved one month later during a visit of Lord John Harris, 
British Minister of State for the Home Office (HO), at the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) in 
Bonn (Maihofer, 1975; MinRat Streicher, 1975). Amongst others, a positive referendum outcome concerning 
British EEC membership had cleared the way for the UK to become proactive with regard to European police 
cooperation (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, pp. 54 ff. & 263 ff.; S. Wall, 2013, p. 589 f.). On 14 October 1975, in a 
minute to the Prime Minister, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins formally proposed the initiation of a meeting of 
Community Interior Ministers to discuss “[…]expanding co-operation in the European Community on 
matters of common interest to Ministers of the Interior, particularly in the fields of counter-terrorism and of 
technical support for police operations” (Jenkins, 1975).  In a similar vein Foreign Secretary James Callaghan 
shortly after described Jenkins’ efforts as “explor[ing...] the possibilities for consultation and cooperation on 
a Community basis[...]” (Callaghan, 1975b). Interestingly, at this point the UK was completely oblivious to 
the German efforts towards the same goal and vice versa. Only during Lord Harris’ visit in Bonn in October 
1975 did Germany become aware of the British intentions. 
Three points are particularly worth noting with respect to the UK’s vision for European police 
cooperation. First, the original impetus came from ministerial levels. The meeting that would effectively 
launch TREVI was suggested by the British Home Secretary himself. In coordination with the British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Cabinet, he recommended to present the idea at highest political 
levels, namely through a formal proposal at the European Council. Second, the early British government 
preference demonstrates a strong Community emphasis, and shows no reservations with regard to a gain of 
EEC competences or a loss of national sovereignty respectively. On the contrary, HO documents demonstrate 
that, while home affairs had not traditionally been a Community policy area, “the Home Secretary believes 
that, in this field as in others, the tendency is likely to be, and should be, increasingly to shift the weight of 
effort from the Council to the Community, which is a tighter and more effective institution” (Armstrong, 
1975). Third and finally, it is worth underscoring the pace at which British plans for a meeting of EEC Interior 
Ministers were advanced subsequent to the positive referendum outcome. By the time Prime Minister Wilson 
gave his consent to officially move forward with the HO proposal – not even half a year after the successful 
EEC membership referendum – intradepartmental coordination among the British ministries was already at 
full speed, and informal soundings had been undertaken with France and Germany (Callaghan, 1975b; 
Jenkins, 1975; Wright, 1975a). Whereas the vision of the Franco-German WG – in line with the German 
preference – had been a well-prepared conference among the nine EEC Interior Ministers that would produce 
a substantial policy outcome in the form of concrete decisions, the UK prioritised a fast realisation with the 
aim of creating multilateral WGs and direct practical exchange rather than political decisions and long-term 
cooperation (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975a; VLRI von der Gablentz, 1975). Accordingly, British 
Foreign Minister James Callaghan announced the proposal informally to the EEC Ministers at a gathering in 
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Lucca, Italy, in October 1974 (see figure 6). The proposal was subsequently agreed as agenda item for the 
European Council meeting in Rome in December (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975c). 
Thus pressured to act, Germany reacted by pro-actively engaging with the UK in an attempt to shape 
the British initiative and approximate preferences on a number of points. In this context, Germany strongly 
suggested to not organise the resulting cooperation within the EPC framework, as the UK had intended, 
because of the experience with the failed EPC WGs from 1972 (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975a; 
RegDir Bracht, 1975a-b). The compromise that was ultimately struck foresaw that the responsible EEC 
Ministers, followed by senior officials and experts, would not meet within the EPC format but rather outside 
any formal EEC body. Nevertheless, intensified cooperation among Member States was to be conducted in 
close connection to the work of EEC bodies (RegDir Bracht, 1975b; VLRI von der Gablentz, 1975). Concerning 
the timing of the conference, the UK wanted it to be held as soon as possible, preferably in early 1976, whereas 
Germany and France preferred the conference to be organised towards the end of the year with more time 
available for preparatory work, clarifying the details of the envisaged outcome and facilitating concrete 
decisions (MinRat Streicher, 1975; VLRI von der Gablentz, 1975). Especially Germany sought to change the 
British position in advance of the European Council meeting (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975a; 
RegDir Bracht, 1975a-b).  
Nonetheless, the UK moved forward and introduced its initiative at the Rome meeting of the 
European Council, where agreement was struck and the proposal accepted (MinRat Streicher & RegDir 
Bracht, 1975b). Consequently, Germany – in close coordination with France – conceded the earlier point in 
time for the conference. It was set to June 1976, the official beginning of operations of the Trevi Group, and 
would be prepared by EEC senior officials at transgovernmental level (MinRat Streicher, 1976; MinRat 
Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975b). A major point of controversy, however, remained the targeted outcome of 
the ministerial meeting in June, that is, the institutional choice for this new cooperation format. While  
Germany had hoped for a substantial policy outcome such as concrete decisions on long-term cooperation 
among EEC Member States, the UK envisaged practical police cooperation through the establishment of WGs 
(MinRat Streicher, 1975; RD Bracht, 1975). In advance of the meeting of EEC Ministers of the Interior in June 
1976, Germany began to lobby extensively for its pro-integration preference. Next to bi- and multilateral 
preparatory talks with other Member States, Germany formally put forward its alternative vision to the 
British proposal. A paper conceptualising possible topics and outcomes of the conference, effectively rivalling 
and far exceeding the scope of the British paper, was circulated to all EEC Members before the first 
preparatory meeting of EEC Officials on 20 February 1976 (MinRat Streicher, 1976).  
France, contrary to Germany, very much welcomed the British ideas for European police 
cooperation. While French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing believed in “[…]an independent and coherent 
Europe,” and – like Germany – pursued the aim of closer cooperation with the ultimate target of achieving a 
political European Union, France favoured a model of decentralisation, including on the European level. 
Consequently, when the UK presented its proposal at senior officials level in Paris, the French side agreed 
but rather saw the purpose of the ministerial meeting as “a cover [to some extent] for closer and less formal 
collaboration on a bilateral basis between them and [...the UK], and[...] some others (Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy[...]” (Tomkins, 1975a).  
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Preference Divergence and Strategic Differentiation 
In view of the French and British positions, by early 1976 Germany had come to accept that its comprehensive 
plans for European internal security cooperation would not be realisable right away. However, it was 
determined to lay the foundation for binding, long-term decisions by including as many elements of its 
original vision as possible. An internal memo for the German Minister of the Interior from January 1976 
demonstrates just how far-reaching the plans for European internal security cooperation already were at the 
time (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1976). 
Previous internal discussions across various federal ministries had already focussed on the eventual 
accomplishment of a full political European union in 1974 (German Federal Foreign Office, 1974a-b). 
However, a full union was not deemed realisable all at once, especially due to the overall sentiment within 
the EEC and certain Member States in particular. Consequently a ‘step-by-step approach’ of differentiated 
integration was thought promising on the way forward (ibid.).  Building on these internal discussions, in the 
beginning of 1976 the German preference, with a view to the long run, included the aim for an international 
convention that would formalise cooperation and legally ‘bind’ Member States (MinRat Streicher & RegDir 
Bracht, 1976). As the British preference for a rather loose and practically oriented cooperation format rendered 
the immediate achievement of this goal unlikely, Germany began to lobby multilaterally at the 
transgovernmental level of EEC officials tasked with the preparation of the ministerial meeting in June 
(MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975b). In this context, Germany advocated the adoption of a political 
declaration of intent at the June conference, which it resorted to as a first ‘building block’ given that neither 
far-reaching political decisions nor concrete, long-term commitment were to be expected (MinRat Streicher, 
1976; MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1976; MR Merk & RegDir Bracht, 1976a; RegDir Bracht, 1976a).  
In the course of the first half of 1976 Germany significantly shaped the working level preparations 
for the summit, for instance through an active involvement in drafting the outcome documents. By the time 
the nine EEC Interior Ministers met in Luxembourg on 29 June, officially marking the inception of the Trevi 
Group, Germany had succeeded in introducing core elements of its preference. While no political declaration 
of intent had been achieved, substantial text sections from the German proposal were included in the 
resulting resolution and press statement (MR Merk, 1976a; RegDir Bracht, 1976b; cf. MinRat Bochmann & RR 
Schöneich, 1976b). They stressed the necessity for permanent cooperation on the entire area of internal 
security, and expressed the intention to hold a follow-up second ministerial conference  (MR Merk, 1976a, 
pp. 1–3). The German preference for permanent, increasingly formalised cooperation would continue to be 
vocalised on different working levels subsequent to the ministerial launch of the Trevi Group (MR Merk & 
RegDir Bracht, 1976b). Nonetheless, the outcome of the first meeting of TREVI remained much behind 
German expectations and ultimately reflected the British preference; it for instance focussed very much on 
counterterrorism and practical police cooperation through the TREVI WGs rather than more comprehensive 
political decisions on general internal security (RegDir Bracht, 1975a, 1976b). While Germany nonetheless 
considered the conference and inception of TREVI a success, even ‘significant progress’ (MR Merk, 1976a, p. 
3), it would have preferred farther-reaching measures with regard to institutionalising cooperation – a goal 
it then determinedly pursued on the level of the WGs (RegDir Bracht, 1976b). At the same time, France would 
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continue to overall demonstrate an unwillingness to advance the Community initiative, while the UK would 
remain largely reluctant to formalise TREVI but was generally in favour of expanding contacts and practical 
cooperation.  
Against the backdrop of this historic overview of the inception of the Trevi Group, the following 
sections more specifically assess the impact of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship 
on the formation of state preferences. They demonstrate that interdependence most strongly drove pro-
integration preferences, particularly on vertical and horizontal integration, while politicisation and 
subnational policy entrepreneurship primarily shaped government positions on the functional scope of 
European police cooperation. By contrast, supranational advocacy neither played a significant role nor did it 
have a noticeable effect on EC Member States in advance of the creation of TREVI.  
 
 
4.1 The Community and Terrorism: Interconnected in Causes and Effects? 
A growing interdependence among EC Member States with regard to ensuring their internal security became 
increasingly apparent in the 1970s, even before the Munich Massacre. On the one hand, a Europe-wide factual 
increase in the (cross-border) activities of criminal and particularly terrorist groups called the existing 
domestic security infrastructures in question (see tables 5, 6 and 7). In addition, the rising number of terrorist 
incidents across Member States was progressively publicised and framed as a peaking interconnectedness in 
the effects of certain security threats within the EC. While issue-specific interdependencies (mostly in the 
fight against terrorism) played an important role with regard to the British and the German preference, 
especially on vertical and horizontal integration. They were much less perceived by France and remained 
largely insignificant in the context of its preference concerning TREVI. This section now turns towards a more 
in-depth look at the influence of interdependence on the German, French and British positions. 
 
Germany 
The factual increase in domestic and cross-border activities of terrorism and organised crime provided a key 
impetus for Germany to favour European police cooperation (German Federal Criminal Police Office, 1973, 
1977; cf. German Federal Ministry of the Interior and German Federal Criminal Police Office, 1970; Saupe, 
2015; SPD, 1969, 1972). There can be no doubt that strong interdependencies – connecting German internal 
security to the home affairs of other Member States – intensified in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. 
Assessments of the  German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) for instance reported the growing 
transnationalisation of terrorism, as domestic terrorist cells such as the RAF took advantage of foreign 
networks and the emerging interdependencies through economic liberalisation within the EEC (Herold, 1974, 
1975b). While terrorists and criminals thus began to conceptualise the EEC as one single territory in which to 
act, Member States – the BKA argued – still acted in isolation and were lacking a permanent system of cross-
border cooperation and information exchange, a prerequisite for meeting the emerging security challenges 
(Herold, 1975b, p. 5).  
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This position likewise appeared in internal BMI documents, including bilateral discussions with the 
FCO (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975a; Bullard, 1975; German Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, 1974a, 1975a-c; MR Merk, 1974a). Following a meeting between Lord Harris from the British HO 
with German Federal Minister of the Interior Werner Maihofer in September 1975, one official noted:  
“[...p]olice investigations had[...] revealed the extent of close links between terrorists in different 
countries and this was encouraging the Germans to seek close collaboration with governments 
and police forces of other states” (Bullard, 1975).  
At the same time, terrorism did not even amount to one percent of all recorded criminal acts in Germany, 
although the number of incidents had risen sharply by the second half of 1975  (Bullard, 1975; Katzenstein, 
2008, p. 161; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017). The German 
government regardless dedicated considerable attention to the matter. This possibly suggests that other 
reasons may have existed which elevated the relevance of the subject. 
 Apart from the factual increase in external interdependence, the perception of an emerging ‘security 
deficit’ and growing internal interdependencies were present from the very beginning. In relation to the 
visions of the Rome Treaty, particularly the European customs union and internal market, both the Standing 
Conference of State Interior Ministers (IMK) and the BKA repeatedly stressed the need to enhance 
international cooperation to offset the effects of these developments and still be able to effectively manage 
German internal security (Bochmann, 1974; German Federal Criminal Police Office, 1976b; Herold, 1974). 
While subnational levels largely focused on emphasising concrete issue-specific interdependencies in the area 
of internal security, the national level appeared to be primarily influenced by the broader political 
interdependencies emerging within the EEC as part of the integration process. German political elites were 
quite aware of the Cold War situation and the tensions it brought with it at the international level (cf. party 
manifestos: CDU, 1969; CDU/CSU, 1972; FDP, 1969, 1972, SPD, 1969, 1972). German politics of the late 1960s 
and 1970s were marked by a strong emphasis on peace in Europe and the world.  
 In this context, intra-German relations and a possible reunification were closely associated with an 
enhancement of general East-West relations as well as with an intensification of relations between EEC 
Member States in the context of ensuring their common security (ibid.). A quick and effective achievement of 
concrete measures and sustainable cooperation – a core political target (cf. RegDir Bracht, 1976a) – was 
perceived unlikely on an international level (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b). Thus, all main 
German parties regarded European integration towards a political union of European Member States as a 
desirable and necessary development. Integration in these areas was seen as a crucial prerequisite and 
building block for the reunification of Germany and political integration of Europe (German Federal Foreign 
Office, 1974a, 1976; MR Merk, 1976b). It is therefore even less surprising that Germany developed a strong 
preference for security cooperation among EEC Member States. What is more, Germany was of the opinion 
at the time that the survival of the EEC and ultimately European integration depended on the leadership of 
Germany, the UK and France. In this context, reiterating the French position, German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt for instance stated that “without a good triangular relationship of this sort, the EEC would go down 
the drain” (Wright, 1976, p. 2). This was uttered rather fittingly at a meeting with the British Prime Minister 
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in Bonn on 30 June 1976, the day after the first meeting of EEC Interior Ministers had officially commenced 
TREVI and thereby European police cooperation. 
 The German preference for permanent cooperation in the policy domain of internal security and 
policing was thus shaped in part by security (external) interdependencies and in part by political (internal) 
interdependencies. Considering the close coordination and exchange between subnational and federal levels, 
it is not surprising that both external and internal cross-country linkages soon came to be frequently cited 
alongside one another in internal government documents preparing the ministerial conference in June 1976 
that marked the launch of TREVI (see for example German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1975, 1976; MR 
Merk & RegDir Bracht, 1976a). Both factors arguably reinforced one another to favourably influence the 
German preference on integration. The emergence of international terrorism on the one hand as well as the 
provisions of the Rome Treaty – envisaging among other things a passport union and the abolition of border 
controls – raised interdependence in the fight against organised crime and international terrorism, and 
exerted functional pressure on policymakers to act (Oberloskamp, 2015, p. 221 ff.).  
 
Table 5. Terrorist incidents21 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970-1978. 
 
 
Table 6. Terrorist incidents22 in France, 1970-1978. 
 
 
21 All incidents (256) regardless of doubt. 
22 All incidents (261) regardless of doubt. 
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Table 7. Terrorist incidents23 in the United Kingdom, 1970-1978. 
 
 
 
Source:   National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2017a, b & c). 
 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, political or institutional interdependence in the context of EEC integration 
seems to have impacted the initial German preference for European cooperation. While the IMK and police 
levels were already and primarily discussing practical security interdependence within the EEC around 1974, 
German national policymakers and senior government officials deliberated the heightened need to work 
together with EEC Member States in this policy domain in light of the advancement of European integration 
(German Federal Foreign Office, 1974a; MinRat Merk & ORR Bahners, 1973; MR Merk, 1973b). Only from 
1975 onwards did higher political levels begin to explicitly acknowledge the growing transnational 
connections among terrorist groups. Factual interdependence in the fight against international terrorism, it 
was then argued nationally, required closer collaboration within the EEC (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1975a; German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1975c). A BMI report from late 1975 
likewise describes how the German preference in the wake of the Munich Massacre did not include a concept 
for comprehensive international cooperation, because it was thought that terrorist groups employed rather 
temporary cross-border support to one another instead of a sophisticated transnational strategy (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1975c, p. 1). This, the report further argues, had begun to change in 1975, and 
internationally operating terrorists now made European police cooperation highly necessary (ibid., p. 3). 
Thus, the German national preference for cooperation and integration in this policy domain can be argued to 
have commenced due to growing security interdependencies in the fight against terrorism on the one hand, 
as well as political interdependence in the context of European integration.  
 
France 
In contrast to Germany, interdependencies were comparatively low in France. In a similar vein, although 
terror attacks had been increasing in numbers since the beginning of the 1970s, they likewise remained 
 
23 All incidents (1,397) regardless of doubt. 
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relatively low and domestically focused until 1975 (see table 5). Only from the late 1970s and early 1980s 
onwards would far left radical groups really begin to perpetrate large-scale attacks in France and systemically 
operate with similar groups in other Member States (French Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1986; cf. Gregory, 2003; 
Lammert, 2015). What is more, nationally rising crime levels – rather than terrorism – seemed to be more of 
a public concern at the time, as is reflected in the inaugural policy targets of French Interior Minister, Michel 
Poniatowski (Walden, 1975). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that France did not experience 
security incidents revealing growing cross-border interconnectivity. A situation assessment from the German 
BKA from August 1975 for example observes how information exchange between Member States only 
occurred if one or more countries were affected by ‘a spectacular act of violence from the terrorists’ (Herold, 
1975b). The document also cites a number of incidents in France, including the murder of two policemen and 
an informant on 27 June 1975 by Ilitch Ramírez Sánchez, a Venezuelan terrorist known as ‘Carlos the Jackal’ 
(Laske, 1997). A few months later, Sánchez would also be responsible for planning and orchestrating an attack 
on the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, also known as the OPEC Siege. 
A terrorist group sympathetic to the Palestinian cause attacked a meeting of OPEC leaders and took more 
than 60 hostages, including the present ministers (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976c). Himself 
a Venezuelan national and member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the case 
Sánchez strikingly demonstrated the increasing internationalisation of terrorism. At the same time, it merely 
constituted one of multiple incidents that were potentially revealing the growing interdependence in home 
affairs to French police officials and authorities. 
 Yet, incident and casualty numbers on French soil remained comparatively low in the beginning of 
the 1970s, as did the cross-border interconnectivity of terrorist groups operating in France. Not only did 
interdependence thus not seem to matter much as driver of the French preference regarding European 
cooperation, on the contrary, the apparent lack of interdependence as a strong push or pull factor possibly 
enabled France to assert that no new cooperation structures were needed, and further led it to adopt a position 
of ‘avoiding’ or ‘denying’ indicators of growing interconnectedness, and thus hindering European police 
cooperation. At the same time, political reasons likewise played a role, as the Abu Daoud Affair showed. On 
7 January 1977, the Palestinian Mohammad Daoud Oudeh, known as Abu Daoud, was arrested in Paris 
(British Home Office, 1977a; cf. Lammert, 2017, p. 56 ff.).  He was wanted in Germany and Israel in connection 
with the 1972 Munich Massacre, suspected to have been in charge of planning the attack. However, French 
authorities ultimately rejected the German arrest warrant and Israeli detention request, and released Abu 
Daoud who left France without delay and was flown out to Algeria (British Home Office, 1977a). Germany 
and the UK, among other Community members, regarded the matter as a failure of European security 
cooperation that illustrated the need to better institutionalise collective action (ibid.). The affair strikingly 
demonstrates how the absence of strong interdependence pressure in France interacted with political 
reasoning, possibly direct pressure from its Arab partners, to produce a state preference that was not aligned 
with Community efforts. Low interdependence arguably failed to shape the French preference in favour of 
integration. 
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The United Kingdom 
By comparison, in the UK, cross-border interdependence only emerged rather late as an indirect driver of the 
British preference and did so largely because of input from police circles and the German government. 
Although by 1974 the UK had recognised the need to work together within the EEC in an increasingly “inter-
dependent world” where certain “practical problems[…] concern[…] all[…] Community members,” this 
aspect did not initially appear as a rationale behind or justification for the launch of TREVI (Nairne, 1974). In 
fact, government statistics and papers demonstrate relatively low crime rates in the UK, not necessarily with 
a transnational connection, as compared to the international scale around 1970 (British Home Office, 1969). 
Although terrorist incidents spiralled in numbers in the early 1970s, the British outlook on terrorism largely 
remained a domestic one (see table 7; cf. START, 2017c). Groups perpetrating attacks and bomb blasts in the 
UK were primarily nationally rooted, and interdependence was thus primarily discussed with respect to 
Northern Ireland, for instance in relation to the IRA and controlling exports of explosives (Carr, 1973; cf. 
British Home Office, 1973). Ultimately, these interdependencies would be framed as high and rising to create 
public pressure to act, as the following section on politicisation discusses further (cf. British Home Office, 
1974b). 
 The tipping point in the British position, marking the first appearance of explicit interdependence 
arguments in government discourse, can be argued to have been the second half of 1975. This point in time 
coincides with the successful EEC membership referendum from June, the Anglo-German information talks 
in September and two highly politicised terror attacks and hostage-takings. In the wake of the general 
elections in February 1974, the Eurosceptic Labour manifesto had promised not only a renegotiation of the 
UK’s terms of entry but also a ‘Consultative Referendum’ on the latter (Labour Party, 1974a). What was more, 
Labour had pledged that “until the British people have voted, we shall stop further processes of integration” 
(ibid., cf. Labour Party, 1974b). In spring 1975, the British Parliament subsequently cleared the way for the 
referendum, which was finally held on 5 June (cf. Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p. 54 ff.). With a turnout of 64.03%, 
the public voted in favour of continued EEC membership with a clear majority of 67.2% Yes-votes (Butler & 
Kitzinger, 1976, p. 263 ff.; Miller, 2015, p. 25). This positive outcome possibly presented somewhat of a game 
changer in the UK’s attitude towards European cooperation. In his powerful portrayal of the process that 
shifted the UK’s national preference From Rejection to Referendum, Wall (2013, p. 589 f.) for example 
demonstrates how Prime Minister Wilson strategically exploited the positive referendum to surmount 
Labour opposition to both British EEC membership and an active Community involvement. And indeed, 
British government documents confirm the importance of the referendum as a turning point in the UK’s state 
preference, inducing the entry of the UK into European deliberations on internal security cooperation. Barely 
two months after the referendum, a letter from the HO to the FCO stated: 
 “Now that the referendum has confirmed British membership of the European Community, the 
Home Secretary has been considering the scope for a Home Office contribution to the 
involvement of Britain in the Community, and for giving Home Office interests and activities a 
specifically Community dimension.” (Armstrong, 1975) 
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Consequently, in early September 1975, a bilateral meeting was held in Berlin to discuss international 
terrorism. At that stage, the development of the HO proposal for a British internal security initiative was well 
underway and first soundings had been conducted with Germany and France. In the information talks, 
Germany especially emphasised the growing transnational connections of RAF terrorists – particularly with 
neighbouring European countries – and provided comprehensive data as evidence for the need to collaborate 
more closely across borders (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975a; German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, 1975b, 1975c). Interestingly, around the same time British police levels likewise began to advocate 
a focus on terrorism in the design of the meeting of Community Ministers of the Interior (Wood, 1975). This 
can be argued to be no mere coincidence, considering the extent to which the HO involved law enforcement 
officials in the preparation of the TREVI conference, including in high-level meetings (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1975e). What is more, the British police was itself in direct contact with foreign police 
officials, most notably from the German BKA (ibid.). The emergence of counterterrorism as a British priority 
and of interdependence as a ‘buzz word’ in the UK’s preference for European police cooperation could 
therefore be convincingly correlated with the input from Germany and domestic law enforcement, 
particularly the police side of the HO. 
 At the same time, two terror attacks revealed growing interdependencies in a painful and most 
public manner, each turning into a six-day hostage crisis. The so-called Spaghetti House Siege and Balcombe 
Street Siege of September and December 1975 were broadcasted via television and radio and thereby 
instigated large-scale public interest and politicisation. The following section elaborates further on their 
impact as politicising events. In the context of interdependence, however, they likewise mattered. The 
Spaghetti House Siege had originally been intended as an armed robbery of a restaurant in London, which 
turned into a hostage-taking and quasi-terrorist incident when the robbery failed. The three black men 
responsible for the siege claimed to be activists of the radical US underground organisation Black Liberation 
Army, and demanded transportation and safe passage to Jamaica in exchange for the release of the hostages 
(Bourne, 2011). After five days of negotiation, including the deployment of four hundred police officers, all 
hostages were released and the gunmen sentenced to harsh prison sentences (ibid.; BBC, 1975). The Balcombe 
Street Siege a few months later was the result of the activities of four IRA members who would afterwards 
be known as the ‘Balcombe Street gang.’ Following a number of bomb blasts and targeted assassinations of 
public figures in the preceding months, the four terrorists – who were part of a six-strong IRA Active Service 
Unit (ASU) – clashed with the police in central London (Moysey, 2008). After a rather venturesome car chase, 
the gunmen forcibly gained access to a flat in Balcombe Street, taking the inhabitants hostage (Moysey, 2004, 
2008). As during the Spaghetti House Siege, the terrorists demanded a plane and safe passage, this time to 
Ireland, but eventually surrendered after six days of intense but fruitless negotiations with the police. Both 
incidents can be argued to have mattered directly for the British preference concerning European police 
cooperation, not only because they powerfully and very publicly demonstrated the transnational links of 
terrorists operating in the UK but also because they uncovered operational shortcomings that could 
supposedly only be remedied through cross-border cooperation. Both events are for instance explicitly cited 
in an official British note to the other Community members in advance of the first ministerial TREVI meeting 
(German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1976a). The government note employs both sieges as examples for 
Chapter 4 │ The Trevi Group: Birth Hour of European Police Cooperation 
67 
the growing need to work together in the fight against international crime and terrorism, to exchange 
experiences and best practices in order to better manage internal and external interdependencies in the area 
of home affairs (ibid.). 
 By early 1976, the British government frequently mentioned growing interdependence in the fight 
against international terrorism with respect to the envisioned ministerial meeting as well as general EC 
cooperation in the area of internal security. In advance of a ministerial EPC meeting in Luxembourg in 
February, for example, the UK officially adopted the position that “[...i]nternational terrorism[...] cries out for 
concerted and effective international action” (Lance, 1976). Although the UK had already previously 
conceptualised terrorism as a world-wide problem (British Home Office, 1975c), it now began to increasingly 
derive a concrete need to act together from this trend, thus linking its own national preference to global 
interdependence in the counterterrorism efforts of states (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976f). 
What is worth noting in this context is that the UK strongly emphasised an interdependence in the effects of 
terrorism rather than in its causes. Consequently, the British considered a “discussion on the underlying 
causes” of terrorism irrelevant, while the interconnectedness in effects supposedly created an “urgent need 
for international counter-measures as the only means of checking terrorism” (ibid.). The British preference 
for EC police cooperation correspondingly focussed on practical cooperation that could effectively mitigate 
these ‘effects’ and prevent terrorist attacks – a position that was very much embodied in the early Trevi Group 
subsequent to the first ministerial meeting in June 1976. 
 Nonetheless, interdependence would even continue to increase in importance as a driver of the 
British preference on European police cooperation. Similar to Germany, the envisioned passport union and 
possible abolition of internal frontiers gave rise to great anxiety about the security implications of such an 
endeavour, not only on the part of the British Government but also other European Member States and their 
security services (Angel, 1977; British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1977c; British Home Office, 1977b; 
Nagler, 1977). However, this development and its implications on the institutionalisation of European police 
cooperation are subject of later chapters. The following sections first shed light on how politicisation and 
subnational policy entrepreneurship further amplified the pressure to act on Germany, France and the UK, 
and thus complemented interdependence as a driver of state preference towards EC integration. 
 
 
4.2 Politicisation and Public Pressure as Drivers of Common Action 
The Munich Massacre at the Olympic Summer Games in September 1972 can be convincingly argued to 
present the main politicising event initiating (German) governmental deliberations on international security 
cooperation. However, it has to be evaluated against the backdrop of a domestic societal and political climate 
that was shaped by increasing anxiety and awareness regarding terrorism and public security threats. In 
response to – among other things – the activities of radical left-wing groups, particularly the RAF, a public 
debate on growing criminality had already been emerging since the mid-1960s and arguably marked the 
beginning politicisation of ‘internal security’ (cf. Pfahl-Traughber & Berndt, 1999, p. 363 ff.; Saupe, 2010, p. 
179 f.). This section analyses the influence of politicisation – understood as increased salience and public-
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political debate of a topic – on the formation of state preferences in advance of the creation of TREVI. Proof 
for the relevance of this factor can be found in the frequency with which the topic returned to the agenda of 
the German Bundestag. It discussed for instance the increase in public fear of crime as portrayed in a report 
from the BKA, and the related establishment of ‘law and order’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 5. Wahlperiode, 1968c, 
pp. 11170–11172, 1968a, 1968b). While regular political discussions among both government and opposition 
parties often revolved around rising crime rates and transnational criminals operating in Germany, 
considerable emphasis was more and more dedicated to left-wing terrorism and the threat it posed to the 
German state (Deutscher Bundestag, 1970, 1972; 1975a). How severe this threat was estimated can be seen in 
a speech from early 1972 of Kai-Uwe von Hassel, President of the Bundestag, in which he called for the defence 
of the German democracy against radical forces (Dokumentation 11/72 - ‘Gefahr für unsere Demokratie’, 1972, 
pp. I–III). Thus, crime and terrorism had gained a certain saliency in German politics and the eye of the public 
even before the terrorist attack at the 1972 Olympic Summer Games. Along the same lines, Lammert (2015, 
p. 206) argues that terrorism – way into the 1970s – was perceived as an ‘existential threat’ by German 
politicians and the public. Nonetheless, he holds that terrorism never presented a serious ‘existential’ threat 
to the German state, and yet it fostered a socio-political ‘consensus against terrorism’ (Lammert, 2015, p. 207).  
 
Germany: Securitising Terrorism 
The emerging significance of terrorism as a topic in German politics in the early 1970s has to be seen in 
symbiosis with the emerging discourse and policy field of ‘internal security’ (Beese, 2010, p. 79; Saupe, 2010, 
2015, p. 175). By 1972, all main German parties explicitly addressed the issue of internal security in their 
manifestos (CDU/CSU, 1972; FDP, 1972; SPD, 1972); the SPD even made ‘security’ one of its main topics in 
the election campaign of 1972 (SPD, 1972). The German government policy of Willy Brandt between 1969 and 
1974, with Hans-Dietrich Genscher as Minister of the Interior, conceived internal security as part of social 
policy and building a safe society (Brandt, 1969b). Accordingly, a number of policy measures and reforms 
were executed from 1970 onwards in response to the increasing number of terrorist incidents, including the 
activities of the RAF (Lemler, 2017, p. 421 ff.; Pfahl-Traughber & Berndt, 1999, p. 364). These comprised a set 
of repressive, technology-focussed reforms to law enforcement, initiated primarily by high political levels 
and police circles, particularly BKA President Horst Herold himself (Weinhauer, 2006). Among the most 
important measures were the 1970 ‘action programme for the modernisation and intensification of the fight 
against crime’24 that Willy Brandt had already announced in his Government declaration in 1969 (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior and German Federal Criminal Police Office, 1970; Brandt, 1969b), and the 
comprehensive federal programme on internal security25 launched in 1972 and 1974 respectively (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1972a; Saupe, 2010, p. 180). These and other government efforts to centralise, 
modernise and better coordinate law enforcement across Germany and its federal states illustrate first, the 
 
24 “Sofortprogramm zur Modernisierung und Intensivierung der Verbrechensbekämpfung“ 
25 “Schwerpunktprogramm Innere Sicherheit“ 
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politicisation of internal security in Germany at the time, and second, the emergence of a policy field through 
this security dispositif (Beese, 2010; Dahlke, 2011a; Saupe, 2010, 2015). 
 Against this backdrop of an already quite tense public-political climate on the one hand and an 
emerging securitisation discourse in reaction to terrorism, the Munich Massacre happened on 5 September 
1972. Not only did it trigger a public outcry but also a – perhaps strikingly strong – emotional and political 
reaction (Dahlke, 2006; Noelle & Neumann, 1974). In the immediate aftermath, German Foreign Minister 
Walter Scheel took a strong international stance at the meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers at Frascati on 12 
September. Calling for collective action in the fight against terrorism, Germany initiated the establishment of 
three EPC WGs that however soon ceased to operate. But the Munich massacre debatably further and more 
sustainably mattered as a driver of the German government preference for European police cooperation 
beyond this immediate first call for action. As Dahlke (2006) and Oberloskamp (2012) point out, German 
Federal Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Interior), Werner Maihofer (Special Tasks, Interior from 1974), 
and Walter Scheel (Foreign Affairs) were members of the crisis committee established to handle the hostage 
situation under the lead of Bavaria’s State Interior Minister Bruno Merk. They thus first-hand observed the 
development of the attack; Genscher even directly negotiated with the terrorists and offered himself in 
exchange for the hostages. There can be no doubt that this direct human experience at the front lines of 
managing the terrorist incident and observing the momentous failure of the negotiations result in the death 
of all Israeli hostages, five terrorists and a German police officer must have somehow affected how these 
politicians regarded terrorism and internal security. In this context, Genscher’s proposal for a European 
conference on internal security from early 1973 seems more than mere timely coincidence. 
While interdependence certainly played a role as well in motivating Germany to pursue this idea – 
after all, already in 1971 Genscher internally requested the development of a ‘uniform security concept’ to 
respond to the ‘security deficit’ arising from the removal of intra-European border controls – the Munich 
Massacre provided a whole new impetus to advance European cooperation (von Rottenburg, 1974). It 
powerfully added the dimension of politicisation to considerations about interconnectivity in the field of 
policing that may have effectively pushed the German preference towards collective action. 
  Nevertheless, it has to be remarked that – while the Munich attack certainly created pressure to act 
on policymakers – public interest faded shortly after. Neither the German public or media fostered an in-
depth, sustainable debate nor did German politicians deliberately harness the event to politicise international 
terrorism, very much in contrast to domestic and especially RAF terrorism (Dahlke, 2006, pp. 102 ff.; 112 ff.). 
At the same time, the terrorist incident at the Olympic Summer Games can be argued to have had a lasting 
effect on Germany’s policy preferences in this issue area (Oberloskamp, 2017, p. 49). What lasted beyond the 
immediate shock was – among other things – a profound sense of uncertainty on the part of the public, 
perhaps also the policymakers, and the demand for a tough political stance on internal security (Dahlke, 2006, 
pp. 113–114). It is thus not surprising that the German public and media more closely followed domestic 
security developments in the 1970s, including the continued activities of the RAF and other left-wing 
extremist groups. Additionally, the immediate German political reaction in the aftermath of the Munich 
Massacre ultimately laid the foundations for European police cooperation on terrorism and internal security 
matters (Oberloskamp, 2017, pp. 49–50).  
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Building on Foreign Minister Scheel’s call for an international approach to fighting terrorism and 
internal discussions on cross-border action against transnational organised crime, subnational levels 
furthered deliberation on these topics and began to openly politicise internal security from 1973 onwards. 
The IMK and particularly its new Chairperson Heinz Schwarz, Interior Minister for Rhineland-Westphalia, 
actively lobbied for a European conference and the institutionalisation of EEC cooperation in the form of a 
European police office. Formal calls for action formulated at the IMK and directed at the Federal Government, 
especially the Minister of the Interior, were instrumental in building a certain pressure on federal 
policymakers; frequent media coverage and consistently high salience of related developments additionally 
intensified this pressure (Bochmann, 1974; Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 1974; Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, 1974; 
‘Newspaper article’, 1974; Press service of the State Government Rhineland-Palatinate, 1974; Schwarz, 1973b). 
While official bilateral preparations for the EEC conference had been ongoing with France since 1974 in the 
intergovernmental WG, two further politicising events in the beginning of 1975 further spurred German 
efforts for European police cooperation and contributed to an increasing shift of its topical preference for 
counterterrorism. These events were two left-wing terror incidents, namely the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz 
by members of the 2 June Movement on 27 February (he was set free on 4 March in exchange for the release 
of five terrorists), and the West German Embassy Siege in Stockholm on 24 April when six RAF terrorists 
forcefully entered the German Embassy in Stockholm, taking twelve staff members hostage and eventually 
killing two. 
 There can be no doubt that these incidents played a part, if not directly resulted, in a culmination of 
the security debate among political circles in Germany that would likewise dominate the 1976 federal 
elections. In contrast to the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Massacre, the political debate in 1975 explicitly dealt 
with the international dimension of terrorism. Interestingly, rather than merely raising the salience of 
terrorism and exerting public pressure to act, these politicising events illustrated existing interdependencies 
and thus amplified functional pressure. In a speech before the German Bundestag in March, Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt accordingly underlined the ‘international connections of terrorists and[...] their followers’ 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1975b, p. 10735(D)). He was echoed by Minister of the Interior Werner Maihofer, who 
stated: “We are obviously facing in this modern terrorism – and I believe we agree on this[...] – an 
international problem.” (ibid., p. 10749(B)).  
Of course, it would be presumptuous to assume a direct correlation between the Lorenz kidnapping 
and Stockholm Embassy Siege on the one hand, and the renewed politicisation of German counterterrorism 
and internal security policy on the other. At the same time, in 1975, a new momentum could be observed in 
the German preference for advancing international action that went beyond mere functional pressure from 
interdependence. Following a conversation between the French and German Interior Ministers, the BMI was 
very much in favour of swiftly continuing preparations for the European conference on internal security. This 
would  be most efficient on a bilateral basis with France and enable the conference to be held as soon as 
possible (RegDir Bracht i.V., 1975a). Additionally, Germany pushed for an early sounding of the attitudes of 
other EEC Member States on the conference proposal (ibid.). Finally, and perhaps also not surprising, 
politicisation pushed Germany to promote a topical focus on the fight against terrorism, thereby deviating 
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from its original preference for a holistic approach to the entire domain of internal security from the start 
(Callaghan, 1975a; Weston, 1975).  
This shift in preference onto counterterrorism possibly illustrates how different drivers together 
shaped the German attitude and at times interacted. In September 1975, for example, roughly half a year after 
the Lorenz kidnapping and the West German Embassy Siege, the British Minister of State for the HO, Lord 
Harris, reported from his visit to Bonn that Germany’s Interior Minister had told him the terrorist situation 
in Germany were “quiet at present” but that “[p]olice investigations had however revealed the extent of close 
links between terrorists in different countries and this was encouraging the Germans to seek close 
collaboration with governments and police forces of other states” (Bullard, 1975). This seems to suggest that 
Germany’s preference, at the time, was primarily driven by interdependence-considerations rather than 
politicisation.  
Nevertheless, the politicisation that had previously arisen, especially in relation to the Lorenz 
kidnapping and the Stockholm Embassy Siege, must have played a part in laying the groundwork for the 
emerging German focus on terrorism in its European cooperation ambitions. Already towards the end of 
1974, the British Embassy in Bonn had observed that “[p]ublic discussion on the danger to the State presented 
by [...terrorism] has continued to run at a high level” (Powell, 1974). Consequently, politicisation continued 
and was fuelled even more by the two incidents of left-wing terrorism in the following months. The German 
government response to both incidents was accordingly tough in a clear public demonstration of control. The 
massive multi-level crisis committees set up by the Federal Government to manage first the Lorenz affair and 
then the Stockholm Embassy Siege sent a clear signal about its toughened stance on terrorism not only to the 
German public but to other European governments (Henderson, 1975a, 1975b). The public and media 
sentiment in Germany at the time called for and supported this increasingly hard line, a political course that 
was consensually adopted by the government and the opposition (Henderson, 1975b, 1975c). In this context, 
the reappearing rhetoric of an existential threat posed by terrorism does not appear surprising. 
Nevertheless, it was at no point factually justified, as terrorism comprised only a relatively small 
fraction of all recorded illicit activities in Germany (Bullard, 1975; Katzenstein, 2008, p. 161). This 
demonstrates how vital politicisation was for the saliency of terrorism as a topic that seemingly required 
urgent political attention. And by 1975 German policymakers were indeed prepared to undertake any 
measures necessary. In a statement before the Bundestag, Chancellor Schmidt for instance dramatically 
proclaimed that “everyone who wished to protect the Rechtsstaat [...]must be ready ‘to go to the borders of 
what the Rechtsstaat[...] allowed’” (Henderson, 1975b; cf. Hürter, 2015a, pp. 71–74). This emerging deliberate 
politicisation would develop more and more into securitisation over the next years, finally culminating in the 
moral panic of the ‘German Autumn’ in 1977 (de Graaf, 2015; Lammert, 2015). 
The political dimension of German counterterrorism and internal security policy, as well as its 
reciprocal politicisation among the public, the media and policymakers, presented a significant driver for the 
German government preference for far-reaching (inter-)national action on terrorism. Particularly in 1976, 
coinciding with federal elections, Germany developed a remarkable activism on a number of different levels. 
Building on an initiative of German Federal Minister of Justice Hans-Jochen Vogel, Germany strongly lobbied 
for a European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) that was eventually adopted by the 
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Council of Europe (CoE) and opened for signature on 27 January 1977 (British Home Office, 1975c; Council 
of Europe, 1977; cf. Katzenstein, 2008, p. 170). Additionally, this time drawing on the European Council’s 
1976 Declaration on Terrorism, German Chancellor Schmidt himself pushed for an EEC Convention on the 
taking of hostages, especially prosecution and extradition aspects (d’A Collings, 1976). The German initiatives 
once again illustrates the coexistence of interdependence and politicisation – often interacting, sometimes 
reinforcing one another – as explanatory factors for its preference. While politicisation certainly presented a 
driver of the German campaign for international cooperation, the official discourse cited growing 
interdependence as a main reason for collective action. Terrorism, it was argued, no longer threatened only 
single states but in fact “the existence of normal international relations[...]”, thereby creating “new 
international tensions” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976f). However, “[...]Bonn knew very 
well that any [UN or global] initiative stood no chance of success” (British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 1976g). The same rhetoric can therefore be found in the German proposal for a political declaration at 
the European internal security conference on 29 June 1976, which likewise justified European police 
cooperation with the need to counter the transnational security deficit emerging from globalisation (MR Merk 
& RegDir Bracht, 1976a; RegDir Bracht, 1976b). 
 
France: Preoccupation with Domestic Affairs and Depoliticisation 
Strikingly, politicisation was much lower and played a significantly less decisive and different role with 
respect to the French preference, although France was working together closely with Germany in preparation 
of the envisioned conference of the Community Ministers of the Interior. Contrary to Germany with its vested 
interest in launching a European ministerial conference on home affairs as soon as possible, France was much 
more sceptical if not actively opposed to such an initiative. While France had been informally cooperating 
with Germany on counterterrorism matters and was not per se opposed to intensifying cooperation and 
expanding it to other EC Member States, it was strongly concerned about the implications for its relations 
with Arab states, should existing European cooperation arrangements become publicly known (German 
Federal Foreign Office, 1973a; German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b). This stance is telling of the 
lack of domestic politicisation and public pressure over the international links of French internal security. 
What is more, political foreign policy considerations shaped the French preference to strictly avoid any 
politicisation of its role in Community action against terrorism; France even threatened to retract completely 
in case its participation should be made public, and thereby effectively blocked Germany’s plans for a rapid 
realisation of TREVI (ibid.; German Federal Foreign Office, 1973b). 
Contrary to Germany’s high domestic politicisation in direct relation to spiking RAF terrorism, in 
France neither left- nor right-wing terrorism were particularly hotly debated in the beginning of the 1970s. 
Although attacks had been increasing (see table 6), the escalation of violence remained below the levels 
experienced by Germany, and French terrorist groups were not similarly perceived as a major threat to the 
French state and public safety (Requate & Zessin, 2007). Between 1974 and 1985, France would experience 
around 358 terror incidents, whereas numbers were much higher in Germany (2,355) (Chalk, 1996, p. 177). 
Interestingly, the sheer number of terror incidents in the UK (242), which would strongly pursue Community 
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action on terrorism, remained even below the one of France (ibid.). This arguably demonstrates that high 
levels of terror attacks and factual interdependence alone are no sufficient explanation for a state preference 
in favour of European cooperation. Otherwise, Italy should have certainly developed a pro-active position 
and outspoken preference for Community engagement in the fight against terrorism (cf. Hürter, 2015a). With 
a view to state preferences, the type of terror attacks as well as politicisation must be taken into account as 
well. While the UK for example experienced relatively few terror incidents in the time between 1974 and 
1985, it had the highest number of incidents in the mid-1970s (see table 7) and additionally the highest fatality 
rate in Western Europe (Chalk, 1996, pp. 44 ff.; 177). Europe-wide, the most devastating attacks with the 
largest number of casualties were committed by the IRA in the UK and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain 
and parts of France (Oberloskamp, 2017, p. 15). Of course, both were nationally-oriented radical separatist 
groups that – apart from their increasingly transnational links to other left-wing terrorists – carry no obvious 
relevance for interdependence as a driver of state preferences. At the same time, large-scale, very violent or 
well-politicised attacks mattered greatly as creators of salience as well as public anxiety and pressure on 
policymakers to act.  
Accordingly, politicisation in France grew tremendously in the late 1970s and the 1980s, when far 
left radical groups like Action Directe spurred public fear through more systemically perpetrated attacks that 
were modelled on the strategies of other transnationally cooperating left-wing terrorist groups such as the 
German RAF and the Italian Brigate Rosse (BR) (French Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1986; cf. Gregory, 2003; 
Lammert, 2015). A certain kind of politicisation concerning French home affairs had already existed in the 
early 1970s as a consequence of terrorist incidents and rising crime levels. However, the domestic media and 
public were mostly preoccupied with internal political matters. The French Minister of the Interior, 
Poniatowski, was experiencing increasingly serious public-political problems (Walden, 1975). In addition to 
political criticism with regard to his handling of the FMI and the police, he was widely unpopular “in the 
country as a whole” due to “his tough tactics on crime” (ibid.). Accordingly, Poniatowski – together with 
Pandraud, Director General of the National Police – deliberately pursued a course of depoliticisation, 
including measures of decentralisation that would help “to distance the Minister from the success or failure 
of particular police operations” (Tomkins, 1975a). 
Unsurprisingly, in the first half of the 1970s, both the absence of and strong French reluctance to any 
kind of politicisation of common European efforts in the fight against terrorism led Germany to tread 
carefully and first develop its proposal for TREVI in close bilateral contact with France. The German BMI was 
quite aware of the French preference for limiting EC cooperation to a bilateral basis and its initial opposition 
to the creation of new multilateral structures (MR Merk, 1974b, 1974a). At the same time, even this bilateral 
cooperation strictly remained off the public radar. Although ministerial levels agreed on the political 
leadership roles of France and Germany in the context of European integration, the Franco-German WG 
focused exclusively on practical and bilateral cooperation, mainly driven by the French preference to avoid 
public attention (Ewart-Biggs, 1974b, 1974a; Wright, 1976). When the UK informed France and Germany that 
it would announce its proposal for a summit of EEC Interior Ministers at the 1975 European Council meeting 
in Rome, France reiterated its stance against a “public emphasis on the problem of terrorism” (Tomkins, 
1975b). Interestingly, while the politicisation of EC police cooperation was explicitly undesirable, President 
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Giscard d’Estaing was an outspoken advocate of advancing the European project, and keen on making his 
efforts and the role of France in this endeavour publicly known (ibid.). In this context, France had persistently 
pushed for the creation of a European passport union at the European Council since 1969, including the 
“suppression of frontier controls” – a matter that somewhat ironically exerted even more pressure on 
Germany and the UK to pursue Community cooperation on home affairs with a view to managing 
interdependencies arising from the abolition of border checks (ibid.; cf. MR Merk, 1974a). 
 
The United Kingdom: A Public Debate on Safety and Terrorism 
Similar to the German politicisation of internal security and particularly the fight against terrorism, the UK 
experienced a large-scale public debate on its security situation. Not only did frequent left-wing terrorist 
incidents in the form of targeted assassinations and bomb blasts against military and civilian targets entail 
extensive media coverage – for instance the IRA-perpetrated blasts in the Houses of Parliament and the Tower 
of London in 1974 – they arguable also played an important part in the government opposition-generated 
debate on “public safety and decline in respect for the law” (British Home Office, 1974a, 1974c). When Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson in a speech in November 1974 affirmed “our determination to track down and deal 
effectively with the criminals who are at the back of these abominable murders,” he spoke in direct reaction 
to citizens’ concerns in relation to terrorist activities in the UK (British Prime Minister’s Office, 1974a). 
However, the latter would continue to disrupt public order and stir anxiety among the media and society 
over the next years. The 1975 Spaghetti House and Balcombe Street Sieges are examples of particularly 
politicised (quasi-)terror incidents. The Spaghetti House Siege entailed a massive public and media 
awareness, as the highest political levels, including the Home Secretary himself, were involved and four 
hundred police officers together with the media were engaged in managing the six-day hostage crisis (‘1975’, 
1975; Bourne, 2011). The Balcombe Street Siege had a similar, if not greater, mass politicising effect. As the 
standoff between the ASU and the police protracted for days, it was widely broadcasted and closely followed 
by the public on radio and television (Mahoney, 1976; Moysey, 2004, 2008). 
In the context of strong public awareness and increasing mass politicisation, emergency legislation 
was passed as a reaction to the IRA bombing campaigns. Subsequent detentions under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act spiked in 1975 and 1976 (British Prime Minister’s Office, 1979). Political discussions were 
likewise becoming increasingly heated, especially on the possibility of reintroducing ‘capital punishment’ for 
terrorist offences, which presented a reflection of just how high emotions were running among the British 
public and policymakers at the time. The Home Secretary experienced this political and public pressure first 
hand, and had to defend himself in Parliament more than once for his Government’s supposed lack of tough 
responses to terrorism (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975f). It may therefore not come as a 
surprise that the “general anxiety about terrorism” eventually translated into “Ministerial concern that action 
should be taken to deal with it[...]” in the fall of 1975 (Prior, 1975). 
This statement coincides with an increase in the pace with which the HO advanced its plans for 
European cooperation. More concretely, it coincides with the first bilateral soundings with France and 
Germany, most notably the Anglo-German information talks and subsequent discussions of a growing 
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international public pressure on European governments to act on terrorism. As the HO and FCO developed 
the British proposal for a high-level meeting of EC Interior Ministers, the continuous exchange with France 
and Germany confirmed the importance of rising “pressure of public opinion” in most European countries 
(British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975a, p. 3). This pressure would manoeuvre the UK into a 
position where – by 1976 – the FCO considered it “unlikely that the public or the media in the Nine would 
understand [...]any show of reluctance on our part” and “would [...]interpret[...it] as a failure to even deal 
with one aspect of the international scourge of terrorism” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976b). 
In view of the strong domestic public and media interest in counterterrorist measures, it appears striking that 
the British Government initially preferred to keep its proposal for TREVI off the public radar.  
On the contrary, the HO was originally very much concerned that information would leak to the 
public and media before British plans had been discussed with the other Member States. What is more, an 
interdepartmental consensus existed among the British Government to avoid any politicisation of the 
emerging TREVI proposal. When the Daily Telegraph printed a small piece on the envisaged meeting of EEC 
Interior Ministers in September 1975 while informal soundings with Germany and France were still on-going, 
the HO expressed great concern and together with the FCO attempted to identify the source of the leak to 
prevent further public debate (Peterson, 1975). Perhaps also worth noting in this context is the conclusion of 
the FCO that the “tone of the report, with its enthusiastic commendation of the police, suggests that it 
originated in either Home Office or police circles” (Fretwell, 1975b; Brimelow, 1975). Although the leak and 
the FCO suspicion of its source do not alone suffice as evidence, police circles did have a vested interest in 
spurring on British plans for EEC cooperation as the following section shows. 
Politicisation of the UK’s domestic security situation in the form of a public-political debate of IRA 
terrorism influenced the British preference in favour of initiating European police cooperation. Whereas 
discussions neither primarily revolved around the transnational dimension of terrorism nor demanded 
international action, the continuous and growing public pressure to act at home and abroad made it 
politically impossible for the UK to not support European cooperation efforts. Following the first IRA bomb 
campaigns and significant subsequent politicisation, the UK reacted through a number of domestic legal and 
policing measures from 1973 onwards. As emotions continued to run high and terrorist incidents did not 
decline as sharply as hoped, resulting in a widespread debate on public safety, the persisting pressure led the 
HO to draft and promote its proposal for EEC cooperation. Strikingly, even after the UK had successfully 
initiated the first TREVI meeting in the summer of 1976, public pressure and politicisation continued to 
matter. The FCO for instance did not cease to reiterate that “domestic opinion[...] will require us to attempt, 
or support attempts, to get some positive [counterterrorism] initiative off the ground” (Fifoot, 1976). 
It is against this backdrop of high domestic politicisation that both Germany and the UK became 
involved in the intergovernmental preparations of the conference and substantially contributed to, if not 
directly shaped, its outcome (MinRat Bochmann & RR Schöneich, 1976b; MR Merk, 1976a; cf. British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 1976a). At the same time, international politicisation around interdependencies 
in the area of counterterrorism strengthened the preferences in favour of EEC cooperation. Large-scale 
terrorist attacks with a transnational dimension were more and more discussed by the public, the media and 
policymakers, as they seemed to reveal a growing interconnectedness among European Member States and 
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countries worldwide. Examples include the OPEC siege in December 1975 (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1976c), or the week-long Entebbe hijacking of a passenger plane by two Palestinian 
and two German terrorists – an incident that should change the British attitude towards additional 
cooperation initiatives on terrorism. From a national position “of considerable caution” towards parallel 
counterterrorism cooperation at the CoE or the UN, the UK began to increasingly support the latter as a 
consequence of the OPEC and Entebbe attacks (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976e-f). The 
power of these major politicising events of international scale that seemed to dramatically reveal existing 
cross-border interdependencies is captured in an FCO note: “the Heads of Government were anxious[...] to 
make a resounding declaration on terrorism quite irrespective of its particular content” (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1976g; cf. 1976i). 
Politicisation undoubtedly acted as an important driver of state preferences for European 
cooperation in Germany and the UK where public pressure to act was relatively high. While national public 
and political debates certainly reinforced one another reciprocally, the British and German pro-cooperation 
preferences may convincingly be argued to constitute a political reaction to high politicisation: the favoured 
policy options often presented securitising moves and venue-shopping – solving domestically manifested 
problems at European level (Friedrichs, 2008; Lammert, 2015). By contrast, politicisation in France 
comparatively low in the early 1970s. Much on the contrary, the French government was set on avoiding any 
publicity of its involvement in European police cooperation on the fight against terrorism. It is thus perhaps 
not surprising that France was initially rather reluctant towards the German and British plans for a new 
Community format to work together on issues of internal security, and consequently preferred a very limited 
scope for TREVI. How and why the French resistance was ultimately overcome and even turned into a 
preference in favour of practical counterterrorism cooperation is explained, among other things, in the next 
section on role of police and other subnational actors in the formation of integration preferences. 
 
 
4.3 The Influence of Police Circles and Other Subnational Actors 
Subnational actors, similar to politicisation, played a significantly more important role in the pro-European 
preference formation of Germany and the UK compared to France. In Germany, with its strong federal 
system, subnational levels were involved very closely in the decision-making and thus of considerable 
relevance for the ultimate state preference; especially the IMK and the BKA. In the UK, police circles were 
perhaps not as visible but nonetheless engaged substantially at the British HO. Concretely, they contributed 
to the public-political debate on European police cooperation and were mainly responsible for the topical 
focus of TREVI on counterterrorism. Law enforcement officials in France were likewise preoccupied with the 
fight against terrorism. At the same time, they remained largely domestically or bilaterally oriented, and 
never acted as a pro-European driver of the French government preference in the same way that police bodies 
did in Germany and France. In contrast to subnational policy entrepreneurs, supranational advocacy was 
completely absent from the process towards the Trevi Group and concretely from the preference formation 
of Germany, France and the UK. Rather than pro-actively exerting influence on the latter, EU actors only 
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played a passive role as ‘being considered’ by national governments. The European Commission for instance 
only mattered in the British preference formation, because the UK wanted to exclude it from TREVI as much 
as possible so as to avoid a potential competence shift towards the Community. Neither the Commission nor 
other supranational actors or institutions actively shaped the British position in advance of the meeting of EC 
Interior Ministers and subsequent launch of the Trevi Group (cf. Lance, 1977). Consequently, this section 
focusses on analysing the impact of subnational policy entrepreneurship on the state preferences of Germany, 
France and the UK. 
 
Germany 
At first glance, the German impetus for an EEC conference on internal security came from the highest political 
levels. In the aftermath of the Munich Massacre in 1972, Foreign Minister Scheel openly called for 
international action, and it was Interior Minister Genscher who first requested a strategic concept for 
European internal security cooperation in 1973. German ministerial levels likewise remained substantially 
engaged in advancing and designing European police and security cooperation, for example in the 
framework of the EEC Council of Ministers where Hans-Jochen Vogel, Federal Minister of Justice, instigated 
the ECST as early as 1975, or in the European Council, where Chancellor Schmidt himself advocated an EEC 
Convention on the taking of hostages. At the same time there can be no doubt that subnational actors 
significantly contributed to the emergence of the German preference for European police cooperation and to 
the particular topical focus of the first meeting of the TREVI Ministers on 29 June 1976.  
With a view to the formation of the German preference, the official order to begin planning a 
European conference on internal security had come from German ministerial levels. Formal preparations 
were conducted first, between Germany and France among senior officials in the bilateral WG at 
intergovernmental level, and following the UK initiative at the European Council meeting, on a 
transgovernmental level among EEC senior officials. Notwithstanding the role of German Ministers of the 
Interior Genscher and Maihofer, significant input was also provided by subnational levels from the very 
beginning. In particular, both the regional Interior Ministers as well as officials from the BKA contributed to 
the German pro-integration preference concerning European police cooperation. As early as February 1973, 
in the wake of the Munich Massacre, the IMK discussed ways forward in the international cooperation on 
the fight against organised crime. It tasked one of its WGs with the submission of proposals for the 
improvement of the latter (IMK, 1973a). Founded in 1954, the IMK institutionalised intra-German cooperation 
among the Federal Lands (IMK, 2017). It was introduced as political forum to formalise the working level 
cooperation that had already been taking place between regional officials and practitioners.  
The IMK played a significant role with regard to shaping a German pro-integration preference and 
the initiation of European multilateral cooperation on internal security. Its views and debates are directly 
shared with the German Federal Minister of the Interior who is a permanent member of the IMK, albeit 
without voting right, and thus participates in all meetings (IMK, 2017). Additionally, in its resolutions the 
IMK may formally ask the Interior Minister or the Federal Government to take specific action, and may 
commission strategic reports and policy proposals (cf. IMK, 1973a). It thus presents an important subnational 
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body providing substantial input for national policy- and decision-making on internal security. Through a 
number of WGs, the IMK effectively connects Federal Government levels with the German states (Länder), 
law enforcement authorities and the intelligence service (Lange, 1999, pp. 118–127). 
This likewise occurred with regard to a European conference on internal security. Building on the 
results of WG II (internal security matters), which the Federal Minister of the Interior had tasked with 
proposals for the improvement of international cooperation in February 1973, the IMK formally asked the 
Minister to initiate such a European conference (IMK, 1973b; cf. Bochmann, 1974; German Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, 1973a). While formal participation was reserved for the Federal Interior Minister, the IMK 
insisted on the explicit inclusion of the IMK Chairperson in all developments and decisions (IMK, 1973b). 
Related discussions at subnational level soon revolved around concrete possibilities for an institutionalisation 
of international cooperation. In fact, first plans for a European regional police office, a ‘Europol’ to 
complement Interpol, appeared as early as January 1973 when Heinz Schwarz, Interior Minister of Rhineland-
Palatinate and Chairman of the IMK at the time, directly presented the idea to Interpol officials in Paris 
(Schwarz, 1973b). The same year, Rhineland-Palatinate submitted a motion to discuss such a ‘European 
police’ at the IMK, where State Interior Ministers and the Federal Minister of the Interior agreed on the 
potential benefit of such a body (ibid.). Interpol – due to the many different judicial conceptions of its 
members, particularly the diverging interpretations of the term ‘terrorism’ – was no longer perceived as a 
sufficient platform for managing security issues that affected the rapidly integrating European territories (cf. 
Schwarz, 1973b).  
Consequently, at its session on 15 February 1974, the IMK officially charged WG II with turning the 
proposals for the improvement of international cooperation into a working paper that was to be presented at 
the European conference on internal security (Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, 1974). Additionally, it adopted the 
final version of the ’Programme for Internal Security in the Federal Republic of Germany,’ building on the 
earlier draft that had been initiated in 1972 (IMK, 1972, 1974; cf. Busch, 1995, pp. 162–164). While the initial 
version of the programme had only focussed on domestic issues of internal security, the 1974 document 
included a significant European dimension with regard to maintaining German national security. Although 
the programme highlights a recent increase in crime rates as well as in the transnational activities of criminals, 
political extremist and terrorist groups in Germany and other European states, it does not explicitly mention 
growing interdependencies (IMK, 1974, p. 5). Instead, the programme primarily justifies the need for 
European cooperation through its role in the European integration process. The section on EEC cooperation, 
for instance, begins by underlining how cooperation in the policy domain of internal security presents a 
precondition for achieving the ‘European political union’ that Member States had envisioned for the 1980s 
(ibid., p. 27). Of course, interdependencies were implied in this context (and variously discussed explicitly), 
as this vision included plans for the completion of an economic and monetary union, further enlargement of 
the Community and, perhaps most important, the passport union that was initially agreed on at the 1974 
Paris Summit (MR Merk, 1976b; cf. Gehring, 1998, p. 47 f.). However, it is striking that the IMK Programme 
for Internal Security did not explicitly list these developments but chose to indirectly refer to them by 
primarily justifying the need for security cooperation among Member States as arising from the dynamics of 
European integration. The only interdependence-creating process mentioned was the foreseen abolition of 
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internal border checks, which was expected to produce a ‘security deficit’ that must be remedied through 
measures at European level and others. In this context, it is further striking how far-reaching plans for EEC 
cooperation already were in early 1974. Amongst others, the document specified support for a ‘common 
European policy of internal security’ and a ‘permanent, also institutionalised cooperation’ (IMK, 1974, p. 27). 
Thus, the German Federal Lands can be argued to have considerably shaped the German national 
preference early on, since they were actively involved in domestic agenda-setting and policy-making through 
the IMK. Strongly in favour of European security and police cooperation, the IMK additionally had a 
preference for far-reaching institutionalisation including the creation of a European police office. This 
preference eventually culminated in a formal request to the Federal Minister of the Interior at the IMK 
meetings of November 1973 and February 1974, to nationally prepare and pursue according plans for a 
European conference on internal security (IMK, 1973b; cf. Bochmann, 1974; Welt am Sonntag, 1974). This 
request was publicised in the media and officially reiterated by the IMK throughout 1974 (Bochmann, 1974). 
Related proposals for such a conference, prepared by the IMK’s WG II, demonstrate a strong operational 
orientation and a focus on law enforcement and security practitioners, which is unsurprising, because WG II 
not only consists of the heads of corresponding departments from the regional interior ministries but also of 
the BKA President and the President of the German Police University (IMK, 2017). Albeit still not directly 
named, throughout the document, issue-specific interdependencies – for instance in the fight against 
organised crime – provided the core rationale justifying a growing need for European cooperation, 
particularly between national law enforcement authorities (ibid., p. 1). The WG proposals very clearly 
referred to the pre-Schengen Area developments by underscoring the ‘security deficit’ emerging from the 
reduction of intra-EEC border checks (ibid., p. 2 ff.). This discourse of securitisation is even taken so far as to 
insist that enhanced European police cooperation and/or an amendment of police powers would have to 
form the precondition for the removal of border controls; otherwise, it would not be possible to sufficiently 
balance the resulting security deficit. Finally, the document – despite its primary police perspective and 
emphasis on concrete practical challenges arising from European integration – additionally conceived EEC 
internal security cooperation as yet another and necessary building block towards ‘the realisation of the 
targeted/aspired European political union’ (ibid., p. 1). Hence, the conclusions of the June 1974 IMK meeting 
illustrate how state Interior Ministers as well as senior policy and law enforcement officials acted as 
subnational policy entrepreneurs to favourably shape the German government preference with regard to 
European security cooperation. Noteworthy are especially the framing of issue-specific interdependencies 
and the political discourse of an emerging security deficit. 
 In this context, a closer look must also be taken at one more German subnational actor: the BKA. 
Apart from its input in the IMK’s WG II, the BKA itself further contributed independently to the German 
national preference. Founded in 1951 as an executive agency of the BMI, the BKA was significantly 
strengthened in its capacity as Germany’s central, coordinating criminal police office from 1970 onwards, 
following the experience with radical political and terrorist groups (cf. Beese, 2010; Dahlke, 2011). Its annually 
issued Police Crime Statistics indicated steadily rising crime rates since at least 1963, including an increase in 
the share of non-German offenders (Bundeskriminalamt, 1973, cf. German Federal Criminal Police Office, 
1977). This seems to imply growing interdependencies in the fight against crime in an ‘ever closer union’ of 
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EEC Member States around the 1970s. While it is difficult to provide similar numbers and statistics for 
terrorist offences, the general sentiment and public perception at the time certainly derived from these 
apparent trends, thereby effectively politicising a growing ‘insecurity.’ 
It consequently does not come as a surprise perhaps that the Federation of German Detectives (BDK, 
Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter), a trade union representing the BKA, held its 1974 international criminal 
police congress (‘Kripo International 74’) under the theme of ‘European Community – including for the 
Criminal Police’ (Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter, 2015). Contributions to the final report of the conference 
included – yet again – reflections on realising a European police office (ibid.; cf. Fijnaut, 2016, p. 19 ff.). 
Notwithstanding the overall sentiment, also on the part of the BKA itself, that growing interdependencies 
and the threat of an emerging security deficit respectively rendered international police cooperation 
indispensable, Horst Herold, President of the BKA at the time, decidedly rejected the thought of establishing 
a ‘Europol’ (cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 193; Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, 1974). He was particularly concerned about 
the potential duplication if not the undermining of cooperation structures already existent within Interpol, 
and thus preferred the enhancement of European police cooperation through the latter framework rather 
than the creation of a new one (Herold, 1974; cf. Busch, 1996). International security threats, Herold further 
argued, required truly international – that is, global – cooperation beyond the borders of the EEC (Herold, 
1974; cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 193). Nevertheless, Herold was not able to assert himself on a national level, and 
the BKA’s initial preference for a more global format of international security cooperation did not succeed in 
taking hold among the responsible government officials. Irrespective of Herold’s statement at the BDK 
international congress in April 1974, the German State Interior Ministers continued to press for a European 
conference on internal security, and German federal levels went ahead with bilateral preparations together 
with the French authorities (Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, 1974; MR Merk, 1974c; Press service of the State 
Government Rhineland-Palatinate, 1974).  
Subnational levels, including the BKA and State Interior Ministries, also provided input once the 
Franco-German intergovernmental WG was in place and thus helped shape the federal preference. Not only 
was it senior officials who substantially prepared the conference in terms of its content, thereby laying the 
foundations for the meeting of national Interior Ministers, but the bilateral WG additionally drew heavily on 
papers and proposals devised by the IMK, particularly its WG II (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
1974b, p. 1; MR Merk, 1974b). Moreover, direct transgovernmental exchange took place between senior 
officials from French and German Interior Ministries as well as from law enforcement in the run-up to the 
intended European conference (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1974b, p. 2). In this context, the BKA 
likewise provided substantial input with regard to the German national position and bringing about concrete 
plans for European police cooperation. Following the failure of BKA President Herold to press for the pursuit 
of a global framework via Interpol, and in the aftermath of further experiences with RAF violence, 
particularly the West German Embassy Siege in Stockholm in April 1975, the BKA’s position vis-à-vis an 
inherently European cooperation format changed. In a situation assessment at the request of Federal Minister 
of the Interior, Werner Maihofer, from August of the same year, Herold highlighted the growing 
transnationalisation of terrorism, and voiced frustrations over the lack of effective counterterrorism-efforts 
through Interpol (Herold, 1975b). The report very much stressed the need to react at bi- and multilateral 
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European levels to the emergence of transboundary terrorist networks within the EEC so as to prevent 
domestic cells like the RAF to take advantage of increasing Community interdependencies (ibid., p. 3 ff.).  
Similar BKA assessments continued to nourish a discourse of an arising security deficit, given the 
discrepancies between national law enforcement capacities and transnationally operating terrorism. Herold 
himself strongly advocated the enhancement of cross-border information exchange with a clear preference 
for modernisation of police technology and comprehensive institutionalisation of communication channels 
(Herold, 1975a; RD Wittschen, 1975; cf. Weinhauer, 2006). Another formal report to the BMI from February 
1976 drastically depicted the negative consequences of the abolition of internal border checks, and 
emphasised that a ‘supranational internal security structure’ among EEC Member States would be 
indispensable to compensate the risks emerging from this development (German Federal Criminal Police 
Office, 1976a, p. 9). In the accompanying letter, addressed to the State Interior Ministers and the Federal 
Minister of the Interior, Herold directly asked the IMK to acknowledge the report and ensure that the 
described security implications would be considered in the IMK’s European WG on the matter (Herold, 
1976a). Additionally, the BKA and senior police levels were directly involved in the preparations for the EEC 
conference of Interior Ministers that would turn into TREVI and initiate formal European police cooperation.  
Both the BKA and the IMK would remain closely involved in preference-shaping following the 
launch of TREVI at the ministerial meeting of 29 June 1976. They would not only do so through their direct 
engagement in the TREVI WGs, but also through regular exchange with the Federal Minister of the Interior 
respectively (RegDir Bracht, 1976b; German Federal Criminal Police Office, 1976b). In this context, the input 
from subnational levels was not only initiated by subnational actors themselves, but was regularly sought 
and even requested by the BMI in the preparations for the European conference on internal security (Herold, 
1976b; MR Merk, 1973b). The IMK and the BKA thus helped shape the German position in favour of 
formalising, if not institutionalising, police cooperation among EEC Member States so as to make it 
permanent – a government preference that remained unchanged throughout the 1970s and beyond, 
culminating in the creation of Europol in the 1990s, as will be shown in the following chapters. 
 
France 
In France, subnational policy entrepreneurship played a similar albeit less significant role regarding the 
national preference on TREVI. Interestingly, German and British police representatives should primarily 
exert pressure and would eventually push France to accept, if not favour, the establishment of the Trevi 
Group. At national level, next to officials from the FMI, National Police officials were likewise substantially 
involved in the concrete preparations for the first ministerial meeting (Ewart-Biggs, 1974b; Tomkins, 1975a). 
They were already closely involved in the early predecessor of the meeting of Community Interior Ministers: 
the Franco-German WG, comprising senior officials from law enforcement in addition to civil servants from 
the Interior Ministries. The involvement of French police levels also arose naturally from the distribution of 
competencies within the political system. The responsibility for the fight against international terrorism solely 
lay with the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, which served as domestic intelligence agency and formed 
part of the French National Police (RD Wittschen, 1975). Accordingly, it exerted significant influence on the 
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French stance vis-à-vis Germany in the early preparatory phase for the internal security conference. As part 
of the bilateral WG’s first meeting in Paris in November 1974, for example, senior officials were to discuss 
ways of fostering a common European attitude regarding political terrorism.  
However, France, represented primarily by intelligence officials, refused to do so because the topic 
was already scheduled for a meeting of the European Heads of intelligence agencies (Oberloskamp, 2017, p. 
65 f.). Similar bureaucratic resistance likewise existed on some subnational levels in Germany. In fact, the 
original proposal for this agenda item at the gathering of EC intelligence services had come from the German 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), thus cutting across the scope of the Franco-German 
WG and effectively rivalling its work and undermining the international efforts of the BMI (ibid.). In France, 
even beyond the launch of TREVI, subnational policy entrepreneurs continued to obstruct the further 
development of European police cooperation via this platform. French police circles – mainly from the 
intelligence side of the National Police – for instance shaped the French preference for a highly limited 
functional scope of TREVI. It is thus not surprising that France vetoed a Dutch proposal for the inclusion of 
intelligence agencies into the Group shortly after the ministerial meeting in June 1976 (German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, 1976c).  
Apart from the legally embedded involvement of the French police in any action by the FMI against 
international crime and terrorism, including in European cooperation platforms, the very close and personal 
relationship between Poniatowski and the Director General of the National Police, Robert Pandraud, ensured 
a direct influence of law enforcement circles on the French preference. The British FCO noted in September 
1975 that “it is a very personal appointment,” and consequently “Pandraud reported directly to, and took his 
instructions directly from, Poniatowski” (Tomkins, 1975a, p. 3). This mattered greatly in view of 
Poniatowski’s personal convictions and his vulnerable political standing at the time. Having pledged to step 
up efforts to combat crime when he came into office in May 1974, Poniatowski relied on tough policing 
measures and was perceived to be “encouraging his police to be too easy on the draw” (Walden, 1975, p. 2). 
In the wake of his tough crime-fighting strategy, harsh anti-Communist stance as well as a number of 
mismanaged operations, he came increasingly under public and political attack, and consequently relied 
heavily on Pandraud for counsel. The latter thus initiated a number of systemic changes in the national police 
with the aim of “distanc[...ing] the Minister from the success or failure of particular police operations” 
(Tomkins, 1975a). While the French National Police accordingly possessed, through Pandraud, a direct 
channel for input into FMI policy and preferences, this input remained largely limited to the domestic 
security and predominantly internal political issues.  
Additionally, Poniatowski and Pandraud regarded the infrastructure of Interpol sufficient for 
multilateral police cooperation, and did not want to undermine it with parallel channels (German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, 1978b; Herold, 1974; MR Merk, 1974a; Solier, 1978). Unsurprisingly perhaps, the 
official FMI position similarly reflects this emphasis on decentralisation and low-profile policing to deal with 
internal security problems rather than bold political commitments to European cooperation. Police actors 
thus effectively shaped the French attitude towards TREVI and the national preference for practical problem-
oriented strategies and rather loose, ad-hoc mutual support in the fight against terrorism on a case-by-case 
basis (MR Merk, 1976a).  
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French subnational policy entrepreneurship contributed to a national preference that was primarily 
preoccupied with the domestic situation and domestic remedies – much in contrast to Germany and the UK 
where subnational levels actively pushed for a transnational approach to internal security governance and 
policing. Although the French National Police, especially its Director General and officials from the national 
intelligence agency, without doubt exerted a certain influence on the French preference against the 
establishment of TREVI as a new multilateral cooperation framework, their role was arguably not as vital as 
that of subnational actors in Germany and the UK. In fact, sustained transnational pressure from Germany 
and the UK – particularly senior government and police officials at the level of intergovernmental WGs – 
contributed to the shift of the French national position towards accepting police cooperation through TREVI. 
Yet, transnational pro-integration advocacy by subnational actors in Germany and the UK failed to 
substantially impact the French preference. Other factors, such as political considerations about the potential 
impact on French relations with Arab states or the perceived absence of significant interdependencies, 
presumably continued to negatively shape its preference on European police cooperation, and thus produced 
an overall sceptical attitude towards the Trevi Group. This attitude would sustain itself throughout the 
following decade. It would for instance be visible in the French outspoken unwillingness and at times 
deliberate ‘politique de blocage’ (French Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1978; ORR Schneider, 1979). On multiple 
occasions, France would actively hinder police cooperation via TREVI as well as attempts at expanding the 
functional scope of the Group, and even request its dissolution (French Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1978; German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1978b; Solier, 1978). 
 
The United Kingdom 
Like Germany, police representatives exerted significant influence on the British preference concerning 
TREVI. Following the Home Secretary’s proposal for a meeting of Community Ministers of the Interior, law 
enforcement circles essentially defined terrorism as the preferred British focus for EC cooperation (Wood, 
1975). Many of the rather technical and operations-focused elements contained in the British note to other 
Member States in preparation of the first TREVI meeting can be argued to have originated on the police side 
of the HO, derived directly from needs arising at the front lines of policing (cf. German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, 1976a). British senior police officials were closely involved in the shaping of the TREVI proposal 
before its announcement at the European Council meeting in Rome. While the most visible impact of 
subnational policy entrepreneurship is the UK’s official preference for terrorism as the focus of the envisioned 
cooperation, the extensive inclusion of police representatives in the preparatory work for the ministerial 
meeting might be seen as further evidence (Wood, 1975). Already in the fall of 1975, Robert Armstrong, HO 
Deputy Under Secretary in charge of the Police Department, played a key role in the development and the 
drafting of the Home Secretary’s proposal for a meeting of Community Interior Ministers (British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 1975b; British Home Office, 1975b). Armstrong was further personally 
responsible for the bilateral soundings with France, that is, he directly met with his French counterpart, 
Pandraud, Director General of the French National Police (British Home Office, 1975a). Similar to Pandraud, 
Armstrong thus acted as a direct channel for police interests and concerns in the UK, which – through him – 
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were consequently able to shape both the British government position and the negotiations in advance of the 
first TREVI meeting.  
In this vein, police officials were involved on various levels, including as formal points of contact in 
higher political fora or as direct, more informal cross-border contacts with other law enforcement authorities 
(British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975e). Their widespread presence in the intergovernmental 
WGs preparing the ministerial TREVI meeting, as well as input in its WGs, was reflected in the outcome 
documents and ultimately the TREVI structure. Both contained a significant amount of police terminology 
and a focus on practical problem-solving and concrete aspects of police work. The influence of British senior 
officials in the policy process can likewise be seen in the change of the German strategy following the British 
announcement of its proposal in December 1975. Since the UK’s political decision to advance the planned 
meeting of Community Interior Ministers had been taken at the highest government levels, Germany 
deliberately shifted to the subnational level for asserting its preferences and manipulating the British position 
in a bottom-up manner (MinRat Streicher & RegDir Bracht, 1975b).  
Apart from subnational policy entrepreneurship deriving from the British political system, domestic 
police actors exerted considerable pressure on the British Government through politicisation. Examples 
include the October 1975 premature news leak of British plans for a conference of Community Interior 
Ministers that seems to have originated in HO police circles, or the frequent and direct contacts between 
senior police and HO officials, including at the highest levels such as exchanges between the Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police and the Home Secretary himself (‘1975’, 1975; Brimelow, 1975; Fretwell, 1975b). Of 
course, the influence of police circles on the British preference regarding European police cooperation must 
not be overestimated either. It is, however, remarkable to what extent police representatives were involved 
in this rather political endeavour, even more so because the British Government’s stated aim for TREVI 
initially had been a rather loose exchange of information and best practices on public order and safety 
(German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1976a). Yet, when the TREVI Ministers finally met in June 1976, the 
UK’s proposal concentrated on practical, even operational support and cooperation regarding concrete terror 
attacks and other rather narrowly-defined areas of police work. Contrary to French domestic security actors, 
British subnational policy entrepreneurs positively shaped the British position on the Trevi Group, even 
beyond its inception. The British Security Service would for example propose an extension of cooperation to 
airport security, including direct training visits among practitioners and experts (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1977a). 
In sum, subnational policy entrepreneurship certainly mattered for both shaping and multiplying 
ministerial impulses. However, it only pro-actively emerged as a driver of national preferences in all three 
countries once these initial impulses had been provided at higher levels. The German IMK and BKA first 
became active in response to the initiative of the BMI, particularly at the request of the Federal Minister 
himself. Once they were involved, however, they acted as important drivers and enhancers of the German 
preference in favour of far-reaching European police cooperation. In France, police levels likewise became 
active only once they had officially been asked to get engaged, for example in the Franco-German WG or in 
the bilateral soundings initiated by Germany and the UK. With the appointment of Pandraud as the Director 
General of the National Police, subnational officials gained significant opportunity for input into the design 
Chapter 4 │ The Trevi Group: Birth Hour of European Police Cooperation 
85 
of French internal security policy and its preference regarding Community cooperation. However, contrary 
to Germany and the UK this potential channel of influence remained largely underexploited in its European 
dimension. In the UK, similar to Germany, the police side of the HO increasingly began to provide input and 
actively lobby for European cooperation on counterterrorism once the initial impulse had come from the 
Home Secretary himself. Subnational actors may possibly even have had an earlier influence on the HO’s 
proposal for a meeting of EC Interior Ministers, as Armstrong, heading the police department, played a major 
part in the development of the Home Secretary’s vision. 
More generally, the growing importance of police levels in the process leading to the creation of 
TREVI can likewise be seen in the strengthened powers of law enforcement across all three Member States. 
Especially Germany and the UK passed and reformed legislation that would allow the police to better tackle 
terrorism, often through tough policing measures. Of course, the extension of police powers might also be 
seen as a political reaction to politicisation and public pressure rather than the targeted lobbyism of 
subnational actors. However, the evidence suggests that police circles did play a pro-active part to these ends, 
even if their voice merely amplified public pressure. In addition to the judicial increase in police powers at 
home, subnational policy entrepreneurs in France, Germany and the UK became more and more active across 
European borders. Next to independent transnational contacts between police officers, senior officials from 
the German BKA (and IMK), the British Metropolitan Police Service, and the French National Police were 
directly involved in the uni-, bi- and multilateral preparations for the first ministerial TREVI meeting. Their 
involvement went beyond mere participation, as demonstrated by the serious concerns of the German 
Ministry of Justice, which feared that the TREVI cooperation – if coordinated by the BMI and police officials 
– might lead German law enforcement to become less accountable, and to act progressively outside the 
control of the German Public Prosecutor’s Office (Oberloskamp, 2015, p. 55 f.). While domestic police levels 
in France, Germany and the UK did not initiate state preferences in favour of European cooperation, they 
played a major part in maintaining and enhancing the momentum – often harnessing politicisation by 
pushing policymakers towards securitising moves – and thus crucially shaped national preferences, 
particularly regarding the functional scope of TREVI.  
This section, and in fact this chapter, has analysed the case of the 1976 Trevi Group. Concretely, it 
has analysed the ways in which issue-specific interdependence, politicisation and subnational policy 
entrepreneurship mattered for the formation of the German, British and French national preferences on 
European police cooperation. It has demonstrated among other things that these drivers often interacted and 
mutually reinforced one another in the production of a specific state position. The following concluding 
section briefly summarises how this translated into the respective preferences concerning horizontal and 
vertical integration as well as the functional scope of police cooperation. 
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4.4 Institutional Choice in a Nutshell: State Preferences on the Three Dimensions 
of Differentiated Integration  
In sum, high interdependence acted as necessary condition and starting point for the development of pro-
integration preferences in support of European police cooperation. Asymmetrical interdependencies can 
likewise account for the ultimate institutional choice of the Trevi Group as an intergovernmental body with 
inherent DI characteristics. Whereas Germany and the UK reacted to growing interdependence by seeking 
common action, first on a global then a Community level, France experienced comparatively lower levels of 
interconnectedness and thus did not initiate or support new forms of cooperation (see table 8). The TREVI 
case further demonstrates that politicisation can act as both a strong reinforcement or deterrence of 
preferences in favour of European cooperation, and that it appears to often interact with interdependence in 
its impact on governments. In Germany and the UK, public debates on the problem of terrorism emphasised 
existing international connections and thereby debatably contributed to positive national positions 
concerning TREVI. A similar debate was largely absent in France where public discourse revolved around 
domestic issues (see table 8). What is more, the French Governments actively undertook efforts to avoid 
politicisation in relation to its counterterrorism policy so as to not further fuel the internal political crisis 
around Poniatowski, and not to burden diplomatic ties with its Arab partners. Only once external pressure 
from other EC governments began to increase did France concede a new European cooperation framework. 
In the studied cases subnational policy entrepreneurship likewise seemed to matter as influencers and 
amplifiers of the national preferences, mostly concerning the functional scope of cooperation. However, this 
was only so where they had sufficient access to higher decision-making levels. The German IMK and the 
BKA for instance arguably departed from the best starting position, embedded in the German federal, 
subsidiary system that ensured the involvement and participation of sub-national actors in internal security 
policy. Although the first impulse for initiating Community cooperation and planning an according 
conference had come from a minister, the IMK and the BKA significantly shaped the German preference 
thereafter. In the UK, the police side of the HO similarly actively influenced the British preference with regard 
to TREVI and especially its functional scope. No such subnational lobbying in favour of European police 
cooperation occurred in France (see table 8). While close (personal) ties existed between the Interior Minister 
and the Director of the National Police, the top-down nature of the French political system allowed for little 
to no bottom-up input in this area. It remains questionable whether this would have been different, had the 
French police system been less centralised. A preoccupation of high-level policymakers with internal affairs 
and averting political scandal at home might have likewise limited subnational policy entrepreneurship on 
international police cooperation. It would be interesting to study if and how higher domestic politicisation of 
international terrorism might have changed the possibilities for police advocacy and the French position 
respectively.  
In view of the political blockage of far-reaching integration, Member States strategically adopted DI 
approaches, if not preferences, in the negotiation phase for TREVI’s establishment. This chapter finds that 
asymmetries in the impact of different driving factors can explain this phenomenon, as they yield diverging 
preferences across these countries and on the three dimensions of DI. The respective strength of single drivers 
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ultimately determined not only preference formation on vertical and horizontal integration as well as the 
functional scope of European police cooperation but also the probability of preference di- or convergence 
among Member States. High interdependence acted as primary influence on positive state positions 
concerning vertical and horizontal integration. Subnational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation, by 
contrast, had the highest impact on state preferences regarding the functional scope of cooperation. While 
Germany’s strong pro-integration preference on all three dimensions of DI was presumably the result of 
relatively high functional, public and political pressure in various areas of internal security, similar levels of 
interdependence, politicisation and subnational policy entrepreneurship in the UK remained mostly confined 
to the area of terrorism, and thus produced a strong integration preference only in this issue area. France, 
against it, experienced comparatively low levels of all three drivers. Consequently, it did not favour EC police 
cooperation at all. The final design of the Trevi Group with its inherent DI characteristics therefore reflected 
not preference convergence but compromise; the intergovernmental structure of varying degrees of 
differentiation or integration across the three levels of DI reflected asymmetrical impacts of the respective 
driving factors. The final institutional choice thus ultimately presented an effective means to realise the key 
substance of each preference. However, this DI approach to European police cooperation was not primarily 
shaped by the Eurosceptics to obstruct or delay integration. On the contrary, Germany and the UK 
deliberately employed it as a strategy to advance cooperation in the present and possibly integration in the 
long run. 
 
Vertical Integration 
The eventual compromise that was struck on vertical integration when the TREVI Ministers came together in 
Luxembourg for the first time was significantly influenced by the UK. The process, however, was a lengthy 
and difficult one. The German preference for far-reaching institutionalisation and a stronger role for the EC 
in the area of internal security collided with the opposite British preference for a decentralised, 
intergovernmental modus operandi of TREVI, that is, no deepening of the Community in this field. Germany 
eventually yielded and the Trevi Group was launched as an intergovernmental body with barely any 
institutionalisation or centralised authority. At the same time, its structure mirrored parts of the German 
federal system and paralleled the EC system in some aspects such as its presidency, thereby making further 
‘deepening’ possible in the future. Departing from this foundation, Germany would continue to lobby for a 
stronger institutionalisation of the Group, although the UK would correspondingly reject any involvement 
or closer association of the Community with TREVI (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1977b; 
Lance, 1977). It is therefore hardly surprising that it should take decades before European police cooperation 
substantially moved towards deeper vertical integration, as will be discussed in the next chapters. 
 While all three theoretical drivers of state preferences on European integration – interdependencies, 
politicisation and policy entrepreneurship – played a role in shaping the German preference for 
comprehensive, institutionalised police cooperation among Member States, the official government discourse 
and internal rationale present significantly different pictures of their respective importance. Issue-specific 
interdependence seems to have mattered most  for  the  German stance on the level of centralisation.  First, a  
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growing external interdependence in security – made evident by practical problems arising from 
international terrorism – provided functional pressure to act. Internal interdependencies deriving from 
European integration and an increasing institutional interconnectedness among EC members reinforced this 
pressure. Finally, a political consensus among German policymakers existed at the time that the European 
project should be advanced towards a political union, and that real-world issues in need of regulation 
provided a convenient entry point for long-term integration progress (cf. German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy, 1974). Notwithstanding the importance of interdependence for the 
development of Germany’s positive preference on TREVI and vertical integration, politicisation amplified 
functional pressure to this end. RAF and Europe-wide terror incidents produced considerable public pressure 
and anxiety at domestic and international level. The growing salience of such cross-border connections and 
public discourse of European interdependence in the fight against terrorism and crime thus intensified pro-
integration pressure on German policymakers. Politicisation – particularly securitisation frames – did 
perhaps not act on its own as driving factor in this regard, but it substantially reinforced the impact of 
interdependence and thus contributed to Germany’s favourable stance on Community police cooperation. 
 Subnational policy entrepreneurship likewise played a role in shaping Germany’s preference on 
formalisation. Political discussions on centralising and institutionalising European police cooperation 
debatably originated from the IMK and police levels, including the idea for a Europol  as early as January 
1973.  Although strong institutional aspirations were present in the national preference from the beginning, 
Germany only pro-actively and consistently pursued the formalisation of police cooperation from 1974 
onwards. Its favourable position on institutionalisation continued to be marked by subnational policy 
entrepreneurship, primarily through the IMK and the BKA who repeatedly voiced the functional need to 
rationalise cooperation in response to an arising security deficit. At the 1976 ministerial conference that 
launched TREVI, the corresponding target outcome Germany hoped for consequently consisted of a 
substantial policy outcome that could lay the foundation for more permanent and long-term cooperation. 
One more factor additionally mattered in this context: the role of norms and domestic legal culture. 
Katzenstein (2008) for example observes how Germany’s active role in fostering international collective action 
against terrorism “has been shaped by the characteristic weight that German political leaders have accorded 
legal norms in domestic politics” (p. 169). Indeed, the German approach towards European police 
cooperation and an international response to terrorism included a strong desire to embed various principles 
and norms. Concrete examples include attempts to issue a common political declaration of intent at the 
European conference on internal security, as well as early plans (at ministerial level) to press for a similar 
declaration at the 31st UN General Assembly (GA) (MR Merk & RegDir Bracht, 1976a; RegDir Bracht i.V., 
1976a). The German desire to formally integrate legal norms in police cooperation matters can likewise be 
seen in the establishment of TREVI and matters because it demonstrates how the domestic political system, 
legal tradition and security culture acted as enablers of a pro-formalisation preference. 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Germany – in the final negotiation phase on the Trevi Group – 
did not conceal its political goals of EEC integration, but was rather open to its European partners about 
prioritising far-reaching internal security cooperation so as to also advance overall European integration. By 
early 1976, functional and public pressure had pushed Germany towards a clear preference for formal 
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binding institutions and legal instruments such as international conventions that would commit Member 
States in the long run. This attitude was, however, largely not received positively. For example, one comment 
in a brief for the British Secretary of State (HO) reads: 
“The difficulty is that their [the Germans’] enthusiasm is expressed with a vigour that tends to 
frighten other Members of the Community who are very nervous about being seen to cooperate 
on terrorism and takes the form of a teutonic fondness for elaborate agreements which could 
hinder rather than assist cooperation.” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976a) 
The asymmetrical impact of driving factors across countries and according incompatibility of state preference 
may explain why Germany shifted its preference towards DI in this area. The overall sentiment in the EEC at 
the time was not favourable to quick integration. Particularly the UK – despite its positive EEC membership 
referendum in June 1975 – strongly preferred to keep initiatives in the area of internal security completely 
separate from EEC bodies. Notwithstanding similarly high levels of external interdependence, its 
institutional connectedness with the EC was arguably not as high and exerted less functional pressure to 
formalise cooperation. Thus, Germany decided to pursue a course of DI; European police cooperation in the 
form of TREVI would begin outside the formal EEC framework albeit effectively comprising all Member 
States. However, Germany would struggle to assert its arguments of interdependence to institutionalise 
European police cooperation in the following decades. On the contrary, the early Trevi Group comprised 
rather practically-oriented WGs, and focussed mostly on concrete issues faced by Member States. Although 
Germany would continue to advocate steps towards vertical integration, for example through the 
establishment of a permanent TREVI Secretariat, it would not or only incrementally succeed in advancing 
this goal until the 1990s (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1978a).  
 By contrast, the British preference on vertical integration was very much embedded in the Trevi 
Group and driven strongly by external interdependence. While the UK’s official attitude had changed on a 
number of points between first intragovernmental deliberations in the summer of 1975 and the inception of 
TREVI one year later, the country ultimately favoured rather informal albeit well-established practical 
cooperation. Growing cross-country linkages in policing, especially in the fight against international 
terrorism, produced increasing functional pressure on British policymakers to better structure cooperation 
above the national level. This was more and more reflected and amplified in the emerging public debate on 
safety and terrorism. When it became clear that universal arrangements through the UN or Interpol would 
not be feasible for realising an internal security initiative focussed on terrorism, an EEC framework seemed 
most promising, yet posed the question where to situate TREVI in relation to the Community. While the exact 
institutional setting would not alter the geographic extension of the Group – the British aimed at including 
all EEC Member States in any case – it certainly would impact the degree of vertical integration and thus the 
power of governments vis-à-vis the Community. Not surprisingly, much deliberation took place across 
departments, different opinions converged and sometimes collided, before the UK should arrive at a clear 
preference. 
 Whereas growing external interdependencies primarily shaped the British pro-cooperation position, 
the prospect of intensifying internal interdependencies and spill-over effects in an EC context produced 
somewhat ambiguous effects on the British integration preference. On the one hand, an almost unanimous 
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interdepartmental fear emerged that any institutionalisation or the creation of formal legal instruments might 
lead to a Community competence creep. Sovereignty concerns related to growing institutional linkages in 
this area thus drove a certain resistance against deeper integration on the part of the UK. The FCO strongly 
preferred to hold the meeting of European Interior Ministers within the intergovernmental, institutionally 
looser framework of EPC rather than at the Council of Ministers (Fretwell, 1975a). Against it, the British 
official position was simultaneously shaped by an interest in exploiting existing EEC structures and 
institutional synergies as a basis for informal but effective practical cooperation. The HO originally favoured 
a direct placement of TREVI in the EC environment, and even advocated “increasingly [...]shift[ing] the 
weight of effort from the Council [of Europe] to the Community, which is a tighter and more effective 
institution” (Armstrong, 1975). Functional integration pressure from rising interdependence thus clashed 
with political sovereignty concerns in the formation of the British preference. The prevalence of fear that a 
launch of the TREVI in the wrong setting could trigger an EC competence gain can be seen throughout the 
policy process. HO Deputy Under-Secretary of State for example considered that proposing European police 
cooperation at the Council of Ministers “[...]would [...make it] difficult to resist a Commission presence at 
such a meeting” (Armstrong, 1975). Even more drastically put, in a note to the FCO, the UK’s Permanent 
Representative to the EC stated: “You are only too well aware that any suggestion of such a meeting being 
held in the Council could have implications in terms of Community competence,” and additionally 
recommended to refrain from announcing the proposal at the European Council which, he argued, 
overlapped too much with the Council of Ministers to ensure a clear separation from Community business 
(Gore-Booth, 1975). The risk of a competence shift towards the EC thus presented a core concern to British 
policymakers. 
At the same time, security considerations and a lack of trust likewise played a part in the emergence 
of a British position favouring little to no involvement of Community actors in TREVI, and thereby the least 
vertical integration possible. The UK specifically feared that a Commission presence would inhibit the open 
exchange of information among ministers due to the “need to avoid leaks,” and a certain hesitance to trust 
the Commission with sensitive data given the lack of secure communication infrastructure in Brussels (Butler, 
1976; Callaghan, 1976a). This was also the rationale behind ultimately holding the ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg and not the EC capital. And the UK was not alone with this preference. Already before the 
formal announcement of the British proposal for TREVI, the Netherlands in an informal meeting with the 
UK, Germany and Italy “pointed out that security was very bad in Brussels and if Ministers of the Interior 
were eventually going to talk about delicate subjects such as terrorism it would be better not to use the EEC 
infrastructure of interpreters etc.” (British Prime Minister’s Office, 1975b). 
Notwithstanding the UK’s opposition to far-reaching political or institutional developments in the EC, 
external interdependence eventually won out and shaped the British preference towards close practical 
cooperation among EC Member States. Contrary to Germany’s political motives, the UK’s hesitant stance on 
vertical integration was primarily the result of a functional need to develop the EEC in response to 
operational issues and common security threats rather than for the sake of general formalisation and 
‘harmonising’ (British Home Office, 1975c; British Prime Minister’s Office, 1974a; Nairne, 1974). In view of 
high functional and public pressure to cooperate, the British Government wanted to be seen as pro-active, 
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yet maintain control over the political process in the hands of the Member States. Thus, the UK pursued a 
course of venue shopping and differentiation that would keep TREVI cooperation outside the formal EEC 
framework and institutions. In this context, the European Council was eventually chosen as the forum for 
announcing the British initiative, because it was deemed to entail the lowest risk of triggering a competence 
creep. An FCO note correspondingly called the “worrying unduly,” and held: “The legal status of the 
European Council is so obscure that no one could argue convincingly that a matter had moved into the 
Community competence just because it was mentioned there. [...T]he risk in practice seems small: no member 
state is going to let the Community interfere in its internal affairs” (British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 1975d). Thus, interdependencies influenced the UK in favour of instigating European police 
cooperation, while both political and practical reasons shaped its preference against formalising TREVI with 
centralised authority in the hands of the EC. 
 By comparison, France experienced considerably less pressure arising from interdependence, 
politicisation and subnational policy entrepreneurship. Therefore, it was highly sceptical, even more opposed 
than the UK, to formalising European police cooperation and creating a new multilateral framework. While 
the French Government acknowledged the need to cooperate more closely in reaction to growing security 
interdependencies as early as 1974, it preferred to expand bilateral cooperation or intergovernmental 
cooperation through Interpol, and thus remained clearly reluctant to centralise any issue area in a 
Community setting, even by mere association (MR Merk, 1974a). What is more, Interior Minister Poniatowski 
was facing his own domestic political crisis at the time in the wake of a number of failed police operations 
that he was held responsible for. Thus, the Ministry was preoccupied with decentralising the French National 
Police, and had no interest in getting involved in European vertical integration, which would make the 
Minister directly answerable for more rather than less. However, unlike the UK, France did not pro-actively 
voice its preference for a minimal level of centralisation with respect to TREVI. In the negotiations, its 
preference for an informal cooperation setting and limited institutionalisation therefore rather passively 
reinforced the British preference, thereby crowding out Germany’s preference in favour of vertical 
integration. 
 
Functional Scope 
State preferences on the functional scope of TREVI and its ultimate topical focus on counterterrorism were 
essentially shaped by politicisation and subnational actors, police officials in particular. Here again, Germany 
had to compromise on its preference. While it had originally favoured a comprehensive scope for the Trevi 
Group, including all issue areas of internal security, the British and especially the French vision collided with 
this far-reaching suggestion. The kick-off meeting of TREVI in June 1976 accordingly remained behind 
German expectations. Mainly driven by the UK, it yielded six TREVI WGs focused largely on practical 
cooperation and information exchange related to international terrorism rather than the formalised, 
comprehensive cooperation on all matters of internal security that Germany would have preferred. In the 
following years, German subnational policy entrepreneurship would reinforce this preference and directly 
lobby at the TREVI expert and senior official levels. German police officials eventually succeeded in pushing 
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for a gradual expansion of the Group’s functional scope, for example to organised crime in the early 1980s 
(German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1982). However, Germany faced significant resistance far into the 
1980s from other Member States who determinedly opposed the incorporation of new subject areas into the 
scope of TREVI. Although growing interdependencies provided the initial impetus for European police 
cooperation, governmental positions on its functional scope were perhaps most shaped by politicising events 
and subnational policy entrepreneurship. 
First steps towards European police cooperation in the fight against terrorism may convincingly be 
argued to have resulted from practical common problems as well as from politico-institutional 
interdependencies and visions in the context of the Community. Both possibly explain Germany’s rationale 
for initiating and pursuing international collective action in the first place, and can partially account for its 
eventual settlement on the fight against terrorism. While the timely coincidence of German party preferences 
in favour of European integration and the initiation of a European conference on internal security may not 
suffice as proof that Germany’s motives extended beyond sheer interdependencies, it cannot be played off as 
a simple contextual factor. Right from the beginning, when early plans for a European conference emerged 
in the aftermath of the terror attack at the Olympic Summer Games, Germany developed a vision for 
cooperation that far exceeded the policy domain of counterterrorism. Internal policy documents from as early 
as 1973 reveal German intentions to expand EEC cooperation to the entire area of internal security and make 
the latter a permanent pillar of European integration (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b; MR 
Merk, 1973a, p. 2). Even before then, Germany had made it very clear that it saw strong ‘interdependencies’ 
between its national interest and its European policies (Brandt, 1969a, p. 3).  
 Against this backdrop, politicisation and subnational policy entrepreneurship helped narrow the 
German preference initially. Both debatably framed interdependencies in the light of terrorism and succeeded 
in shaping the governmental position accordingly. In the wake of the Munich Massacre and the massive 
emotional response by the public, it was perhaps only natural that operational levels at the BKA and the IMK 
lobbied strongly in favour of collective action on this issue. Subsequently, German policymakers developed 
a topical focus on the fight against terrorism and fostering international cooperation to those ends. The three 
EPC WGs that were subsequently launched all prioritised issues related to terrorism.  
Nonetheless, this not only presented a political reaction to politicisation and subnational policy 
entrepreneurship, it constituted a deliberate strategy of flexible integration in view of eurosceptical 
sentiments in other EEC countries.  After the activities of the EPC WGs had petered out in the course of 1973, 
Germany’s preference shifted back towards the original, much more ambitious functional scope of European 
police cooperation. Its second attempt at rallying EEC Member States with a long-term view to establishing 
sustainable and permanent cooperation on the entire area of internal security was however incompatible with 
less integration-friendly preferences of other Member States (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973b; 
MR Merk, 1973a, p. 2). Germany therefore adopted a DI approach out of pragmatism. Although a clear vision 
for a topical expansion of EEC cooperation to all internal security matters existed from the very beginning – 
so as to establish TREVI as integral and permanent pillar of European integration in the long run – the 
realisation of this target was perceived to be best achieved through a gradual step-by-step process (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1974b). This flexible piecemeal approach became manifest in the Franco-
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German WG on transnational organised crime, whose scope Germany intended to soon extend to other 
questions of internal security, and whose results it envisioned to form the basis for TREVI. This, the German 
BMI hoped, would lay the foundation for more permanent long-term cooperation among EEC Member States 
and would eventually facilitate the widening of the Trevi Group’s functional scope beyond the fight against 
terrorism and transnational organised crime. 
 Somewhat similar to Germany’s preference on a broad functional scope for TREVI, the UK had 
originally envisioned a topical focus on the wider field of public order. Subsequent to the positive EEC 
membership referendum of June 1975, the British HO initially aimed for a rather broad scope for European 
internal security cooperation. As early as July, HO officials discussed a “meeting of Community Ministers of 
the Interior to discuss matters of common interest in the field of public order,” and an intensification of 
cooperation in “the maintenance of public order and the detection of crime in modern conditions” 
(Armstrong, 1975; Callaghan, 1975b). Although the UK intended to raise terrorism as an issue at the European 
Council meeting in Rome on 1-2 December, it did not actually have a particular preference for terrorism as 
possible focal point of EEC cooperation.  In the words of the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary: “it was not[...] 
particularly high on our list of priorities” (Wright, 1975b). Instead, the British preference at the time 
comprised a number of rather wide interests related to the field of public order, ranging from computer 
technology and forensic science to drugs, immigration and even race relations amongst others (Wright, 1975). 
 Yet, towards the end of 1975, subnational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation began to move 
the British preference to a narrow focus on terrorism. At the initiative of the “police side of the Home Office” 
and supported by the highest levels, the HO placed increasing emphasis on counterterrorism as the key 
theme for the proposed meeting of Community Interior Ministers in 1976 (d’A Collings, 1975; Wood, 1975; 
cf. Jenkins, 1975). This shifting government preference and consequent prioritisation of terrorism in EEC 
police cooperation mirrored the increasing saliency of the issue in the UK. Various politicising events raised 
public pressure to act, and thereby amplified subnational entrepreneurship to centre European police 
cooperation on this matter.  
At the same time, the British preference for a more limited focus on terrorism may not only have 
derived from a strong public, political and police interest in this issue area but also from a certain pragmatism 
in relation to the European reality at the time. Similar to Germany, the UK adopted a strategic DI approach 
and preferred an incremental extension of TREVI’s functional scope. The British Government had a strong 
interest in building practically useful cooperation among EEC Member States rather than working towards 
political integration like Germany advocated. Nonetheless, the asymmetrical effects of interdependence first 
and foremost, but also politicisation and policy entrepreneurship, made agreement on a broad functional 
scope difficult. Although terrorism was relatively most politicised across EC Member States and perceived 
as exerting most functional pressure to cooperate, the lack of precedent and asymmetrical levels of 
affectedness complicated preference convergence among European governments. Bureaucratic resistance at 
subnational level perhaps most importantly prevented farther-reaching cooperation. Even a limited 
functional scope of TREVI, British policymakers contemplated, would have to be developed carefully and 
incrementally, as a number of Member States were already “very nervous about being seen to cooperate on 
terrorism” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976a; cf. Acland, 1976).  
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 One of these was France. Its preference against any EC framework for police matters – or at best in 
favour of a minimal functional scope for TREVI – could be argued to have been the product of comparatively 
low levels of interdependence on the one hand, and a high level of fear about politicisation around the topic.  
Although France had been involved by Germany from the very beginning and acknowledged the functional 
need to enhance police cooperation due to growing cross-country linkages in home affairs, it arguably 
experienced relatively little interdependence in counterterrorism compared to Germany and the UK. What is 
more, the issue area did not experience particularly high salience and public-political debate in France. On 
the contrary, the French Government had an interest in depoliticising the topic, and opposed the creation of 
a new Community framework to cooperate on terrorism for political reasons. It feared that such European 
cooperation might strain its relations with the Arab world. Consequently, France was extremely reluctant to 
concede responsibility in any issue area to the Community, primarily out of a concern about being seen as 
actively involved in collective European action and commonly emphasising the problem of international 
terrorism (Maihofer, 1975; MR Merk, 1976a). Low levels of interdependence and politicisation related to 
terrorism thus shaped the French preference in favour of no outcome at all, that is, no functional scope for 
European police cooperation. However, international political pressure from its European partners – 
primarily Germany and the UK – eventually pushed France towards conceding the creation of the Trevi 
Group with a minimal functional scope. Its reluctance towards this cooperation platform would persist, as 
can be seen in the French call for the termination of the Group shortly after it was launched. 
Ultimately, the position that both Germany and the UK took in the TREVI negotiations leading up 
to the first ministerial meeting was “primarily, but not exclusively,” focussed on terrorism (British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 1976c; Lance, 1976). Nevertheless, preparatory documents and official statements 
provide evidence of their determination to eventually expand the scope – a position that was driven by 
subnational advocacy from operational levels. Among further envisioned areas for police cooperation were 
for example law enforcement training, matters related to explosives and fire security, as well as transnational 
organised crime (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1976a). British and German police officials had 
a significant input in this regard. The UK and Germany thus both adopted a preference of flexible functional 
integration and coordinated closely in order to assert themselves at European level, against the reluctance of 
France where subnational actors had comparatively limited influence in political decision-making related to 
TREVI. The Trevi Group was subsequently established with a primary focus on counterterrorism, yet, with 
a clear agenda to include a larger range of offences in the near future. Or, as British Home Secretary Roy 
Jenkins phrased it only two days after the first ministerial meeting on European police cooperation: “we 
established a clear political determination to improve co-operation in the fight against international crime 
and in particular against terrorism” (Jenkins, 1976, p. 246). Although the intergovernmental group shortly 
after its inception began to extend its topical and functional fields of activity through new and altered WGs, 
it would take decades before the scope of the Trevi Group would be formally widened, and moved European 
police cooperation to the next level. 
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Horizontal Integration 
In contrast to the level of centralisation and the functional scope of European police cooperation, Germany, 
the UK and even France agreed on the preferred geographical extension for TREVI. In this context, similar 
levels of interdependence – alongside politicisation – seem to have mattered most in bringing about this 
consensus. In view of the unlikelihood of achieving global membership, all three eventually preferred the 
inclusion of all EC Member States.  
However, the European horizontal expansion of TREVI only presented the second-best alternative. 
Interdependencies in the fight against terrorism were global. The 1972 Munich Massacre had first 
demonstrated the emerging global links of terrorist groups and instigated (German) deliberations on 
international police cooperation. Unsurprisingly, the German government at the time conceptualised 
terrorism as a worldwide problem and thus favoured a universal response. Albeit Germany was itself not yet 
a member of the UN, it decidedly promoted a coordinated approach of European Member States in the UN 
GA, particularly with regard to the initiation of an international convention against terrorism in order to 
manage these global interdependencies in the fight against terrorism (Council of Europe, 1972; cf. Blumenau, 
2014, p. 87 ff.; Friedrichs, 2008, p. 47). Increasingly visible global interdependencies in this issue area likewise 
drove the British preference towards a universal cooperation format. Like Germany, the UK preferred global 
action on terrorism over further deepening or newly developing European structures. However, contrary to 
the German Government, external interdependencies in this policy domain would continue to define the 
British prioritisation of worldwide membership, even after the inception of TREVI. This would lead to a 
British preference for external differentiation of European police cooperation. An HO brief on international 
terrorism from May 1975 underscores this position: “this remains our basic view: terrorism is a world-wide 
problem and the practical value in the world dimension of an agreement confined to like-minded Western 
European States remains open to doubt” (British Home Office, 1975c). Yet, the reality was a stalemate on the 
global stage.  
A preference shift away from prioritising universal membership primarily emerged in Germany and 
the UK as a result of frustration with existing structures and institutions at international level. By the end of 
1973, the Western European and Others Group of the UN GA concurred that “no effective action was possible 
under the agenda item of international terrorism” because of the large variety of diverging interests 
represented at global level (British Home Office, 1974b). The same realisation can be found throughout 
internal communications of German Federal Ministries, which deemed the chances for success at the UN or 
even the CoE as improbable (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1973a, 1973b; RegDir Bracht i.V., 1976a). 
Similarly, by mid-1975, the British Government – first and foremost the HO and the FCO – were becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of progress of existing international channels and structures. Despite 
the best efforts of various countries, no action could be expected from the UN, a stalemate that would 
continue to frustrate the UK (British Home Office, 1974b; cf. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
1976d). While interdependence and politicisation regarding the fight against terrorism continued to increase, 
a similar disenchantment had set in with regard to international cooperation via Interpol. In a letter from July 
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1975, Robert Armstrong, then HO Deputy Under-Secretary of State, thus stressed the need for an EEC 
initiative in view of “the widespread feeling that Interpol is not as effective as it might be” (Armstrong, 1975). 
France, by contrast, did not concur with this position, although it would eventually concede to the 
creation of TREVI as a European initiative. It remained highly sceptical if not opposed to creating a new 
multilateral cooperation instrument and continued to voice a preference for enhancing cooperation through 
Interpol rather than TREVI, which is perhaps not surprising as the organisation was located in Paris and had 
been long-dominated by the French (French Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1976; Solier, 1978). A parallel European 
structure, France argued, might duplicate if not cut across the work of Interpol (German Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, 1978b; Herold, 1974; MR Merk, 1974a; Solier, 1978).  
Notwithstanding the French preference for global membership, the stalemate at international level 
to cooperate in the fight against terrorism created a window of opportunity for the launch of a European 
initiative. The rising interconnectedness in common security threats eventually generated sufficient 
functional pressure on Germany and the UK to pursue an institutional alternative for the advancement of 
police cooperation in the face of political deadlock at policy venues like the UN or Interpol. Institutional 
linkages among European governments and particularly their law enforcement authorities additionally 
reinforced preferences for a European horizontal extension of collective action in this policy domain. The 
German Federal Foreign Office (AA) and BMI for instance agreed that concrete results and practical 
cooperation would be attainable more effectively and faster within the setting of likeminded EEC Member 
States (MR Merk, 1974a; VLR I von der Gablentz, 1976). Although diverging opinions were voiced inside the 
UK Government with regard to the preferred horizontal extension of police cooperation, the best chances of 
success to achieve practical cooperation in a most timely and effective manner were likewise deemed to lie 
within an EEC format, where internal interdependencies were comparatively high and rising.  
The clash of high global external and European internal interdependencies as well as their 
asymmetrical effects would ultimately cause an interesting ambiguity in the preferences of Germany, France 
and the UK and drive all three governments to adopt strategies of DI. Notwithstanding growing institutional 
linkages amongst European countries, an asymmetry in the interconnectivity among Member States caused 
diverging levels of pressure to integrate. Operational cooperation between national levels or within security 
and police networks was not similarly well established across all EC members. What is more, a dawning 
‘Eurosclerosis’26 generated widespread scepticism towards further integration in many countries. In this 
light, Germany’s adoption of a step-by-step approach appears perhaps unsurprising. Preparing European 
police cooperation through a small avant-garde group of likeminded Member States with well-established 
connections presented a means to expanding cooperation partnership to all EEC Member States. Even when 
full territorial expansion was within easy reach in the run-up to the first meeting of the future TREVI 
Ministers, Germany pursued a strategy of internal and external differentiation. Whereas its advocacy of 
holistic EEC collective action remained unchanged – particularly in the context of European integration – 
Germany believed in the need for a triangular leadership provided by France, the UK and itself (British Prime 
 
26 a term coined by Herbert Giersch (1985) to denote the period of Europessimism and economic stagnation of the 1970s 
and 1980s 
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Minister’s Office, 1976a). Interdependencies among these three countries, it argued, were comparatively high 
and institutional linkages relatively well established. Not only did they presumably require more intense 
cooperation, an avant-garde approach by a sub-group of Member States with similar problems was also 
framed as a potential blueprint and catalyst for overall EEC police cooperation. Of course, considerations 
about political control over the policy process as well as strong interests in domestic problem-solving and 
venue shopping likewise mattered as motivating factors to differentiate initial membership internally.  
In the UK, global external interdependencies mattered relatively more than internal 
interconnectedness within the Community. Although the UK eventually settled on the EEC format, albeit 
rather out of pragmatism, it continued to prefer global cooperation and thus advocate external differentiation 
of European police cooperation. Contrary to Germany, whose political and legal tradition already favoured 
European integration, the British position on horizontal integration lacked such ambitions and was marked 
primarily by operational demands. Accordingly, Germany’s preference for an at least informal internal 
differentiation – singling out a steering group for European police cooperation – was met with reluctance. 
Precisely because the Luxembourg Presidency and other Member States were perceived to be “very willing 
to press ahead efficiently with EEC and other European activities,” the British government feared that: 
“[i]f, on the other hand, they are given the impression that we, the French, and the Germans, 
think that we can settle these matters between ourselves without the involvement of the smaller 
European countries they will quickly lose interest or become less cooperative.” (Acland, 1976; 
Callaghan, 1976b) 
Subsequently, no such (semi-)official leadership emerged, and working level preparations for the TREVI 
conference involved all EEC Member States. Finally, institutional linkages likewise affected the French 
preference. While France acknowledged the merit of intensifying European police cooperation, its 
cooperation networks in the area of police cooperation were best developed with its Interpol partners. 
Accordingly, France preferred to limit cooperation to well-established bilateral channels and neither extend 
nor limit membership to the EEC. Functional and public pressure to cooperate predominantly at European 
level was not as high and thus unable to shift the French preference from international to European 
cooperation venues. Regardless, France was ultimately outmanoeuvred by Germany and the UK, and 
outnumbered by the other Member States.  
 Although Member States formally chose a European horizontal extension for TREVI in 1976, 
subnational policy entrepreneurship shaped their preferences in favour of external differentiation in the long 
run. German sub-state actors, primarily police officials and the IMK, early-on called to expand police 
cooperation to non-EEC states such as Austria and Switzerland (Press service of the State Government 
Rhineland-Palatinate, 1974). In the light of persisting global interdependencies, this preference was 
supported by the UK and France as well as the other EEC members as a whole. Subnational advocacy 
additionally helped shape state preferences on the institutional setting in which TREVI and its European 
members should cooperate. Even before the inception of the Group, one of the key questions in the 
negotiation phase was where precisely to situate European police cooperation: in the EC or the CoE with its 
wider membership. Unsurprisingly, Germany, with its holistic long-term vision for internal security as a 
future pillar of the Community, soon favoured a close association of TREVI with the EC. The UK, by contrast, 
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preferred to situate TREVI outside the formal Community framework but to simultaneously associate it 
closely with EEC bodies, effectively comprising the EEC Member States. Political and operational concerns 
from government and police officials alike produced this preference after a lengthy process of deliberation. 
One initial concern was the effectiveness of different horizontal formats of cooperation. This arose amongst 
others from the sentiment that multiple parallel “initiatives[...] being pursued in a number of separate fora” 
were already causing a lack of coordination and duplication of efforts (British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 1976e).  
This British reservation did not only hold for the creation of TREVI as a new construct but would 
likewise (re-)surface vis-à-vis other initiatives such as the establishment of a European Convention on 
Terrorism and possible action at the UN. While most of the HO, as well as the Home Secretary himself, 
regarded the Community as the “tighter and more effective institution” (Armstrong, 1975), the FCO and 
certain HO units openly wondered “how far it would be profitable to work in the framework of the Nine 
rather than in the wider though often less cohesive framework of the Council of Europe” (Fretwell, 1975a; cf. 
Wright, 1975). Operational interdependencies and institutional linkages in the area of police cooperation were 
arguably better established among EC Members. The UK eventually reconciled these concerns by 
distinguishing TREVI as its primary forum for practical cooperation, and the wider CoE for broader legal 
questions (d’A Collings, 1976; Duff, 1976). The British Government was very much set on including all EEC 
Member States right away in the development of the Trevi Group. Contrary to Germany, which would have 
preferred a tripartite preparation of the ministerial meeting among the UK, France and itself, the British 
Government – informed strongly by subnational actors – was highly sceptical of differentiating horizontally, 
even if only initially. 
Notwithstanding final agreement on the targeted membership for police cooperation – that is, 
geographical extension to all EC Member States – this did not solve the problem where to situate TREVI in 
relation to the Community framework once and for all. Whereas growing internal interdependencies would 
drive Germany would pro-actively advocate the gradual extension of the Group’s functional scope and its 
level of centralisation, and France would persistently exercise a ‘politique de blocage,’ the British preference 
should remain rather ambiguous, torn between the benefits of Community cooperation and the risk of a 
competence shift in favour of the EC. The following chapters study how preferences on these three 
dimensions of DI changed in the course of the further development of TREVI until the 1990s, and ultimately 
enabled the step-by-step integration of European police cooperation until today. They illustrate how the Trevi 
Group and related cooperation structures increasingly gained practical and legal authority of their own and 
gradually evolved into a more independent body across all three levels. The next chapter scrutinises the 
impact of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship on the formation of state preferences 
in advance of the establishment of Europol.
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5. Institutional Beginnings: The Europol Drugs Unit and 
Early Europol 
The Trevi Group had been around for almost a decade when substantial discussions regarding the shape and 
organisation of European police cooperation began to re-emerge in the mid-1980s. For a while already the 
TREVI Ministers had been increasingly debating its rationalisation and further institutionalisation, including 
the possible establishment of a permanent secretariat and the potential expansion of the Group’s functional 
scope. From 1985 onwards, some even demanded the creation of a whole new organisation to structure the 
common fight against international terrorism and organised crime in the Community. Interdependencies 
played a key role in this context. At the time, the EC was undergoing rapid changes in different areas that 
caused a sense of loss of control over national security and raised functional pressure to work together. From 
formerly nine Member States the EC had grown to comprise twelve members by 1986, and further 
enlargement would follow in 1995 bringing the count to fifteen. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 
by five of ten Member States at the time, thereby committing them to eventually abolish internal borders. Not 
even a year later the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted. It would additionally lift national restrictions 
within the Community by initiating concrete steps towards the completion of the internal market, and laying 
the foundation for a political and monetary union including a single European currency. Albeit unexpected, 
other events like the fall of the Berlin wall and the Iron Curtain in 1989 as well as the subsequent collapse of 
the Soviet Union by 1991 further spurred the need to work together within an increasingly borderless, 
interconnected EC – a need that was perhaps fuelled even more by the Maastricht Treaty and its then 
unprecedented integration agenda that transformed the Community into a Union: today’s EU.
 Against this background it does perhaps not seem surprising that the European Council at its 
meeting on 28-29 June 1991 in Luxembourg decided to significantly expand cooperation on matters falling 
under the newly created JHA-pillar, and agreed on the establishment of a Central European Criminal 
Investigation Office that would eventually result in the official launch of activities of Europol in 1999. 
However, the process that led there was – as with the Trevi Group – neither easy nor straightforward. 
Contrary to the previous chapter where three Member States were clearly most important and identifiable in 
the process towards the launch of TREVI, this was not the case with regard to the creation of Europol. With 
the exception of Germany, which continued to play a significant and pro-active role, no single Member State 
overwhelmingly and consistently shaped the process. The following sections of this chapter are thus arranged 
chronologically by the various phases leading to the launch of Europol, each marking a new stage of progress 
or changing dynamics in European police cooperation (see figure 7). The first such phase began in the mid-
1980s when Italy proposed the consolidation of different cooperation formats under the single structure of a 
European Criminal Intelligence Office. Although the initiative failed, Member States began to increasingly 
discuss the need to formally join forces in the fight against drugs. In this context important steps were taken 
to improve European coordination, including through a certain centralisation and professionalisation. This 
first phase in the process towards Europol culminated in a British proposal at a meeting of TREVI Ministers 
in April 1989 for the foundation of National Drug Intelligence Units (NDIUs) as predecessors of a European 
Chapter 5 │ Institutional Beginnings: The Europol Drugs Unit and Early Europol 
101 
Drug Intelligence Unit (EDIU). While the NDIUs were quickly realised, no agreement could be reached on a 
EDIU, and the discussion was postponed.  
Preferences and negotiation dynamics changed in what this chapter considers the second phase 
towards a European police office. Building on the developments of the late 1980s and the UK’s efforts related 
to NDIUs, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl planted the seed for the actual creation of Europol at a European 
Council meeting in June 1991 where he introduced a far-reaching practical proposal for JHA cooperation in 
the EU. Notwithstanding formal consensus regarding the need to intensify cooperation, Member States could 
initially not agree on the details of such an organisation. Consequently, the second phase was marked by 
negotiations on the scope and powers of the early Europol, as well as by preliminary alternative arrangements 
such as the launch of the EDU – yet another instance of DI to circumvent political deadlock.  
Third, and completing the timeline of the inception of Europol, this chapter investigates the last 
phase, from the signing of the Europol Convention in 1995 until the commencement of operational activities 
in 1999. This phase comprises negotiations on the implementation of the Convention, including discussions 
on Europol’s institutional set-up and – once more – on its legal competencies and powers. When Europol 
finally began operating on 1 July 1999 it constituted the product of nearly a full decade of bargaining and 
reconciliation of different national preferences that were essentially aligned with the maximalist-minimalist 
positions shaping the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 Across all stages leading to the inception of Europol – the Italian Scalfaro Paper, The British 
NDIU/EDIU proposal, and the German initiative for EDU/Europol – three explanatory factors stand out. 
First, interdependence was of particular importance for shaping state preferences in favour of EC cooperation 
and leading governments to propose or support European integration in the area of internal security and 
policing. Second, emerging supranational policy entrepreneurship in the widest sense mattered greatly in the 
form of functional spill-overs from other areas of European integration, most notably the internal market. On 
a related note, two more factors reinforced the shifting focus of EC governments on Europe and the 
Community as police cooperation formats: political spill-overs and institutional path-dependency following 
from the Trevi Group amongst others, paired with a growing organisational need to structure the 
mushrooming number of ad-hoc multilateral platforms. Third and last, national systems as well as domestic 
security and policing cultures played a complementary part as facilitators or inhibitors of state integration 
preferences. The extent to which a political system was compatible with European modes of governance 
certainly made the respective government more or less open to EC cooperation in such a sensitive area. 
Similarly, whether a country’s security policy and police followed an internal tradition of centralisation and 
concertation significantly contributed to a state preference favouring European coordination and integrated 
action. The structural make-up and domestic ‘cultures’ of national security governance thus strongly acted 
as facilitators in the professionalisation of Community cooperation. While this might fall under subnational 
policy entrepreneurship in the widest sense, active advocacy did not take place for the most part. Both supra- 
and subnational entrepreneurship as well as their influence on governments remained overwhelmingly 
passive.  
Whereas interdependencies and spill-over effects acted as key drivers of state integration preferences 
in the 1980s and 1990s, neither policy entrepreneurship nor politicisation represented essential factors. 
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Politicisation without doubt heightened public pressure and often amplified government positions favouring 
European collective action. However, it was not alone sufficient for impacting political decision-making in 
the long run. Wherever the other driving factors were lacking or insufficient, politicisation could not by itself 
sway state preferences and produce a positive integration outcome. Similarly, sub- and supranational actors 
were unable to have a substantial or sustainable effect on the preferences of EC Member Stats. The initiative 
and ultimate decisions related to the advancement of European police cooperation came from the highest 
political levels, and the input from national law enforcement and security authorities remained overall 
limited and varied greatly across countries and their systems. In a similar vein, supranational actors did not 
impact the positions of the Community members. European police cooperation still occurred largely within 
intergovernmental and informal fora outside the EC framework and did not provide for the regular inclusion 
of EC institutions. Only following the Maastricht Treaty and especially the adoption of the legal agreements 
establishing EDU and Europol did the European Commission begin to gain an official role. Nevertheless, its 
influence on EDU and Europol remained limited throughout the 1990s. Although sub- and supranational 
actors may have been able to amplify and support national preferences, this chapter demonstrates that they 
did not present a substantial influence on Member States regarding the creation of Europol. 
 
 
5.1 The 1980s: First Attempts towards a Central European Body and Emerging 
Focus on Drugs 
The Scalfaro paper: An Italian Proposal for a Permanent European Secretariat 
At the meeting of TREVI Ministers on 20 June 1985, Italy’s Minister of the Interior Oscar Luigi Scalfaro 
formally introduced a proposal for the creation of a new European body to centralise existing European 
cooperation formats (see figure 7; cf. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985c, 1985g, 1985h). The 
‘Scalfaro paper’ foresaw the establishment of a permanent secretariat at European level to jointly coordinate 
the Trevi Group, the Pompidou Group and the Club of 527 (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985d). 
The far-reaching institutionalisation of this proposal becomes evident when considering that it entailed a 
central connection of national data bases as well as joint investigation teams (JITs).  Similarly, the functional 
scope was to be rather wide, encompassing terrorism, transnational organised crime and drugs. Very 
different from the setting at the time of the Trevi Group’s launch a decade earlier, the Scalfaro paper departed 
from a situation of rapidly expanding European cooperation. Consequently, Italy not only advocated the 
reconciliation of different, separate structures but the necessity to do so in view of advancing EC integration 
(ibid., p. 1). This type of reasoning perhaps neatly illustrates the emerging relevance of spill-overs and path-
dependency in a field of European cooperation that had not actually existed before the Trevi Group. 
Notwithstanding the overall ‘maximalist’ preference of Italy concerning European integration and 
the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, Italy had previously not been pro-active in this issue area, not even 
within TREVI (Bruggeman, 2016, p. 27). However, around 1980, surging politicisation and deepening 
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interdependence began to exert considerable pressure to act on the Italian government. They primarily arose 
from developments related to terrorism, drug trafficking and national police organisation.  
 
TERRORISM AND DRUGS: GROWING TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES 
Since the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s Italy had been increasingly experiencing terrorist activities 
similar to the ones that had so crucially motivated the German and British preference in favour of establishing 
TREVI in 1976 (Hof, 2015, p. 11 ff.; Requate & Zessin, 2007, p. 437). Particularly BR were perpetrating more 
and more violent acts and assassinations from 1978 onwards, although they had already for some time shaped 
the public debate and political securitisation discourse (Hof, 2015, p. 12; Meade, 1990, p. 183 ff.; Requate & 
Zessin, 2007, p. 437). In addition to intensifying cross-national links and cooperation among domestic terrorist 
groups in EC Member States, the beginning of the 1980s marked a surge in international terrorism in Italy 
(German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1986; Meade, 1990, p. 219 ff.; Requate & Zessin, 2007, p. 437).  
These developments generated significant political and functional pressure on the Italian 
Government to act and favour a European solution. Accordingly, Italy – which at the time had no institutional 
police cooperation with other Member States – showed a growing interest in TREVI and a common EC 
approach (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1978b, p. 2; van Helten, 1977). Italy thus supported the 
proposal for a permanent TREVI Secretariat in 1978 (German Federal  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  1978a,  p. 4).  
However, an agreement on the secretariat question was postponed to a later point due to a lack of political 
will. Other Member States did not see the same necessity for formalising and expanding cooperation, 
arguably because they lacked a similarly high level of (inter-)dependence on centralised European collective 
action or possessed alternative, sufficiently well-established contacts in single cooperation formats (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1978a, 1979; MD Boge & ORR Schneider, 1979). Contrary to Italy, Germany 
and the UK were for example already highly active within TREVI. This lack of Member State support for the 
further centralisation of EC police cooperation would remain the case for almost another decade. 
In addition to terrorism, drugs constituted another issue area in which European governments were 
increasingly interconnected. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s drugs had been emerging as a serious 
problem across European Member States (Busch, 1999; Deflem, 2002; Friedrichs, 2008; Nadelmann, 1993; 
Sheptycki, 2000). They especially posed a considerable problem in Italy where they exemplified the 
transnational links of domestic criminal groups like the mafia. Yet, the Italian Government did not officially 
acknowledge that drug abuse and drug crime were an issue of concern until the mid-1970s (Friedrichs, 2008, 
p. 144; Gardner, 1979). By then, Italy was experiencing a massive surge in drug-related criminal activities that 
posed a considerable and direct threat to the government and its monopoly on the use of force. The Italian 
Mafia was incrementally professionalising its conduct and expanding its influence beyond the local and 
national confines (Arlacchi, 1986; Pantaleone, 1979). 
Interdependence in the fight against threats from drug trafficking and related crimes ultimately 
pushed Italy to develop a preference for international cooperation. A sort of international mafia 
entrepreneurship was evolving that capitalised on global market liberalisation and cross-border supply 
chains. Increasingly blurring the lines between licit and illicit economic activities, drug trafficking and related   
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crimes accumulated a massive profit and served as financial basis for the Mafiosi’s power and transnational 
organised crime (Arlacchi, 1986). The Italian Mafia thus did not only horizontally widen its operational 
territory beyond national boundaries, it moreover began to vertically integrate different criminal areas in 
order to expand its economic power and political autonomy (e.g. overlaps between drugs and arms 
trafficking). To this end, drugs were of fundamental importance for the rise of the Mafia as a serious 
contender of the state monopoly on violence. They enabled it to amass and (re-)invest an incomparable 
fortune and thus infiltrate almost every part of the socio-political and economic sphere (ibid.). Unilaterally 
powerless in the face of this enormous transnational threat, the Italian Government and law enforcement 
authorities consequently began to pursue cooperation in the struggle against global drug cartels. At first this 
occurred on a bilateral basis, primarily with the US that possessed long standing experience in the 
investigation and pursuit of international drug traffickers since the early 20th century (Friedrichs, 2008, pp. 
144–147; Nadelmann, 1993). The European regional office of the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 
transformed into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in 1968, was for instance located in 
Rome (Cusack, 1974, pp. 244 & 252; Friesendorf, 2007b). Following the US model, an Italian Central Drug 
Office was created in the mid-1970s in recognition of the “need for a centrali[s]ed coordinated unit” (Gardner, 
1979, p. 14). This ‘Americanisation’ of European drug enforcement similarly occurred in many other EC 
Member States, who for the first time faced drugs as a significant problem of unprecedented scale. 
 
A FUNCTIONAL NEED FOR CENTRALISATION 
Most European countries were soon confronted with legal difficulties posed by their diverging national 
frameworks vis-à-vis the transnationally-oriented, semi-institutionalised and invasive American 
investigation methods (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 134 ff.; Nadelmann, 1993). This was especially true for the case of 
Italy. Legal constitutional restraints and its security culture made it difficult for Italian policymakers and 
police officers to implement the innovative American techniques (Friedrichs, 2008, pp. 144–147; McDonald, 
1990; Nadelmann, 1993, p. 216 f.). Although the Italian preference around 1980 prioritised a global approach 
to the fight against drug trafficking via Interpol, its decentralised system of security governance and internal 
compartmentalisation complicated cooperation, even among domestic agencies (Anderson, 1989, p. 89; 
Italian Senato della Repubblica, 1976, pp. 18–23).  
The organisational and administrative need at operational levels for a professionalisation of 
emerging cooperation channels additionally contributed to the emergence of an Italian preference in favour 
of centralisation. When TREVI was conceived in the early 1970s, Italy’s police system and internal security 
governance was rather decentralised as a consequence of a strong counter-trend to previous fascist structures 
as well as a lack of political consensus (Hof, 2011, p. 124 ff.). Additionally, a strong inward-looking and 
nationally focussed legal culture in criminal matters impeded a strong Italian preference in favour of cross-
border cooperation. Friedrichs (2008, p. 93) observes how the Italian constitution ”categorically prohibits the 
extradition of foreigners and Italian citizens for political offences (Articles 10 and 26)” (cf. Council of Europe, 
1973). This perhaps partially explains why Germany and the UK, not Italy (or France with its on-going 
decentralisation reforms), had taken the initiative in launching European cooperation in the mid-1970s. In 
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both countries a strong cross-party consensus had emerged in the fight against terrorism, and their police 
systems were developing towards more centralised coordination (Busch, 1995, pp. 160–181 & 200–219).  
Against it, Italy only experienced a similar domestic trend later in the light of politicisation. Changes 
in its rather decentralised security system and culture ultimately helped shift the national preference in 
favour of European police cooperation and centralisation. An equivalent party consensus in favour of central 
coordination in the fight against terrorism was only achieved in 1977 (Hürter, 2015a, p. 74). However, only 
from roughly 1978 onwards and in view of growing public anxiety did the Italian Government commence to 
perceive legal (constitutional) and systemic restraints to cross-border police cooperation as serious obstacle 
to its internal security and police. The kidnapping and murder of Italy’s former Prime Minister Aldo Moro 
mattered as politicising event to this end. It shockingly illustrated the substantial rise of terrorist violence and 
further radicalisation of the BR (Italian Camera dei Deputati, 1979, 1980). This opened the floodgates to a 
consistent, united political reaction to the activities of terrorist groups, including securitising moves in the 
form of comprehensive reforms and centralisation within the police system (Hof, 2015, p. 12). 
Politicisation and public pressure thus opened a window of opportunity for the ultimate shift of the 
Italian preference towards European police cooperation. While interdependence in the fight against terrorism 
and drugs were already exerting significant functional pressure to favour collective action, spiralling 
domestic salience of both topics may perhaps explain why Italy finally acted on this preference and proposed 
relatively ambitious institutionalisation of cooperation and the integration of multiple initiatives within 
TREVI. An internal memo of the German BMI, documenting a meeting of the German Interior Minister with 
Scalfaro in April 1985, similarly evaluated Italy’s initiative and its renewed efforts to intensify bilateral 
cooperation as primarily of “political and psychological importance” rather than an actual effort towards the 
effective improvement of the existing security situation or cooperation arrangements (German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, 1985e). The EC level thus presented a means of political venue shopping for Italy to 
signal action in view of domestic anxiety. 
 
A LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Rather than politicisation, a lack of cooperation alternatives at international level as well as rapidly rising 
interdependence began to move Italy’s preference away from its original global cooperation focus and 
towards a progressively pragmatic position that began to acknowledge the benefits of a European approach. 
On the one hand, global cooperation was still far from satisfying in the 1980s. Interpol had neither been able 
to overcome the obstacles and deadlocks that had already frustrated EC Member States at the beginning of 
the 1970s, nor had it sufficiently evolved with regard to speeding up procedures and improving its practical 
benefit (Fijnaut, 1993, pp. 11–12; Interviewees 7, 14 & 21; Marotta, 2016, p. 24). Whereas Italy had previously 
been rather hesitant and passive towards EEC initiatives in the fight against terrorism, it now began to 
pragmatically embrace the European format. In this context, high levels of external and internal 
interdependence ultimately shaped its preference in favour of creating a central structure to rationalise 
cooperation. Like many EC countries, Italy experienced a steady, albeit gradual rise in international organised 
crime and transnational activities of criminal groups around 1980, and explicitly voiced concerns about a loss 
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of national control in the course of deeper European integration (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
1982, 1985b). It is thus no coincidence that a similar argument about the need to manage functional spill-overs 
of European integration was included in the Scalfaro paper in 1985. The Italian proposal came amidst an on-
going discussion on the need to expand the functional scope of the Trevi Group, which had been initiated by 
Germany in the beginning of the 1980s (see figure 7; cf. German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1982, 1985c, 
g & h; Rupprecht, 1985). Accordingly, a third WG (TREVI III) was created by the TREVI Ministers in June 
1985 to deal with organised crime and drugs (Rupprecht, 1985). The Scalfaro paper, against it, was not 
realised. 
This seems counterintuitive in the light of the shortcomings of Interpol and an emerging 
internationalisation of terrorist and criminal activities within the EC. What is more, the rapidly expanding 
cooperation structures of TREVI, its multitude of WGs across different levels, were becoming increasingly 
complex. External and internal interdependencies were high and rising across EC Member States, as was 
subnational policy entrepreneurship in favour of pragmatic professionalisation of existing cooperation 
networks and bureaucracy (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1986). Especially security and police 
authorities highlighted the benefit of a central body as envisioned in the Italian proposal. The German BfV 
for example signalled interest to the BMI in coordinating information exchange via a permanent secretariat 
in the field of counterterrorism (Borgs, 1985). Similarly, the German BKA expressed its support for the Italian 
proposal and strongly advocated the institutionalisation of cooperation on organised crime; it even 
demanded to go beyond the structure of a secretariat in the long run and create a European Criminal Police 
Office (Zachert, 1985). The decision of European governments to not realise the Scalfaro paper demonstrates 
that the influence of subnational policy entrepreneurs remained limited. 
 
INSUFFICIENT PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE? 
Neither functional pressure to simplify and better coordinate Community cooperation nor subnational policy 
entrepreneurship pushing for formalisation sufficed to sway state preferences and unify police cooperation 
in 1985. The Scalfaro paper failed as a result of reluctance from other Member States and an overall lack of 
political will. Germany was concerned that the creation of yet a new body would lead to duplication and 
overlap. It therefore advocated the expansion of the Trevi Group (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
1985c; Schreiber, 1985). France was similarly sceptical with respect to Scalfaro’s proposal, especially 
concerning the potential impact on national competencies if information exchange were centralised within 
the proposed European secretariat (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985a). Most Member States 
preferred to focus their efforts on on-going cooperation initiatives and fora rather than establishing additional 
ones, and were outspoken about their preferences. France naturally favoured Interpol, while the UK centred 
on TREVI and was opposed to any significant formalisation (Anderson, 1993b, pp. 77–81; cf. Anderson, 1989; 
Busch, 1995, p. 332 f.; German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1983b). This seems striking in view of rising 
interdependence pressures across all EC Member States, particularly the internationalisation of terrorism and 
organised crime and a well-established recognition of drugs as a problem to be reckoned with. European 
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governments faced an additional functional need for the professionalisation of existing cooperation, 
particularly to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of cross-agency coordination.  
A possible explanation for the lack of support of the Italian proposal could be the mismatch with 
state preferences on vertical integration. Interdependence pressure may have been high across most Member 
States and shaped their preferences in favour of European police cooperation, yet internal interdependence 
and spill-over effects had perhaps still not reached a sufficient threshold to turn the tide across Member States 
in support of deeper integration. Although TREVI had been in existence for almost a decade and was closely 
linked to the Community framework in practice, it remained formally outside the EC. What is more, TREVI 
had still not been able to establish itself as the main cooperation forum of European states. It certainly was a 
strong contender as unprecedented format that was quickly growing. However, as of the mid-1980s, various 
countries (or even single domestic agencies) still continued to prioritise Interpol and bilateral networks for 
day-to-day cooperation. In this context, it appears logical that European governments lacked the political will 
to undertake such a significant step of institutionalisation as embodied by the Scalfaro paper. Additionally, 
Italy was not prepared to follow its initiative through once the latter had not been well received by the EC. 
Even before it had presented the paper at the meeting of TREVI Ministers in June 1985, other Member States 
were assessing the initiative as a mere lip service and political venue shopping intended primarily to reassure 
the Italian public and politicians at home (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985e). Consequently, a 
proposal that could have presented a qualitative quantum leap in European police cooperation rather quickly 
faded into oblivion. However, it presumably prepared the grounds on which a British impulse for a European 
system of drug intelligence units would succeed a few years later. 
 
The British Proposal for NDIUs as a Game Changer 
Drugs continued to matter as an issue area that shaped the preferences of EEC Member States. In a WG 
meeting of TREVI III in April 1989, British Home Secretary Douglas Hurd proposed to create NDIUs in all 
Member States and assess the feasibility of establishing an EDIU at supranational level (see figure 7; cf. 
Knelangen, 2001, p. 197; Peek & Hoefman, 1993). While some governments were surprised by the UK’s 
initiative, and the discussion of a possible EDIU was postponed due to persisting scepticism, the overall 
proposal received strong support and led to the systematic and coordinated installation of drug intelligence 
units across the Community. What is more, with its European outlook the British advance – similar to the 
Italian one before it – helped pave the way for a paradigm change in police cooperation that enabled the 
eventual inception of a central European body to align national approaches. External interdependence in the 
area of drugs alongside internal interconnectivity within the Community primarily acted as drivers of the 
British preference to this end. However, both were considerably amplified by politicisation and subnational 
policy entrepreneurship from domestic police officials. 
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON DRUGS: STILL INSUFFCIENT 
Since the 1960s drugs had been emerging as an increasingly serious problem with rapidly growing 
interdependencies across most EC countries and drove state preferences in favour of cooperation. Yet, 
existing arrangements fell short of the functional and operational needs of European Member States. The so-
called Pompidou Group had for example been founded in 1971 at the initiative of French President Georges 
Pompidou. It was strongly influenced by the American drug enforcement regime and the US preference for 
formalisation (Friedrichs, 2008, pp. 139–141). High interdependence and politicisation played an essential 
role in marking the shift of the French preference towards a multilateral approach in the fight against drugs 
(Friedrichs, 2008, pp. 136–137). Similar to Italy, France had for a long time not prioritised this issue area, and 
had thereby become a notorious transit country and safe haven for international drug traffickers, very much 
to the annoyance of other countries. The US consequently made a point of moving the European office of its 
BNDD from Rome to Paris to deal with this ‘French Connection’ (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 136 ff.; Friesendorf, 
2007b, pp. 37–78). The French media likewise extensively reported on the spiralling domestic drug deaths 
and individual cases of overdose, and thus reinforced public pressure and the international ‘naming and 
shaming’ (Cusack, 1974, p. 252; Gévaudan, 1985, p. 45).  
In this context, France launched the Pompidou Group in 1971. The group initially comprised all EC 
governments and the UK, and can thus be seen “as a French attempt at setting standards for a European 
approach to the drug problem” (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 140; cf. Pompidou, 1971). Although the group was 
intended to include operational and working levels as well, it never truly managed to move beyond high-
level and strategic discussions. Next to the lack of operational and policy output, the integration of the 
Pompidou Group into the CoE in 1980 and subsequent expansion of membership beyond the Community 
disqualified it as a possible central EC body (de Witte, 1993, p. 96; Interviewee 7). Nevertheless, the Pompidou 
Group presented an important first advance on the path to European integration in the area policing, because 
it made formalisation and institutionalisation thinkable, and its deficiencies cleared the way for the 
development of alternative, improved European cooperation formats. 
 Against it, a number of legal agreements had been successfully initiated at international level by the 
1980s: the UN drug prohibition regime, which pursued repressive strategies and prioritised a crackdown on 
the supply side (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 113 ff.). It did not at the time address the demand side and prevention, 
both aspects that were increasingly discussed among European countries and law enforcement authorities 
who sought to integrate  normative-social strategies into their approaches to drug enforcement and promote 
according bottom-up measures (European Council, 1986, p. 12; Friedrichs, 2008, p. 134 ff.). The UN regime 
constituted a purely legal regime that remained insufficiently institutionalised for decades due to strong 
opposition from some governments (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1974).  
Therefore, Interpol might have offered a suitable institutional alternative for a holistic common 
approach in the fight against drugs. The bulk of Interpol information exchange already centred on Europe, 
and thus Germany requested a European regional office at the 1981 meeting of the Interpol GA (Interviewee 
7; Pütter, 1991). Although this resulted in the creation of the Technical Committee for Cooperation in Europe, 
a European secretariat was not formally established until the mid-1980s and would only begin operating in 
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1987 (Baun, 1987; Lange, 1999, p. 167 ff.; Pütter, 1991). Police cooperation via Interpol remained behind the 
political expectations and operational needs of European Member States, particularly in the areas of terrorism 
and drugs (Baun, 1987, p. 27; Interviewee 7; Norman, 1998, pp. 96–97). This dissatisfaction became further 
obvious through the meetings of other European cooperation formats such as the Club de Berne and the 
Vienna Club that began to deliberately schedule their reunions outside Interpol (Interviewee 7).  
The lack of effective and comprehensively streamlined cooperation platforms in the fight against 
drugs (and terrorism), and the resulting discontentment of national authorities formed crucial contextual 
determinants for the creation of a new, separate Community structure. The inability of existing institutions 
to deal with rising functional and public pressure to meaningfully cooperate crucially shaped the emergence 
of pro-integration preferences of European Member States. 
 
THE COMMUNITY LEVEL AS A MEANS OF VENUE SHOPPING 
External interdependencies, exacerbated by domestic politicisation, ultimately pushed the UK to promote the 
EC context as cooperation alternative in this regard. Rising national crime rates had become a salient topic 
among the UK’s media and public since the late 1970s (Anderson, 1993a, p. 23 ff.; Morgan, 2014, p. 10 ff.). The 
progressive internationalisation of terrorism and growing evidence of cross-national links of British terrorist 
groups additionally fuelled public and political pressure on the government (Shackleton, 1978; cf. German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1983a). Accordingly, from the 1980s onwards British policymakers 
increasingly employed a strategy of deliberate counter-politicisation in the form of political and legislative 
securitising moves to signal control (Anderson, 1993a, p. 23 ff.). Part of this strategy was venue shopping: the 
open pursuit of international police cooperation, a tactic that did not only seek to accommodate intensifying 
pressures to act on transnational problems but that reflected “broad acceptance in the UK of the view that the 
boundaries of the state no longer coincide with the boundary of the problem” (Anderson, 1993a, p. 25).  
Similar to other European states, drugs were emerging as a particular problem of growing scale in 
the UK, not only statistically but also in the public eye (MacGregor, 1998). The spiralling, unprecedented rise 
in domestic drug users and international drug connections debatably shifted the British position from a 
sovereignty-focussed stance to one of cautious support for international drug enforcement (Friedrichs, 2008, 
pp. 115–117; Morgan, 2014, p. 24 ff.). While external interdependencies thus shaped the UK’s preference in 
favour of extending the functional scope of European police cooperation, the UK maintained its nationalist 
attitude on vertical integration, that is, its opposition to any delegation of powers to a supranational body. 
Keen on preserving autonomy, it neither agreed with the demand-side orientation of other EC Member States 
nor did it initially support the multi-level harmonisation and institutionalisation attempt of the Pompidou 
Group (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1974, p.).  
Growing pressure from internal interdependence as well as a functional need for the rationalisation 
of European police cooperation would transform this anti-centralisation preference and lead the UK to 
propose the establishment of NDIUs and even a central EDIU in 1989. A number of developments at 
European level heightened internal interdependencies (see figure 7). January 1985 marked the beginning of 
the European passport union and subsequent abolition of passport controls within the EC. In June of the same 
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year, five of the ten EC governments signed the Schengen Agreement, thus marking first steps towards a 
common travel area without internal border checks that was regarded as possibly entailing negative 
externalities for the non-signatories as well (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1983); cf. Anderson, 
1993a, p. 29 f.). What is more, the SEA was finally signed in February 1986 and would enter into force the 
following year. It effectively targeted “an area without internal frontiers” and completion of the single market 
by 1992 (Section II, Art. 8a, Single European Act, 1986). All these developments heightened internal European 
interconnectedness. They potentially confronted EC governments with collective action problems and thus 
created significant functional pressure to cooperate. Subsequently, Member States decided to expand TREVI’s 
functional scope to drugs and organised crime, and launch a study “with a view to the establishment of a 
[European] structure aimed at exchanging information to counter drug trafficking” (Marotta, 2016, p. 25; cf. 
Rupprecht, 1985). Growing internal interdependencies and spill-over effects from European integration were 
beginning to effectuate an emerging paradigm-change in JHA cooperation at European level. 
This trend likewise affected subnational levels. Not only did developments within the Community 
reinforce the need for centralisation, they perhaps initiated a gradual shift in domestic national security and 
policing cultures towards streamlining and rationalisation. The UK’s police system and security governance 
had always been practically oriented, focussed mostly on pragmatic cooperation and organised in an 
informal, flexible manner. Nonetheless, internal interdependencies and spill-over effects from EEC 
integration were suddenly creating a rising functional need to streamline and rationalise British policing. 
Law enforcement officials increasingly advocated centralisation as a consequence of more and more positive 
practical experiences with innovative methods on the one hand, and a need to manage deficiencies and better 
structure international police cooperation. The Metropolitan Police Services (MPS) of London even began to 
serve as unofficial role model in the establishment of standardised policing tools within the UK and as the 
central point of contact beyond.  
Subnational policy entrepreneurship in turn underlined operational needs arising from growing 
interdependencies and thus instigated a systematic restructuring process in the 1970s (cf. Busch, 1995, pp. 
200–219). Domestic officials demanded a better integration of British internal security agencies as well as the 
deliberate centralisation of some tasks. A parliamentary report on practical police cooperation for example 
established that “virtually all forms of crime and all kinds of police-public relations now have transfrontier 
implications” (Anderson, 1993a, p. 25). Subsequently, MPS Commissioner Sir Imbert lobbied for a ‘British 
FBI’ (Imbert, 1989), while other police representatives even contemplated a possible ‘Europolice’ that could 
oversee the work of ‘multinational operational units’ (Alderson, 1988, 1989; F. E. C. Gregory, 1991, p. 154). 
Although these examples illustrate a wider multi-level acknowledgement at operational levels of the need to 
rationalise and better structure police cooperation, political reluctance to formalisation remained (Busch, 
1995, p. 215 f.). After all, the shift in the UK’s security culture towards increasing centralisation was mostly 
the result of a functional necessity arising from practical interdependence pressures, not an integration-
friendly political system and tradition. Notwithstanding strong subnational advocacy of vertical integration, 
the British Government continued to favour existing European cooperation formats like TREVI to manage 
common threats (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1983b). 
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A NEW MAGNITUDE OF THE DRUG PROBLEM: THE HEROIN EPIDEMIC OF THE 1980s AND 1990s 
However, interdependence in the area of drugs eventually reached a level that drove the UK to propose 
further centralisation at European level. By the late-1980s drug trafficking had not only emerged as one of 
the most serious security problems across the Community, it was additionally interconnected with other 
crime areas (de Witte, 1993, p. 96; Interviewees 7 & 21). Drug enforcement thus increasingly involved the 
policing of related criminal activities such as money laundering, fraud and arms trafficking. What is more, as 
the EC strove for deeper integration, it gave rise to a European criminal area with inextricably intertwined 
security threats. Consequently, the British proposal for the establishment of NDIUs and an EDIU came amidst 
spiralling pressure from geographic and functional interdependence, at a time when TREVI was starting to 
emerge as main cooperation platform beyond the fight against terrorism (Interviewee 7; Knelangen, 2001, p. 
215). The 1985 creation of TREVI III on organised crime and drugs had set a precedent, from which a certain 
path-dependency would follow. The British had always favoured TREVI as main cooperation format within 
the EEC – a centralisation preference that was arguably reinforced by the restructuring of its police system 
and emergence of subnational policy entrepreneurship in favour of vertical integration. Additionally, the 
saliency of European security produced wide-spread public acceptance of international police cooperation as 
well as considerable political and operational willingness to undertake necessary steps (Interviewee 7). 
The effects of rising interdependence and public anxiety was likewise reflected at European level. In 
1986, the European Council expressed its severe concern about drug abuse and its dissatisfaction with 
existing international cooperation on the matter. It recommended to consider “ad hoc collaboration between 
the Member States and the Commission” (European Council, 1986, p. 12). Already at this stage, the UK was 
becoming increasingly proactive within the Community with respect to managing interdependencies and 
streamlining both national approaches and common efforts. Examples include the creation of an Ad-Hoc 
Group on Immigration at British initiative (Bunyan, 1997a, p. 9), as well as the proposal to install a central 
protected communications network across all Member States to improve coordination in the areas of drugs, 
illegal immigration and terrorism (Harrington, 1985; cf. Bunyan, 1997a, p. 11). Furthermore, the UK was 
concerned about the isolation of TREVI within Community cooperation, and aimed at better connecting it 
with other platforms (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1986). A discourse of interdependence 
mattered tremendously in this regard and could likewise be found at European level. Documents of the 
European Council and the Trevi Group regularly included references to the adverse and potential security 
effects of the SEA and the Schengen Agreement on the entirety of the EC (cf. Bunyan, 1997a, p. 9 ff.). 
Particularly the 1988 European Council meeting in Rhodes employed this discourse. Not only did it actively 
demand the JHA Council to “step up its efforts,” it initiated a ‘Coordinators group on the free movement of 
persons’ to bring together existing bodies working on JHA matters related to the SEA (Bunyan, 1997a, p. 12).  
 
BEGINNING PATH-DEPENDENCY AND OPERATIONAL CALLS FOR CENTRALISATION 
Against this backdrop, TREVI began to gain considerable political weight. In 1987, Member States had 
already decided to strengthen its role in countering drug trafficking and illicit drug use, and had accordingly 
expanded its functional scope to additional issue areas like hooliganism (Council of the European Union 
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[1987], 1997; cf. Bunyan, 1997a, p. 11). Horizontally, the Group was more and more connected to third 
countries operationally, thus expanding practical albeit not formal membership. Vertically, certain aspects of 
TREVI were institutionalised for the first time. Next to the implementation of a secure communications 
network, Member States agreed to create a “light administrative structure” for better coordination, 
“stress[ing] the need for an experimental and progressive phase” (ibid.). Following the Rhodes European 
Council, TREVI was linked even more explicitly to Community developments through the creation of WG 
TREVI 1992 that was tasked with the management of spill-over effects and balancing measures related to the 
completion of the internal market, notably the abolition of internal frontiers (Busch, 1995, p. 333 f.). TREVI 
’92 was to “specifically consider the ‘policing and security implications of the Single European Market’ and 
to ‘compensate for the consequent losses to security and law enforcement’ in the EC” (Bunyan, 1997a, p. 9). 
In line with these developments in European police cooperation – especially the cumulative focus 
on TREVI to cope with interdependencies – the UK developed a pro-integration preference and accordingly 
proposed the creation of NDIUs and an EDIU in the spring of 1989. Although growing interdependencies 
had increasingly shifted the UK towards embracing the practical merits of structured Community 
cooperation, the idea for the Europe-wide creation of NDIUs as well as the need for a central unit to 
coordinate this network derived directly from British policing practice and operational context. Partially due 
to increasingly close cooperation with the US, national security governance and policing methods in the UK 
had been undergoing a ‘cultural’ transformation since the 1980s. British law enforcement and home affairs 
were now gradually moving from a rather compartmentalised organisation to ‘intelligent centralisation’ 
(Busch, 1995, pp. 200–219; Knelangen, 2001, pp. 198–199). Drug policy and enforcement were streamlined, 
and related practices and structures rationalised, all in an attempt to better coordinate the efforts of different 
actors at national level. Organisational and operational innovation based on the US model thus also entailed 
the structured collection of information and data, and subsequent consolidation in the hands of a central 
entity or authority (MacGregor, 1998). To this end, in 1985 an NDIU was created at the MPS to spearhead the 
new integrated British approach to drug enforcement (South, 1998, p. 96). As this new policing model was 
implemented on the national level, it yielded effective results and thereby began to transform the UK’s 
security culture and practices. Consequently, from an operational perspective it became evident quickly that 
a similar approach was sensible, even necessary, for European police cooperation (Interviewee 7; Knelangen, 
2001, pp. 197–198). The intervention of British Home Secretary Douglas Hurd at the meeting of TREVI III 
could thus be seen as a pragmatically-oriented preference to expand the UK’s operational centralisation 
experience to the EC level. His proposal for the creation of NDIUs in all Member States, and an EDIU to 
coordinate the former, thus originated from subnational policy entrepreneurship, that is, the emerging trend 
in British security culture towards practical rationalisation in order to manage growing interdependence. It 
mirrored domestic developments in response to both the progressive global deterritorialisation of national 
security and functional spill-overs from Community integration, not an inherent normative desire to 
politically integrate (Interviewees 7, 17 & 18). 
As a result, a dichotomy evolved in the British preference. The practical need for intelligence-led 
centralisation of European cooperation collided with a strong political opposition to comprehensive 
institutionalisation at Community level. Whereas the UK’s security and policing culture was developing in 
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the direction of more integration, its legal and political culture had a longstanding tradition of national 
sovereignty (Friedrichs, 2008, p. 190). In this vein, police and policing were considered core state powers (cf. 
Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014). This belief was engrained in the British “constitutional tradition[…as] an 
indispensable legal concept” and as a “principle of legal sovereignty in criminal law,” and likewise embedded 
in the practice of British “executive law enforcement” (Anderson, 1993a, p. 21). With a view to European 
cooperation, the UK thus demonstrated a strong preference for maintaining national autonomy in police 
matters and internal security, regardless of the practical benefits of intelligent centralisation. This attitude is 
perhaps neatly illustrated by the British reaction to the German proposal for an ‘FBI-like’ European structure 
in 1988 (Anderson, 1989, p. 30; Knelangen, 2001, p. 196). When German Chancellor Helmut Kohl supposedly 
reiterated his intentions to create a ‘European FBI’ in a personal meeting with Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, she is said to have responded: “Never ever.” (Interviewee 21). 
Despite the practical orientation of the British NDIUs/EDIU proposal, only the suggestion for 
NDIUs was adopted in the spring of 1989 (Peek & Hoefman, 1993). However, an emerging path-dependency 
and paradigm-change in European police cooperation provided fertile ground for the continued discussion 
of the idea of an EDIU among EC Member States. In December of the same year, the TREVI Ministers 
subsequently commissioned a study on “the need for the possible extension [of NDIUs] at European level” 
(TREVI Ministers [1989], 1997, p. 36). To this end, an ad hoc WG on EDIU would be established within the 
Trevi Group in 1990, followed by political agreement to actually realise such a structure one year later  
(Knelangen, 2001, p. 199; Rupprecht & Hellenthal, 1994). In this vein, the UK’s initiative substantially 
prepared the ground for the German proposal and realisation of Europol. 
 
 
5.2 The 1990s: Starting Point for a European Police Office 
Just as the British and the Italian preferences had been crucially shaped by interdependence in conjunction 
with functional and political spill-overs from other areas of European integration, the German preference 
regarding police cooperation emerged in direct relation to Community developments. Accordingly, the 
German proposal for the expansion of JHA cooperation within the EC and the establishment of a European 
police office were no isolated instances, and the formal suggestion at the European Council meeting of June 
1991 no timely coincidence (see figure 7). Internal factors at domestic level had shaped the national preference 
in favour of the institutionalisation of European police cooperation. Tracing back to the 1970s and the creation 
of TREVI, Germany had for a long time aspired to comprehensive European integration in this issue area. 
Rising interdependencies in the area of counterterrorism, paired with growing public pressure, had primarily 
shaped the German pro-integration preference back then. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this 
interconnectivity in security threats and law enforcement grew even further. What is more, spill-over effects 
from previous integration decisions and other policy domains began to produce a functional need to integrate 
further in the field of policing.  Finally, the German political system and its national security and police 
culture contributed to a proactive Eurofriendly position of its government. This section elaborates on these 
Chapter 5 │ Institutional Beginnings: The Europol Drugs Unit and Early Europol 
115 
factors in conjunction with a number of external factors and contextual determinants. It analyses how they 
combined to shape Germany’s integration preference and ultimately led it to call for the creation of Europol. 
 
The German Historic Experience: Predisposing the National Preference To Eurofriendliness? 
The development of a strong pro-integration preference as such is perhaps not surprising, because Germany’s 
political system and its security and police culture in a way ‘predisposed’ it towards a European cooperation 
format. As the TREVI case has shown, Germany had for a long time strongly interrelated its own identity to 
the EEC and thus developed a preference for strengthening the latter. In this context, European integration – 
particularly building common institutions and embedding certain legal norms – was regarded as the way 
forward in the political rehabilitation of Germany within the European and international community. By the 
1980s, Germany had consequently emerged as role model and driver of EC integration, and was historically 
linked to the deepening of Community ties (Interviewee 23). Moreover, its federal system with a power 
distribution across multiple levels presented an ideal test case for the EC, and in turn rendered Germany 
structurally compatible with European modes of governance as well as politically favourable towards them 
(British Prime Minister’s Office, 1976; Interviewees 21, 22 & 23). 
 Against the backdrop of this historically grown Eurofriendliness, Germany’s internal security 
culture had developed in a similar direction. Since the 1970s – primarily set in motion by the experiences with 
international and domestic terrorism – a restructuring process of the national police system had been on-
going and caused an overall shift of competencies towards the federal level. Reforms included the 
introduction of the BKA as central police coordination body to the inside and single point of contact to the 
outside world (Lange, 1999, p. 212 ff.). Not unlike the UK, comprehensive professionalisation and 
modernisation of police work reinforced centralisation tendencies in Germany, including at the technical 
level through computer systems that centralised data collection and information management across 
different German states (Busch, 1995, pp. 160–181). By the mid-1980s Germany was one of the leading 
countries in the computerisation and technical rationalisation of law enforcement activities (Busch, Funk, 
Kauß, Narr, & Werkentin, 1985, pp. 115–146; Wiesel, 1985). Consequently, technological innovation as well 
as the operational and methodological needs of police work further boosted centralisation tendencies in 
German internal security governance. 
 
Growing Community Linkages: Connected in Threats and Institutions 
Notwithstanding the role that operational needs and new demands on national policing played in its 
conception, Europol was ultimately a top-down political initiative of the German Government (Interviewees 
7, 14 & 21; cf. Knelangen, 2001, pp. 206 & 251). Although an increasingly cooperation- and centralisation-
friendly political system and security culture undoubtedly helped pave the way for Kohl’s proposal at the 
European Council in 1991, interdependencies primarily shaped the German preference towards the creation 
of a Central European Criminal Investigation Office. Internal and external factors were becoming increasingly 
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interconnected in the mid-1980s, effectuating an increasing approximation between German and EC security 
governance. On the one hand, political spill-overs contributed to this development, since Germany already 
held an intrinsic preference for European integration and believed that domestic problems could only be 
solved at the European level. In this vein it actively sought to shape and promote EC cooperation accordingly. 
It is no coincidence that the structure and institutional set-up of TREVI as well as Europol strongly resemble 
the German internal security architecture and political system (cf. Lange, 1999, p. 170).  
Moreover, functional spill-overs from European integration, particularly the single market, 
tremendously affected Germany and required security authorities to change in relation to new transnational 
threats (Lange, 1999, p. 201 ff.). Its central geographic location at the heart of Europe predisposed it to being 
a transit country and thereby to the effects of developments within the EC and its immediate neighbours. In 
this context, an increasing internationalisation of organised crime in Germany continued to illustrate growing 
external interdependencies, and challenged German law enforcement with new practical problems that 
reinforced the need for transnational policing within the EC. While RAF terrorism had significantly decreased 
and would stop its activities alltogether in the early 1990s, its networks remained an important part in the 
German public debate and political discourse on internal security (Requate & Zessin, 2007, p. 436 f.). National 
crime incidents, by contrast, had doubled in the course of 25 years (Rupprecht & Hellenthal, 1994, pp. 28–29). 
Its geographic position rendered Germany particularly vulnerable. Especially in the fields of illegal migration 
and drugs, Germany soon emerged as a hub of international trafficking routes and mattered as transit and 
distribution country within the EC (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1983; Interviewee 7; Rupprecht, 
Hellenthal, & Weidenfeld, 1994; Weidenfeld, 1994, p. 11). 
In the light of quickly growing external and internal interdependencies, it appears logical that 
Germany strongly supported the Belgian proposal in 1982 for an expansion of TREVI’s functional scope to 
organised crime, and that related internal discussions were initiated at the BMI in the same year (German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1982). Germany first officially put its political weight behind advancing 
European integration in this area at the meeting of the Stuttgart European Council in June 1983. The Stuttgart 
European Council marked an important milestone on the path towards the SEA and the subsequent 
completion of the single market. The ‘Solemn Declaration on European Union’ that was issued at the meeting 
explicitly recognised the growth in activities of international organised crime and rising interconnectedness 
of criminal groups (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985b). The Declaration highlighted the very 
real effects of cross-border crime at a time when national border controls were still in place, and called for 
enhanced JHA cooperation in view of Community integration so as to balance further negative consequences 
and a loss of national control (ibid.; cf. MR Siegele & RA Lümmen, 1985; Rupprecht & Hellenthal, 1994).  
 
Asymmetry as Driver of Avant-Garde Initiatives and Flexible Integration 
At the same time, interdependencies were arguably moving quicker than their political counter measures, 
and EC integration was not progressing fast enough for German policymakers. The asymmetrical effects of 
external threats and institutional linkages across Member States may explain why preference convergence in 
favour of integration was stalling at European level, and why Germany opted for a strategy of flexible 
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integration. The negotiations on a common travel area and a European passport union had been moving at a 
sluggish pace since the 1970s, and chances of achieving an EC-wide agreement in line with German 
expectations seemed less than slim (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 222 f.; Monar, 2010). Consequently, Germany opted 
for DI together with a group of likeminded Member States that were experiencing similarly high levels of 
interconnectedness and functional pressure to advance integration. It initially signed the Saarbrücken 
Agreement together with France in July 1984. This agreement stipulated the removal of border controls 
between the two countries as well as far-reaching police and customs cooperation on drugs and illegal 
migration among other things (Mitsilegas et al., 2003, p. 27 ff.; S. Paoli, 2017). Not even a year later the 
agreement was extended to the Benelux countries with the signature of the Schengen Agreement, which 
envisioned the creation of a common travel area without internal border checks between five out of the ten 
EC Member States at the time (Den Boer, 1997; Fijnaut, 1992a; Gehring, 1998). Although Germany would have 
preferred universal European membership in this endeavour, it purposefully chose an instance of flexible 
integration as a piecemeal strategy to European integration; the expansion to the rest of the Community was 
envisioned from the beginning (Monar, 2001).  
The ‘political Schengen project’ in turn reinforced internal interdependencies among its members on 
the one hand and within the Community as a whole. The German Government exerted considerable pressure 
with regard to speeding up the removal of internal borders and the abolition of frontier checks within the 
EEC (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1985f). This high-level political pressure – paired with 
functional pressure from growing interconnectedness in threats and institutions – created a ripple effect at 
the domestic and European level and helped gradually shift state preferences on police cooperation towards 
the EC framework. By the mid-1980s, German police circles accordingly focused increasingly on a European 
format (Boge, 1985, p. 38). Within the Community, TREVI had already been emerging as key cooperation 
body and developments like the Schengen Agreement, the passport union and the SEA further strengthened 
the political prioritisation of the EC framework (Knelangen, 2001, p. 194 f.). What is more, no suitable 
institutional alternatives rivalled the European format in general and TREVI in particular. Interpol was still 
insufficient in the eyes of European governments and security authorities due to persistent confidentiality 
problems and trust issues (Interviewees 7, 14 & 21). A meeting of the International Police Association in 
Munich in 1986 consequently discussed the creation of a ‘European Interpol’ as suitable alternative to offset 
the shortcomings of information exchange via Interpol and the “lack of a joint cooperation mechanism” that 
would “allow for prompt and reliable answers” to transnational organised crime (Marotta, 2016, p. 24; cf. 
Interviewee 14; Knelangen, 2001, p. 205 f.; Zachert, 1992). Rather than bureaucratic resistance, subnational 
policy entrepreneurship in support of integration was on the rise. 
‘Functional arguments’ about institutional interdependencies and spill-over effects were likewise 
reflected in deliberations at political and working level. According discussions explicitly dealt with balancing 
measures and enhanced Community cooperation in relation to the abolition of internal frontiers. For the first 
time, the Trevi Group was discussed in direct relation to emerging ‘European’ JHA policies, thus setting an 
important precedent and confirming an emerging path-dependency. TREVI was officially chosen as the 
appropriate body to prepare common counterefforts intended to safeguard the national security of its 
Member States. To this end, at their June 1989 meeting in Madrid the TREVI Ministers adopted the so-called 
Chapter 5 │ Institutional Beginnings: The Europol Drugs Unit and Early Europol 
118 
‘Palma Document,’ a concrete working programme with respective priorities and timelines (European 
Council [1989], 1997; cf. Bunyan, 1993, 1997a, p. 9; Busch, 1995, p. 333 f.). The December meeting in Paris for 
instance formally acknowledged “the new requirements for cooperation arising out of the European 
construction and of the creation of a European area without internal frontiers” (TREVI Ministers [1989], 1997, 
p. 35). These developments did not only illustrate a discursive change, that is, the completion of a paradigm-
shift in the preferences of EC Member States towards the Community framework and deeper cooperation, 
they would moreover matter greatly as political spill-overs expediting path-dependency and further 
integration in this growing European policy area. Apart from strengthening the geographic focus on the 
Community, they particularly impacted state preferences on vertical integration. Already in late 1989 the 
TREVI Ministers adopted several balancing measures that had long been discussed by the Schengen 
signatories, a prime example of DI speeding up European integration as a whole (cf. Busch, 1995, p. 333 f.). 
In a similar vein, the British proposal for NDIUs and an EDIU had prepared the ground on which the TREVI 
Ministers now decided to “encourage[…] the creation of structures to centralise and co-ordinate information 
and to exchange intelligence” (TREVI Ministers [1989], 1997, p. 36). 
These developments – effectuating rising institutional interdependencies and spill-over effects – 
produced a paradigm-shift in the German preference on vertical integration. Initially, the German 
Government had been rather reluctant towards the Italian proposal for the creation of a novel organisation. 
Germany had for a long time preferred the EC framework for police cooperation; it prioritised the Trevi 
Group and advocated extending its functional scope to cope with growing spill-overs and realise the political 
goals of EC integration (Lange, 1999). Advancing Community integration in the late 1980s raised 
interdependencies even further and pushed Germany to lobby for a comprehensive formalisation of 
European internal security governance. At the Hannover European Council meeting in June 1988, German 
Chancellor Kohl called for an ‘FBI-like’ structure at European level (Anderson, 1989, p. 30; Knelangen, 2001, 
p. 196). In 1990, coinciding with the signature of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, 
German Interior Minister Schäuble proposed a European Criminal Office as a central European police body 
to facilitate and coordinate information exchange (Schäuble, 1990). These examples reflect the saliency of the 
early ‘Europol thought’ among high-level political circles in Germany at the time, particularly top 
policymakers and government officials. Consequently, Germany tied in with on-going Community 
deliberations regarding a possible EDIU in December 1990. It introduced a graduated scheme for the creation 
and build-up of an EDIU at the TREVI experts meeting in London. Very much in the spirit of DI, the German 
BMI saw the EDIU primarily as a strategic “pre-stage for a European police unit with eventually executive 
powers for the effective fight against internationally oriented drug trafficking” (Busch, 1995, p. 337). 
Whereas interdependence as well as functional and political spill-overs shaped the German 
preference in favour of deeper integration, from an operational perspective, no practical need seems to have 
existed for a further institutionalisation of European police cooperation. Notwithstanding Germany’s internal 
centralisation tendencies, by the mid-1980s, German law enforcement and security authorities regarded 
cooperation with key EC partners and European Member States as well-established. The BKA for example 
described relations with the UK as “optimal” (Boeden, 1984, p. 3); the BMI concluded that “no formal 
regulation” was necessary (Bischoff, 1984). In a similar vein, the BfV did not see a need for further agreements 
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and ‘no obvious topic that would require discussion at ministerial level’ (German Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution, 1984). The impetus for a German vertical integration preference thus did not 
come from subnational policy entrepreneurs. On the contrary, police levels as well as the IMK had no 
noticeable influence to this end, and would only be involved later, following the launch of the Europol idea 
within the European Council (Knelangen, 2001, p. 206). When Germany officially proposed the creation of 
Europol at the European Council meeting of 28-29 June 1991 – barely half a year after it had taken on the 
build-up of an EDIU – the initiative came as a surprise to both the German subnational levels and other 
Community Member States (European Council, 1991a, p. 6 [Annex I]; cf. Busch, 1995, p. 145; Knelangen, 2001, 
p. 204). It had been devised by the federal government of Kohl alone and was not previously discussed with 
the German Länder although they had formally endorsed the thought of a European Criminal Police Office at 
the IMK meeting in May 1991 (Zachert, 1992, pp. 10–11; cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 200). 
Instead, pressure from rapidly growing interdependence and spill-over effects informed this top-
down preference for creating a Central European Criminal Investigation Office. In addition to internal 
Community developments, two more events of Europe-wide significance presumably heightened the 
functional need for transnational policing and cross-border security governance in Germany: first, the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the Iron curtain in 1989, and second, the subsequent reunification of Germany in 1990 as 
well as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Both resulted in a sudden and dramatic spike in crime 
numbers not only in Germany but in Central and Eastern Europe (Interviewee 7; cf. Rupprecht & Hellenthal, 
1994, p. 29). In Germany, it quickly became evident that especially the country’s reunification meant a 
‘significant overload’ of its security authorities, in particular the BKA and BMI (ibid.). Consequently, the 
German practical proposal for enhanced police cooperation at the European Council meeting in June 1991 
was hardly timely coincidence and may be argued to have been driven significantly by these developments.  
Once Kohl’s proposal for a ‘Europol’ had been adopted by the European Council, the TREVI 
Ministers were asked to further discuss and prepare the possible details of this new European structure. To 
this end, the AHWGE was founded within the Trevi Group (Benyon, Turnbull, Willis, Woodward, & Beck, 
1993, p. 160; Knelangen, 2001, p. 205). In December of the same year – after further deliberations – the 
European Council decided to charge Europol initially with the coordination of information exchange in the 
area of drugs  (European Council, 1991a). This presented the official go-ahead for the creation of Europol. 
Accordingly, the TREVI Ministers initiated the development process and – following a suggestion from 
Germany – agreed to merge discussions on EDIU and Europol. This would concretely entail a two-step 
process towards Europol, starting with the launch of the EDU (previously the EDIU), which would then be 
developed into Europol (Bunyan, 1997b, pp. 40–41; cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 207). The next section analyses the 
process and preferences that led to the adoption of the Europol Convention in 1995 and the effective 
commencement of operational activities of Europol in 1999. In particular, it assesses the drivers behind EDU’s 
initially rather limited mandate and topical focus on drugs, as well as behind Europol’s ultimately much 
wider institutional and functional set-up. 
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5.3 The Europol Convention as a Turning Point  
Following the adoption of the German Europol proposal in 1991, EC Member States began to contemplate 
the precise institutional and functional layout of this new body. “The initial proposal to establish Europol as 
a type of European FBI was extremely controversial in the political, professional and public domains. Lengthy 
discussions and negotiations took place in the TREVI WGs, the Council and its WGs, and the European 
Parliament before agreement was reached on the model, the structure, the tasks and the competences of 
Europol” (Storbeck, 2016, p. 22). This deliberation process may be divided into two subsequent and partially 
overlapping streams: 1) the focus on EDU as predecessor and drugs as initial issue area, 2) the parallel 
negotiations on the Europol Convention until its adoption in 1995, and ensuing discussions in the course of 
implementing the Convention and preparing Europol’s commencement of activities in 1999. Both streams 
comprised differing state preferences on the three dimensions of DI respectively. Overall, internal 
interdependence, functional and political spill-overs as well as a gradually emerging path-dependency 
mattered most as drivers of pro-integration preferences. In the following, each stage is analysed with regard 
to the factors that shaped government positions and produced the eventual integration outcome. The primary 
focus, as in the preceding section, lies on Germany, because it was an indispensable promoter in the build-
up phase of EDU and Europol. Or, in the words of one senior European official: “without Germany this 
would have never happened” (Interviewee 21).  
 
The Europol Drugs Unit 
Concerning the initial focus on drugs, the developments of the 1970s and 1980s had significantly prepared 
the ground, including most notably collective drug enforcement efforts and initiatives such as the Italian and 
British proposals. Especially the British EDIU initiative constituted the institutional – and possibly functional 
– basis for the establishment of EDU as first step towards Europol (Knelangen, 2001, p. 200 f.). While the 
original intention, primarily driven by Germany, had been the quick roll-out of EDU until December 1992, 
agreement on the process was only reached in June at the London reunion of the TREVI Ministers. This meant 
that both projects would first be merely merged by formally renaming the EDIU as ‘EDU.’ An EDU project 
group was subsequently launched under German leadership and began operating in September (Storbeck, 
2016, p. 21; cf. Busch, 1995, p. 337 f.). Contrary to German hopes, the EDU would only take up activities in 
1994, following the signature of a ministerial agreement in the summer of 1993 (Ministerial Agreement, 1993). 
Nonetheless, the EDU marked a historic change in the pace and depth of European police cooperation. In this 
context, a growing path-dependency as well as functional and political spill-overs played a crucial part in 
shaping Member State preferences. They derived from both specific developments in the area of JHA as well 
as from the general context of European integration. Whereas spill-overs from past cooperation in the area of 
internal security especially affected state preferences with regard to the favoured horizontal extension and 
functional scope of EDU, the greater process of Community integration in other policy domains was 
particularly important as a driver of vertical integration. 
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First, state preferences on membership and functional scope were primarily driven by spill-over 
effects and an emerging path-dependency in European police cooperation. The initial focus on drugs 
constituted a natural continuation of the EDIU (and TREVI) discussions and presented a practical starting 
point for the German Europol thought. In view of Germany’s far-reaching vision for European police 
cooperation and Kohl’s original plans for a European FBI, EDU might even be argued to have been a 
deliberate strategy of DI to speed up the overall process. Albeit both organisations comprised all EC Member 
States, EDU was functionally and vertically much more limited than Europol. The issue area of drugs simply 
presented a logical continuation of on-going police cooperation and the ‘path of least resistance’ towards 
institutionalisation.  
However, the topical focus on drugs likewise strongly derived from continuously rising 
interdependence pressures, which significantly shaped Germany’s preference in favour of creating the EDU 
as a predecessor of Europol. Drugs at the time presented “the biggest problem” in Europe (Interviewee 21). 
Although cross-border police cooperation on this issue had evolved since the mid-1980s, its ad-hoc and 
informal character continued to challenge national security and law enforcement authorities with 
considerable practical obstacles. Since judicial and police cooperation relied heavily on personal contacts and 
networks, the quality of bilateral relations was rather randomly dependent on individuals. In Germany for 
instance communication was better established with Turkish police authorities than with French ones 
(Interviewee 21; cf. Rupprecht, 1993, p. 41). In addition to a lack of professionalised cooperation, steadily 
rising criminal interdependencies illustrated that “[…d]ifferences between police structures, legislation and 
judicial systems[...were] exploited and criminals ma[...d]e their haul on one side of the border and then 
cross[ed] over it to escape detection and prosecution” (de Witte, 1993, p. 90).  
This targeted exploitation of national differences by criminal groups was particularly problematic 
for Germany. While its own legal framework was relatively strict and drug enforcement rather effective, 
neighbouring countries with less rigid prosecution were increasingly emerging as safe havens for drug 
traffickers, from where drugs could easily be transported back into Germany (Interviewee 21; cf. Friedrichs, 
2008). The rapid expansion of the transnational dimension of drug abuse and related criminal activities was 
felt Europe-wide (ibid.; cf. Busch, 1999; Fijnaut, 1993; Marotta, 2016, p. 25). Drug cartels and criminal groups 
were strategically operating across borders, a fact that was likewise cited frequently in the EDU/Europol 
preparations (Knelangen, 2001, p. 201). Interdependence in Germany was further heightened by its 
geographic location and especially the ramifications of the Schengen Convention, the SEA as well as the 
German reunification. In this context, Germany had become a popular hub as destination and transit country 
for drug trafficking routes (Interviewees 7 & 24). In 1991, the number of drug-related deaths in Germany 
therefore reach an all-time peak with over 2,000 deaths (compared to 324 in 1985) (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2003, p. 118; cf. Interviewee 24). Accordingly, the public and practitioners overwhelmingly 
worried that Member States, and the police in particular, were no longer in control of the crime and drug 
problem and failing to regain it (Interviewees 7, 14 & 21; cf. Busch, 1999). 
While drugs thus increasingly entered the radar of German (and European) policymakers due to 
significant interdependence pressures as well as an existing basis for cooperation in this area, the final catalyst 
that drove Chancellor Kohl to propose a European FBI and then EDU was a highly personal one. Reportedly, 
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a book on the transnational reach of the Italian Mafia and global drug cartels worldwide inspired Helmut 
Kohl to act on this issue (Interviewees 7 & 21). Following the read, he allegedly enquired of Interior Minister 
Schäuble to what extent this was a problem in Germany and Europe, who then in turn tasked the BKA with 
an according study. When the findings revealed extensive activity of transnational organised crime groups 
in Germany and thus emphasised significant interdependencies in the maintenance of internal security, 
Chancellor Kohl is said to have first demanded a European FBI (Interviewee 21). His focus – and the 
government’s focus – on drugs was further fuelled by a white paper from the German Federal Intelligence 
Service (BND) from January 1992. The paper reported on the very real strategic threat from international drug 
trafficking for Western nations, particularly emanating from the rising influence of drug cartels within 
democratic and political systems, and from the exploitation by criminal groups of open markets and 
transnational economic ties enterprises (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1992; cf. ‘Rauschgift’, 1992). 
Consequently, the German preference for action on illicit drug trafficking and Community support for the 
launch of EDU was strongly informed by external interdependencies. The EDU Ministerial Agreement itself 
leaves no doubt as to the relevance of this factor and the related issue areas when it refers to the “urgent 
problems posed by international illicit drug trafficking, associated money laundering and organised crime” 
(Ministerial Agreement, 1993). 
In addition to the drivers of preferences on the functional scope, spill-overs from the overall context 
of European integration contributed essentially to the German preference and ultimate institutional choice 
regarding vertical integration. Since the 1970s, the increasing Europeanisation and internationalisation of 
policing structures and methods had prepared the ground for the idea of a ‘Europol,’ as had the advancing 
emphasis on the Trevi Group as “cornerstone for the ensuing development of police cooperation among EU 
Member States” (Marotta, 2016, pp. 25–26; cf. Busch, 1995, p. 157 ff.; Interviewee 7). This emerging path-
dependency within EC police cooperation was further intensified by the renewed political momentum that 
shaped Community development in the 1990s. Changes in police cooperation at the time perhaps constituted 
“a result of decisions made under the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties and by the Tampere Council” 
(Storbeck, 2016, p. 21). When the TEU was signed in February 1992, it did not only transform the EC into 
today’s EU but also created a “broad base [...]for JHA cooperation” within this new political union (cf. 
Bruggeman, 2016, p. 27). Concretely, the TEU stipulated that Member States considered as “matters of 
common interest: police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international crime,” as well as “the organisation of a Union-wide 
system for exchanging information within a European Police Office” (Art. K.1, para. 9, Maastricht Treaty, 
1992). Thus, Europol had become formally linked to the EU’s framework as well as to the wider integration 
debate and negotiations following the Maastricht Treaty. The discussion and final choice of the Europol 
headquarters (situated in The Hague) for instance formed “part of a greater deal on the location of several 
EU institutions Europe-wide” (Storbeck, 2016, p. 22). 
However, the impact of the overall Community evolution on European police cooperation extended 
beyond the paradigm-changing significance of the TEU. Spill-over effects from other policy areas of European 
integration and instances of DI were becoming more and more tangible across Member States. This chapter 
has elaborated on the role of the single market and the Schengen Agreement amongst others, and their 
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implications on heightening interdependence in JHA matters. Kaunert, Léonard and Occhipinti (2013, p. 276) 
refer to this ‘interest shaper’ as the “spillover-enlargement effect.” They additionally emphasise the 
importance of EU enlargement as a further push towards integration in the area of internal security. 
Notwithstanding the impact of these developments on external interdependencies – that is, raising the 
interconnectedness in threats among Community members – they furthermore created functional spill-overs 
from growing internal interdependence; intensifying institutional linkages among Member States required 
or provided practical opportunities for cross-border police cooperation, for example in the prosecution of 
drug traffickers (Interviewee 7). DI initiatives such as Schengen served as “pilot project[s] for police 
cooperation in the entire EC” (Busch, 1995, p. 332). Consequently, state preferences on EDU and Europol 
were essentially shaped by political and functional spill-overs from market integration, Schengen and the 
emerging European JHA policy area (cf. Lavenex & Wallace, 2005, p. 460; Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 235).  
In this context, the Ministerial Agreement on the establishment of the Europol Drugs Unit was signed 
in mid-1993. Information within EDU would continue to be exchanged via national systems initially. It thus 
presented a deliberate DI tactic and strategic concession by Germany to facilitate the process towards Europol 
(Busch, 1995, p. 339). When EDU began operating in January 1994 – with a mandate to assist national police 
forces in criminal investigations – police circles and subnational practitioners were highly sceptical if not 
opposed to this newly created body that was regarded as ‘top-down political project’ (Interviewees 7 & 14; 
cf. Europol, 2016, p. 14). Especially national criminal police offices and the German Länder objected to 
widening EDU’s competencies, partially out of concerns that the inclusion in investigations and operational 
tasks might yield a loss of competencies on the part of national authorities (Interviewees 7, 14 & 21). This may 
have also been due to the complete novelty of such an organisation, and the lack of inclusion of law 
enforcement in the decision-making. Although the TREVI WG on Europol comprised senior officials from 
ministerial departments and law enforcement, representation was limited because of its small size (40 
members) (Benyon et al., 1993, p. 160; Knelangen, 2001, p. 205). Only with the creation of Europol would 
national police authorities start to be better represented at European level (cf. Anderson, 1993a, p. 26).  
Correspondingly, EDU initially faced significant bureaucratic resistance across EU Member States – 
a factor that impeded the swift convergence of pro-integration preferences with regard to Europol. National 
police officers were reluctant to share data via EDU, and officials of interior ministries continuously 
advocated a rigid exclusion of EDU from operational tasks (Interviewees 7 & 14). On the one hand, trust 
issues among different security authorities sustained this bureaucratic resistance to EDU, and by extension 
Europol for which negotiations were on-going among Member States. Turf wars and rivalries existed not 
only across countries but likewise among national agencies, thus further complicating the centralisation of 
European information exchange even if limited to the area of drugs (Interviewee 14). What is more, the 
criminal police offices of many larger EU members already possessed extensive, satisfactory liaison networks 
and were not as interested in pooling communication and analysis in a shared capacity at European level 
(Interviewees 7, 14 & 24). Consequently, the key task of the early EDU – particularly against the backdrop of 
the simultaneous discussions on Europol – was to build a reputation and a clientele (Interviewees 7 & 21). 
Even before the Europol Convention was signed in 1995, its predecessor already had to prove the practical 
value of centralised EU police cooperation especially in comparison to established international structures 
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such as Interpol and the Schengen Information System (SIS) (cf. Knelangen, 2001, pp. 217–219). This remained 
a critical challenge throughout the negotiations on Europol, as the following section illustrates. 
 
The Europol Convention 
Similar to the EDU, the Member States’ decision to establish Europol was primarily shaped by 
interdependence as well as functional and political spill-overs, which would continue to nurture path-
dependency within European police cooperation. However, colliding state preferences protracted the process 
towards the final adoption of the Europol Convention. Originally, Germany had envisioned the completion 
of negotiations by December 1993, and had hoped for a timely launch of Europol. The German Government 
had aimed at creating Europol as a Community organisation rather than intergovernmental body, including 
independent operational powers within Member States (Interviewees 7 & 21; Knelangen, 2001, p. 201). 
Nonetheless, this preference for rapid vertical integration was not able to assert itself. Instead, the Europol 
Convention was only adopted in 1995 and would come into force as late as 1998. It would establish Europol 
as intergovernmental organisation after all, and equip it with a rather limited, relatively weak mandate. 
Differences in national security cultures, particularly bureaucratic reluctance, played an important part to 
this end, as they shaped state preferences in favour of an intergovernmental approach to Europol that 
remained formally outside Community structures.  
Formal negotiations began in June 1992 when the European Council officially agreed to formalise 
the Europol endeavour that was now also included in the EU’s founding treaty. Interdependence had formed 
a key driving factor to this end; the Europol project constituted a European political “response to 
transnational crime” amongst others (Marotta, 2016, p. 25). It illustrated the evolving (paradigm-)shift in the 
strategic priorities of many Member States, and marked the culmination of a development towards new, 
European modes of governance in the area of internal security and policing. The consensus in the European 
Council to create a common institution reflected an emerging political commitment rather than mere 
operational dimension of police cooperation (Interviewees 7, 21 & 24). This can also be seen in the expansion 
or readjustment of the functional scope of European cooperation. Whereas the Trevi Group had formerly 
prioritised terrorism and remained largely limited to this domain, EDU and Europol focused on different and 
broader areas of organised crime in line with internationalisation trends. The mandates of EDU and Europol 
presented a political recognition of growing interdependencies. Similarly, the decision to launch Europol may 
be regarded as direct political reaction to spill-overs and unintended consequences of European integration 
elsewhere. Consequently, in June 1992, EU Member States agreed to draft a convention establishing Europol, 
thereby laying the foundation not only for a central coordinating body but also for deeper vertical integration. 
The choice for a legal agreement in the form of an international convention is interesting, because it 
broke with the rather ad-hoc, informal tradition of the Trevi Group that had previously characterised 
European police cooperation. This decision does however not seem random in the light of parallel 
formalisation trends at national, EU and the global level. On the domestic level, security governance and law 
enforcement authorities demonstrated increasing technical and operational rationalisation tendencies. These 
in turn required a certain central professionalisation of information exchange, including across the EU (Busch, 
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1995, p. 335 ff.). This was especially the case in view of the management of common data bases such as the 
SIS on which the Europol Information System (EIS) would be modelled years later (ibid.). Second, a similar 
paradigm-change towards centralisation was evolving at Community level and can partially account for the 
formalisation preference with regard to Europol. The Maastricht Treaty established JHA as a pillar within the 
EU framework and explicitly mentioned the foundation of Europol in the context of this political integration. 
Finally, the global level might have additionally reinforced Member States’ preferences in favour of a 
convention, namely the overall trend at the time to base cooperation on international treaties (Interviewee 
21). There was a widespread belief that “harmoni[...s]ation through international treaty obligations and 
through harmoni[...s]ation of legal procedures[...was] a basic requirement for systematic police cooperation” 
(Anderson, 1993a, p. 20). Therefore, the preference to professionalise European police cooperation through 
an intergovernmental convention was possibly influenced not only by growing interdependence and 
functional spill-overs but also by political spill-overs and a comprehensive trend towards formalisation of 
international relations and policing methods. Notwithstanding the operational needs of the law enforcement 
community at the time, Europol thus primarily reflects the “political rationale marking the shift from the ad 
hoc mechanisms developed from 1976 to the new Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers” (Bunyan, 
1997a, p. 16; cf. European Council [1993], 1997). 
The establishment of EDU and Europol has been described as an organic multidimensional process 
that constituted a direct reaction to events and trends in different areas of Community governance and 
cooperation (Interviewees 7, 14 & 21). “There was no blueprint. Europol has grown historically. The build-
up of the EDU often was like walking a tightrope” (Interviewee 7). The same verdict applies to the process 
that led to the Europol Convention. When the EDU began operating in January 1994, significant difficulties 
remained with regard to Europol, as Member States could not agree on important details (cf. Busch, 1995, p. 
341 f.). These primarily concerned the functional scope of Europol and its degree of centralisation. Spain for 
instance aimed at an inclusion of terrorism in the mandate of the new organisation, whereas the UK remained 
strongly opposed to this suggestion and preferred the informal TREVI channels to deal with this matter 
(Busch, 1995, p. 341; Simancas Carrión, 2016, p. 81). Germany, by contrast, envisioned Europol to be involved 
in all areas of internal security, not only those related to terrorism or drug trafficking (Knelangen, 2001, p. 
226 f.). Whereas it favoured a holistic inclusion of Europol at all levels, countries like Spain and Greece 
supported a narrower operational focus on specific cases and delinquencies rather than broad cooperation 
on potential suspects or entire policy fields. On the extent of Europol’s central powers, Germany had a well-
known preference for deep vertical integration, that is, Europol as quasi-autonomous EU institution. Ideally, 
the organisation would comprise its own, supranational personnel, independent competencies (also to act 
within Member States) and a strong legal basis (ibid.). Albeit not nearly as far-reaching as the German 
preference, the Netherlands was likewise in favour of a fully integrated European police office (Knelangen, 
2001, p. 206). Against it, France and especially the UK advocated a ‘customers-oriented’ approach. Backed by 
Italy and Spain, they favoured Europol as rather weak institution, mere agent and support tool of the Member 
States that should consist of national liaison officers as in the EDU. They moreover preferred  no or very 
limited involvement of other EU institutions (e.g. the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) (Busch, 1995, p. 341 f.).  
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THE ASYMMETRICAL EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC SECURITY AND POLICE CULTURES  
The asymmetrical impact of driving factors can partially explain this divergence and collision between 
national preferences on Europol. Pressure from interdependence and politicisation was more present or 
stronger in some countries than in others. However, the most striking factor shaping each national position 
in the negotiations was the respective national security and police culture, as the preceding cases have 
likewise shown. Political, professional and organisational differences seem to have mattered tremendously 
with regard to defining the respective national positions on Europol (Anderson, 1993a, pp. 31–35). They 
affected both the performance of the EDU as well as the design and implementation of the Europol 
Convention. The formation of the respective Member States’ preferences and the ensuing bargaining process 
occurred mainly on the basis of their own systems, and whether they tended more towards national and 
intergovernmental or federal, rather integrated modes of governance (Interviewee 14). On one side of the 
spectrum, essentially federal states such as Germany and states with a tradition of interdepartmental 
coordination like the Netherlands were arguably more open to the idea of shared powers and cooperation 
within a supranational framework, including a strong Europol at the heart of EU police cooperation (British 
Prime Minister’s Office, 1976; German Bundesrat, 1994, p. 19; cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 235). Against it, countries 
with an internally decentralised or compartmentalised police system and strong political sovereignty 
concerns mostly supported an exclusively intergovernmental legal basis for Europol. Countries like France, 
the UK and Belgium preferred a degree of vertical integration that would leave Member States in the driver’s 
seat and little to no leeway for the development of autonomous powers and supranational authority 
(Knelangen, 2001, p. 224 f.). The negotiations on the Convention and the institutional design of Europol 
demonstrate the collision of these positions. Concretely, Germany, the UK and France dominated the 
bargaining process, reinforced by Spain, Italy and the Benelux countries amongst others. 
Germany was the most important advocate for a strong role of Europol in EU police cooperation. In 
addition to having initiated the Europol discussion, it was likely the most active Member State during the 
negotiations on the Convention (Interviewee 21). Its engagement can not only be seen in its input to the draft 
agreement but also in the commitment of its negotiators, some of whom would travel back and forth to The 
Hague each week to ensure a direct say of German officials and counterbalance the input of other, more 
critical Member States, most notably the UK and Ireland (ibid.). As regards content, the German preference 
on the Convention and in favour of making Europol a Community agency with “investigative competences” 
derived mainly from the highest political levels, similar to the initiative for Europol in 1991 (Rupprecht, 1993, 
p. 43 f.). Subnational policy entrepreneurship, by contrast, was only emerging. While police and ministerial 
officials may well have generally supported the creation of Europol and mostly influenced its functional 
scope, they did not act as driver of the German preference on the Europol Convention. Although the German 
BKA and the states were technically included or at least represented in the negotiations, they tended to mirror 
the Euro-enthusiastic government position instead of themselves pro-actively shaping it (Knelangen, 2001, p. 
206; Rupprecht et al., 1994). In this vein, “[...]all police unions unanimously demand[ed] Europol” 
(Rupprecht, 1993, p. 44). The BKA, especially its president Hans-Ludwig Zachert, strongly seconded the 
government’s vision of a far-reaching role for Europol within Member States. This included direct police 
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support to the German-led roll-out of EDU and working level discussions on the possible creation of a 
European Internal Security Union as framework for European police cooperation (Interviewee 21; cf. 
Weidenfeld, 1994, p. 14; Zachert, 1992).  
Notwithstanding the importance of input from German subnational policy entrepreneurs in its 
political and security system, the pro-integration preference on Europol seems to have been passed down 
from the top rather than vice versa. Not only were police representatives only formally involved after the 
decision to create Europol had been taken at the highest political level, in the negotiation of the Convention 
German law enforcement representation was limited to few senior officials. Although a certain ‘European 
socialisation’ arguably occurred among these officials, more operational police circles who remained mostly 
distant from political decision-making regarded Europol more sceptically, even opposed it (Interviewees 7 & 
21). At the level of the Länder, the government’s demand for a Europol with autonomous ‘executive 
competences’ was likewise met with considerable resistance, as sub-federal ministries feared a loss of powers 
on internal security policy (Knelangen, 2001, p. 207 f.; Rupprecht, 1993, p. 44; cf. de Witte, 1993, p. 44). The 
IMK actively demanded that the German Government ensure direct access and inclusion of the State Criminal 
Police Offices (LKAs) next to the BKA (German Bundesrat, 1994, p. 19; IMK, 1995, p. 6). Similarly, the federal 
lands continued to insist on direct representation in the Europol negotiations, for example in the Trevi 
Group’s AHWGE (Knelangen, 2001, p. 209).  
Contrary to the original top-down proposal for Europol, the political process towards its 
establishment was thus likewise shaped by subnational actors. Notwithstanding the bureaucratic resistance 
of state governments and the police to stronger centralisation, let alone vertical integration, they generally 
supported the idea of enhanced European police cooperation and a broad functional scope. Here again, high 
interdependence and practical problems arising from European integration presented key drivers. Related 
discussions among police and ministerial officials from the state levels revolved around Germany as key 
transit country within Central Europe and the growing lack of national control in the fight against cross-
border crime (Interviewee 7; cf. Knelangen, 2001, p. 201 f.; citing Rupprecht, 1991). Contrary to political 
arguments from the German Government of the need to advance EU integration, subnational representatives 
primarily voiced functional spill-overs and rising interdependence. The Europol Convention itself reflects 
this two-sided input of political and police priorities, and demonstrates the extent of the German influence 
on the final document. Article 2(2) for instance lists as Europol’s initial tasks high-profile crimes such as 
“unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, 
trade in human beings” but also relatively low-profile offences like “motor vehicle crime.” In this vein, the 
Europol Convention reads somewhat like a laundry or shopping list catering to the needs and preferences of 
both politicians and law enforcement; it reflects pressure from rising interdependence and spill-over effects 
alike (Interviewees 7, 29, 30 & 31). The annex presents an additional, rather long “[l]ist of other serious forms 
of international crime which Europol could deal with,” thus illustrating both the wide response to and 
demand for European cooperation in different issue areas but also the political difficulty of including them 
all in Europol’s functional scope (cf. Annex, Europol Convention, 1995).  
This political difficulty derived to a large extent from the asymmetrical effects of driving factors on 
the integration preferences of other Member States. Many governments were thus possibly more open to 
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flexible integration models rather than extensive formalisation right from the start. In the Netherlands, high 
interdependence, strong public pressure and a cooperation-oriented security and police culture formed an 
ideal basis for a national preference in favour of EU police cooperation. However, a lack of institutional 
precedent and path-dependency in this area resulted in a more hesitant Dutch stance on the extent of vertical 
integration. The Netherlands had a long tradition of multi-level governance and multi-stakeholder 
consultations, even more so than Germany. Located similarly in the centre of the Community and one of the 
Benelux countries, it had since the 1960s formed part of a common travel area, the “lab for Schengen and the 
EU” (Interviewees 14, 23 & 30). Interdependence was thus comparatively high. In this context, the Dutch 
police had a long tradition of cross-border cooperation with its neighbours even before the Trevi Group and 
the Europol initiative (de Witte, 1993). Similar to trends in Germany and the UK, the initially rather ad-hoc 
pragmatic, decentralised system of cooperation was becoming increasingly regularised with a view to 
improving coordination (Busch, 1995, p. 199 f.; Peek & Hoefman, 1993). The internationalisation of drugs and 
related organised crime as well as extensive domestic debate and politicisation of the matter acted as 
important drivers of an emerging formalisation and partial centralisation of Dutch policing (Busch, 1995, pp. 
181 ff. & 245; Interviewee 7). However, the emphasis of this restructuring process primarily lay on 
harmonisation rather than strict organisational centralisation (Peek & Hoefman, 1993, p. 105 f.). 
The Netherlands thus present an interesting case. Exhibiting relatively high interdependence, its 
decentralised police system with a strict separation between state and local levels was nonetheless very well 
integrated procedurally through a culture of multi-level WGs (Busch, 1995, p. 181 ff.; Interviewee 30). Its 
Euro- and cooperation-friendly culture distinguished it crucially from France and others. Yet, when Germany 
proposed the establishment of Europol with investigative powers, Dutch subnational policy entrepreneurs 
resisted the superimposition of a central power at EU level and shaped the Dutch preference accordingly. 
Albeit generally supportive of the Europol proposal, the Dutch Government was sceptical about the 
reconciliation of national systems that featured considerable differences. What is more, the Netherlands did 
not feel comfortable with such a trailblazing quantum leap in Community cooperation because of the lack of 
precedent in this area, that is, no organisational, legal and institutional preconditions (Peek & Hoefman, 1993, 
p. 109 f.). Although the Netherlands thus preferred a lower degree of vertical integration, they were highly 
interested in advancing European police cooperation. Especially the practical and financial benefits of a 
common capacity for information exchange mattered as influencer of the government position, maybe more 
so than in many bigger Member States. The Netherlands consequently supported the German Europol 
proposal, but lobbied for a step-by-step approach in the negotiations on the Europol Convention. The Dutch 
Council Presidency suggested to link up the EDIU and Europol proposals so as to create EDU as a “relay 
station” (Peek & Hoefman, 1993, p. 110).  
In the UK, national security culture and policing tradition were likewise important for the formation 
of its official negotiating position on the Europol Convention. While the UK was highly interested and 
involved in practical EU cooperation, it had no history of furthering European integration (Interviewee 23). 
Rather, its political and legal sovereignty-focussed tradition predestined it to “almost always favour[...] inter-
governmental cooperation rather than the pooling of sovereignty” (Anderson, 1993a, p. 23). In this vein, 
Prime Minister Major had commented the Europol initiative in advance of the Maastricht summit: 
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“It is a classic case for intergovernmental co-operation between the countries of the Community 
rather than for co-operation within the framework of Community law. And it is an area where 
Governments, not the Commission, have expertise” (cited by Knelangen, 2001, p. 208; cf. 
Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1992, p. 427).  
In contrast to the central geographic location of Germany, the peripheral and island status of the UK 
presumably made it less susceptible to growing Europe-wide interdependencies (Interviewee 7). However, 
this did not render it less open to political and functional spill-overs from Community integration and related 
developments within the EU. Albeit not a Schengen member, pressures from market integration were for 
example indeed relevant as driver of a British desire for improved police cooperation (German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, 1983b; cf. Anderson, 1993a, p. 29 f.). 
 Yet, the British national political and organisational culture rather negatively shaped its preference 
on vertical integration. Compared to the German police, especially the BKA that was relatively closely 
subordinated to the Interior Ministry, British law enforcement had always enjoyed a “considerable degree of 
independence from government control” (Anderson, 1993a, p. 26). This rather deeply engrained 
decentralised tradition with sometimes isolated bureaucratic cultures of different police entities made (sub-
)national adaptation to increasingly formalised European cooperation a challenge (Anderson, 1993a, p. 26 
ff.). Similar to the German states, British police officials demonstrated significant bureaucratic resistance 
against vertical integration via Europol (Interviewees 7 & 14). In view of extensive bi- and multilateral 
cooperation networks and informal personal contacts to EU and third countries, not only was there little 
functional need to further structure operational cooperation but outright opposition to an external oversight 
mechanism. Although police input into the official British government position was arguably stronger than 
in Germany, it did not constitute a primary driver of the UK’s preference either. It may however well have 
reinforced the political doctrine of national sovereignty and the government’s position in favour of a step-
by-step process commencing with minimum powers for Europol and an initially restricted functional scope. 
Anderson (1993a, p. 25) similarly observes how “flexible and ‘variable geometry’ of cooperation[...was] seen 
by the British government and by British police officers as both desirable and inevitable.” This entailed a 
limited objective for Europol under the Convention, namely to “improve[...] the effectiveness and cooperation 
of the competent authorities in the Member States,” a goal that would be achieved “progressively” (Art. 2(1) 
& (2), Europol Convention, 1995).  
 
THE EUROPOL CONVENTION AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE PREFERENCES OF GERMANY AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The final Convention presented a compromise between the German-favoured establishment of Europol as 
autonomous EU agency and the British preference for a weak body outside the Community framework. 
However, it likewise embodied a gradual shift in the British preference in response to subnational policy 
entrepreneurship. While deep vertical integration in the area of JHA was still out of the question – as was the 
involvement of the ECJ – growing interdependencies as well as practical centralisation and computerisation 
trends in national policing increasingly formed the UK’s preference in favour of European intergovernmental 
cooperation. Subnational interest shapers like the MPS promoted technological and methodological 
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rationalisation of police work. On-going systemic centralisation tendencies additionally contributed to the 
overall acceptance by British police circles of Europol as central coordination and support body.  
At European level, the collective organisational capacity, synergy effects and practical benefits of 
existing cooperation formats had garnered subnational interest as well (Anderson, 1993a, p. 37 f.). Particularly 
Schengen and the facilitation of police work through the use of its central information system was attractive 
in the eyes of police officers. The work conducted within the EDIU and later EDU project group was likewise 
proving the merits of common institutional structures for European police cooperation. It therefore is no 
coincidence that the UK, among other Member States, pushed for a focus of Europol on information exchange. 
And indeed, Article 3(1) of the Europol Convention stipulates as key task the facilitation of information 
exchange within the EU, including through the creation of a computerised data collection system. While the 
British Eurosceptical preference during the Europol negotiations was primarily shaped by its political system 
and doctrine of national sovereignty, technological trends in British policing and cultural changes in 
subnational policy entrepreneurship helped shift the government position towards favouring some degree 
of centralisation at European level, although bureaucratic resistance continued to impede actual vertical 
integration. To this end, British law enforcement officials emphasised the functional need arising from 
interdependence on the one hand, and the practical benefits of pooled capacity. Of course, a certain path-
dependency deriving from TREVI and the British-initiated EDIU project additionally shaped the UK’s 
preference in favour of intensifying European police cooperation. 
The case of France by contrast illustrates how political denial, the national police and security 
culture, and a lack of path-dependency combined to impede a strong preference or active involvement in the 
Europol negotiations. While the interconnectedness of organised crime in France was undeniably growing as 
well, particularly with regard to drug trafficking and money laundering, policymakers for a long time refused 
to recognise, even outright denied the problem (Interviewee 30). While the infamous ‘French Connection’ 
was eventually addressed by the government, French policymakers continued to reject the notion that 
organised crime was a central issue up to the 1990s (ibid.; Anderson, 1993b, p. 78). Although transnational 
criminal networks operating in France factually demonstrated rising interdependence, the matter was 
politically downplayed as a primarily Italian problem (Interviewee 30).  
In contrast to Germany and the UK where police circles signalled a need to act in response to these 
developments and were thereby able to – at least partially – shape their governments’ preferences, the French 
security and police tradition did not allow subnational policy entrepreneurship to the same extent. Its rather 
centralised political system and inward-looking governance culture, particularly on core state powers such 
as security, created a less ideal starting position than Germany’s federal system and long tradition of 
European cooperation (Interviewees 7 & 21; cf. Aden, 1998). Similar to the UK, France frequently voiced 
concerns about its political sovereignty in a Community context. In 1991, it for example legally questioned 
“the constitutionality of the Schengen Agreement on the grounds it infringed national sovereignty” 
(Anderson, 1993a, p. 23). Although the French Constitutional Court rejected the case, France saw similar 
problems with regard to Europol (Neumann, 2012, p. 292). Consequently, it adopted a rather reluctant, at 
times obstructive, stance in the Convention negotiations (Busch, 1995, p. 342). The majority of reservations 
on the draft Convention originated from France, with a particular emphasis on limiting the powers of 
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Europol, since “a restriction on the sovereignty of Member States is unacceptable” (Council of the European 
Union, 1994, p. 67). 
In addition to this political culture of safeguarding national sovereignty, anti-EU entrepreneurship 
from within the French police system further hampered the extent of integration in the Europol Convention. 
Not only was French law enforcement deeply embedded in a complex national legal and organisational 
culture that complicated international cooperation, it was moreover strongly influenced by domestic politics 
(Aden, 1998; Anderson, 1993b). Notwithstanding the decentralisation efforts since the 1970s, the police 
system remained tightly integrated with the government and certain bodies such as the Gendarmerie 
continued to operate “under direct ministerial control” (Anderson, 1993b, p. 55). Police officials consequently 
often adopted the political opinion of the government and tended to be involved in the production of a 
“regular stream of politico-police scandals” (Anderson, 1993b, p. 69). Consequently, public and political 
opinion regarding the police was highly ambiguous and divided. The previous chapter already explored how 
the perception of the French police as embodiment of the state, and its repressive strategies towards public 
order formed a domestic environment that was preoccupied with internal discussion. This domestic 
‘seclusion’ of law enforcement and the public-political influence on policing in France continued into the 
1990s. Subnational policy entrepreneurship on Europol was accordingly weak if not completely absent. 
Contrary to Germany and the UK, French police structures were still largely compartmentalised and internal 
coordination problems had not been systematically addressed. Despite the close integration of police and 
government, law enforcement was organised in a very hierarchical manner with a strict separation between 
different bodies and departments (Anderson, 1993b, p. 64). Turf wars and bureaucratic rivalries within and 
among police authorities strongly conflicted with harmonisation and centralisation attempts, both at 
domestic and European level (Anderson, 1993b, p. 55 ff.; cf. Crozier, 1964). What is more, France for a long 
time remained behind other Member States with regard to innovating policing methods. Whereas Germany 
was at the forefront of systematic computerisation and technological rationalisation, French police officials 
still largely relied on analogous methods and personal contacts for information exchange (Anderson, 1989, 
p. 88; Bigo, 1996, p. 90; Friedrichs, 2008, p. 71; Wiesel, 1985, p. 214).  
Finally, a lack of comparable path-dependency as exhibited by Germany and the UK explains the 
French resistance to Europol. France had historically prioritised Interpol and had always been less 
enthusiastic about Community police cooperation (Interviewee 23). This preference persisted through the 
1990s, although British and American influences had grown significantly within the organisation (Anderson, 
1993b, p. 81; cf. Anderson, 1989). Whereas Germany and the UK were increasingly focusing on TREVI for 
police cooperation, the French political denial of the rise of transnational organised crime and its closed-off 
police culture contributed to a highly sceptical government position concerning the Trevi Group (cf. German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1982). In view of its lack of investment in EU police cooperation, it is hardly 
surprising that France remained largely passive in the negotiations on the Europol Convention. Only once 
Germany ‘baited’ France with Strasbourg as possible location for the Europol headquarters did France first 
show an interest; the EDU project team was already situated there (Interviewee 21). Nonetheless, it never 
developed a preference in favour of EU cooperation or Europol. Despite pressure from growing 
Chapter 5 │ Institutional Beginnings: The Europol Drugs Unit and Early Europol 
132 
interdependence, its political and police culture dominated the formation and maintenance of a preference 
rejecting the integration ambitions of Germany and others. 
 
STATE PREFERENCES ON EUROPOL: VENUE SHOPPING OR INTEGRATION? 
While asymmetrical levels of interdependence and diverging national security cultures certainly mattered as 
important drivers of state preferences, many governments neither developed strong pro- nor anti-integration 
preferences in the negotiations on the Europol Convention. Although most countries exhibited a clear 
national position with regard to vertical integration – whether Europol was to be relatively weak or strong – 
the majority was relatively undecided and passive with respect to organisational details and the functional 
scope. Germany, the UK and France thus largely dominated the bargaining process, which remained rather 
unstructured with ad-hoc and sometimes random input from different Member States (Interviewees 7 & 30). 
This ultimately resulted in the ‘laundry list’ character of certain parts of the Europol Convention, and is telling 
of the asymmetrical influence of driving factors on state preferences. Some governments primarily regarded 
Europol as an opportunity to manage national problems. This venue shopping can for instance be seen in the 
Spanish preference to include terrorism in Europol’s functional scope, a priority that was mainly informed 
by the persisting domestic challenge posed by ETA rather than transnational criminal or terrorist pressures 
(Interviewee 30; Simancas Carrión, 2016, p. 81; cf. Busch, 1995, pp. 245 & 341 f.). In the end, terrorism was 
included in the Convention but not among the list of initial tasks (Art. 2(1) & (2), Europol Convention, 1995).  
The negotiation process on the Europol Convention neatly illustrates how common driving factors 
across all Member States – primarily rising interdependence and functional spill-over effects from market 
integration – shaped similar experiences. At the same time, the diverging historic and cultural security and 
policing traditions mattered tremendously in differentiating each national experience and preference. On the 
one hand, an overall need for the formalisation of cooperation, or at least for technical and organisational 
rationalisation, had emerged throughout the Community. As functional demands on national police and 
security systems increased in line with growing interconnectedness, European cooperation became more and 
more attractive regardless of the official government position on EU integration. Interdependencies and spill-
over effects thus seem to have ultimately convinced Member States to favour Europol. Irrespective of 
preferences on vertical integration – which differed in accordance with the national systems – there was wide-
spread recognition of the practical benefits of a common institution with shared capacity, pooled resources 
and operational synergies. In this context the European Council concluded: “[...c]ommon police institutions 
of the EC or of the EC Countries would[...] realize more efficiency and lower costs, even without executive 
power” (European Council [1993], 1997). 
In sum, interdependence, functional spill-overs and an emerging path-dependency ultimately drove 
Member States towards the final adoption of the Europol Convention and subsequent establishment of 
Europol in 1995. Transnational criminal activities were spiralling across all EU countries, particularly in the 
wake of the collapsed Soviet Union, and arguably gave rise to a new security paradigm among policymakers 
and practitioners: “[...w]ith regard to security strategy and the geography of crime, [...]the EU[...] should be 
seen as a single territory[...]. [...I]n terms of crime the EU states constitute a largely homogenous geographical 
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area” (Rupprecht & Hellenthal, 1994, p. 30). Functional spill-overs from the Schengen Convention and market 
integration further fuelled this trend. The abolition of internal borders necessarily produced a certain 
deterritorialisation of policing and internal security governance, and raised the sheer scale of tasks and 
demands on national law enforcement. Member States, especially smaller ones, were therefore not only 
increasingly interdependent with regard to transnational crime but also with respect to policing capacity 
(Interviewee 7; cf. Rupprecht, 1993, p. 45 f.). However, the extent to which governments advocated European 
collective action highly depended on their national security and police culture. 
Apart from functional spill-overs and heightened interdependencies, political spill-overs and path-
dependency played an important role in the achievement of a Europe-wide consensus regarding the need for 
rationalising police cooperation. The experiences with the Trevi Group had simultaneously demonstrated the 
benefits of professionalisation and central coordination on the one hand, and the shortcomings of informality 
and organisational isolation (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1986). By the 1990s, it had thus emerged 
as one of the key cooperation formats and had been formally linked to managing the security implications of 
the SEA. From there, it was only logical to also task TREVI with the creation of Europol. Moreover, early 
institutionalisation initiatives at European level such as the Italian Scalfaro-paper and the British 
NDIU/EDIU proposal had likewise contributed to shifting state preferences towards Community 
cooperation and its ensuing formalisation. 
By contrast, sub- and supranational policy entrepreneurship mattered little as drivers of state 
preferences in the Europol Convention negotiations. While subnational levels had varying input in the 
political decision-making process across Member States, police circles rather acted as enhancers than shapers 
of the national position. Against it, supranational actors were barely involved in the design and negotiation 
of the Convention (Interviewee 14). The European Parliament for instance was not even consulted on the 
draft Convention (Bunyan, 1997a, p. 21). While the European Commission was gaining a role in JHA 
subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty, it still had no formal right of initiation in the area of police cooperation 
(Interviewees 14 & 21; cf. Busch, 1995, p. 340 f.). Consequently, the Europol Convention remained a project 
of the Member States that had commenced at the highest political levels and was now gradually being 
expanded top-down.  
Irrespective of the intergovernmental legal framework and the situation of Europol outside the EU, 
the adoption of the Europol Convention marked an important step in the formalisation and 
institutionalisation of European police cooperation. Its clear association with the EU – not only in geographic 
membership but also in explicit tasks and mentions of EU bodies – laid the foundation for further integration. 
This can already be seen in the process preceding the implementation of the Convention and the beginning 
of activities at Europol. While the Commission’s involvement remained limited, it assumed a formal role as 
observer in the Europol Management Board – the proverbial ‘foot in the door’ (Art. 28(4), Europol 
Convention, 1995; cf. Soreca, 2016, p. 71).  
A number of external developments further approximated Europol and the EU even before the 
Convention had been officially ratified. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty for instance targeted the creation of an 
AFSJ within the Union, and put Europol front and centre in police cooperation, especially with regard to 
information exchange (Art. 30(1b) & (2), Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; cf. Bruggeman, 2016, p. 27). 
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Additionally, the Amsterdam European Council decided to incorporate the Schengen acquis into the EU 
framework (European Council, 1997). Since the creation of Schengen and Europol had been closely related, 
the integration of the former was likely to bring Europol closer to the Community as well, if only by further 
raising interdependence (Interviewees 7, 21 & 24).  
Although a certain path-dependency was underway in EU police cooperation throughout the 1990s 
and shaped preferences on horizontal integration, political spill-over effects and binding commitments were 
possibly not yet strong enough to positively impact Member States on vertical integration. Regardless of the 
gradual paradigm-shift towards a stronger focus on the EU in the area of JHA, “the Amsterdam negotiation 
was characterized by a ‘maintaining national control trend’” “[...r]ather than [...]institutional spillover”  
(Devuyst, 1998, p. 615). It is thus telling of the ‘in-between’ state at the time when Member States had on the 
one hand recognised the benefits of EU police cooperation and were increasingly preferring the institutional 
framework of the Union, but were simultaneously still reluctant towards deeper integration and sovereignty 
transfers.  
 
GRAPPLING WITH BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE: THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPOL SALESMANSHIP 
Subnational policy entrepreneurship against integration perhaps exacerbated this preference even before 
Europol officially commenced activities in 1999. The early Europol faced considerable bureaucratic resistance 
from the police and security community. Whereas the original proposal had been devised by the highest 
political levels and decided at the European Council, the negotiation phase of the Convention and subsequent 
preparations for Europol’s launch saw a gradual top-down inclusion of subnational officials from ministries 
and law enforcement. This growing role for domestic actors heightened the impact of bureaucratic resistance 
on state preferences and EU police cooperation as a whole. The top-down political nature of the Europol 
initiative collided with a police desire for operational autonomy (Interviewees 22 & 23). Europol’s 
Management Board – comprising ministerial officials representing the respective governments – was tasked 
with drafting the implementing acts after the Convention entered into force in October 1998. Yet, “[...i]nitially, 
the chiefs of police in the Member States were highly sceptical about the need for the creation of a 
Management Board” (Storbeck, 2016, p. 23). Law enforcement officials likewise opposed further 
institutionalisation and resisted competency transfers to Europol. Not only did diverging domestic security 
cultures and policing systems produce “very different, heterogeneous interests” among the law enforcement 
community, trust among different authorities was a serious problem as well, and many larger criminal offices 
preferred their own cooperation networks in any case (Interviewees 7, 14 & 29). Consequently, even before 
Europol began to operate in 1999, its main clients needed yet to be convinced to cooperate with and via 
Europol. Rather the rule than the exception, many police officials had barely heard of the EDU or Europol, 
let alone knew either one existed (Interviewee 28). The Dutch head of police for instance first enquired about 
Europol in 1998 (Interviewee 30). In many bilateral police relations, Europol was openly deemed “completely 
superfluous” (Interviewee 7).  
The process preceding the commencement of Europol’s activities as well as its early days in operation 
demonstrate that supranational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation mattered much more for the 
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ultimate acceptance of the organisation than interdependence or spill-over effects. In this context, the first 
Europol representatives deliberately focussed on building a reputation and ‘hawking’ the organisation’s 
services among national police officials (Interviewees 7, 21 & 30). In addition to advertisement, the actual 
practical and analytical benefits of a central institution would help to build trust and interest. Similar to many 
smaller Member States, the Nordic countries for instance lacked extensive information and liaison networks 
of their own and were therefore rather intrigued by the possibilities of Europol (Interviewee 7). The functional 
merits of Europol thus presented a window of opportunity for supranational advocacy. Europol officials 
actively promoted the organisation as a means to solve domestic shortcomings or problems, similar to the 
‘laundry list’ approach of the Europol Convention. Notwithstanding continued bureaucratic resistance from 
subnational actors in many Member States, pro-EU entrepreneurship gradually emerged among some 
national law enforcement authorities in the form of venue shopping in single issue areas. The establishment 
of a Europol analysis project on outlaw motorcycle gangs originated from a Nordic initiative in response to 
the Great Nordic Biker War, particularly the Hells Angels (ibid.).  
Next to the organisation’s practical merit, Europol top officials and Member States’ representatives 
in the Management Board harnessed the power of politicising events to shift preferences towards cooperation 
via Europol. They for instance leveraged a migrant smuggling incident that was widely publicised for months 
to expand Europol’s role in this area (Interviewee 7; cf. BBC, 2000). In a similar vein, the inclusion of 
trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances among Europol’s initial tasks had constituted a direct 
reaction to public pressure and widespread concern about the collapse of the Soviet Union rather than to 
factual interdependencies (Interviewee 7). Salience therefore facilitated supranational policy 
entrepreneurship and helped shape state preferences in favour of extending the functional scope of EU police 
cooperation (cf. Storbeck, 2016, p. 22). 
The implementation and early operating phase of Europol presented a tightrope walk between the 
concerns and interests of policymakers on the one hand, and those of practitioners, police officials and the 
public. Although the creation of Europol constituted an unprecedented institutionalisation of police 
cooperation – and thereby an important step towards EU integration in the area of JHA – state preferences at 
the time of its launch were still shaped by political sovereignty concerns and bureaucratic resistance. 
Nevertheless, Europol’s practical output and emerging entrepreneurship together with growing institutional 
binding and spill-overs were paving the way for the further development of the organisation. Whether 
Member States had intended for it to happen or not, Europol was quickly developing a dynamic of its own 
that would increasingly merge with the overall process of EU integration. 
 
 
5.4 Institutional Choice in a Nutshell: State Preferences on the Three Dimensions 
of Differentiated Integration 
In comparison to the Trevi Group, both EDU and Europol already presented significant steps towards further 
EU integration in the field of police cooperation. While TREVI had gradually evolved into a more 
autonomous structure with growing practical authority as well as a slowly expanding functional scope by 
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the late 1980s, it remained for the most part informal due to the lack of an explicit legal basis. Against it, 
Europol may convincingly be argued to have constituted an unprecedented level of integration, because it 
marked a sudden change in the pace and quality of the institutionalisation of EU police cooperation. Member 
States for the first time opted for an international binding agreement, thereby equipping it with a formal 
identity and legally committing themselves. What is more, they agreed to expand the tasks and competencies 
of Europol, although the initial mandate remained relatively limited. Finally, EDU and Europol were shaped 
by horizontal external differentiation from the very beginning, as cooperation with third countries formed a 
vital part of their day-to-day business.  
The 1990s thus constituted a paradigm shift in European police cooperation. Interdependence, spill-
overs and institutional path-dependency acted as the primary drivers of state preferences in favour of 
formalising existing, ad-hoc structures and associating them with the EU (see table 9). They likewise shaped 
related centralisation initiatives as well as the ultimate decision of Member States to institutionalise police 
cooperation in the form of Europol. While interdependencies and functional spill-over effects undeniably 
shaped preferences in favour of horizontal integration and a large functional scope, the respective national 
security cultures and police systems acted as intervening factors influencing government positions on the 
degree of vertical integration. Overall, domestic centralisation tendencies at operational levels favourably 
shaped attitudes in many Member States towards coordination and cooperation at European level, including 
the early thought of a Europol. Following its inception however, bureaucratic resistance from domestic 
officials often rather negatively affected vertical integration preferences and inhibited cooperation at Europol. 
Nevertheless, the influence of subnational policy entrepreneurship remained very limited and ultimately 
succumbed to strong functional pressure from internal and external interdependence. Both pushed 
governments and subnational actors alike to prioritise Europol for addressing national problems, even if only 
in the form of venue shopping. Although European actors did not play a role at all with respect to the official 
positions of EU governments in advance of the birth of Europol, the first signs of supranational policy 
entrepreneurship began to emerge in the late 1990s. For the first time in EU police cooperation, supranational 
actors like the European Commission leveraged politicisation and political spill-overs in an endeavour to 
promote integration at Europol. This section takes a closer look at these driving factors across each integration 
dimension and the respective preferences of Member States. While national preferences largely converged or 
were relatively easily reconcilable on the horizontal and functional dimension, they differed considerably 
with regard to vertical integration, that is, the competencies and powers Europol should have. 
 
Vertical Integration 
The Europol Convention presented a qualitative leap in EU police cooperation, taking it from the ad-hoc, 
informal character of the TREVI WGs to a formal, central institution coordinating information exchange. 
Political spill-overs and institutional path-dependency mattered greatly as drivers of state preferences to this 
end, and prepared the ground for beginning vertical integration. They include the decision of the 1986 
European Council at its meeting in London to establish a central secure communications network within 
TREVI as well as the JHA Council decision of April 1987 to create an experimental “light administrative 
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structure” for the better coordination of the Group (Council of the European Union [1987], 1997, p. 11). 
Together with the SIS, these developments laid the institutional foundations for Europol and its EIS (cf. 
Busch, 1995, p. 332 ff.). The Maastricht Treaty likewise played an important role and presented somewhat of 
a game changer. It formally acknowledged the on-going paradigm shift towards the Community context for 
JHA matters, particularly “a certain Communitization of police cooperation between the Member States and 
the European Community” (Fijnaut, 1993, p. 15). What is more, the Treaty heralded a phase of incorporating 
existing cooperation and ad-hoc structures into the EU institutional framework and thus paved the way for 
supranational integration initiatives (European Council [1993], 1997). The Commission – albeit not a relevant 
influence on the preferences of Member States with regard to Europol – gained an official role in the area of 
internal security and police cooperation. This would in turn enable it to propose integrative initiatives in the 
future, thus increasingly shaping Europol through cultivated spill-overs, as the next chapters show. 
Some EU members with pro-integration preferences such as Germany deliberately employed path-
dependency and political spill-overs to sway state preferences in favour of Europol and centralisation (see 
table 9). To this end, the German government exploited the piecemeal approach of gradual deepening and a 
strategy of DI. It purposefully played and built on previous commitments of EC Member States. Governments 
had already agreed to professionalise the originally ad-hoc Trevi Group, for instance by way of ministerial 
declarations and regularising its WGs. The ministerial agreement establishing EDU presented a logical 
extension of this development and paved the way for further institutional binding in the form of the Europol 
Convention. While information exchange was still regulated by respective national systems under the EDU 
agreement, EDU effectuated a first centralisation and rationalisation attempt regarding the coordination of 
police cooperation. Apart from a permanent, central location (Strasbourg), the EDU nevertheless constituted 
a rather loose “cooperation team” of national liaison officers than an actual institution (Ministerial 
Agreement, 1993). Additionally, the British NDIU/EDIU proposal formed a convenient basis for the 
promotion of EDU as predecessor for Europol. 
In this context, preferences on Europol were likewise shaped by a widespread interest among many 
Member States to benefit from the positive externalities and functional spill-overs of the Schengen 
cooperation. Germany thus used the Schengen group to test models of centralising and formalising 
cooperation, always with the intention of eventually rolling it out to the rest of the Community (Busch, 1995, 
p. 332 ff.; Peek & Hoefman, 1993, pp. 103 & 107). The Schengen Convention would indeed have a role model 
character as the “first instrument of international law which involve[d...]-far-reaching international police 
cooperation within a sound political and legal framework” (Peek & Hoefman, 1993, p. 104). The agreement 
among Member States to establish EDU – and later Europol – was to a large degree informed by the Schengen 
Agreement and a functional recognition that an institutional basis was needed for European police 
cooperation (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 223 f.). DI and an overall flexible approach to integration thus influenced 
the institutionalisation of EU police cooperation and was employed as deliberate strategy by Germany and 
others to achieve the creation of Europol. 
In addition to path-dependency and political spill-overs from previous integration decisions, EU 
governments were significantly and perhaps primarily driven by interdependence and functional spill-overs 
in  their  choice  for Europol’s  degree of autonomy.  External interdependence spiralled across Member States  
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as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union or the fall of the Berlin wall and Germany’s national 
reunification. The growing Europeanisation and internationalisation of organised crime and terrorism played 
an important part in the shift of EU government preferences towards a certain internationalisation of police 
work and internal security governance. Additionally, Community developments like the European passport 
union, the completion of the single market and the creation of the Schengen Area produced spill-over effects 
that further heightened functional pressure to manage the growing interconnectedness. Many Member States 
thus began to gradually favour the regularisation of cooperation, a shift that first occurred within national 
security and policing systems before it was reflected at European level. The rationalisation and 
computerisation of police methods informed national political levels, as domestic security cultures were 
gradually moving towards professionalised coordination. Countries like Germany and the UK who were at 
the forefront of innovative policing technologies increasingly supported some degree of vertical integration 
in EU police cooperation and began prioritising EDU and Europol as central channels. 
 However, internal interdependencies within the EC were asymmetrical across Member States and 
not yet high enough to substantially impact state preferences on vertical integration with respect to Europol. 
Additionally, diverging national political systems and legal traditions strongly limited integration 
preferences. A tradition of intergovernmental treaties, the lack of precedent regarding supranational 
authority in the area of internal security, and national sovereignty concerns mattered greatly as restraints 
upon Europol’s degree of autonomy. Most EU Member States agreed that Europol should be established as 
rather weak organisation in support of national authorities, and not as a body with independent investigative 
powers like Germany had originally foreseen (Interviewees 7 & 29, 2018). The qualitative leap in integration 
that Chancellor Kohl had envisioned for Europol was met with political resistance in most other countries, 
although they generally supported the idea of part-centralising EU police cooperation through structures 
such as an EDIU (cf. Anderson, 1993a; Benyon, Turnbull, Willis, Woodward, & Beck, 1993, p. 159; Knelangen, 
2001, p. 203; Rupprecht, 1993). The proposal to integrate Europol into the EU framework and equip it with a 
certain autonomy was thus highly controversial. Belgium, Spain and Portugal for example regarded this more 
“as a long-term possibility,” while France thought it “attractive in theory but not necessary to achieve 
cooperation” (F. E. C. Gregory, 1991, p. 152 f.). The UK with its focus on practical cooperation and strong 
sovereignty concerns, supported by Denmark, was similarly sceptical “whether a body of this nature would 
be more effective than current arrangements” (ibid.). Even the relatively Euro- and integration-friendly Dutch 
Government saw no institutional basis or precedent for such deep integration right away (cf. Peek & 
Hoefman, 1993, p. 110).  
 Subnational bureaucratic resistance likewise explains why a compromise was struck with EDU as a 
transitional solution. Especially operational and police levels strongly opposed a wider competence for 
Europol. This would only change progressively as Europol proved its practical value and was able to build a 
clientele among domestic law enforcement authorities. With an initially underdeveloped legal basis and 
much leeway for interpretation, Europol officials executed somewhat of a balancing act in the development 
of the organisation. On the one hand, they faced a theoretically rather limited mandate and resistance from 
national criminal police offices who regarded it as rival, and at the same time were demanded by different 
Member States to take a pro-active approach to EU police cooperation and at times even engage in operational 
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activities and support national investigations (Interviewees 7, 14 & 21). This deviation between theory and 
practice, political and operational levels would slowly lead to a gradual function creep in Europol’s powers 
and its functional scope. Both would be expanded through amending protocols to the Convention and 
eventually by a new legal framework. The progressive adaptation of national security and policing cultures 
to this new European cooperation format as well as growing acceptance of Europol likewise helped shift state 
preferences towards further vertical integration. However, when Europol began its activities in 1999, it was 
the product of a lengthy negotiation process on the extent of its institutionalisation and powers, which had 
resulted in a compromise: Europol as a Member States-driven intergovernmental structure outside the EU 
framework, but one that was nonetheless closely associated with the Community’s JHA pillar and included 
a growing role for EU actors in its governance. 
 
Functional Scope 
Contrary to vertical integration, Europol’s functional scope presented a much less contentious issue, although 
it was marked by a similar piecemeal approach. The Europol Convention significantly expanded the issue 
areas delegated to the Trevi Group, which had for the most part remained limited to terrorism-related 
matters. While Member States opted for an initial focus on drugs in the EDU, Europol’s mandate likewise 
included the trade in nuclear substances, migrant smuggling, human trafficking and motor vehicle crime. 
This chapter has identified various factors that shaped state preferences in favour of this functional widening. 
However, two main drivers stand out. First, external interdependence – within and across different crime 
areas, especially in relation to drugs – played a crucial role in shaping the positions of Member States (see 
table 9). Second, path-dependency and spill-overs positively affected integration preferences. Subnational 
policy entrepreneurship and politicisation only played complementary roles in further consolidating 
governments’ resolve to task Europol with more not less issues.  
 As regards interdependence, the threat posed by drug trafficking and a rapidly increasing cross-
border interconnectedness of organised criminal groups exerted considerable functional pressure on 
European policymakers. These developments not only affected state preferences in favour of 
institutionalising police cooperation in the form of EDU and Europol, they likewise impacted their stance on 
the desirable functional scope of the latter. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the profits and activities of 
transnational organised crime continued to grow across Europe, especially in the areas of illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking and money laundering (cf. Fijnaut, 2016, p. 341 ff.; Lenhard, 1991; Stümper, 1990). 
Simultaneously, the number of drug-related deaths spiralled in the late 1980s, causing the European Council 
to expand TREVI’s competencies to “drug trafficking and the illegal use of drugs” at its December 1986 
meeting in London (Council of the European Union [1987], 1997, p. 11).  
The scale of the problem and the rapidly growing interconnectedness among crime areas rendered 
TREVI’s limited functional scope insufficient. EDU and also Europol may thus be regarded as a reaction not 
only to the inherent functional need to manage drugs across borders but also in relation to other issue areas 
that were becoming increasingly intertwined (de Witte, 1993, p. 96; Interviewee 7). Terrorism for instance, 
albeit no longer as much on the radar of Member States as in the 1970s, began to develop linkages with 
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organised crime (Fijnaut, 2016; Interviewees 30 & 31; Rupprecht et al., 1994, p. 10 f.). The inclusion of motor 
vehicle crime among Europol’s initial tasks did not only reflect a rise in vehicle theft as a means of profit for 
transnational criminal groups, it addressed the emerging links between international terrorism and organised 
crime. Cars that were stolen in one country were moved all over Europe and were frequently used by terrorist 
groups for bomb attacks in another country (Interviewees 21 & 30). Interdependence similarly drove state 
preferences for the inclusion of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances in the Europol Convention. 
Member States were concerned about the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
opportunities for illicit trade in these substances across the EU and its internal market (Interviewee 7).  
Additionally, internal interdependence shaped preferences to involve Europol in the fight against 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Against the backdrop of the general trend of removing 
national barriers within the Community, Member States were especially keen to balance possible negative 
effects of the free movement of persons (Fijnaut, 2016; Rupprecht et al., 1994, p. 10 f.). Functional pressure to 
cooperate, if not integrate, in more and more issue areas subsequently shifted the strategic priorities of 
European governments away from the narrow focus on terrorism and towards the inclusion of the broader 
issue area of transnational organised crime (Interviewee 24). 
 In addition to interdependencies, path-dependency and spill-over effects moved preferences 
towards expanding the functional scope of EU police cooperation. Next to functional spill-overs from 
European integration in other policy domains, political spill-over effects mattered tremendously. The 
growing involvement of the Trevi Group in an increasing number of issue areas, the Italian Scalfaro paper, 
and the British NDIU/EDIU initiative all laid important foundations for the creation of EDU and Europol. In 
conjunction with the Maastricht Treaty, they reinforced a preference among European governments to solve 
nationally-experienced problems at EU level and expand the functional scope of EU police cooperation. 
TREVI – an accumulation of single instances of venue shopping in many regards – began to increasingly 
produce political spill-overs. Governments expanded its mandate from terrorism to organised crime and 
drugs. By the 1990s, their initial commitment to cooperate on a few issue areas may be argued to have become 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The step-by-step expansion of the functional scope of EU police cooperation paved 
the way for further functional widening in the future. Path-dependency and political spill-overs in this way 
enabled the creation of EDU with an additional focus on money laundering, and even broader functional 
scope of Europol, including the laundry list of further possible tasks included in the Convention.  
By contrast, subnational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation only played complementary 
roles as drivers of state preferences on this integration dimension. Whereas domestic actors acted as anti-
integration forces with regard to vertical integration at the early Europol, they positively shaped government 
positions on the functional scope of EU police cooperation. Their input in the Europol Convention was clearly 
noticeable. Its annex details an extensive number of issue areas. It does not coincidentally resemble a police 
‘wish list’ but in fact originated directly from subnational policy entrepreneurship through the TREVI WGs 
(Council of the European Union [1993], 1997, p. 29 f.). Although law enforcement representatives did not act 
as major drivers of state preferences and were only involved relatively late and to diverging extents across 
Member States, they played an important part in publicising growing interdependencies to policymakers and 
signalling a functional need to cooperate in more issue areas.  
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In this context, politicisation additionally exerted pressure on governments to expand the scope of 
European police cooperation. For example, widespread public fear and media discussion related to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union amplified political concerns to collectively address trafficking in nuclear 
substances. The same holds with regard to the area of drugs. Whereas domestic operational levels as well as 
rising criminal and health statistics were signalling increasing interdependence, the saliency of drug abuse 
and related deaths among the public and media certainly contributed to placing the matter on the political 
agenda. The French government’s recognition of the problem and subsequent launch of the Pompidou Group 
in response to extensive media reporting on cases of overdose presents only one example. Although 
politicisation of drugs helped to push state preferences towards agreeing on the British NDIU proposal and 
Germany’s suggestion for EDU (and thereby Europol), public pressure acted as a comparatively weak driver 
in contrast to the creation of TREVI. However, once Europol began to operate, the influence of public debate 
and pressure would grow and directly affect state preferences on the design of Europol. Politicising events 
such as Europol staff scandals or large criminal cases of transnational scale were widely publicised and 
garnered significant public and political debate that resulted in institutional changes at Europol. 
 
Horizontal Integration 
Both the Ministerial Agreement on the EDU and the Europol Convention were signed by all EU Member 
States in line with the enlargement process: all 12 in the case of EDU and 15 with regard to Europol. EDU and 
Europol thus present a continuation of TREVI and its universal Community membership. Here again, 
interdependence acted as major driver of state preferences on European horizontal integration and can 
likewise account for a growing tendency towards practical horizontal internal and external differentiation. 
When Member States first began to realise the extent of interdependence in the fight against drugs and 
organised crime, they emphasised the global scale of this interconnectedness. Yet, cooperation via Interpol, 
the UN and other international channels remained behind the expectations of EU governments; no viable 
institutional alternative existed at the time (Boge, 1985, p. 38; Marotta, 2016, p. 24).  
Additionally, institutional interdependencies among Member States were comparatively higher than 
with most other countries and rising (see table 9). Functional spill-overs from integration in other areas were 
arguably transforming Western Europe into “a denser criminal geographic area” (Rupprecht, 1993, p. 48). 
Especially in the field of drug trafficking, criminal groups were exploiting economic liberalisation and the 
openness of the single market. Rupprecht and Hellenthal (1994, p. 30) observe that the “fluctuation of 
offenders between EU member states[...was] significantly larger than that between EU and non-EU states,” 
and conclude that “offenders from non-EU states use[d] the EU as a single operational, retail, base, and refuge 
area.” What is more, emerging institutional linkages within the Trevi Group contributed to a gradual 
prioritisation of the Union format for EU police cooperation. Not only were other non-EU police systems not 
considered equally sophisticated, a lack of operational and political trust hindered the formalisation of police 
cooperation on a global level (Interviewee 14; Rupprecht, 1993, p. 48). Although bureaucratic resistance 
complicated information exchange and collaboration at domestic and European level, it was relatively lower 
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compared to the international sphere. High and growing intra-European interdependence thus primarily 
shaped state preferences in favour of limiting formal Europol membership to EU countries. 
On the other hand, an asymmetry in internal interconnectedness – not all countries shared similarly 
close linkages – drove Member States to favour practical horizontal differentiation within the Community 
and the formation of sub- and avant-garde groups. In a way, the creation of Europol itself presented a reaction 
to an instance of internal differentiation and flexible integration: namely the Schengen acquis. Initiated by 
Germany as intergovernmental agreement among five Member States, the long-term goal behind the 
Schengen Agreement was the extension to all EU members. The abolition of internal borders among the 
Schengen signatories not only raised interdependence among its members but additionally produced 
functional and political spill-over effects beyond the Schengen acquis. Heightened interdependencies among 
Schengen signatories likewise created a functional need among the latter to cooperate closely on police 
matters. EDU and Europol were accordingly modelled after the Schengen experience. Albeit formally 
comprising all Member States, the EDU project team was fairly small and strongly dominated by a few 
countries in practice; it reflected much of the previous work of the Schengen members  (Interviewees 7, 14 & 
30). Spill-over effects from Schengen continued to shape preferences on EU police cooperation even after the 
transition from EDU to Europol. A certain practice of internal differentiation was for instance structurally 
embedded in the Europol Convention. Since only 10 of the 15 signatories were Schengen members, the 
protocol to the Convention stipulated the possibility of opt-ins and opt-outs. The UK, Ireland, Denmark and 
Greece had already been reluctant to join Schengen in all aspects because they rejected the possible 
implications on national sovereignty (Leuffen et al., 2013, pp. 227–231). These countries additionally 
experienced comparatively less interdependence pressure due to their peripheral geographic location. Thus, 
asymmetrical pressure from spill-over effects and interdependence can account for internal horizontal 
differentiation in EU police cooperation of the 1990s. Some Member States did not develop strong integration 
preferences, as both factors were relatively weaker and outweighed by national sovereignty concerns and 
“positive externalities for the laggards” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 231).  
Finally, external interdependencies informed government support for horizontal external 
differentiation at EDU and Europol. Interdependence in the fight against drugs, and organised crime in 
general, was of a global nature. Already the Trevi Group had repeatedly stressed the operational need to 
expand cooperation to non-EU countries, and Council representatives increasingly met with third countries 
from Europe like Switzerland, Sweden and Austria but also from the outside such as Australia, the US and 
Canada (Council of the European Union [1987], 1997, p. 11).  
The early phase of EDU and Europol likewise constituted a tightrope walk in this regard. Due to a 
lack of trust among security authorities and bureaucratic resistance, governments preferred to strictly specify 
for EDU’s legal framework that “transmission of personal information to non-Member States or to 
international organisations by the liaison officers will not take place” (Ministerial Agreement, 1993). 
Notwithstanding this de jure limitations on EDU’s geographic extension, interdependencies beyond the EU 
drove a certain de facto external differentiation. Where national law enforcement authorities so required, EDU 
worked together with third countries on a case-by-case basis, including cooperation with Columbia on global 
drug trafficking or with Bulgaria on European vehicle theft (Interviewee 7). Unsurprisingly, the formal 
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prohibition of cooperating with non-EU states was retracted by the Europol Convention, arguably in 
recognition of global interdependencies and the operational need for a wider geographic extension. When 
the Convention was adopted in 1995, effectively absorbing EDU, cooperative relations of Europol with third 
states and third bodies were explicitly allowed and encouraged (Art. 42, Europol Convention, 1995). Internal 
and external differentiation would continue to matter in Europol’s operational support activities and its day-
to-day business throughout the 2000s. As an organisation increasingly associated with the EU framework – 
and thereby more and more in between intergovernmental and supranational modes of governance – Europol 
would be critically shaped by avant-garde governments and smaller groups of like-minded Member States, 
as the following chapter demonstrates.
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6. European Police Cooperation in the Early 2000s: Towards 
an EU Law Enforcement Agency 
Europol as an intergovernmental organisation had barely taken up activities when the September 11 attacks 
claimed the lives of close to 3,000 people and introduced a new kind and scale of terrorism not previously 
experienced by Western countries. 9/11 is thus often argued to have marked the transition to ‘fourth wave’ 
terrorism and subsequent transformation of counterterrorism approaches (Rapoport, 2001, 2013; cf. Bossong, 
2013; Bures, 2011, pp. 59–84; Cronin, 2003). In the early 2000s, a considerable number of new priorities and 
cooperation initiatives likewise emerged among EU Member States, including at Europol. Especially with 
regard to information exchange and the institutionalisation of police cooperation, “[t]he terrorist attacks in 
the United States in 2001, as well as the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, triggered another 
dynamic in the development of Europe’s information management policies” (European Commission, 2010b, 
p. 2). In other words, crises clearly mattered. 
Although numerous initiatives of Member States aimed at centralising and streamlining approaches 
in concrete issue areas of EU police cooperation, very few directly aimed at strengthening or further 
formalising Europol, let alone equipping the EU with more powers. At the same time, governments 
increasingly preferred cooperation within European formats from 2000 onwards (for an overview see Annex 
II, European Commission, 2010). A rapidly unfolding chain of events, developments and generally 
accelerating cooperation dynamics in the early 2000s thus similarly affected Europol. It was for example 
reflected in the swift expansion of Europol’s functional scope to terrorism, euro counterfeiting and child 
pornography amongst others, or in growing supranational entrepreneurship, particularly the role of Europol 
officials in national and EU policy-making. Nonetheless, the ultimate demonstration, perhaps even 
culmination of this newly emerging momentum in EU police cooperation was the formal transformation of 
Europol into the EU’s official law enforcement agency in 2009. Although the Europol Council Decision de jure 
left power in the hands of the Member States, it instigated a de facto shift of responsibility to Europol and the 
EU in various areas. It thus constituted a qualitative change in the nature of this intergovernmental body and 
EU police cooperation, and mirrored a broader shift of preferences towards an overall integration trend 
within JHA. 
This chapter investigates the emergence of this new momentum in EU police cooperation throughout 
the early 2000s and the formation of state preferences to this end. The first section constitutes somewhat of a 
detour from this dissertation’s focus on Europol, because it looks at the European Car and Driving License 
Information System (EUCARIS), the Prüm Treaty and other instances of flexible integration that deviated 
from using Europol or the EU as institutional point of departure. Nonetheless, they often related to or in some 
way affected developments at Europol. Although these instances of DI differed with regard to the initiating 
Member States and issue areas, they were quite similar in the evolution of state preferences, and yielded 
comparable institutional developments or policy outcomes. All of them, in one way or another, ultimately 
strengthened EU police cooperation and the role of supranational actors. The second section returns to 
Europol. It studies the conversion of Europol into an EU agency by scrutinising the causal process leading to 
Chapter 6 │ European Police Cooperation in the Early 2000s 
146 
the adoption of the ECD. In view of the strong sovereignty concerns of the 1990s, it appears striking that 
Member State preferences shifted towards further institutionalising EU police cooperation and even 
integrating it into the Community framework instead of expanding Europol’s intergovernmental 
Convention. 
In this context, three observations stand out in particular. First, shocks and crises seemed to have 
mattered greatly as drivers to this end. The period between 2000 and 2009 showed that spiralling saliency 
and public pressure in the aftermath of crises more often led to positive integration decisions than not. In the 
early 2000s, high politicisation made it more – not less – likely for Member States to favour cooperation at EU 
level. Second, continuous pressure from growing interdependence as well as related functional and 
operational needs shaped state preferences in favour of integration. The developments of the early 2000s 
confirm the findings from the previous chapter. High interdependence in security issues and institutional 
linkages positively affected integration preferences. At the same time, the more asymmetrical these 
interdependencies were, the more likely Member States prioritised various cooperation formats, thus giving 
rise to internal and external differentiation as well as instances of DI. Third, supranational policy 
entrepreneurs increasingly mattered as influence on integration preferences. While EU actors were gradually 
beginning to have an impact on state interests, reputation and political legacy seem to have been of even 
greater importance. Holding the Council Presidency favourably affected the legislative activities and 
integration preference of the responsible Member State, and can thus partially explain the mushrooming of 
police cooperation initiatives, including at Europol. The 2000s demonstrate that governments shouldering 
the responsibilities and powers of the Presidency were more likely to be concerned about political legacy and 
to use their power for agenda-setting and initiating EU police cooperation.  
 
 
6.1 United in Diversity? EUCARIS, Prüm And Other Instances of Flexible 
Integration 
A number of initiatives outside Europol revitalised EU police cooperation in the early 2000s. Among the most 
important ones were the evolution of EUCARIS and the Prüm network, first outside the EU framework, then 
increasingly overlapping with and even (partially) integrated into the latter. In the following, this section 
investigates how both came about and looks at the driving factors behind the preferences of Member States. 
Concretely, it assesses the influence of interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship. By 
tracing the process leading to the creation and ultimately (partial) integration of EUCARIS and Prüm, it not 
only seeks to understand the causal mechanisms shaping state preferences on integration but also the role of 
DI and what drives preferences in favour of flexible integration. Finally, this section tests the findings from 
the EUCARIS and Prüm cases in a brief exploratory study of various smaller examples of DI initiatives in the 
early 2000s.  
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The Dutch Subnational Initiative for a European Car and Driving License Information System 
EUCARIS is a decentralised information system that has been formally recognised by the EU and facilitates 
the exchange of vehicle and driving licence information and other transport-related data among European 
countries in the fight against vehicle-related crime. Having started in the mid-1990s as informal working 
arrangement between three Member States – then five and later even more – today it is a formal, widely 
recognised information system with a continuously expanding base of users. As such, it now de jure overlaps 
with and de facto forms part of the official EU landscape of information exchange. Its use is part-based on EU 
legislation, with a role for the Commission in the scrutiny of data protection, and extends to all Member States 
(albeit only eight governments are formal signatories to the Treaty’s latest Protocol) plus a number of non-
EU countries. EUCARIS thus constitutes an example of DI in the evolution of European police cooperation. 
In this context, rising issue-specific interdependence and subnational policy entrepreneurship appear to have 
predominantly influenced state preferences with a view to instigating cooperation. With regard to initially 
favouring differentiation over integration, strong subnational policy entrepreneurship and the absence of 
supranational policy entrepreneurship best explain why Member States chose an intergovernmental treaty 
between just a few governments instead of EU policy venues. With the passage of time this is debatably 
confirmed. In line with the growing relevance of supranational policy entrepreneurs in this issue area, 
particularly the Commission, EUCARIS has increasingly been associated with the EU framework and even 
been partially integrated. 
 
MOVING CARS ALL OVER EUROPE: THE GROWING TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF VEHICLE CRIME 
Since the late 1980s, vehicle theft had become an increasing problem across Europe, and interdependencies 
were growing. Especially Central European countries were affected with Germany as one of the key transit 
countries and biggest criminal hub for the import and export of stolen vehicles (Interviewees 24, 31, 45 & 46). 
Particularly since the Schengen Agreement and the subsequent removal of border controls, cross-border 
vehicle crime and driving licence tourism were becoming a growing phenomenon across Member States 
(EUCARIS, 2017b; Interviewees 31, 45 & 46). As one practitioner put it: “a car stolen in Estonia can be used 
for a terror attack in Spain”  (Interviewee 29). What was more, vehicles stolen in one country could often be 
legally registered in another where the authorities had no record of foreign car theft. It was becoming a 
growing criminal trend to thus ‘launder’ stolen cars by exploiting differences in national systems and 
information gaps (Interviewee 46). Notwithstanding the rising interdependence, especially among Central 
European states, vehicle theft remained a secondary political issue. It primarily became manifest as relevant 
problem at the police level and in the daily practice of law enforcement. “Cars were being moved all over 
Europe,” (Interviewee 30) “it became more and more important to check vehicles during import and export 
(e.g. the signal ‘stolen’ was/is very important information)” (Secretariat EUCARIS, 2018).  
In 1994, the Netherlands thus approached other Member States with a proposal to launch 
multilateral cooperation in sharing vehicle and driving licence information across borders (Interviewees 45 
& 46). The initiative came from the subnational level, namely from the Dutch Vehicles and Driving Licences 
Registration Authority (RDW). In view of these functional interdependence pressures and the practical need 
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for international cooperation, RDW Deputy Director Hans van der Bruggen contacted his counterparts in 
Belgium and Luxemburg about the preparation of a pilot project (Interviewees 45 & 46; Secretariat EUCARIS, 
2018). The idea for professionalising cooperation was pitched at a scoping conference organised by the RDW, 
where other European vehicle registration authorities confirmed that they were experiencing similar 
problems. Consequently, it was agreed that the Benelux countries should realise the pilot (Interviewee 46). 
The first step was a proof of concept to better exchange data on vehicles and driving licence information 
among the national registration authorities of these three countries. It resulted in the establishment of 
enhanced albeit still informal cooperation and the development of a decentralised technical system to 
facilitate information-sharing between national databases (EUCARIS, 2017b; Interviewee 45). Three main 
factors explain the preference for a multilateral, informal format outside the EU framework and among just 
a few of its Member States: asymmetric interdependence, subnational entrepreneurship and lack of 
institutional precedent at EU level.  
First, an asymmetry in internal and external interdependencies among Member States significantly 
influenced the Dutch preference for horizontal internal differentiation instead of EU-wide action 
(Interviewees 14 & 21). Cooperation among the security authorities of likeminded countries seemed more 
promising due to a perceived closer cultural proximity, shared policing experiences and traditions. Personal 
contacts and existing institutional ties were simply more well-established with officials from certain countries 
than with others, as was the case among the Benelux countries (Interviewees 14, 45 & 46). Additionally, 
external interdependencies were highest in relation to the Netherlands’ immediate neighbours (Interviewee 
24). Although other vehicle registration authorities were likewise experiencing similar problems with stolen 
cars and driving license fraud, not every country faced equal levels of interdependence related to the problem 
itself as well as to policing capacity (Interviewee 46). Accordingly, some Member States did not regard vehicle 
crime or cross-country capacity-building as a priority. 
Second, subnational policy entrepreneurship explains the preference against vertical integration and 
for short-term differentiation in the form of an avant-garde group to advance integration in the long run. 
Subnational officials at the RDW had an interest in initially circumventing political circles to get practical 
cooperation between executive bodies off the ground and yield results as fast as possible. Not running the 
conference and the pilot project via the Dutch Ministry of Transport had thus been a deliberate choice of 
subnational practitioners. Although the Ministry had of course been informed, the RDW preferred to directly 
contact other registration authorities and activate transnational networks in order to launch the conference 
and subsequent proof of concept. As one official phrased it: “You do not want to do things together with the 
ministry. It will take longer and there will be a lengthy legal process before anything can be done” 
(Interviewee 46). Additionally, differences in cultural ties and police capacity explain why subnational actors 
did not equally lobby for the creation of EUCARIS across Member States. Not only did shared experiences 
and institutional links vary among vehicle registration and law enforcement authorities, some countries – 
including larger Member States – regarded their national resources and policing approaches as sufficient for 
dealing with cross-border vehicle theft (ibid.). It was thus seen as “easier to start with a few countries” 
(Interviewee 45), a consequence of the initial impulse coming directly from practitioners and their day-to-day 
experiences. Hence, the Dutch preference to go ahead in an informal setting as an avant-garde group of 
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subnational practitioners was also informed by the entrepreneurship and functional need of transnational 
practitioner networks.  
Third, not all Member States could be convinced to join the initiative from the start, because EU 
legislative procedures at the time simply did not account for this sort of cooperation. “It was brand-new; 
nothing like this had been done before” (Interviewee 46). No concepts were in place for European data 
exchange, as no comparable efforts had previously been taken at EU level; the Europol Convention had not 
even been signed yet. In other words: “EU legislation was not moving fast enough” (Interviewee 45); there 
was no real precedent in JHA for instigating something completely new or formalising collective action at 
supranational level. Additionally, many of the countries with whom information-sharing was needed – 
primarily Eastern European and Balkan countries – were not yet members of the EU at the time (Interviewee 
46). Consequently, the RDW deliberately opted for a cooperation format that did not require EU membership 
and thus chose a traditional intergovernmental setting to better fight transnational vehicle-related crime. 
 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICO-LEGAL CULTURES ON FORMALISATION PREFERENCES 
Pursuing internal horizontal differentiation and avoiding vertical integration constituted a deliberate strategy 
of Dutch subnational officials to quickly achieve much-needed cooperation and practical results. Based on 
their pilot project, legal and political integration processes would follow. The growing practical merit of this 
emerging central capacity soon drove other Member States to join the project, such as the UK and Sweden 
within two years after the launch (Interviewee 46). Yet, differences in legal traditions and political systems 
determined the impact of subnational policy entrepreneurship on state preferences. Political rather than 
practical pressure primarily ultimately shaped preferences on formalisation. Countries like France for 
example strictly opposed entering new multilateral treaties instead of relying on the EU, and were waiting 
for a Commission initiative (ibid.). In the case of Germany, its legal tradition of embedding rules and norms 
trumped the interest of the German vehicle registration authority to likewise participate. The latter was 
unable to assert itself vis-à-vis the German Ministry of Transport under whose political control it was situated. 
Contrary to the Dutch RDW, the German authority did not have as much leeway: “the Ministry was a 
breaking factor” (ibid.). German ministerial officials would not agree to becoming a part of this cooperation 
initiative unless it was formalised with an explicit legal base governing information exchange and especially 
data protection. 
However, the increasing functional benefits and evolving magnitude of this cross-border data 
exchange drove Germany to finally get involved. Growing internal interdependencies thus shaped an overall 
EU cooperation preference, whereas political and sovereignty concerns informed the preference on 
professionalisation. Together with the UK, Germany actively pushed for legal formalisation, which resulted 
in the signing of the EUCARIS Treaty in 2000 (Interviewee 45; EUCARIS Treaty, 2000). Contrary to the 
original impetus from subnational practitioners that had focused on instigating collective action to respond 
to growing interdependencies and functional needs, the British and German calls for a treaty appear to have 
been motivated primarily by the politico-legal cultures of both countries. In view of the rapidly expanding 
exchange of driving license and other personal data within the bounds of this cooperation arrangement, 
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higher political levels in Germany and the UK aimed at safeguarding their sovereignty by ensuring adequate 
data protection (Interviewees 45 & 46).  
This is strongly reflected in the treaty that was signed in Luxembourg on 29 June 2000. Although it 
was not a legal instrument of the EU but rather a multilateral treaty between five Member States, it was clearly 
associated with EU data protection and privacy rules (EUCARIS, 2017a). They clearly formed the foundation 
and baseline legislation for information exchange within EUCARIS (Art. 18, EUCARIS Treaty, 2000). 
Although this did not give the EU or concretely the Commission an active role, it placed the protection of 
individuals and the processing of personal data under the responsibility of the latter. Article 24 (EUCARIS 
Treaty, 2000) even made compliance with EU Directive 95/46/EC (1995) on personal data a precondition for 
states wanting to accede to the Treaty. Not only did this formal linkage to EU data protection law ensure the 
common standards that Germany and the UK had pushed for, it likewise catered to the practical need for 
professionalising certain aspects of cooperation that was becoming progressively more complex. While a 
practical need to manage increasing interconnectedness of vehicle-related crime had driven the original 
launch of cooperation, the further formalisation and beginning integration arguably responded to functional 
integration pressures arising from the quickly intensifying interdependence in the day-to-day work of 
practitioners. It thus was not only governments who wanted a formal agreement and clear rules for 
sovereignty reasons, but also vehicle registration authorities who favoured some sort of institutionalisation 
to structure growing internal interdependence, preferably through the EU as single point of reference 
(Interviewees 45 & 46). 
 
ASSOCIATING EUCARIS WITH EU POLICE COOPERATION 
Whereas rising interconnectivity and subnational policy entrepreneurship informed preferences on 
horizontal integration, and political systems alongside sovereignty concerns primarily shaped vertical 
integration, growing interdependencies shaped preferences in favour of widening the functional scope of 
EUCARIS to the area of policing and JHA. When the Treaty was signed in 2000, vehicle crime represented a 
more and more visible and rapidly expanding criminal market across all EU Member States (Interviewees 24 
& 31). On the one hand, significant financial losses were becoming noticeable at the level of private 
corporations, especially insurance companies, and individuals. Moreover, stolen vehicles could potentially 
be used for terrorist purposes and thus posed a security threat beyond mere economic damage (ibid.). 
Although EUCARIS had been started by vehicle registration authorities and ministries of transport within 
the EU’s first pillar, the Treaty targeted the transfer of information to police, customs, prosecution and 
national security authorities (Art. 9, EUCARIS Treaty, 2000). Concretely, Article 2(2) stipulated as one of the 
main purposes of EUCARIS “to assist in preventing, investigating and prosecuting offences against the laws 
of individual States in the field of driving licences, vehicle registration and other vehicle-related fraud and 
criminality.” Spill-over effects from other issue areas and parallel cooperation developments in EU police 
cooperation certainly played a role to this end, as the following sections demonstrate. However, external and 
internal interdependencies acted as primary drivers of government preferences to expand the use of 
EUCARIS and increasingly integrate it as formal instrument of EU police cooperation. Even before the Treaty 
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officially entered into force in 2009, its linkage to the EU as well as police cooperation was reinforced by 
several legal instruments. These include most notably the 2004 Council Decision 2004/919/EC on tackling 
vehicle crime with cross-border implications, and the Prüm Council Decisions of 2008 respectively (Council 
Decisions 2008/615/JHA, 2008 & 2008/616/JHA). Especially the latter stipulated EUCARIS as key 
application for data exchange among all Member States, and clarified “which aspects of the Eucaris system 
are mandatory to use and/or prescribed and which are optional to use and/or free to determine by the 
Member States” (Council Decision 2008/616/JHA, 2008, p. 67). 
While EUCARIS had already been operational as a technical platform since the 1990s, the legal and 
political process was only officially concluded much later (Interviewee 46). Following the entry into force of 
the Treaty, horizontal external differentiation progressed quickly alongside further (partial) integration of the 
information system into the EU framework. Functional pressure from heightened interdependence played a 
substantial role to this end. Now other states could officially apply for accession to the Treaty. Latvia and 
Slovakia acceded in 2010, followed by Romania in 2012 (Secretariat EUCARIS, 2015, p. 10). This is not 
surprising in view of the high interconnectivity in criminal networks between the Central European countries 
who were already members of EUCARIS and Eastern European states (Interviewees 29, 31 & 45). As more 
and more stolen cars were entering the EU from Eastern Europe or were being moved from the EU to Eastern 
Europe, the EUCARIS signatories had already approached among others Romania, Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania shortly after the Treaty was concluded in the early 2000s, to exchange information even before the 
latter became official EU members (Interviewees 24 & 45). Other non-EU states likewise joined EUCARIS and 
some of them are today indirectly connected to the system via a special server in the Netherlands. 
Incorporating these countries was a logical step from a criminological point of view and a logical consequence 
of the practical needs arising from day-to-day cooperation. Not only were Switzerland, Norway and Iceland 
associated, the British dependencies of Gibraltar, Isle of Man and Jersey were themselves independently 
linked to EUCARIS (Interviewee 45). The move of the EUCARIS signatories towards external differentiation 
was thus primarily driven by functional pressure from interdependencies in vehicle-related crime and 
advocated by subnational practitioners. Here again, spill-overs from other cooperation formats likewise 
contributed to the widening of EUCARIS’ membership, most prominently the Prüm network, which is 
discussed in the section below. Although the Netherlands, especially RDW Deputy Director Van der 
Bruggen, had been advertising the information system since the beginning, convincing the Prüm signatories 
to name EUCARIS as official data-sharing platform for all EU Member States can undoubtedly be called a 
breakthrough and marks the formal connection of EUCARIS as first-pillar instrument to third pillar police 
cooperation (Interviewee 46).  
Next to external differentiation, EUCARIS also embodied – still to date – internal horizontal 
differentiation (see table 10). By 2012, 30 parties had been connected to the information system (European 
Commission, 2012d, p. 44). However, only 14 governments actually comprised formal members of EUCARIS, 
although the expansion process was on-going and remains so to date. Functional spill-over effects and an 
emerging supranational policy entrepreneurship produced ambivalent effects to this end. Accession today 
appears to be more difficult compared to the early 2000s when the EU data protection framework was not 
quite as advanced and the Commission had a much weaker role. At least since the General Data Protection 
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Regulation (GDPR), EU data protection and privacy rules have become much more stringent and their 
enforcement more rigid, also due to the stronger powers of the Commission  (Interviewee 45). Currently, it 
is up to the latter to take adequacy decisions on the protection level of personal data in non-EU countries 
wanting to accede to EUCARIS (Art. 45, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016). If potential accession states do not 
manage to get on the Commission’s so-called white list, they may not become formal parties to the 
information system.  
 
Table 10. EUCARIS Cooperating Member States.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Secretariat EUCARIS, 2019. 
 
 
MANAGING COORDINATION PROBLEMS: A ROLE FOR EU ACTORS 
This increasing role for the EU, especially the Commission, in the context of cooperation on vehicle-related 
crime, possibly arose as a consequence of the functional need to regulate the exchange of information within 
EUCARIS and monitor compliance with common rules (Interviewees 45, & 46). In other words, internal 
interdependence drove Member States to increasingly associate the intergovernmental cooperation format 
 
28 This table provides a non-exhaustive overview. The totality of cooperating states also derives from other legal bases 
(e.g. 3rd Driving License Directive, European Register of Road Transport Undertakings, CBE Directive, Salzburg 
Agreement etc.). 
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with EU data protection legislation. They deliberately opted for an involvement of the EU to better manage 
distribution problems related to information-sharing. However, they debatably did not intend to confer quite 
as much power to the Union and its institutions. This was rather a consequence of parallel developments in 
the EU, namely spill-over effects from changes in the legal framework and other policy domains. Venue-
shopping thus led to a loss of control (albeit relatively small) on the part of the Member States. The growing 
role of the Commission might even cause further integration if it opens the floodgates to supranational policy 
entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, if interdependence pressures and the practical benefits of institutionalised 
cooperation are not high enough, one might expect informal members to remain outside the formal structure 
of EUCARIS and simply continue to take advantage of and cooperate within the decentralised system. 
Although institutional interdependencies and spill-overs would eventually produce supranational 
pro-integration advocacy on all three dimensions of DI, EU actors were not initially interested in promoting 
EUCARIS as tool of EU cooperation. On the contrary, not only was supranational policy entrepreneurship 
largely absent in the early stages, the Commission outright opposed the decentralised system that had been 
developed by subnational officials of various domestic executive authorities. When Dutch negotiators 
approached the Commission before concluding the EUCARIS Treaty and offered it an official role in the 
technical system under development, Commission officials refused (Interviewee 46). Rather than taking an 
interest in the multilateral initiative, they pursued the creation of a new EU system that would centralise 
information exchange at the European Commission. This parallel development naturally collided with the 
preferences of the Member States who had signed the Treaty, and led to an outright “war of opinion” between 
the Commission on the one hand and EUCARIS signatories and users on the other (ibid., Interviewee 45). 
Several practitioners underlined that they wanted to avoid waste and duplication where a functioning system 
existed that had been developed for almost ten years. “We wanted to prevent a new system from being made. 
The Commission was not very cooperative at the time, it was very self-interested and sought to make a new 
EU system for every topic instead of adapting existing systems” (Interviewee 46). 
The historical turning point came in 2007, shortly ahead of the Prüm Council Decisions that 
integrated the Prüm network into the EU framework and – more importantly – named EUCARIS the official 
information system for EU-wide cooperation within Prüm. It was in the light of this overwhelming support 
of EUCARIS by the Member States and its factual appointment as central data exchange platform in the EU 
context that the Commission finally abandoned its resistance alongside the promotion of a whole new system 
rivalling EUCARIS (ibid.). Institutional interdependencies and spill-over effects thus contributed to the 
prioritisation of EUCARIS over alternative cooperation channels and the emergence of supranational 
entrepreneurship in favour of this venue. 
Policy entrepreneurship from below and above however did not suffice to shift state preferences 
towards deeper integration. In 2010, the Commission first explicitly “agreed Member States could use the 
EUCARIS technology for the exchange of driving licences” based on other EU legislation (Secretariat 
EUCARIS, 2015, p. 15). Since then, EUCARIS has not only been officially referenced in EU legislation as 
preferred cooperation mechanism for the exchange of information on road transport undertakings, in 2012, 
Member States named EUCARIS the “official platform to facilitate the cross-border exchange of information 
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on road safety related traffic offences” and legally linked it to the so-called CBE Directive 2011/82/EU29 
(Secretariat EUCARIS, 2015, pp. 10–11). While these developments legally reinforced EUCARIS as an EU 
instrument, even stipulating that all Member States should be connected by 2013, it did not formally 
incorporate the EUCARIS Treaty into the EU legal framework. Notwithstanding the expanding membership 
in practice, most parties still used “the EUCARIS system based on various types of other legislation” (EReg - 
Association of European Vehicle and Driver Registration Authorities, 2017b). As a consequence, complicated, 
often lengthy procedures inhibited day-to-day operations and produced a functional need to institutionally 
simplify and structure cooperation – a need that subnational officials continuously voiced in different venues  
(cf. European Parliament, 2018). Thus, in 2012, the Commission proposed a regulation simplifying the 
transfer of motor vehicles registered in another Member State within the Single Market (Draft Regulation 
COM/2012/0164 final, 2012). Had it been adopted, it could have consolidated the EUCARIS Treaty and other 
EU legislation as primary legal basis for governing related information exchange (Interviewee 46). However, 
Member States could not agree on all articles. A substantial step towards centralisation and integration thus 
failed at the political level despite pressure from policy entrepreneurs below and above the national level. 
Consequently, the Commission formally withdrew its proposal in July 2018. As the demand for better 
structuring cooperation continues to grow in line with internal linkages among authorities connected by 
EUCARIS, it is expected that a new proposal will be presented to the Member States in the next decade 
(European Parliament, 2018; Interviewees 45 & 46). 
 
THE EUCARIS PROTOCOL: DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION IN PROGRESS 
Against the backdrop of the failed draft regulation and steadily growing interdependence, it is hardly 
surprising that EUCARIS signatories launched an alternative integration initiative in 2017. Given the lack of 
a more flexible instrument – such as the regulation could have been – the EUCARIS Treaty needed to be 
amended to capture changing circumstances. Criminal markets in this issue area were still becoming more 
and more connected, and increasingly overlapping with other forms of crime. Subsequently, interdependence 
in the fight against vehicle-related crime was likewise high  (Interviewees 31 & 45). The changing nature and 
growing extent of transnational crime and cross-border cases challenged generated a practical need to update 
cooperation structures in a timely manner so that practitioners could benefit from quick operational results. 
On 8 June 2017, the eight ECUARIS signatories thus signed a EUCARIS Protocol. The Protocol mirrors recent 
changes in EU regulation and legislation, which are finally “catching up” with the functional needs arising 
from practical cooperation in this issue area (Interviewee 45). Through the EUCARIS Protocol, Member States 
most importantly chose to widen the scope of the information system and explicitly open it up for the use 
based on legal bases other than the Treaty (EUCARIS Protocol, 2017a). The protocol paradoxically connects 
EUCARIS ever more closely with the EU, yet embeds differentiation and decentralisation. On the one hand, 
it strengthens the role of EU data protection law and its applicability to all data exchanged via EUCARIS (Art. 
8 & 18). What is more, it strikes certain issues from the Treaty that are now covered by EU instruments. The 
 
29 Cross-border Enforcement Directive; since 2015: Directive 2015/413/EU 
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EUCARIS Protocol (2017b) for instance specifies: “Because in the meantime EU legislation in the field of 
vehicle registration and driving licences covers the aspect of document handling it's not necessary anymore 
to regulate this separately in the Treaty.” On the other hand, strikingly, the Protocol makes cooperation with 
Third Parties and thus external differentiation ever more important. For example, Article 2(2) explicitly 
mentions as the purpose of EUCARIS “to be at the disposal for Parties or Third Parties wishing to exchange 
data based on an EU legal act or any bilateral or multilateral agreement other than this Treaty.” Furthermore, 
it broadens the applicability of EUCARIS considerably, and now the “system can be used for the cross-border 
exchange of all kinds of information based on other legislation then the EUCARIS Treaty itself” (EReg - 
Association of European Vehicle and Driver Registration Authorities, 2017a). Nonetheless, Member States 
are well aware that the format of a multilateral treaty is no longer very conducive, because it is “highly 
inflexible,” and legally changing it could be “quite lengthy, sometimes several years” rather than months 
(Interviewee 46). In the face of growing internal and external interconnectivity, this state of current 
dissatisfaction with the legal complexity of EUCARIS and its implications for operations and cooperation 
practice might yet open the floodgates to further integration. 
 While the integration process of EUCARIS continues today, it currently remains an instance of DI: 
an EU information system that is decentralised, yet part-based on supranational legislation and partially on 
other treaties and legislative acts. Its evolution since the 1990s clearly demonstrates the strong influence of 
interdependence and policy entrepreneurship on state preferences. In reaction to intensifying cross-border 
links in vehicle-related crime, national registration authorities provided the first impetus for practice-driven 
informal, multilateral cooperation where no precedent existed at EU level. Asymmetrical interdependence 
and subnational policy entrepreneurship thus drove preferences on internal and external horizontal 
differentiation. The large initial influence of subnational policy entrepreneurs led to state preferences in 
favour of differentiation and decentralised, informal modes of cooperation. As one practitioner put it: 
differentiation is necessary, because “in the end you want a global exchange of data,” and decentralisation is 
an appropriate model to circumvent a trust problem in the police pillar “where Member States like to keep 
data at the national level” (Interviewee 45). Although EUCARIS started as “a more technical platform” in the 
realm of transportation and traffic, not as a JHA matter (ibid.), growing internal interdependence and an 
emerging EU policy advocacy arguably motivated a vertical deepening of cooperation and widening of its 
functional scope. Especially the growing role of the EU, particularly the Commission, has become 
increasingly important in shaping state preferences on EUCARIS. As early as 2012, Member States underlined 
the significance of “the proper use of existing databases (e.g. EUCARIS); the need to improve Commission 
supervision and enforcement of existing EU legal instruments.” (European Commission, 2012d, p. 63). Yet, 
Member States would still need to amend related legal instruments such as the Prüm Council Decision before 
police organisations will be able to make full use of vehicle-related information at EU level. Whether and 
how this could be done so as to enable police authorities to fully employ EUCARIS, appears first and foremost 
a question of political will in an otherwise relatively uncontroversial cooperation area. “On a technical level 
this is feasible very easily. It’s the legislation that has still a way to go” (Interviewee 45). Supranational policy 
entrepreneurship and the extent to which it manages to influence state preferences could matter greatly for 
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the future development of EUCARIS. The Commission, and a possible new proposal for a regulation in this 
area, could emerge as important brokers in this regard. 
 
The Prüm Treaty: A German Strategy towards Deeper Integration in Police Cooperation on Terrorism, 
Cross-Border Crime and Illegal Migration 
In 2005, seven Member States signed the intergovernmental Prüm Treaty at the initiative of Germany to 
multilaterally enhance police cooperation on terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Five of them 
had likewise been Schengen founding members, four of them were original signatories of EUCARIS (see 
figure 8). Similar to EUCARIS, perhaps even more so, the Prüm network constitutes an example of DI. It has 
been described as “foundation for Europol,” resembling the Schengen process (Interviewee 30) but also as 
providing “no added value for Europol” (Interviewee 21). Some have regarded Prüm a “clear political signal” 
for EU police cooperation (Interviewee 31), while others have termed it a “significant countervailing political 
force” that “undermines the EU’s ability to become an efficient policy-making body in the field of security” 
(Balzacq et al., 2006, pp. 1 & 17). Possibly of most importance, functional pressure from rising 
interdependence alongside growing public-political pressure to react to a changing security landscape 
primarily motivated Member States to launch Prüm as a new step in EU police cooperation. While integration 
preferences were heightened by these two factors, the ultimate differentiation decision – as was the case for 
EUCARIS – was driven by asymmetries in the effects of these factors as well as by diverging operational 
needs and the lack of an institutional alternative at EU level. Contrary to EUCARIS, Prüm presented a 
political, top-down initiative that lacked subnational policy entrepreneurship. Yet, cultural differences in the 
security traditions and bureaucratic resistance to an EU-wide approach very well played a part in shaping 
the institutional set-up and further development of Prüm. 
 Irrespective of Germany’s often cited role as ‘motor of integration,’ particularly high levels of 
interdependence primarily shaped its preference to deepen EU police cooperation. Around the turn of the 
millennium, intra-European interconnectedness in threats was experiencing another peak (Interviewee 30). 
Security and law enforcement officials were increasingly confronted with transnational criminal networks 
that challenged their day-to-day work and the viability of traditional policing methods and unilateral 
approaches (Interviewees 3 & 22). This was especially true for Germany and other countries at the heart of 
Europe and these cross-border networks (Interviewee 24). The growing number of bilateral police agreements 
initiated by Germany around that time bears testimony to this spiralling practical need. In 1999, one such 
formal agreement was concluded with Switzerland, followed by one with Austria in 2003 and with the 
Netherlands in 2005 (cf. Schober, 2017).  
 
9/11 AS A TURNING POINT 
However, the expanding transnational dimension of crime and terrorism was perhaps most dramatically 
illustrated by the terror attacks of 9/11, which not only illustrated growing interdependencies but 
additionally generated significant politicisation in favour of more cooperation. 9/11 has therefore widely 
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been acknowledged as ‘game and paradigm changer’ of security governance (Interviewees 1, 21, 22, 27 & 32; 
cf. Bakker, 2006; Balzacq & Léonard, 2013; Bossong, 2013; Bures, 2011, 2018; De Vries, 2008; Edwards & Meyer, 
2008; Monar, 2007). The attacks caused strong reactions across EU Member States. Especially Germany saw 
itself confronted with a substantial need to review its security policies and cooperation arrangements. When 
it became known that the Al-Qaida attackers had been radicalised in Hamburg and had used Germany as 
safe haven for planning the attacks, it exposed the shortcomings of German security authorities in the face of 
transnational terrorism, and had a “fundamental psychological impact” (Interviewees 27, 30 & 32). Public 
and political pressure skyrocketed in Germany in the wake of 9/11, and marked an “enormous timestamp” 
for national security governance and policing (Henzler, 2018). Indeed, numerous cooperation initiatives were 
launched at European and international level, including the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) that connects 
all 28 EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland under the chairmanship of the Dutch intelligence 
agency. In Germany, a Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) was finally created after plans for such a 
platform had existed since the 1990s (Interviewee 21).  
Against the backdrop of 9/11, the upcoming Eastern enlargement generated further public-political 
pressure. The prospect of 10 new Member States joining the EU in 2004 presented the largest single 
enlargement in the history of the EU (Interviewee 30). While subnational practitioners were overall satisfied 
with existing police cooperation arrangements and thus did not fear a substantial increase in security threats 
(Interviewee 7; cf. Storbeck, 2004), the political discourse framed the enlargement round as “exporting a lot 
of crime into the EU, mostly from Eastern countries” (Interviewee 29). Politicisation thus significantly 
amplified functional pressure on policymakers to cooperate by producing public pressure to ‘act now’ 
(Interviewee 30; cf. Kietz & Maurer, 2006, p. 203). 
 
SHORT-TERM DIFFERENTIATION AS DELIBERATE INTEGRATION STRATEGY 
In February 2003, Otto Schily first proposed formalising police cooperation via a multilateral treaty to the 
Interior Ministers of France and the Benelux countries, Germany’s close neighbours and the other original 
signatories of the Schengen Agreement (see figure 8) (Interviewee 40; Kietz & Maurer, 2006, p. 206). Multiple 
expert meetings convened over the following months. However, France soon left the negotiation table due to 
constitutional and sovereignty concerns, and was replaced by Austria (Austrian National Council, 2006, pp. 
3–4). When the details of the Prüm Convention were finalised in early 2005, France and Spain decided to join 
the treaty at short notice (ibid.). It was signed on 27 May between seven Member States. Although the Prüm 
Convention constituted an intergovernmental treaty between a sub-group of EU Member States, it very 
clearly stipulated as ultimate goal the improvement of EU cooperation and inclusion into the supranational 
legal framework within three years (Preamble & Art. 1(4), Prüm Treaty, 2005). In the words of the Treaty, its 
signatories were “[e]ndeavouring, […]for the further development of European cooperation, to play a 
pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation” (Preamble). This begs the 
question why Germany did not pursue an EU-wide agreement in the first place. Especially in view of its 
historic dedication to the EU and strong integration preference (as exemplified by the TREVI Group and 
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Europol Convention), it appears striking that differentiation should be chosen in an area where 
interdependence was high and growing. 
Two main factors shaped the German preference with regard to differentiation. First, a number of 
negative experiences with cooperation initiatives at the EU level arguably influenced the decision of Otto 
Schily to advance cooperation via other channels. Or, in the words of a senior official from the German BMI: 
“I believe he was fed up with Europe” (Interviewee 40). Without going into depth, the prospect of lengthy 
procedures, reservations of other Member States and the recent failure or deadlock of common projects 
clashed with an intensifying functional pressure and a practical need to act in the areas of terrorism, 
transnational crime and illegal migration. A Swedish initiative for introducing a principle of data availability 
at European level was not going anywhere since its proposal after 9/1130 (cf. European Commission, 2006). 
The operational benefits that Germany had hoped for since the transfer of the Schengen Agreement into the 
EU framework were likewise falling short of its expectations (Austrian National Council, 2006, p. 1; 
Interviewees 31, 35 & 40). The development of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
was taking longer than expected and highly unsatisfactory from a practitioner’s perspective; negotiations 
were lengthy and the system was outdated even before it was adopted let alone operational (Interviewee 40). 
 
Figure 8. Mapping Flexible Cooperation Arrangements in the Early 2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Author. 
 
Second, and perhaps most important for shaping the German preference to pursue a differentiated approach, 
choosing an EU-wide format for expediting police cooperation was simply not feasible in the early 2000s due 
to bureaucratic resistance. Similar to EUCARIS, no precedent existed at EU level for the instigation of 
collective action and integration in the way Germany was envisioning for police cooperation in the areas of 
terrorism, transnational crime and illegal migration. Not only did no precedent exist, institutional deadlock 
 
30 The principle means that information available to the authorities of one Member State should likewise be made available 
to other Member States. The proposal was only realised by the Commission in 2006. 
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within the EU and a trust crisis among Member States inhibited any attempt at further integration 
(Interviewees 10, 30, 33 & 40). Negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty were difficult and stagnant – 
complicated by public referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Law enforcement and security 
authorities were still reluctant to share data Europe-wide, and continued to rely on their own networks 
instead (Interviewees 21 & 32). The practical experiences with the relatively young Europol and the Swedish 
initiative demonstrated that any universal agreement trying to coerce agencies into exchanging information 
with everyone was likely to be met with significant subnational bureaucratic resistance. While the German-
instigated Europol should have been the preferred option for furthering police cooperation, it “was not in a 
position to act“ as its mandate at the time was still very much restricted and Europol lacked a practical track 
record and political standing (Interviewee 32). Additionally, differences between the legal frameworks of 
Member States, especially regarding data protection, posed substantial obstacles to reaching an EU-wide 
arrangement (Interviewee 24). Notwithstanding Germany’s overall preference for integration, deepening 
cooperation among all Member States thus simply was no realistic option and Europol no institutional 
alternative to a multilateral treaty outside the EU framework (Austrian National Council, 2006, p. 1).  
Irrespective of these institutional obstacles, Germany and its ‘coalition of the willing’ did not 
surrender ambitions for an extension of Prüm to all Member States and the EU legal framework, as the Treaty 
itself makes clear. Internal horizontal differentiation constituted a short-term strategy to manage spiralling 
interdependencies and prepare integration to this end. Germany “had originally not been interested in a 
multilateral treaty” at all; it regarded the EU level as the most effective format to achieve quick practical 
results and aimed at quickly deepening European police cooperation (Interviewee 30). This can not only be 
seen in the resolve with which Schily pushed for the swift completion of the draft Prüm Treaty, anecdotal 
evidence suggests he tore up a draft document on a flight to one of the experts meetings because it was “too 
unprogressive, lacked ambition and needed to be written from scratch” (Interviewee 40). The multilateral 
treaty, albeit seemingly advancing differentiation, thus presented a means for Germany to enhance European 
integration in the long-run in the fight against terrorism, transnational crime and illegal migration; a “Europe 
of multiple speeds was practically necessary at the time” (Interviewee 29). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Prüm was 
deliberately modelled on the Schengen experience (Interviewees 24 & 33). Germany similarly designed the 
Prüm Convention as a “laboratory for Europe,” in which countries with higher homogeneity and capacities 
could go ahead and others would be able to join later (Interviewees 29 & 40). 
 Yet, Prüm did not even comprise enough countries initially to invoke the enhanced cooperation 
procedure specified by the EU treaties. With only seven interested parties, it fell two short of the required 
minimum of nine Member States (Art. 20 TEU; Art. 326-334 TFEU). Many governments’ integration 
preferences remained overall weak or firmly opposed to the formalisation of EU police cooperation because 
of sovereignty concerns and the asymmetrical impact of driving factors (Interviewee 27). On the political 
level, JHA was not a well-established EU policy area yet; discussions about the tension between national 
sovereignty and supranational competence were still on-going and emotions running high (Interviewees 3, 
27 & 32). On the practical level, security threats, operational needs and capacities, as well as police traditions, 
cultures and values differed greatly among Member States; not all experienced the same functional pressure 
to cooperate (Interviewees 14, 22, 27 & 44). However, even if Germany could have convinced other Member 
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States to join its endeavour, it seems unlikely that this group of countries would have opted for enhanced 
cooperation. Not only had the latter never been activated before, it was regarded as ‘cumbersome and time-
consuming’ procedure (Austrian National Council, 2006).  
 
ASSIMILATING LEVELS OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND APPROXIMATION OF INTEGRATION 
PREFERENCES 
An approximation and intensification of integration pressures between Prüm signatories and outside 
Member States ultimately produced a change of heart of the governments who had not originally signed the 
Prüm Convention. Finland, Slovenia and Hungary for instance formally joined as early as 2007 (Interviewees 
24, 29, 30 & 40). Intensifying external and internal interdependencies partially explain this shift. Additionally, 
the increasing impact of trailblazing effects, economic considerations and practical incentives account for the 
horizontal expansion of Prüm. Although Member States still did not experience equal levels of 
interdependence in the same issue areas, problems and patterns were becoming increasingly similar across 
all governments in the early 2000s, and relations between European security authorities more frequent in line 
with the rising internationalisation of security risks (Interviewees 14, 22 & 27). A semi-institutional 
interconnectedness between Prüm signatories and other Member States had been developing for some time 
and was gradually eroding bureaucratic resistance and generating a functional need to better structure 
cooperation.  
The Prüm Convention provided just that: a practical model to facilitate cross-border police 
cooperation and the fight against common threats (Interviewee 30). Similar to the Schengen experience, the 
initial ‘heavy lifting’ had already been done by the treaty parties; a structure had been put in place and was 
being implemented. Around 2007, Prüm suddenly was no longer a vague idea but a concrete “ready-made 
product” (Interviewee 33). Joining Prüm now offered clear operational benefits and relatively lower costs for 
any other parties. At EU level, JHA ministers formally acknowledged that “[a]lready at this early stage, 
[...Prüm] has brought about noticeable operational success[, and...] amounts to a quantum leap in the cross-
border sharing of information.” (Council of the European Union, 2007b, p. 7). This possibly swayed the 
preferences of third parties in favour of Prüm, as the network offered practical synergies alongside 
advantages from pooled capacity and central coordination. Economic considerations and cost-benefit 
calculations consequently played an important role as drivers of horizontal integration. While security 
cultures and norms had of course not significantly adapted to cooperating at EU level, the first practical 
results from Prüm and the prospect of free-riding debatably considerably motivated Finland, Slovenia and 
Hungary to join this cooperation format (Interviewees 27, 29 & 30). However, asymmetries in the level of 
interdependence persisted and explain why only a few smaller Member States opted to join Prüm; not all 
countries were as dependent on pooled capacity in combatting transnational threats. The UK for example 
already possessed a quite sophisticated DNA database at the time (Interviewee 44). Smaller Member States, 
by contrast, tended to have less developed capabilities and therefore relatively more often favoured common 
police resources and systems (Interviewees 4, 21, 22 & 29). Thus, money mattered after all. Rising 
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interdependence and functional benefits (economic and security) of the Prüm network trumped national 
sovereignty concerns and bureaucratic resistance among non-signatories. 
 
THE MADRID AND LONDON BOMBINGS AS WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY  
Additionally, two terror attacks generated considerable politicisation and shaped Member States’ preferences 
in favour of joining Prüm. The bombings in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005 respectively, exposed the 
shortcomings of unilateral policing approaches as well as of isolated information and governance systems. 
Even more so than 9/11, they sparked a public security crisis and fuelled expectations for political action in 
the EU (Interviewees 21, 22 & 40; cf. Bures, 2018; European Commission, 2010). While 9/11 had undoubtedly 
initiated awareness of international (Islamist) terrorism and the subsequent need to adapt security policies 
and policing, the terror attacks in Madrid and London functioned as “actual catalysts for change and action 
in the EU,” because they had been conducted on European soil and thus felt “closer to home” (Interviewee 
40). External shocks thus created windows of opportunity by giving a new urgency to EU police cooperation 
and strongly politicising it in favour of further integration (Interviewee 33). The Madrid and London 
bombings did so in two main ways. They functioned as demonstrators of interdependence, and raised the 
salience of EU counterterrorism and police cooperation (Interviewees 21, 22 & 40). 
Regarding the first, the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 had been planned and executed by 
an Islamist terrorist cell with international connections within and outside Europe. The attacks killed 191 
people and injured over 1,700 more (provisional numbers, Spanish Ministry of Justice, 2006). It thus 
constituted the deadliest terror attack in the history of Spain and the EU. Subsequently, its immediate 
aftermath was marked not only by a profound sense of crisis and shock but by a public-political realisation 
that international terrorism had arrived in Spain. In the face of this ‘new’ international terrorist threat, the 
Spanish government regarded the introduction of counter-measures indispensable (Proyecto de Ley 
Orgánica, 2005, p. 1418). However, the Madrid train bombings also caused a ripple effect beyond the national 
level. In a declaration of the European Council, European heads of state or government called for immediate 
action and initiated a number of measures at the level of the EU (European Council, 2004). In response to the 
terror attacks in Spain, they decided to advance the formalisation of information exchange between security 
agencies and especially police authorities, through the promotion of data-sharing based on the principle of 
availability (cf. Bunyan, 2006, p. 2).  
One year after the attacks of 11 March (or 11-M, as they are commonly known in Spain), a similar 
incident occurred in the UK. On 7 July 2005, a group of Islamist terrorists committed a series of suicide attacks 
on public transport in London. With more than 50 dead and over 700 inured, the London bombings present 
the deadliest terrorist attacks in British history (British Home Office, 2006). Similar to 11-M in Spain, they 
evoked a strong emotional reaction among the public and policymakers, and a sense of crisis that needed to 
be managed. “Let no one be in doubt. The rules of the game have changed,” announced Prime Minister Tony 
Blair at a press conference a few weeks later (Wintour, 2005). New counterterrorism legislation was 
introduced in October as “direct consequence” of the 7 July bombings (Cobain, 2010). Although the proposals 
had been under development even before the attacks, the London bombings provided new momentum and 
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political urgency (Clarke, 2005; cf. Interviewees 21, 33 & 40). The Terrorism Act 2006 was passed a few months 
later. At EU level, the July attacks in the UK coincided with the British Council Presidency. With a view to 
the shortcomings of national security authorities and European information exchange that had been 
shockingly illustrated by the successful execution of the London bombings, the UK proposed the introduction 
of a European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) and the concept of intelligence-led policing for all Member 
States (European Union Committee, 2008, p. 27; UK Presidency, 2005). Due to the international 
interconnectedness of their perpetrators, the bombings in Madrid and London thus strongly acted as 
demonstrators of European security interdependencies and related deficiencies in EU police cooperation. 
With a view to increasing salience, the attacks indeed brought EU cooperation on the radar of the 
public. In their aftermath, arguments of growing interdependence and a transnational necessity for 
cooperation, if not a stronger role for the EU, recurred in the media and political discourse (Bures, 2018). 
These dual functions of the Madrid and London terror attacks – demonstrating interdependence and raising 
public-political pressure – can perhaps not be separated. Various interviewees pointed out that the 
“subjective perception of public security is just as important as a driver of governance” (Interviewee 22), and 
that it may indeed be less important whether politicised issues are “real” and the facts are true but that the 
public and political sphere believe they are (Interviewee 41; cf. de Graaf, 2015). Following the Madrid and 
London bombings, the role of narratives and discourse became more important as shapers of state 
preferences, especially because the shortcomings of national security authorities were actively framed as 
stemming from coordination problems (Bures, 2018; Interviewee 22). While the threat of international 
terrorism in Europe had perhaps not changed significantly since 9/11, the public-political perception of the 
latter as potential threat spiralled amidst high media coverage after the attacks (Interviewee 44). 
 
THE PRÜM DECISIONS: INTEGRATING COOPERATION INTO THE EU FRAMEWORK 
In this crisis climate, “not participating in Prüm, and by extension EU cooperation, was politically not 
feasible;” Member States could not justify it (Interviewee 27). Apart from Finland, Slovenia and Hungary, six 
more countries notified the Prüm signatories of their wish to accede. These were respectively: Italy, Portugal, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Sweden (Council of the European Union, 2007b, p. 8). All of these – except 
Greece – can likewise be found alongside the original signatories as initiators in the preamble of the Prüm 
Council Decision (2008/615/JHA) that legally transferred the network into the EU framework. Additionally, 
Slovakia and Romania had joined this group of like-minded governments in initiating the formal shift of 
Prüm. On 15 February 2007, the respective ministers of the Member States consequently “agreed on the 
integration[…] of the parts of the Prüm Treaty relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters” 
(Council of the European Union, 2007b, p. 7). Whereas only seven countries had designed the Prüm Treaty, 
heightened interdependence and politicisation drove a cohort of fifteen Member States to favour and promote 
Prüm’s inclusion into EU police cooperation not even two years later. 
In 2008, the Council of the EU hence adopted two decisions, known as the Prüm Decisions 
respectively. They not only integrated Prüm but furthermore reinforced EUCARIS as central EU platform for 
exchanging car registration data (Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA & 2008/616/JHA; cf. European 
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Commission, 2017). Pressure from rising internal interdependencies on the one hand, and positive incentives 
in the form of practical operational and economic benefits acted as primary drivers of this vertical integration. 
At the subnational and practitioners’ level, cross-border cooperation had practically begun to explode among 
the Prüm members and offered a means of balancing capacity asymmetries (Interviewee 33). As internal 
interconnectedness grew among police authorities participating in Prüm, so did the functional need for 
professionalisation (Interviewee 30). Since the success of Prüm in its decentralised, pilot format relied heavily 
on the different national capacities of its members, formalisation and some sort of centralisation seemed 
necessary to ensure the operational success and effectiveness of the network in managing common threats 
(Interviewee 33).  
Integrating the Prüm Treaty into the EU framework would not only solve coordination and collective 
action problems arising from intensifying complexities in the day-to-day practice of cooperating police 
officers, it offered a common budgetary and reference framework (Interviewees 29 & 30). Although Germany, 
as main initiator, had provided the lion’s share of the financial means and political manpower to launch 
Prüm, growing operational needs and functional pressure to rationalise cooperation soon exceeded the 
resources that Germany alone could provide (Interviewee 29). This confirms the findings from the case study 
of EDU and the Europol Convention: intensifying internal interdependence and subnational advocacy 
heightened functional pressure on governments to professionalise cooperation. In contrast to the initial 
establishment and early stages of EU police cooperation, integration preferences were now increasingly 
shaped by the mere ‘principle of viability:’ an intensifying practical need to create synergies and use existing 
structures (Interviewee 29).31 
Another parallel to the previous chapters on TREVI and the early Europol may be found in 
Germany’s deliberate strategy of DI. Differentiation had never been its actual preference but was employed 
temporarily as a means to push for later integration (Interviewee 30). Although operational needs and 
functional pressure from interdependence certainly shaped the German preference, its determination to 
integrate the Prüm Treaty was perhaps mostly driven by politics (Interviewees 21 & 40). This can be seen in 
the resolve with which the German Council Presidency pursued the adoption and subsequent 
implementation of the Prüm Decisions (Interviewee 30). In the words of one Council representative: “It 
clearly was a German political priority. The Germans were incredibly pushy and rushed to have the decisions 
done; there were even still mistakes in the draft. They had the manpower, the financial resources and 
generally a very good team behind it.” (Interviewee 33). The transfer of Prüm into the EU legal framework 
was considered a potential “big hit” for the German Council Presidency and its political legacy at EU level 
(Interviewee 40). The suggestion stemmed from the preparations of the presidency at ministerial level around 
2005. Unsatisfied with the “unambitious” envisioned priorities, the head of the responsible directorate 
proposed the inclusion of integrating Prüm. This was met with hesitation if not outright bureaucratic 
resistance. German subnational officials signalled that it might perhaps be too early to integrate Prüm before 
 
31 Prüm’s integration into the EU framework opened the floodgates to supranational policy entrepreneurship. As early as 
2008, Europol for example formally targeted the submission of a proposal for its own role in relation to Prüm and other 
“initiatives relating to the exchange of information and intelligence at EU level” (Europol, 2008, p. 18). 
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the network was even completely developed (ibid.). Nevertheless, the agenda was pushed through and 
realised over the following years. 
 
Other (Differentiated) Integration Initiatives and the Role of the Council Presidency 
The case of Prüm introduces an interesting new element potentially shaping state preferences in favour of 
integration: political legacy and the expectations or opportunities created by holding the Council presidency. 
The theoretical literature already offers convincing evidence for the relationship between EU Presidency and 
legislative proposals in the Council (Bunse, 2006, 2009; Tallberg, 2003; R. Thomson, 2008; Warntjen, 2007). 
While more research and evidence are of course required to confirm this hypothesis for the area of JHA and 
EU police cooperation, other integration initiatives of the early 2000s – most of them marked by initial 
horizontal internal differentiation – might provide further proof.  
Coinciding with its presidency of the EU in 1999, Finland proposed a Council decision to enhance 
cooperation among national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that was adopted in 2000 (Council Decision 
2000/642/JHA). The initiative was followed by the Dutch Presidency in 2004, which employed the office to 
transfer a multilateral pilot project for professionalising FIU cooperation to the EU level and eventually 
extend it to all Member States (Amicelle & Chaudieu, 2018, p. 656). Another milestone of EU police 
cooperation was the result of British advocacy one year later. The UK held the Council presidency in the 
second half of 2005, coinciding with the London bombings. It was likewise the UK which then proposed the 
introduction of an ECIM, and thereby intelligence-led policing, at EU level – a step that ultimately led to 
closer integration and entailed regular EU threat assessments and the EU Policy Cycle for organised and 
serious international crime (Interviewees 21 & 33; UK House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008, p. 
26; UK Presidency, 2005). Based on British policing needs and the UK’s National Intelligence Model, the ECIM 
thus presented a direct product of the British Presidency. It was initially met with reluctance on the part of 
other Member States, which could not see the practical added value of the model and regarded intelligence-
led policing as “slightly counter-cultural”  (UK House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008, p. 27). The 
initial set-up phase was accordingly shouldered by a smaller group of Member States and – similar to other 
instances of DI – followed a gradual, step-by-step professionalisation process. “We couldn’t do everything 
with everybody,” one Council official argued, and underlined that the experimental implementation together 
with an avant-garde group of governments yielded good results that ultimately convinced other Member 
States of its merit (Interviewee 33).  
Another example for the coincidence of Council presidency and integration initiative can be found 
in the establishment of Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) across the EU to facilitate “the tracing and 
identification of proceeds of crime” (Council Decision 2007/845/JHA, 2007). Austria provided the impetus 
during its presidency in 2006, and received support from the Finnish Presidency, which succeeded it in the 
second half of the same year. Similar to the Prüm case, and the German Presidency’s ambition to transfer an 
instance of DI to the EU framework, the Austrian Presidency sought to build on and part-integrate an 
intergovernmental arrangement that had been launched by a sub-group of six Member States in 2004. This 
arrangement was CARIN, the Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency Network, which had been initiated by 
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Austria, Germany, the Benelux countries, Ireland and the UK (European Scrutiny Committee, 2006; Mühl, 
2011). Council Decision 2007/845/JHA formally recognised CARIN in 2007 and obliged all Member States to 
establish EU national AROs. What is more, a coordinating role was given to Europol with the set-up of a 
Europol Criminal Assets Bureau (ECAB) as central contact point (Van Berkel, 2017). A final example is the 
French Council Presidency of 2008. France employed the EU as a venue for the realisation of its new national 
security strategy by proposing to create a European Cyber Crime Platform (ECCP). The proposal was 
adopted in the same year and tasked Europol with the ECCP’s development and coordination in the common 
fight against cybercrime (European Union Committee, 2010, p. 125; French White Paper on National Defence 
and Security, 2008). Holding the Council presidency arguably mattered as a positive influence on integration 
preferences, both in the form of political expectations and a means of venue shopping. 
In addition to a timely coincidence with the EU presidency, all these examples debatably exhibit the 
influence of politicisation, another factor that has been observed to influence legislative activity of Member 
States.32 Politics and public visibility mattered in all cases. A particular issue (or issue area) experienced high 
salience thanks to deliberate pro-integration politicisation by Council presidencies. External crises and shocks 
provided important impulses to this end. The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) was for 
example instigated by Spain in the aftermath of 11-M in 2004. Belgium pushed for the adoption of a European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in 2008, following the case of serial killer Michel Fourniret and 
subsequent politicisation regarding the failure of domestic authorities. Although he had been sentenced and 
imprisoned for murder multiple times in France, Belgian officials had no knowledge whatsoever of his 
criminal record when he moved to Belgium around 1990 (European Commission, 2017a; Muller, 2018). 
Looking back on the previous chapters, Germany was likewise holding the Council presidency when it first 
contacted France to discuss its proposal for a European conference on internal security in the beginning of 
1974. Similarly, the British initiative at the 1975 European Council meeting that paved the way for the 
establishment of TREVI came just ahead of the UK’s Presidency in the Council. Although the German-
instigated creation of Europol did not coincide with the German Presidency, the final signature of the Europol 
Convention was most actively and substantially advanced by Germany during its Council presidency in the 
second half of 1994. Of course, further research will be needed, for example to investigate the importance of 
politicisation and crises versus holding the Council presidency. While the presidency might itself constitute a 
driver of state preferences in favour of integration, for instance through the creation of public expectations 
and pressure to leave a political legacy, it remains to be seen whether this is indeed the case or the Council 
presidency merely presents a contextual determinant. It may just as well function only as ‘enabling factor’ by 
offering an obvious venue for the policy choices of Member States and thereby opening windows of 
opportunity for EU collective action such as policy or integration initiatives. Ultimate integration preferences 
and decisions might nonetheless still be primarily driven by functional pressure from interdependence 
amongst others. 
In sum, a number of lessons may be learned from this investigative ‘excursion’ into instances of DI 
in the area of JHA in the early 2000s. First, they confirm that issue-specific interdependence acts as important 
 
32 see for example Warntjen (2007) on the influence of domestic salience on advancing EU-level legislation 
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driver of integration preferences among Member States. In all cases, interdependence was high and growing 
– for example related to vehicle crime with regard to EUCARIS, and concerning terrorism and illegal 
migration in the case of Prüm. Interdependencies thus provided a significant impulse for governments to 
favour EU cooperation. At the same time, asymmetries played a crucial role for state preferences of (initial) 
differentiation. In initiating EUCARIS, the Netherlands opted for an avant-garde group of likeminded 
Member States with comparable functional pressure and similarly high levels of interdependence. When 
Germany launched Prüm, it likewise favoured to first involve those countries at the heart of European 
criminal and terrorist networks or who had experienced growing interdependence in the same issue areas. 
Second, the above cases provide evidence towards the positive influence of politicisation and crises. 
In the light of growing salience and public-political expectations, especially in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks on European soil, Member States reacted positively to public pressure and issue-specific politicisation. 
The Madrid and London bombings – apart from illustrating practical interdependencies – created a sense of 
crisis and pressure to act. Consequently, Spain proposed the establishment of an EU APIS, the UK instigated 
the adoption of an ECIM and intelligence-led policing, and Member States’ initial reluctance against Prüm 
was overcome and the treaty was integrated into the EU framework. External crises thus produced issue-
specific politicisation that created significant political momentum for the integration of differentiated and 
new cooperation initiatives. 
Third, whereas integration preferences were overall influenced favourably by high interdependence 
and politicisation, differentiation preferences appear to have been shaped by the asymmetrical impact of 
drivers and policy entrepreneurship. EUCARIS was itself a bottom-up initiative from the subnational level. 
Its ‘multi-speed’ cooperation format and decentralised set-up were chosen on the basis of asymmetrical, 
informal trust relationships among police authorities. Additionally, an asymmetry in operational needs at 
the practitioners’ level shaped the initial pursuit of enhanced rather than EU-wide cooperation, as can 
likewise be seen in the cases of Prüm, the ECIM and FIU.net. Nevertheless, these case studies only partially 
confirm the influence of subnational police entrepreneurs on state preferences in favour of differentiation 
and decentralisation. As cooperation in sub-groups progressed and internal interconnectedness grew, 
subnational practitioners voiced the growing functional need for professionalisation and a certain 
formalisation, and thus indirectly contributed to state integration preferences, as in the cases of EUCARIS, 
Prüm and also SIS.  
Supranational policy entrepreneurship debatably played a similarly important role with regard to 
the preferences of governments in favour of both initial differentiation and later integration. Indeed, the 
influence of supranational policy entrepreneurs was very low or even absent when EUCARIS and Prüm were 
created. No precedent existed at EU level in this issue area; EU actors neither possessed a practical role nor 
political legitimacy to initiate anything or even become substantially involved in cooperation. Hence, they 
could not promote integration or counter subnational policy narratives of differentiation. What is more, 
organisational self-interest and institutional struggle to build a reputation and legitimise practical 
involvement impeded supranational entrepreneurship at these early cooperation stages. However, as 
cooperation (and integration) proceeded, EU policy venues and actors swiftly gained a role and legitimacy 
in these issue areas, and opened them up to the influence of supranational advocacy. This can be seen in 
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numerous cases. Concerning EUCARIS, the European Commission at first refused to acknowledge the 
platform in its multilateral format and instead sought to create a similar structure of its own. Yet, it eventually 
embraced the decentralised system and began to promote it at EU level. Prüm was similarly initiated outside 
the EU framework but was quickly transferred, thus provoking a greater role for EU actors such as Europol 
where a 24/7 Prüm desk was established. In a similar vein, Europol and the Commission have become 
involved in many other initiatives that started outside the EU framework or as pilot project of a few Member 
States. These include FIU.net, ECIM, AROs, and the ECCP, which today is the EC3. 
In sum, the scrutiny of the above cases demonstrates that high issue-specific interdependence and 
politicisation acted as primary drivers of integration preferences of Member States, while asymmetry and 
subnational policy entrepreneurship contributed to differentiation preferences. Strong subnational policy 
entrepreneurship and the absence or weakness of supranational entrepreneurs at early cooperation stages 
shaped state preferences in favour of informal avant-garde approaches and decentralisation. By contrast, at 
later cooperation stages, functional pressure to formalise cooperation alongside a growing influence of 
supranational actors shifted Member States’ positions towards EU integration. Nonetheless, integration 
promoters like Germany and EU entrepreneurs such as the Commission did not insist on full supranational 
integration but acted strategically by allowing for DI and flexible models somewhere in between. In these 
cases, DI presented a strategy rather than a preference. The following section further tests the validity of these 
findings by investigating the transfer of Europol into the EU framework. 
 
 
6.2 The Europol Council Decision: Transferring Intergovernmental Cooperation 
to the EU Framework  
Europol had barely been in operation for seven years when discussions emerged on its practical future and 
legal framework in early 2006. By then, respective Council presidencies had already initiated three amending 
protocols to the Convention so as to improve Europol’s operational functioning and adapt it to the changing 
threats and needs in the Member States (see figure 9). Nevertheless, these legal instruments were found to be 
rather cumbersome and inflexible. By 2006, not a single one had entered into force yet (European 
Commission, 2006a, p. 2). “[A]ttempts by the Council to address Europol’s requirements by reforming the 
Convention through amending Protocols were complicated by the years’ long ratification process required 
for any change to the intergovernmental legal basis” (Europol, 2016a, p. 52). Compared to the legislative 
process of the Europol Convention, the ECD was negotiated and adopted rather swiftly. A proposal was on 
the table at the end of the same year, adopted by the Member States not even two and a half years later in 
April 2009, and became formally applicable on 1 January 2010, transforming Europol into the EU’s official 
law enforcement agency. Nonetheless, the ECD constituted a “delicate balance between continuity and 
change” (ibid., p. 53).  
Among the most important changes – apart from the integration into the EU legal framework – were 
a significant expansion of Europol’s functional scope to all areas of serious transnational organised crime 
(Art. 4, Council Decision 2009/371/JHA); a gain of powers, including the right to “suggest the setting up of 
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joint investigation teams” and participate in JITs (Art. 5.1(d) & 6), and act as central office for combating euro 
counterfeiting (Art. 5.5); and a new, strengthened role for both subnational actors through the creation of 
Europol National Units (ENUs) (Art. 8), and for supranational actors through the integration into the area of 
EU JHA, which entailed scrutiny tasks related to Europol’s new funding from the EU budget as well as the 
applicability of the EU’s general rules and provisions (Art. 42). The ECD additionally altered the rigid 
intergovernmental governance structure by introducing new voting rules for the Europol Management 
Board. Whereas decisions had previously been taken unanimously, the ECD stipulated a two-thirds majority 
procedure (Art. 37). Although it tasked the Management Board with devising a strategy for Europol, the 
responsibility for “the initiative for defining the strategy” de facto shifted from the Board to Europol itself as 
early as March 2009, and thus provided it with further agenda-setting powers (Europol, 2016a, p. 54). The 
ECD not only marked the formal transition of Europol from an intergovernmental to an EU organisation, it 
perhaps most importantly paved the way for a gradual shift of power in EU police cooperation away from 
the Member States and towards Europol and the EU. All interviewees underlined the great importance of 
Europol’s integration into the EU framework as well as the subsequent momentum and leeway this gave to 
Europol and its further institutional development. In the words of one enthusiastic official: “In retrospect, it 
is unbelievable what all has been achieved. It is an amazing success story” (Interviewee 30). 
This ‘success story’ is the subject of study in the remainder of this chapter. Three factors seem to have 
mattered most as drivers of state preferences on transforming Europol into an EU agency. First, 
interdependencies presented the most significant influence on vertical integration preferences. As Member 
States were increasingly becoming interconnected not only in threats but also in emerging structures of police 
cooperation, collective action problems intensified. Lack of trust, bureaucratic resistance and diverging goals 
between political and practitioners’ levels all undermined the operational benefit of the early Europol. EU 
governments thus opted for further centralisation in an attempt to respond to the growing functional pressure 
from interdependence, solve collective action problems and more effectively structure police cooperation.  
Second, spill-over effects likewise shaped state preferences to integrate. On the one hand, the 
practical and institutional interconnectedness between national authorities was growing. Earlier integration 
decisions (mainly the creation of TREVI and Europol) were increasingly producing functional spill-overs and 
pressure to formalise evolving cooperation as it became more and more complex. As EU police cooperation 
progressed under the Europol Convention, shortcomings became manifest in practice – sometimes 
dramatically – and required substantial changes in more than one area. What is more, in the early 2000s, 
political spill-overs increasingly began to act as drivers of pro-integration preferences, since more and more 
Member States favoured the EU level for problem-solving. Additionally, the evolution of the EU, most 
notably through the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, affected state preferences with regard to Europol. Next to an 
emerging path-dependency due to the ‘shaping and constraining effects’ of Europol as a common institution 
(Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 278), cultivated spill-overs and supranational entrepreneurship from both the 
Commission and Europol itself drove governments to transform Europol into an EU agency.  
Finally, politicisation presented a third factor that favourably impacted the preferences of Member 
States. Multiple crises provided public-political pressure and expectations at domestic and EU level. While 
these might not have been primary drivers, they created important additional momentum and arguably 
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opened windows of opportunity. In the following, this chapter traces the process that preceded the adoption 
of the ECD. It analyses the formation of state preferences at the examples of different milestones on the way 
towards becoming an EU agency. These include the three amending Protocols to the Europol Convention 
and the formal proposal for a Council decision (see figure 9).  
 
Fixing the Convention: Amending Protocols I, II and III 
Europol had taken up its activities in July 1999, while “a fledgling organisational structure was still being 
developed” (Europol, 2016a, p. 49). An evaluation report from February 2000 criticised the institutional set-
up and governance of Europol, particularly its organisational fragmentation and the inflexibility of its 
mandate and legal basis, which complicated swift operational responses. On the part of the Member States 
and their law enforcement authorities, the report found “[l]ack of commitment, poor feedback, insufficient 
support and different expectations” as well as “differing and sometimes conflicting priorities at the political 
and law enforcement levels with respect to what Europol should do and how” (ibid.). Shortcomings in 
Europol’s governance framework, its insufficiently established practical track record and reputation 
alongside bureaucratic resistance from the Member States produced a dangerous mix that undermined, 
perhaps even threatened, not only the operational benefit of the young organisation but its institutional 
development and EU police cooperation as a whole (Interviewees 7, 9, 21, 22, 29, 35 & 41). Collective action 
problems and information asymmetries that the creation of Europol should have alleviated persisted.  
However, it was not this functional pressure alone that shaped state preferences in favour of quickly 
adapting the newly founded cooperation body. Before Member States even opted for further vertical 
integration and decided to substantially alter Europol’s governance framework with a view to developing 
more coherent, long-term strategic planning and financing processes, rising interdependencies drove the 
expansion of its functional scope. Whereas most Member States were relatively satisfied with Europol’s 
operational output in the area of drug trafficking – its oldest competence – its function as an instrument to 
“reduce crime” in other areas fell short of expectations (Europol, 2016a, p. 17). One of these issues was money 
laundering. In line with globalisation and increasing economic ties between countries and their open markets, 
money laundering was becoming a global problem and had “assumed vast proportions throughout the 
world” (Karamanou, 2000, p. 11). This interconnectedness was even higher in the EU and intensifying around 
2000. The single market had been completed in the previous decade, the Schengen acquis had been integrated 
and was growing, and financial flows across countries were increasing in quantity and becoming 
progressively intertwined in view of the steps undertaken for the realisation of an economic and monetary 
union as well as the euro area.  While the euro was only launched in its paper form and as hard money on 1 
January 2002, it had already been released as ‘book money’ in 1999, thus effectively presenting an alternative 
means of payment next to national currencies (European Commission, n.d.). Consequently, in July 2000, the 
Portuguese Council Presidency initiated a first competence extension to include money laundering among 
the issue areas falling under Europol’s responsibility (Council doc. 2000/C). The proposal was comparatively 
quickly realised and adopted as amending protocol to the Europol Convention in November of the same year 
(Protocol I, Europol Convention, 2000).  
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Against the backdrop of all these developments, interdependence in the fight against counterfeiting of money 
and forgery of other means of payment was rising as well (Interviewees 1, 21 & 24). Euro counterfeiting as 
such was criminologically “no significant problem” in police work at the time (Interviewee 21). Yet, the 
common means of payment alongside the internal and financial market produced spill-over effects on other 
areas, including new opportunities for criminal activities and illicit economic gain through drug trafficking 
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and cybercrime amongst others (Interviewees 7, 31 & 38; cf. Carrapiço & Farrand, 2018). Moreover, the 
introduction of the euro produced asymmetric capacity interdependencies in the fight against related crimes. 
Whereas larger Member States debatably possessed sufficient resources to combat euro counterfeiting, many 
small ones comparatively lacked similar means to do so. However, participating countries of the euro area 
did not only depend on one another for the protection of their common currency, they further relied on other 
Member States that might be used as safe havens from which to import counterfeited or laundered money 
(Interviewees 21 & 30). Growing economic and capacity interdependencies as well as criminal 
interdependencies thus produced functional pressure to counteract the considerable threat of spiking 
financial losses in all Member States. The European Parliament likewise acknowledged this in its report on 
the Portuguese proposal for an amending protocol. Its summary read: “Given the scale of money laundering 
in all the Member States, the Portuguese initiative was favourably received by the European Council with a 
view to enhancing the Union's legal arsenal” (Karamanou, 2000, p. 14). 
 
PROTOCOL I: DEALING WITH INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 
In addition to real functional pressure from rising internal and external interconnectedness, taking action 
against money laundering and euro counterfeiting at the EU level constituted a political question. On the one 
hand, it was “politically quite attractive, because it was very well saleable and something politicians could 
do for the public stage” (Interviewee 21). Furthermore, nominating a central contact point presented a 
political necessity. Not only within the EU was it essential to centralise the coordination for this issue area 
but especially to outside partners, third countries such as the US, who needed to know whom to approach 
with regard to cooperation on money laundering and payment fraud (Interviewees 24 & 31). As political 
spill-overs and an emerging path-dependency increasingly shifted the attention of national policymakers to 
the EU level for problem-solving, Europol was the obvious choice as central contact point in the context of 
EU and global police cooperation. It was well-connected to European structures and constituted a direct 
channel to the respective law enforcement authorities. In contrast to Interpol at the time, it was also better 
institutionalised due to the Europol Convention and its evolving governance framework (Interviewees 21 & 
30). While Protocol I formally inserted money laundering into the list of Europol’s competencies, Europol 
would however only be officially named the central office for euro counterfeiting in 2005, following the 
initiative of five Member States (Council doc. 2004/C 317/6; cf. Council Decision 2005/511/JHA, 2005). 
Nonetheless, Protocol I presented a first step in this direction. It helped to establish Europol as official actor 
in one more issue area of EU police cooperation and to further its profile as central cooperation body at 
subnational and operational levels (Interviewee 31). What is more, it already foreshadowed the emerging 
influence of supranational policy entrepreneurship and perhaps thus helped pave the way for the ECD. 
Although the Protocol was adopted rather swiftly without difficulty, the European Parliament criticised the 
legal instrument for its inflexibility: 
 “It is regrettable that the procedure for the entry into force of the protocol is based on the same 
procedure applying to the original Europol Convention, i.e. it must also be adopted by the 'last' 
Member State. This procedure will delay the adoptions of the Protocol at EU level.” 
(Karamanou, 2000, p. 12) 
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The Parliament would continue to ask for the adoption of an EU legal instrument, an option that the Council 
already discussed in 2001, namely “the possibility to replace the Europol Convention by a Council Decision” 
(European Commission, 2006a, p. 3). Yet, it decided to wait for the outcome of the Constitutional Treaty and 
to instead opt for additional protocols as interim solution. 
 
PROTOCOLS II AND III: FROM VENUE SHOPPING TO EUROPOL AS EU FOCAL POINT 
Not too long after the initiative of the Portuguese Presidency in July 2000, even before the Council act drawing 
up Protocol I was adopted, France assumed the Council presidency and presented a proposal of its own for 
the extension of Europol’s functional scope. Similar to Portugal, growing interdependencies drove France to 
advocate the inclusion of yet another issue area to Europol’s mandate: cybercrime, or ‘computer crime’ as it 
was called at the time (French Presidency, 2000). Similar to money laundering, this area was strongly affected 
by globalisation, particularly by the intensifying internationalisation and digitisation of markets, interactions 
and social structures, affecting both public and private spheres (cf. Niemeier, 2007). This ‘structural change’ 
not only increased cross-national interconnectedness among countries, it rendered national borders and 
conventional, often unilateral governance instruments less important, perhaps even obsolete in some cases 
(Interviewees 1, 22, 24 & 29).  This in turn created substantial new opportunities for criminals and terrorists. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, these opportunities were not merely theoretical, they were becoming more and 
more manifest in practice. As one interviewee phrased it: “the transnational dimension of criminal issues was 
increasingly empirically proven and perceived as a problem” (Interviewee 30).  
This was especially true with regard to cyberspace, which evolved rapidly. Thanks to the internet 
amongst other things, different criminal areas and groups were developing links or becoming more 
interconnected in one way or another (Interviewees 21, 22, 28 & 29). New criminal markets and methods, 
even new types of crime were forming online or in relation to cyber. Whereas police officials initially regarded 
the internet merely as a new means for criminal activity, for instance for crimes related to mobile devices, it 
soon became evident that “cyber was here to stay” (Interviewee 35; cf. Carrapiço & Farrand, 2018). As cyber 
or high-tech crime emerged as a form of crime in its own right, it began as a primarily economic rather than 
security concern. Similar to the threat of significant financial loss emanating from money laundering, 
cybercrime – and concretely illicit activities related to non-physical means of payment and online transaction 
– presented very real risks (Carrapiço & Farrand, 2018). Among law enforcement officers, there was a strong 
sensation and growing recognition that security governance needed to become similarly connected across 
borders to counter this trend (Interviewee 27). Yet, police cooperation at the time was still rather limited and 
practically focussed on “the old topics stemming from the 90s” such as drugs, mafia style groups and vehicle 
crime (Interviewee 35). 
In view of spiralling external interdependencies that exploiting the growing institutional connections 
among Member States, it is perhaps not surprising that the French Council Presidency suggested an extension 
of Europol’s functional scope to this emerging criminal area in October 2000. The magnitude of these drivers 
can be seen in the overhaul of the French proposal just a few months later when the subsequent Council 
presidencies of Sweden and Belgium presented an even more ambitious widening of the issue areas falling 
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within the responsibility of Europol and EU police cooperation. In March 2001, an according proposal was 
tabled and adopted at the Council (Council doc. 2001/C 176/05). It tasked Europol “to deal with the serious 
forms of international crime” that had already been mentioned as potential future mandate areas in the 
Convention and been listed in its annex. This included a whole array of (more than twenty!) new and very 
different forms of crime that Europol would be responsible for, among other things: counterfeiting and 
product piracy, forgery of money and means of payment, organised robbery, kidnapping, illicit trafficking 
related to a variety of objects, and computer crime. The latter thus rendered the French proposal redundant, 
because criminal activities in cyberspace were already incorporated in the Swedish-Belgian proposal.  
By mid-2001 – after not even two full years in operation – Europol’s mandate had consequently been 
widened to deal with money laundering and all other forms of transnational crime that had been listed in the 
annex to its Convention. This not only presents a remarkable development with regard to Europol’s 
functional scope, it arguably constitutes a quantum leap in the integration of a large number of issue areas 
into this newly created institution of EU police cooperation. At this early stage of Europol, the sudden 
‘Euromania’ of its Member States, their preference to cooperate at supranational level and the subsequent 
quick expansion of Europol’s responsibilities primarily responded to the rapid growth of interdependencies 
of criminal structures across borders and issue areas. However, as integration and time progressed, these 
would be increasingly complemented by additional driving forces that made ‘deeper’ (rather than merely 
‘functional’ or ‘wider’) integration seemingly indispensable. 
One of these drivers was politicisation, which became powerfully visible in late 2001. Politicisation 
in the aftermath of 9/11 not only generated direct pressure on policymakers to address the issue, it presented 
a window of opportunity for supranational policy entrepreneurship in the area of counterterrorism. The 
September 11 attacks placed international terrorism on the radar of countries around the world as “politically 
largest problem,” and marked the arrival of Islamist terrorism as a topic in Europe (Interviewee 21). Having 
horrifically illustrated global interdependencies and shaken publics beyond the US, 9/11 substantially 
determined the focus of EU police cooperation and development of Europol over the following years 
(Interviewees 8, 22, 24, 27 & 32). It effectively “changed everything” (Interviewee 27). When emotions were 
running high amidst a sense of crisis, strong public pressure created a political climate that was conducive to 
EU action and advocacy. Following the attacks, Europol’s Director Jürgen Storbeck argued to the Member 
States that “something needed to be done at EU level,” and initiated the creation of an according WG at 
Europol (Interviewee 7; cf. Europol, 2001, p. 11). Thus, the next step towards strengthening and furthering 
the role of this organisation had been taken by Europol itself. Politicisation from 9/11 amplified functional 
pressure from interdependencies and enabled supranational policy entrepreneurship as drivers of state 
preferences. As such, it acted rather as complimentary factor than causal condition. However, the salience of 
terrorism and public sense of crisis pushed Member States to act. In this context, EU policy venues offered a 
convenient escape from and practical solution to domestic public pressure. 
Against this backdrop, the Belgium Presidency of the second half of 2001 – jointly with Spain which 
succeeded it in 2002 – proposed to expand Europol’s powers via the adoption of a second protocol to the 
Europol Convention. The initiative was presented at the Council in February 2002 (Council doc. 2002/C 
42/07). It was adopted as a Council act in November, effectively empowering Europol officials from then on 
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“to participate in a support capacity in joint investigation teams” and “to ask the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned to conduct or coordinate investigations in specific cases” (Protocol II, Europol 
Convention, 2002). Albeit not quite an instance of vertical integration, Protocol II presented a significant step 
towards the further deepening of Europol’s powers and its role as a somewhat independent actor within EU 
police cooperation. The next one followed soon thereafter when the Danish Council Presidency instigated 
discussions on a third amending protocol in July, which would name Europol “focal point of European police 
cooperation” (Protocol III, Europol Convention, 2004; Council doc. 2002/C 172/05). Its ultimate adoption 
would however take considerably longer and was only achieved in November 2003. The three amending 
Protocols to the Europol Convention exhibit a possible influence of the office of the EU Presidency on state 
preferences in favour of integration or at least venue shopping. In each case, it was the respective Council 
Presidency who proposed to advance Europol’s mandate. And this ‘presidency activism’ was not confined 
to Europol alone. Apart from Protocol II, the Spanish Presidency of 2002 for example likewise initiated the 
creation of a “European network for the protection of public figures” (Council doc. 2002/C 42/08) and a 
European Institute of Police Studies (Council doc. 2002/C 42/10). 
Although further research is needed, the Protocols to the Europol Convention seem to suggest that 
holding the Council Presidency matters for integration preferences and initiatives. Across the six presidencies 
who pro-actively furthered EU police cooperation via Europol between 2000 and 2003, none of the other 
drivers – interdependence, politicisation or policy entrepreneurship – rose significantly and consistently in 
order to sufficiently explain the sudden activism of these different countries. It might be argued, however, 
that the office particularly exposed the respective governments to the influence of supranational 
entrepreneurship, namely cultivated spill-overs, and to politicisation through the exposure to public scrutiny 
and pressure to act (at EU level) in accordance with expectations.  
Although the legal adaptation of Europol’s mandate in the early 2000s was generally regarded as 
necessary and welcomed by the EU as a whole, the choice of amending protocols was strongly criticised as 
insufficient and inflexible across different levels. Here again, in a report on the Third Protocol the European 
Parliament re-emphasised its “concern at the instrument chosen,” particularly in the light of its previous 
“recommendation to the Council on the future development of Europol and its automatic incorporation into 
the institutional system of the European Union” (von Boetticher, 2003, p. 6): 
“It is regrettable that a more flexible instrument of Article 34 of the Treaty on the European 
Union was not chosen, for example a decision (Article 34(2)(c)). This is particularly regrettable 
because Europol has a key role with respect to cooperation between Member States’ authorities 
in the field of cross-border crime investigation.” (ibid.) 
This would soon be remedied through the ECD, a development for which supranational entrepreneurship 
was vital, as the next section shows. 
 
Replacing the Convention: The Europol Council Decision 
In the early 2000s, Member States were interested in improving Europol’s operational role in EU police 
cooperation (Europol, 2016a, p. 50). The choice of legal instruments – patching up shortcomings of the 
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Convention through amending protocols – demonstrates that governments sought to strike a balance 
“between the intergovernmental nature of Europol and the EU framework,” yet were eager to defend national 
sovereignty and “preserve their primacy in the governance of Europol” (Europol, 2016a, pp. 18 & 53). 
Nevertheless, in 2006, the Austrian Council Presidency launched discussions on the future of Europol and 
possibly replacing the Convention with a Council decision (European Commission, 2006a, p. 3). Within a few 
months, Member States agreed to assess this possibility further and commission a formal review of what such 
a decision could look like, which would ultimately lead to the adoption of the ECD in 2009. This change of 
preferences is best explained by the influence of politicisation and supranational policy entrepreneurship. 
Issue-specific interdependencies, albeit they continued to matter, debatably only played a secondary role as 
drivers in the case of the ECD. They exposed the shortcomings of the status quo of EU police cooperation; 
while criminal and terrorist linkages continued to grow and evolve, the rigid framework of the Europol 
Convention limited the organisation and thereby Member States in responding to new and evolving threats.  
 Structural shortcomings and practical deficits related to the Convention became evident soon after 
Europol had taken up activities. Despite the amending protocols, the intergovernmental legal framework 
remained insufficient for effective and timely police cooperation for several reasons. National sovereignty 
concerns and bureaucratic resistance continued to impede both the effectiveness and efficiency of EU police 
cooperation as well as the evolution of Europol as an organisation. The narrow legal definition of Europol’s 
mandate, which made its involvement strictly conditional upon the cross-border character of criminal cases 
or issue areas, prevented support to law enforcement authorities in less clear instances (Interviewee 21). 
Additionally, the sharp distinction between different jurisdictional areas and Europol’s limited rights 
complicated police cooperation via the organisation. Police officials used to working with broader or multiple 
legal delimitations often found it difficult and frustrating to succumb to the rigid and lengthy cooperation 
procedures required for Europol to provide operational support (Interviewee 40). The legal rigidity of the 
Convention became quickly and regularly manifest in practice. It was not adequately equipped to respond 
to the swiftly changing organisational needs of a growing Europol. “The financial regulation was a 
catastrophe, the staff regulations were not satisfying either, and the headquarters building was not suited 
and soon too small” (Interviewee 21).  
Perhaps most importantly, the Europol Convention had been a top-down political project of 
governments rather than police authorities. Accordingly, early EU police cooperation lacked an appropriate 
trust basis and was hindered by domestic bureaucratic resistance (Interviewees 21 & 29). Although law 
enforcement officials were requesting a larger role and more substantial input, they largely remained the 
‘recipients’ of initiatives from above (Interviewee 44). With thus limited opportunity for subnational policy 
entrepreneurship in the development of Europol, subnational actors were accordingly sceptical, even 
reluctant to cooperate via Europol and share information. Notwithstanding the establishment of a central 
body and formal channels for cooperation, different national security cultures and policing traditions did not 
automatically adapt to these new modes of working and jointly fighting cross-national phenomena 
(Interviewees 21, 22, 29 & 30). EU police cooperation in the early 2000s thus not only presented a means to 
balance asymmetrical interdependencies in criminal issue areas, it itself incorporated existing structural 
asymmetries between law enforcement authorities. Institutional and informal linkages among different 
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domestic police officials and authorities varied across countries, as did the degree of domestic adaptation to 
cooperating via Europol and the evolving supranational policy domain of JHA. The structural-legal change 
in EU police cooperation that had been superimposed onto national officials through the Europol Convention 
was in many cases quicker than the national practical and cultural adaptation, which lagged behind, and 
produced further obstacles to European policing. For instance, the first French contribution to Europol’s EU 
Organised Crime & Threat Assessment (OCTA) comprised several hundred pages of uncoordinated 
information submitted by different national security actors (Interviewee 21). Other countries’ police 
authorities were completely unwilling or unable to cooperate at the time. The first three annual organised 
crime reports published by Europol did not even include contributions from Italy (ibid.), and the proposal 
for an EU Policy Cycle to determine priority issue areas was initially met with outright resistance from Dutch 
law enforcement officials (Interviewee 30). This domestic bureaucratic resistance to EU police cooperation 
and Europol would only be overcome slowly in line with a gradual socialisation process among national 
police authorities. The ECD and Europol itself would prove to be important means to this end.  
In addition to these ‘Europol-specific’ obstacles to integration in the area of police cooperation, 
obstacles also derived from the broader EU environment. An extensive analysis of these more general trends 
at EU level go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, two observations shall be mentioned here. First, 
structural shortcomings from the Maastricht Treaty – similar to the ones surfacing within Europol – were 
becoming increasingly visible in practice in the form of “rather cumbersome decision routes in the Third 
Pillar;” “new structures were simply superimposed on those already in place” (European Commission, 1995). 
Second, most JHA priorities at European level were arguably driven rather politically than through functional 
pressure from interdependence (Interviewees 9 & 24). Growing interdependencies and a professionalisation 
of transnational criminal structures and organised criminal groups had already been observed by domestic 
police authorities since at least the 1990s, yet European governments initially lacked the political will to 
accordingly adapt EU police cooperation and Europol in particular (Interviewees 42, 43 & 44). Although the 
early Europol had been a top-down initiative of senior policymakers, the rapidly expanding role of Europol 
under the Convention presented somewhat of a “baby that nobody wanted” (Interviewee 30), and Member 
States sought to strictly limit and control what the organisation could and should do (Interviewee 40). The 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty in mid-2005 debatably marked the peak of this trust crisis and illustrated 
that European constituencies were likewise dissatisfied with the institutional reality at the time and 
demanded a qualitative change of the Union (Interviewees 29, 30 & 34). A consensus was thus emerging 
among practitioners, policy- and decision-makers about the growing need to fundamentally restructure the 
EU (Interviewees 1, 29, 30 & 33). It culminated in the signature of the Lisbon Treaty two years later, which 
among other things enhanced the EU’s powers by giving it legal personality, dissolved the former pillar 
structure and integrated JHA into the consolidated single framework of the Union (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). 
These structural changes marked a shift in state preferences towards integration as a reaction to shortcomings 
in the EU’s legal framework and cooperation arrangements. They in turn opened the floodgates to 
supranational entrepreneurship in EU police cooperation, as the final part of this section shows. 
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FUNCTIONAL AND PUBLIC PRESSURE AS JOINT INFLUENCES ON INTEGRATION PREFERENCES 
While public-political reform expectations perhaps paved the way for a shift of state preferences towards 
further integration, it was the interaction of growing interdependencies and politicising events that ultimately 
shaped Member States’ positions in favour of a new legal framework for Europol in the early 2000s. On the 
one hand, rising internal interdependencies progressively exposed structural shortcomings in the design of 
the Europol Convention as well as practical problems in its implementation. Although the Convention had 
created an institutional structure for EU police cooperation, cross-border cooperation at the time still 
presented “the exception rather than the rule” (Interviewee 35). Lack of trust, ignorance and outright 
reluctance to cooperate among national police officials produced collective action and coordination problems 
at Europol. Consequently, high functional pressure from institutional interdependencies shaped state 
preferences in favour of centralisation. Vertical integration of EU police cooperation presented a means to 
solve these problems. Against it, politicisation likewise played a significant role in shaping Member States’ 
preferences with regard to deeper integration. Next to structural deficiencies from the Convention, whose 
stipulations did not suffice to adequately manage growing internal and external interdependence within EU 
police cooperation, multiple crises illustrated the rising interconnectedness in the fight against crime and 
terrorism, and made practical shortcomings publicly visible.  
Unsurprisingly, 9/11 constituted the first one of these paradigm-shattering crisis moments. Since 
this chapter has already elaborated on the relevance of 9/11 as ‘game changer’ and psychological momentum-
provider in the fight against terrorism, this section limits itself to briefly underlining the importance of the 
September 11 attacks for the salience of EU police cooperation and Europol. Although radical Islamist groups 
had sporadically appeared on the radar of European security agencies even before 9/11, Islamist and 
international terrorism only really “arrived in the EU” after the attacks (Interviewee 27). What is more, it 
provided a significant window of opportunity for Europol to offer its unique services, for example the central 
cross-checking of the names and personal data of terrorism suspects who were often registered in different 
national databases under multiple alias or variations in spelling (Storbeck, 2001). The attacks thus marked a 
substantial increase in the involvement of Europol in EU police cooperation, particularly with regard to 
information exchange and data analysis (Interviewee 21). Notwithstanding the “internationalisation of 
terrorism” and counterterrorism strategies in the Western hemisphere in the aftermath of 9/11, Europol only 
benefitted marginally from the politicising effect of the attacks. Islamist terrorism still seemed relatively far 
away from the EU, as the focus of security officials at the time remained mostly on groups and possible targets 
in the US (Interviewees 10 & 35). Although Europol was granted an increase in human and financial resources 
dedicated to counterterrorism and itself pro-actively pushed for a larger role and substantial involvement by 
national agencies, bureaucratic reluctance prevented any significant institutional consequences for the 
organisation or EU police cooperation as such. 
This would only change in 2005, when two more crises had reinforced the public salience and 
political momentum of EU police cooperation as well as Europol’s role in the fight against terrorism. The 11-
M attacks of March 2004 presented the first incident of international terrorism on European soil and thus 
considerably shook EU Member States. They not only led to a number of Spanish initiatives at European level 
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as well as the creation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) (European Council, 2004, p. 14), they 
moreover created public expectations and pressure to improve police cooperation within the Union 
(Interviewee 21). European governments were accordingly eager to signal action and control to their 
constituencies by committing themselves to “to ensur[…ing] that the optimum and most effective use is made 
of existing EU bodies, in particular Europol and Eurojust, to promote cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism” (European Council, 2004, p. 6). Although this did not immediately alter the powers and standing 
of Europol, it reactivated the momentum garnered from 9/11 and heightened the salience of EU police 
cooperation in relation to 11-M. The sense of crisis in its aftermath arguably created a ripple effect that 
crucially helped shift state preferences towards deeper integration.  
Public pressure was reinforced substantially by the London bombings of July 2005, which 
perpetuated the ‘crisis mode’ and marked the beginning of a gradual shift in EU police cooperation “from 
retrospective learning to preventive policing, and from Europol as a passive to a (pro-)active actor” 
(Interviewee 21). The terror attacks in London presented a game changer in various regards. First, they 
powerfully illustrated growing cross-border interdependencies in the fight against terrorism within the EU. 
British government officials repeatedly emphasised the rapidly expanding international links of criminal and 
terrorist groups, and public discourse framed the bombings as a direct consequence of coordination and 
collective action problems among different security authorities (Bures, 2018; Interviewees 22 & 44). Second, 
the attacks additionally fuelled the sense of crisis produced by 11-M and reinforced public pressure to react 
to the security shortcomings exposed by both incidents. The London bombings thus provoked a significant 
qualitative leap in data exchange and information-sharing via Europol (Interviewees 3, 10, 15 & 27). Finally, 
the combination of publicly exposed interdependencies in the area of counterterrorism and heightened 
politicisation provided a window of opportunity for Europol to prove its value and become substantially 
involved in national investigations of this scale for the first time. Its Director at the time proactively offered 
the organisation’s services to the UK in the aftermath of the July bombings. British officials not only accepted 
the support, they expressed a strong demand for transnational support in the investigations and were eager 
to openly harness Europol in the analysis and assessment of related police data (Interviewee 21). 
Ultimately, the crisis momentum and politicisation generated by the terror attacks of 9/11 but 
especially by the Madrid and London bombings shaped state preferences in favour of more and better police 
cooperation at the EU level. Next to providing a window of opportunity for Europol to get involved and 
promote itself (as the final part of this section demonstrates further), politicisation exerted pressure on 
policymakers to manage the crisis and react to public expectations and exposed shortcomings. The 
combination of high interdependence and politicisation subsequently drove Member States to actively turn 
to Europol as a solution for collective action problems. As one interviewee phrased it: “policymaking in the 
area of internal security usually needs a good crisis” (Interviewee 33). Accordingly, in January 2006 the 
Austrian Council Presidency initiated a debate on the further development of Europol and the possible 
replacement of its current legal framework with a Council decision (Europol, 2016a, p. 53). In June, the JHA 
Council decided that an assessment should be carried out concerning whether and how this could be realised 
(European Commission, 2006a). The process that had been started amid a sense of crisis in the wake of the 
terror attacks in Madrid and London eventually led to the adoption of the ECD less than three years later on 
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6 April 2009. It was largely a matter of step-by-step legitimisation of Europol as relevant player within EU 
police cooperation and “certainly a question of using the right crisis” (Interviewee 33). 
 
MOVING PREFERENCES TOWARDS A COUNCIL DECISION: PATH-DEPENDENCY, SPILL-OVER EFFECTS 
AND SUPRANATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
While the scope and impact of the ECD were much broader than the fight against terrorism, the initial 
momentum and sense of crisis generated by the terror attacks built important public pressure on Member 
States to act in the domain of counterterrorism. This created a ripple effect that extended to other issue areas 
of police cooperation as well. Europol, and in fact the whole of EU police cooperation, thus benefited from 
the politicisation of a single issue area. Concerning Europol’s functional scope, the public psychological effect 
of the attacks mattered perhaps more as a catalyst of pro-integration preferences than actual 
interdependencies (Interviewees 21, 35, 38 & 44). Although the internationalisation of crime and terrorism 
continued to evolve in the early 2000s, this threat had been on the radar of European security agencies for a 
while. By contrast, blame-shifting to the European and international level as well as national frames of 
political action and control periodically (re-)surged following 9/11, 11-M and the London bombings. In the 
words of one official: “Terrorism is a bizarre thing, it’s a high-profile area. It goes up and down. Organised 
crime is never politicised. Cyber isn’t, corruption isn’t. These areas rarely trigger the same public reaction, 
although they are often statistically the much bigger threat.” (Interviewee 33). Indeed, available resources 
and momentum for EU police cooperation skyrocketed in the aftermath of each terror attack. Public pressure 
and expectations on policymakers to manage the security crisis certainly played an essential role in driving 
governments’ willingness to alter EU police cooperation and further strengthen Europol. Yet, they quickly 
faded away and data submission to Europol declined again as public attention abated (Interviewee 35). 
Politicisation alone can therefore not explain why Member States moved towards favouring long-term, 
vertical integration. Neither they nor functional pressure from growing interdependencies or practical 
cooperation shortcomings suffice as accounts for the adoption of the ECD and the far-reaching institutional 
and legal changes it initiated. 
The missing link is provided by path-dependency, spill-over effects and the supranational 
entrepreneurship that arose in the early 2000s and which would continue to grow and substantially shape 
state preferences on EU police cooperation beyond the Council Decision. These factors influenced Member 
States with regard to the ECD and further integration in three main ways. First, EU police cooperation was 
increasingly influenced towards deeper integration by the path-dependency of the emerging supranational 
structures and policy venues, not only in the area of JHA but within the Union in general. Functional pressure 
to continue and expand cooperation at Europol arose in line with a paradigm shift in European cooperation 
in the early 2000s away from intergovernmental treaties and conventions towards EU legal instruments and 
the creation of agencies as tools for administration, regulation and execution (Interviewees 14 & 29). The 
Lisbon Treaty demonstrates the spirit of the time of expanding the EU’s functional scope and competences 
and presented a response to growing public and political expectations at national and EU level to follow the 
path of common institutions and collective action in Europe (Interviewees 27 & 29).  
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Second, the continuously growing practical and institutional interconnectedness between national 
police authorities produced a functional need to further design and regulate this cooperation. Linkages in 
one area created functional spill-overs to other issue areas; for example, cooperating in the fight against 
terrorism also made cooperation in other relevant criminal areas necessary that were often related such as 
drug and arms trafficking. Similarly, cooperation between law enforcement officials mostly began as mere 
information-sharing on a case-by-case basis, yet its practical benefits soon produced a growing demand for 
cooperation more generally, for instance in the exchange of best practices and the initiation of common 
training programmes.  
Third, state preferences on EU police cooperation were – perhaps most importantly – shaped by 
cultivated spill-overs and supranational policy entrepreneurship. Although different EU actors played an 
important part in promoting the integration of Europol into the EU’s institutional structure33, the European 
Commission and Europol itself arguably developed the most significant supranational advocacy with regard 
to shaping state preferences in favour of the ECD. While the Commission very actively promoted deeper 
integration, Europol mainly impacted government positions through the ‘shaping and constraining effects’ 
of being a common institution (Kaunert et al., 2013, p. 278). For both, the political weight and room for 
entrepreneurship vis-à-vis the Member States grew continuously in line with their practical track record, 
organisational reputation and standing (cf. Carpenter & Krause, 2012, 2014; Waeraas & Maor, 2015). 
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
At the beginning of the 2000s, neither Europol nor the Commission had asserted themselves as primary actors 
of EU internal security cooperation and had not yet developed a real say in the government-driven design of 
police cooperation (Interviewees 21, 23 & 30). Nevertheless, both organisations were making the most of their 
limited influence and sought to actively expand the latter. The European Commission for example ensured 
its own institutional relevance and paved the way for the ECD through its uniformity agenda for EU agencies 
and corporate governance (Interviewees 29 & 33).  As early as 2001, an according White Paper on European 
Governance laid down the cornerstones for substantial institutional reform of the Union (see figure 9; cf. 
European Commission, 2001). It was followed barely one year later by a Commission Communication on the 
operating framework for European regulatory agencies, which initiated the process of judicial streamlining 
within a more coherent policy framework for all relevant EU bodies (European Commission, 2002b).  
Particularly from 2004 onwards, the Commission’s activities and its involvement and 
entrepreneurship in shaping state preferences on EU JHA and particularly police cooperation rose 
significantly. Building on the Communication from 2002, a draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the 
operating framework for European regulatory agencies was presented to the Member States and adopted in 
2005 (European Commission, 2005a). What is more, Commission advocacy began to overlap with and amplify 
Europol’s entrepreneurship. A formal cooperation agreement between the two had been signed in early 2003 
and now facilitated further contacts. Over the coming years, Franco Frattini, the European Commissioner for 
 
33 for example the European Parliament’s repeated calls for a new legal framework in view of the Convention’s deficiencies 
(cf. Karamanou, 2000; von Boetticher, 2003) 
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Justice, Freedom and Security, directly and increasingly liaised with Europol’s Director. In this way, the 
Commission not only developed substantial knowledge on the state of play of EU police cooperation, it in 
turn began to publicly promote Europol and its organisational needs (Interviewees 21 & 23). As one official 
phrased it: “the role of the Commission has changed tremendously since 2004, and they do drive now” 
(Interviewee 33). In fact, the proposal for a Council decision to replace the Europol Convention was an 
original suggestion from the European Commission in the context of its uniformity agenda (see figure 9; 
Interviewees 14, 21 & 29). In 2006, the Commission strongly criticised the stubborn status quo of EU police 
cooperation in view of the persistent shortcomings related to the Convention: “none of these instruments [the 
Protocols] have entered into force yet, due to the fact that not all Member States have ratified them. [...E]ven 
after the entry into force of the three Protocols, further improvements to Europol's functioning are still 
desirable” (European Commission, 2006a, p. 2; cf. Europol, 2016, pp. 52–53). In this context, the Commission 
underlined two driving factors that especially exposed shortcomings of EU police cooperation at the time 
and thus supposedly called for further integration. First, it highlighted growing functional pressure from 
external interdependencies: the need to respond to “the emergence or increase of new security threats such 
as terrorism, which pose new challenges to Europol and require novel approaches” (ibid.). Moreover, the 
Commission pointed to internal interconnectivity and the spiralling functional need to exchange information, 
which made “it necessary to further adapt Europol's legal framework” (ibid.). This adaptation, it advocated, 
should take the shape of a Council decision that would transform the organisation into an EU agency, thereby 
placing it under the scrutiny of the Commission among others. 
The entrepreneurship of the European Commission did however not stop at initiating discussions. 
When the Austrian Presidency presented the idea in 2006 and Member States began to assess whether a new 
legal framework was necessary and what this could look like, the Commission played a major part in 
overcoming governmental reluctance and shaping the details of the ECD (Interviewees 14, 21 & 29). A first 
draft was devised by the Commission in the same year, which provided the EU body with a first-mover 
advantage; this presumably enabled it to set the general tone of the decision and influence the scope of its 
content and extent of the institutional change (Interviewee 31). In this endeavour, the European Commission 
benefitted from two additional factors in the promotion of integrating Europol into the EU framework. First, 
in contrast to the Member States, the Commission was able to present a uniform position and ‘united front’ 
in the negotiations on the ECD. Although EU members preferred to keep EU police cooperation an 
intergovernmental affair – as the number of additional Protocols demonstrates – and feared that placing 
Europol under the umbrella of the Union would lead to more bureaucracy and less national flexibility and 
control (Interviewees 14 & 21), they agreed more far-reaching changes were needed to cope with the 
shortcomings of the Convention. However, Member States were divided on how this should be 
accomplished, whether or not a new legal framework was necessary and if so, what this should look like 
(Interviewees 29 & 31). This possibly provided an opening for the Commission to assert its proposals and 
influence the overall debate and preferences of Member States.  
Second, the European Commission clearly benefited from functional and public pressure. It perhaps 
deliberately harnessed both to strengthen the impact of its supranational entrepreneurship in favour of more 
integration in the area of EU police cooperation. By the early 2000s, many European governments had already 
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significantly invested into Europol or were committing themselves to working together with other law 
enforcement agencies via the organisation. Expanding interdependencies not only created a functional need 
to widen the functional scope and capacity of Europol in line with the growing and divergent needs of 
domestic police authorities, they demanded a vertical adaptation of the governance framework to better 
coordinate and manage collective action problems. Furthermore, parallel developments at EU level 
intensified institutional linkages and increasingly shifted the standard policy venue, if not the power itself, 
towards supranational structures. The Commission’s uniformity initiative regarding EU governance and 
European agencies and the Lisbon Treaty most notably helped to shift state preferences towards more rather 
than less EU, as was the spirit of the time (Interviewees 27 & 29). What is more, the politicisation and public-
political momentum of previous terror attacks had only been conducive to furthering supranational 
entrepreneurship. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Commission was able to harness public pressure and shape 
state preferences towards convergence in favour of an EU Action Plan as well as a joint “minimum definition 
of terrorism” (Bures, 2018, p. 159). 11-M and the London bombings provided a similar opening for EU 
advocacy and resulted in the launch of an EU counterterrorism strategy (ibid., p. 158). 
The European Commission continuously fuelled the trend towards EU collective action in the area 
of JHA, and lobbied for more centralised power or at least coordination at supranational level. As discussions 
on the ECD went on, it for instance published a communication sketching ‘the way forward,’ a future agenda 
for the role and governance of EU agencies (European Commission, 2008b). When the ECD was adopted in 
2009 it not only effectively transformed Europol into a decentralised EU agency, the decision unsurprisingly 
also attributed a formal role to the Commission in the governance and strategic guidance of Europol. Through 
the ECD, it obtained a permanent seat on Europol’s Management Board, a role in its budget supervision and 
financial planning, and by default Commission decisions would apply to Europol by analogy (adaptation 
contingent upon review by the Management Board). The European Commission’s emerging supranational 
entrepreneurship is thus reflected in the ECD and the subsequent changes in Europol’s legal framework and 
governance structure (Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, 2009).  
 
EUROPOL 
In addition to the Commission, Europol itself began to increasingly act as supranational policy entrepreneur 
in the early 2000s. Especially after the 9/11 attacks, the organisation began to take a pro-active role in EU 
police cooperation and develop first forms of transactional authority and autonomy rather than only acting 
as an agent on behalf of the Member States (Interviewee 30; cf. Carpenter & Krause, 2012, 2014). For the first 
time, discussions at Europol revolved around what it could actively offer to governments and police 
authorities, and Europol officials approached relevant actors with according initiatives and proposals 
(Interviewees 24 & 30). In line with the Commission’s emerging entrepreneurship, Europol thus responded 
not only to a window of opportunity but to political expectations at EU level including at the Council 
(Interviewees 24 & 27). Although its influence at the time was still relatively limited, in the wake of 9/11, 
Europol officials successfully lobbied for establishing the organisation as central coordination body and point 
of contact within Europe and to the outside (Interviewee 30). Together with politicisation and the crisis 
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momentum following the terror attacks, supranational entrepreneurship thus shaped state preferences in 
favour of expanding Europol’s functional scope to the fight against terrorism and further legitimising the 
agent as an actor in EU police cooperation. This pattern could likewise be observed in the aftermath of the 
Madrid attacks and the London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In both cases Europol immediately 
offered its services to the affected authorities and proactively assumed a support role, without having been 
charged to do so by the Member States (Interviewee 40). 
In contrast to the advocacy practised by the Commission, Europol’s entrepreneurship evolved much 
more gradually and was strongly focused on establishing its legitimacy as an actor in EU police cooperation. 
This partially also presented a response to bureaucratic resistance from governments and law enforcement 
authorities, one of the key institutional problems Europol was facing in the early 2000s. When the 
organisation commenced operations in 1999, it was neither well-known nor interesting to national and local 
police officials for a number of reasons (Interviewees 21, 22, 27 & 32). Structural impediments often rendered 
domestic and European careers mutually exclusive. “Especially in the early years, [...]Europol was not 
considered a particularly good career move” (Groenleer, 2009, p. 291). Some national systems, like the French 
one, simply offered better benefits and professional prospects. Europol, by comparison, could offer fewer 
incentives to police officers for moving to the supranational level (Interviewee 7). What is more, national 
police bodies often boycotted Europol outright or indirectly. In various cases, the flow of information from 
Europol to the domestic level was curbed, and vacancy notices did not always reach potential applicants 
because senior law enforcement officers were concerned it might lead to brain drain (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). 
Additionally, staff seconded to Europol often had slimmer or unaltered career prospects when returning to 
their national police force; if they wanted a future in their own domestic system at all, they often had to leave 
Europol prematurely and return to their original positions (Interviewee 24). Consequently, the development 
of some sort of entrepreneurship was perhaps essential for Europol’s institutional survival. By raising its 
public profile and proactively offering its services, the organisation could reassure police authorities that 
European and national policing were complimentary rather than a zero-sum game. 
Apart from bureaucratic resistance against recruitment to the supranational level, Europol’s pro-
integration entrepreneurship was a response to the different security cultures and policing mentalities of the 
Member States (Interviewees 21, 22, 27 & 32). Lack of trust remained one of the most significant problems 
among national officials and agencies involved in EU police cooperation (Interviewees 2, 7 & 29). 
Coordination between single police entities was already a challenge at the domestic level. Institutional 
rivalries and turf wars often hindered or prevented effective national police cooperation (Interviewee 27). 
When the Netherlands began to reform and part-centralise their police system in the late 1990s, this had 
likewise been met with strong reluctance from different local entities. One official involved in the process 
remarked: “one of the regional police chiefs told me I was taking away his most beautiful daughter. They 
were not pleased, there was a lot of competition” (Interviewee 32). Unsurprisingly perhaps, competition 
among national representatives also extended beyond their own countries. Security officials were often 
reluctant to share and exchange information with Europol, afraid of losing control and sceptical of diverging 
security and policing traditions. Germany for example strictly separated law enforcement and intelligence, 
whereas both were not structurally separated in the French and the British systems, where police and general 
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interior affairs were relatively integrated (Interviewees 14, 21 & 22). While British and German law 
enforcement authorities attached great importance to prevention, this did not constitute a priority in France 
and was not even included among the tasks of the police in Spain (Interviewees 22 & 27). These cultural 
differences presented significant obstacles to cooperation via Europol in the early 2000s. Police officials had 
so far mostly worked together on a bilateral and case-by-case basis and were not yet used to – and therefore 
highly sceptical if not opposed to – this new institutionalised, semi-centralised form of cooperation and 
general information-sharing via the EU level. 
In order to manage this wide-spread bureaucratic resistance, Europol officials launched an EU-wide 
public relations offensive in an attempt to build an organisational reputation, make its positive practical track 
record more visible and promote itself as coordination and socialisation platform to national police 
authorities. Representatives from Europol frequently travelled to European Member States to introduce the 
organisation and advertise its services, sometimes tailormade to the criminal problems faced by a country or 
authority – a process that one interviewee described as “building a clientele for Europol” (Interviewee 7). But 
Europol officials were not only active in the Member States, they also repeatedly voiced concerns about the 
shortcomings and restrictions of the Convention to their supranational counterparts in other EU institutions. 
As mentioned above, especially from 2004 onwards, Europol closely liaised with the Commission to 
emphasise the need for a new legal framework to the Council and to each EU presidency (Interviewee 21). 
Similar to the Commission, Europol harnessed public and functional pressure to shape state 
preferences in favour of EU police cooperation and the ECD in particular. Concerning public pressure, 
Europol sought to expand its reputation and actively leverage politicisation in an attempt to improve the 
willingness of Member States to cooperate. Intensive networking and public relations work constituted key 
elements of Europol’s strategy to build a positive public image. Senior officials and representatives of its 
management exploited every possible opportunity to raise the organisations profile through the media, 
visiting international conferences, reaching out to governments directly and speaking with national and local 
practitioners (Interviewee 7). Although Europol staff were initially hesitant about being able to force Member 
States to step up their involvement and support to the organisation, the management’s strategy of ‘power 
through public pressure’ paid off eventually (Interviewee 21). It was for instance primarily through Europol’s 
own advocacy in the wake of 9/11 that a counterterrorism task force was established at the organisation 
(Europol, 2001, p. 11). Harnessing the politicisation and political momentum in Brussels after the attacks, it 
could offer an additional venue to national policymakers for collective action and signalling control. Its 
entrepreneurship likewise surged in the aftermath of the Madrid and London bombings. Europol not only 
directly approached the affected governments with an offer for support, it managed to achieve a substantial 
increase in information exchange via its databases and communication channels as well as the establishment 
of an EU First Response Network at Europol (Interviewees 21 & 40). Of course, it could be argued that the 
crisis momentum of terror attacks only temporarily provided opportunities for supranational policy 
entrepreneurs. However, Europol was able to maintain and further develop advocacy beyond these 
politicising events. Its continuous involvement with the Member States and other EU actors for instance 
resulted in the right of the Europol Director to participate in Council meetings, a concession that had been 
achieved against the will of the Commission (ibid.).  
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Next to exploiting public pressure to further its own influence and standing, Europol itself generated 
functional pressure on policymakers to further integrate in the area of EU police cooperation. Through a 
growing array of services and unique products, the organisation gradually convinced EU governments and 
national police authorities of its practical merit and legitimacy. Its portfolio of more and more cross-national 
tools, resources and solutions was increasingly relevant to domestic police officials. “Europol became 
progressively interesting to national and local levels because of its practical track record. This started slowly 
at the beginning of the 2000s and then changed enormously and the demand skyrocketed” (Interviewee 32). 
Indeed, the use of Europol by Member States and third parties increased steadily and significantly between 
2000 and 2009 (see table 11). Through developing a public, corporate profile, an organisational reputation 
and practical track record, Europol had thus succeeded in promoting itself as key platform for EU police 
cooperation. Its entrepreneurship was presumably so successful because it managed to prove its value and 
justify its existence not only as coordination platform and agent but also as pro-active initiator and broker. 
Additionally, Europol acted as socialisation platform for domestic police authorities and deliberately sought 
to build trust and overcome bureaucratic resistance. Its policy leverage and influence on state preferences 
increased in line with its organisational entrepreneurship and reputation, creating a boomerang effect that 
raised its public image beyond the EU. The more non-EU countries and entities contacted Europol and began 
to cooperate via the organisation, the more its legitimacy as an agent was reinforced and the more functional 
pressure was created on Member States to likewise pursue and intensify cooperation through Europol 
(Interviewee 21). As one interviewee formulated it: “That’s the nice thing about the EU, once initial resistance 
and obstacles have been overcome, the process continues on its own. It was the case for Prüm, and it was the 
case for Europol” (Interviewee 40). Spill-over effects thus possibly likewise played a part in rendering 
Europol’s supranational entrepreneurship so successful. 
 
Table 11. New Cases Initiated at Europol (2000-2009). 
Cases initiated by Member States, ENUs, non-European Union states and international organisations. 
 
Source:   Author, based on Europol Annual Reports. 
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The emergence of Europol’s policy entrepreneurship is perhaps best described as ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ 
(Interviewees 7, 9, 21 & 30). By talking about Europol as a semi-autonomous actor – a justified entity in its 
own right within EU police cooperation – its representatives consistently enhanced the organisation’s 
reputation and legitimacy, which in turn fed into the image of Europol as the core of European policing. The 
more its officials managed to promote Europol and its services, and the more they were used by domestic 
law enforcement officers, the more demand was generated for further services and involvement of the 
agency. This snowball effect gradually but continuously raised not only the profile as Europol as an agent 
but also its legitimacy as initiator and principal in some regards. Like the Commission, the organisation 
deliberately harnessed functional and public pressure to create leverage on Member States, assert itself as a 
force in EU police cooperation and increasingly build a form of entrepreneurship that shaped state 
preferences. 
By the time the Council was discussing the ECD, Europol had built a solid practical track record as 
well as a clientele network beyond its original mandate. Although the organisation perhaps did not exert as 
much or as direct influence on governments as the European Commission with regard to the ECD, its 
continuous advocacy and role within EU police cooperation arguably helped shape state preferences in 
favour of integrating Europol into the EU framework. This influence would continue to grow in line with its 
institutional development and professionalisation, as the final chapter demonstrates (Interviewee 32). 
 
 
6.3 Institutional Choice in a Nutshell: State Preferences on the Three Dimensions 
of Differentiated Integration 
In the early 2000s, a number of developments shaped state preferences in favour of further integration in the 
area of EU police cooperation. Concretely, three factors seem to have mattered most: issue-specific 
interdependence, supranational policy entrepreneurship and politicisation in the wake of security crises. The 
above cases confirm the liberal intergovernmentalist hypothesis that high and growing interdependence 
drives Member States to prioritise EU cooperation and integration. First, external interdependencies, that is, 
an increasing interconnectedness in specific security threats, significantly shaped state preferences. Rising 
interdependencies in the areas of vehicle-related crime, terrorism and illegal migration for example played 
an essential part in the establishment and ultimate (part-)integration of EUCARIS and Prüm into the EU’s 
institutional framework. Similarly, increasing interdependence in money laundering, cybercrime and other 
areas of transnational organised crime crucially shaped state preferences towards furthering Europol’s role. 
Second, the emerging structures of EU police cooperation were intensifying internal or institutional 
interdependencies between domestic authorities. Following the creation of EUCARIS and Prüm, cross-border 
cooperation grew rapidly and produced a practical need for further professionalisation. The same applied to 
early-stage Europol. In all three cases, subnational officials and practitioners themselves favoured some sort 
of institutionalisation, leading eventually to the appointment of the EU as single reference point for data 
protection in the case of EUCARIS, the adoption of the Prüm Decisions replacing the intergovernmental 
treaty, and the naming of Europol as the EU’s official and central hub for police cooperation.  
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The early 2000s thus confirm the findings from the chapters on TREVI and the EDU. External issue-
specific interdependencies provided the initial impetus for the inception of cooperation among EU law 
enforcement authorities. A certain (semi-)institutional interconnectedness then quickly emerged among 
cooperating Member States in the early integration stage, thus producing additional functional pressure to 
formalise cooperation. The EU framework and Europol in particular presented effective means to solve 
collective action and coordination problems. However, the more asymmetrical these interdependencies were, 
the more likely Member States with high levels of interdependence strategically prioritised flexible 
integration.  
Supranational policy entrepreneurship likewise played an important role in furthering integration. 
This presents a striking change compared to TREVI and the EDU, where supranational actors had no or only 
very limited influence. From 2000 onwards, path-dependency, spill-over effects and proactive advocacy by 
EU actors began to increasingly shape the preferences of Member States. Resembling the causal mechanism 
employed by interdependence, earlier integration decisions were creating functional pressure on 
governments to continue and expand EU police cooperation. Not only did the sunk costs of establishing 
Europol and investing in common action among European law enforcement officials generate a certain path-
dependency, parallel developments related to the evolution of the EU made further integration among 
European law enforcement authorities indispensable. Additionally, EU actors pro-actively sought to promote 
supranational settings and venues for the further development of EU police cooperation. This is illustrated 
by a large range of integration initiatives, particularly on the part of the European Commission and Europol 
itself. The progressive association of EUCARIS with the EU framework had been substantially promoted by 
the Commission, as had the uniformity of governance related to EU agencies that eventually led to the 
integration of Europol through the ECD. As the 2000s progressed, in response to pro-active supranational 
advocacy, numerous instances of differentiation were transferred to the EU framework and central 
coordination placed in supranational hands. Europol and the Commission thus increasingly built a ‘clientele’ 
among the Member States and their law enforcement authorities.  
Finally, politicisation in the wake of security crises mattered significantly as ‘window of opportunity’ 
for the influence of interdependence and supranational entrepreneurship on state preferences. In particular, 
9/11, 11-M and the London bombings created important political momentum. Each terror attack generated 
a public debate on the state of affairs in European police cooperation that allowed the European Commission 
and Europol to promote themselves. Although politicisation in the aftermath of terror attacks – especially the 
sensation of crisis requiring immediate action – cannot alone sufficiently explain why Member States opted 
for deeper integration, it had a vital and positive impact on state preferences in the early 2000s. The cases 
studied in this chapter suggest that politicisation in conjunction with one of the other factors constitutes a 
sufficient condition for pro-integration preferences. Especially the combination of high interdependence and 
politicisation produced integration preferences with a sustainable and long-term effect in the area of EU 
police cooperation. Where public pressure reinforced functional pressure as causal mechanism, Member 
States prioritised substantial integration. This pattern can be observed throughout the 2000s, as the cases of 
EUCARIS, Prüm and also Europol demonstrate. What is more, various instances of initial differentiation such 
as the early EUCARIS exhibit a lack of politicisation and public pressure. Their ultimate integration into the 
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EU framework strikingly coincides with increasing salience or crisis momentum in the aftermath of 
politicising events.  
Compared to all integration initiatives before it, the ECD constituted an unprecedented leap in the 
integration of EU police cooperation, possibly still the most significant one to date. By transforming Europol 
into an EU agency, albeit decentralised, it substantially increased vertical integration by giving the Union and 
its institutions a formal role in the development and oversight of the organisation. Member States’ preferences 
to this end were primarily driven by interdependencies and supranational policy entrepreneurship. With 
regard to functional scope, the ECD presents the culmination of a process that had been started in the early 
2000s and quickly expanded the number of issue areas in Europol’s mandate. Here, external 
interdependencies mainly shaped the demand for a maximal range of policies and influenced state 
preferences in favour of more functional authority for Europol. Finally, horizontal integration was not 
furthered, since all EU Member States were already represented at Europol before the adoption of the ECD. 
However, the legal integration of Europol into the EU framework ensured full horizontal integration in the 
future, including new members of the Union. What is more, intensifying interdependencies drove state 
preferences progressively towards external differentiation of police cooperation via Europol. 
 
Vertical Integration 
In the early 2000s, centralisation of EU police cooperation accelerated noticeably. While it continued the trend 
that had started in the 1980s and 1990s, professionalisation of cooperation underwent a significant qualitative 
leap from 2000 onwards. The early Europol resembled a rather anarchical, decentralised authority with 
decision-making power in the hands of the Member States. Yet, European governments incrementally opted 
for equipping the organisation with more and farther-reaching powers and eventually transformed it into an 
EU entity, thus effectively handing over some control to the agency and relevant EU bodies. The ECD for 
instance gave Europol legal personality, thereby making it more than a mere agent of EU governments. This 
process was strongly driven by interdependencies and supranational policy entrepreneurship. Member 
States more and more relied on cooperating with one another due to a growing external interconnectedness 
in security threats and growing internal linkages within the relatively young institutional environment of EU 
police cooperation. Both produced functional pressure on Member States to continue the rationalisation 
process that had been started in the previous decades so that issue-specific interdependencies and collective 
action problems could be effectively managed. In the early 2000s, European countries consequently 
prioritised the further development of a common cooperation infrastructure at Europol, which necessarily 
entailed a certain technical and functional centralisation. “The successful development of the Europol 
Information System and the establishment of the secure telecommunication network linking Europol with 
the Europol national units of the Member States were cornerstones in this development of international law 
enforcement cooperation” (Storbeck, 2016, p. 22).  
In addition to interdependencies, supranational policy entrepreneurship and spill-over effects 
undoubtedly helped shape state preferences in favour of deeper integration. Even before the European 
Commission and Europol had assembled a basic advocacy capacity, functional spill-overs and path-
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dependency influenced Member States to pursue and deepen police cooperation via Europol. Although they 
still tended to rely on bilateral contacts, previous investments in the common organisation as well as its 
evolving network, unique operational services and products generated a demand for further vertical 
integration. The parallel development of the EU – most notably through the Lisbon Treaty – likewise created 
functional and cultivated spill-overs. The European Commission’s uniformity and harmonisation efforts at 
EU level produced various initiatives, which in turn made it increasingly possible for EU actors to shape EU 
police cooperation. Europol pro-actively lobbied for the centralisation of coordination in its hands, and 
frequently collaborated with the Commission in its advocacy of deeper integration. In their advocacy, both 
Europol and the Commission harnessed politicisation and crisis momentum to exert public pressure on EU 
governments. In this context, countries holding the Council presidency were perhaps most exposed to public 
expectations and political pressure to act (at EU level). They were arguably especially vulnerable to 
supranational policy entrepreneurship and cultivated spill-overs. It therefore seems hardly surprising that 
the Austrian Presidency – still under the impression of the Madrid and London bombings – followed the 
Commission’s proposal in 2006 and initiated discussions on the possible replacement of the Europol 
Convention with a Council decision. Similarly, many debatably supranational positions on vertical 
integration were included in the ECD when it was adopted in 2009.  
 
Functional Scope 
When Europol commenced operations in 1999, its functional scope was initially limited to “unlawful drug 
trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human 
beings and motor vehicle crime” (Art. 2(2), Europol Convention, 1995). While path-dependency as well as 
political spill-overs from earlier integration helped shape state preferences in favour of widening Europol’s 
functional scope, issue-specific interdependencies and functional spill-over effects acted as primary drivers 
to this end. The Convention already envisioned an expansion to other criminal areas, which were included 
as ‘laundry list’ in its annex. It paved the way for the ‘agent’ to develop a life of its own as supranational 
policy entrepreneur. However, Member States did not initially intend to substantially expand Europol’s 
mandated areas in the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. National interests and police priorities differed 
too much between countries to quickly agree on any issue beyond the original objectives, and terrorism 
remained a difficult subject due to its political dimension and the lack of a common definition.  
Yet, interconnectedness within the EU continued to rise steadily in the early 2000s. External trends 
such as globalisation and digitisation on the one hand, and internal developments related to deepening and 
widening the Union on the other, produced functional spill-over effects in the area of JHA and police 
cooperation. Interdependence was growing in various sectors, making it essential for Member States’ 
authorities to better cooperate. The increasing cases and spiralling costs associated with financial crime, 
money laundering in particular, acted as drivers of Protocol I to the Europol Convention, which expanded 
the organisation’s functional scope to this issue area. Similar functional pressure drove governments to widen 
Europol’s mandate to other serious forms of international crime through Protocol II. Spill-overs from 
integration in different domains were progressively having an effect on internal security in the Member States 
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and created a need to advance EU police cooperation. The introduction of the euro for example pushed state 
preferences towards tasking Europol with euro counterfeiting in 2001. Integration within the common market 
arguably impacted France to propose a competence for fighting cybercrime at Europol.  
Issue-specific interdependencies were reinforced positively by supranational policy entrepreneurs 
and crisis momentum. 9/11, 11-M and the London bombings not only demonstrated existing security 
interdependencies, they generated public-political pressure to act and an important pro-integration 
politicisation. Against this backdrop, Europol was able to promote itself and trigger an – at least temporary 
– shift of government preferences in favour of further involving the organisation and adding tasks to its 
portfolio. This included for example the establishment of a counterterrorism task force at Europol in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and the creation of an EU First Response Network following the London bombings. 
Interestingly, this interaction of politicisation and interdependence seems to be most prominent in the area 
of terrorism, where offences can perhaps more easily build crisis momentum than in low-profile issue areas. 
Against this backdrop, Member States opted for expanding Europol’s functional scope. The ECD widened 
the organisation’s competence to various broader fields, namely “organised crime, terrorism and other forms 
of serious crime” (Art. 4(1), Council Decision 2009/371/JHA). Whereas path-dependency and spill-overs 
from earlier integration possibly shaped state preferences more generally in favour of further competence 
areas for EU police cooperation, issue-specific interdependence presented the most important driver of 
Member States’ preferences on the way towards the ECD.  
 
Horizontal Integration 
Contrary to vertical integration and the functional scope of EU police cooperation, the ECD did not constitute 
any changes with regard to horizontal integration. All EU Member States were already part of Europol. 
However, in the early 2000s, governments formally confirmed this continuity of full horizontal integration in 
EU police cooperation, while external interdependencies influenced parallel external differentiation in 
practice. Concerning the former, internal interdependencies alongside supranational policy entrepreneurship 
pushed state preferences towards legally consolidating EU and Europol membership. On the one hand, the 
EU format was progressively proving its worth, and ties between the competent authorities of its members 
were gradually intensifying in most policy domains. A certain path-dependency and functional spill-overs 
thus generated a practical demand to maintain the same territorial focus in police cooperation. Integration in 
the common market and digital infrastructure or the Eastern enlargement likewise produced effects on police 
cooperation, requiring an operational emphasis on the EU level. EUCARIS and Prüm likewise demonstrate 
the influence of intra-EU interdependencies, which played a large part in shaping state preferences in favour 
of full horizontal integration. 
On the other hand, ‘territorial continuity’ of EU police cooperation was additionally shaped by 
supranational actors, primarily the Commission. Through a number of concrete integration initiatives, the 
European Commission successfully lobbied Member States with regard to prioritising the EU format for 
police cooperation in general. This can also be seen in the transfer or (part-)association to the EU context of 
many intergovernmental initiatives in the early 2000s. Whereas supranational policy entrepreneurship was 
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very low or absent at the time that EUCARIS and Prüm were launched, EU actors like Europol and the 
Commission increasingly gained a role in this issue area and progressively impacted state preferences 
towards full horizontal integration. In this vein, supranational policy entrepreneurs have become involved 
more and more in EU police cooperation and acted as horizontal integration advocates in a number of cases, 
such as pilot and avant-garde projects like FIU.net, ECIM, AROs, and the ECCP, which today is the EC3. The 
Commission’s entrepreneurship also played an essential part in how horizontal integration was captured in 
the ECD. Commission advocacy substantially shifted governmental preferences towards formally aligning 
Europol membership with EU membership. Already in 2003, Member States thus named Europol the central 
hub for EU police cooperation, and reiterated this commitment in the ECD, which officially transformed 
Europol into the EU’s law enforcement agency. 
In contrast to this horizontal integration continuity, growing European and global interdependencies 
in the early 2000s shaped state preferences increasingly in favour of practical external differentiation. Here 
again, functional spill-overs amplified pressure to extend police cooperation, at least informally, beyond the 
EU. The development of the EU’s AFSJ and particularly its external dimension required cooperation with 
non-EU states and bodies. In 1999, the European Council in Tampere had stressed the importance of this 
endeavour (European Council, 1999), followed by a Council decision authorising Europol’s Director to 
conclude cooperation agreements with third states and international organisations (European Council, 2000). 
This Decision likewise included a list of potential first partners with whom Europol should seek agreements, 
comprising amongst others Interpol, Canada, the US, Russia, Turkey, various Balkan countries and future 
EU accession states. The Hague Programme reiterated the necessity for enhancing external relations in the 
development of the AFSJ, especially in critical areas of police cooperation such as the fight against organised 
crime and terrorism (European Council, 2005). Europol accordingly concluded numerous operational and 
strategic cooperation agreements with third countries, international and EU entities in the early 2000s. These 
agreements enabled Europol to independently work together with these partners, although they were no 
formal members in the organisation and varied greatly in their applicable rules, extent of data exchange and 
degree of strategic or operational cooperation. 
 
In sum, EU police cooperation from 2000 onwards seems to confirm the neofunctionalist tenet that the degrees 
of cross-national interdependence and supranational entrepreneurship primarily drive the integration 
preferences of Member States. Depending on the relative (or asymmetrical) strength of both, they influence 
preference convergence or variation. However, the analysis of EU police cooperation between 2000 and 2009 
additionally supports new intergovernmentalist tenets that distinguish between early and later stages of 
integration, and claim that Member States might lose control of the process. Although EU governments opted 
for enhancing Europol’s role, they did not originally intend to integrate it into the supranational framework. 
Yet, the more issue areas Member States added to its responsibilities and the more powers they gave to the 
agency, the more path-dependency and spill-overs they created that increasingly justified Europol as an actor 
itself. The early 2000s consequently demonstrate how unintended consequences of initial cooperation 
decisions shaped future integration. Contrary to the decades before, the formation of state preferences on EU 
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police cooperation was more and more impacted by previous integration steps and the “long-run ‘feedback 
loop’ between state preferences and institutional choice” (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015a, p. 707). 
Furthermore, studying the processes leading to EUCARIS, Prüm and the adoption of the ECD 
confirms that a “mixture of ideational convergence[…and] institutional diversity [...]help us understand the 
intensification of integration” in EU police cooperation (Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 709). Diverging domestic 
security cultures, differing bureaucratic traditions and institutional environments complicated early stage 
cooperation and produced a functional need to further integrate. In this context, Europol increasingly acted 
as socialisation platform for European police officials and played an important role in building trust among 
Member States’ authorities. This observation in turn provides evidence for the claim that “supranational 
institutions are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union […and that they] act strategically: when faced with 
a favourable environment for entrepreneurialism they may well take advantage of it[…]” (ibid., p. 712). Both 
Europol and the European Commission acted accordingly.  
In the early 2000s, integration preferences on EU police cooperation were thus primarily driven by 
growing interdependencies and supranational policy entrepreneurship. Politicisation acted as sufficient 
condition in conjunction with one or both of these driving factors. If the findings of this chapter – and in fact 
these tenets of neofunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism – are to hold, the next and final chapter on 
Europol after 2009 should be able to demonstrate a continuity and increase of spill-over effects as well as 
supranational entrepreneurship in the formation of state preferences. One might moreover expect a further 
decrease of domestic bureaucratic resistance and differentiation initiatives as the integration of EU police 
cooperation advances. 
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7. Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation 
and Beyond 
When the ECD transformed Europol into the EU’s official law enforcement agency on 1 January 2010, it 
marked an unprecedented step in the integration of EU police cooperation. Nonetheless, barely six years 
later, Member States opted for yet another legal framework with the adoption of the Europol Regulation in 
May 2016, thus rendering the ECD obsolete. The Regulation arguably advanced integration by further 
shifting relative power towards the EU level in a number of regards. Not only did it alter the general voting 
rules in Europol’s Management Board from two-thirds to simple majority for most decisions, it also 
strengthened Europol’s standing vis-à-vis the Member States by widening its analytical capacity and allowing 
it to ask Member States to initiate criminal investigations and operational cooperation. The Regulation 
additionally introduced formal mandates for a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) and the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) in the agency’s governance. The Regulation thus marks the peak of 
integration dynamics in EU police cooperation to date.
The post-ECD period and current Europol demonstrate a continuity of various trends and drivers 
from the early 2000s. While rising interdependencies and intensifying spill-over effects had already been 
important enhancers of integration preferences around 2000, they likewise shaped state preferences on 
Europol after 2010. Internal and external interdependence among European police authorities deepened 
further, through cooperation structures but also in the fight against common threats, and a steadily growing 
nexus between different areas of crime and terrorism. Thanks to Europol’s new status as EU agency and 
previous developments, the organisation had gained a constant foothold as actor in EU police cooperation 
and was increasingly emancipating itself. It continued to benefit substantially from processes that Member 
States had set in motion in the early 2000s, particularly spill-over effects from the Lisbon Treaty. 
Supranational policy entrepreneurship likewise continued to play a role and even increased significantly 
after 2010. Politicising events – especially the crisis momentum from terror attacks – provided windows of 
opportunity for EU actors to shape state preferences in favour of further integration. Although politicisation 
did not act as independent driving factor, it was frequently present in a set of jointly sufficient conditions 
that influenced governments to pursue EU action. In the following, this chapter more elaborately investigates 
the impact of these driving factors on state preferences after the ECD. It first assesses the emergence of a 
‘centre approach’ at Europol, that is, the creation of multiple centres of expertise, ranging from cybercrime 
and intellectual property crime to counterterrorism and migrant smuggling, and second, turns to the 
adoption of the Europol Regulation.  
 
 
7.1 A Centre Approach on the Path to an Ever More Sophisticated EU Actor 
The ECD formally confirmed Europol as the EU’s central hub for police cooperation and information 
exchange. Following its transformation into an EU agency in 2010, Europol quickly sought to promote and 
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establish itself as centre of law enforcement expertise with a focus on criminal analysis in support of the 
Member States. To this end, three dedicated centres were launched at the agency between 2013 and early 
2016, namely the EC3, the ECTC and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) (Europol, n.d.-c). They 
all arguably presented reactions to rising interdependence in these issue areas as well as supranational policy 
entrepreneurship in the wake of politicising events. Globalisation and digitisation acted as key transformers 
of governments’ preferences in this context. However, the extent to which they were able to effectuate 
integration at Europol differed across issue areas. Only in the cyber security domain was functional pressure 
from growing interdependence the primary driver of state preferences, and the EC3 accordingly a rather 
operationally-informed integration initiative. By contrast, governmental preferences to launch the ECTC and 
the EMSC were strongly shaped by public pressure and post-crisis politicisation. The establishment of 
Europol’s operational centres between the 2009 ECD and the 2016 Europol Regulation demonstrate that high 
interdependence may independently act as sufficient condition for pro-integration preferences, while 
politicisation acts as a multiplier and usually forms part of a set of sufficient conditions. The remainder of 
this section elaborates on the causal processes and conditions that shaped Member States’ preferences 
accordingly and led to the creation of each centre at Europol. In the following, it looks – in chronological 
order of establishment – at the EC3, the ECTC, and the EMSC. 
 
The European Cybercrime Centre 
The EC3 was launched in January 2013, falling under one of five strategic objectives defined by the 2010 EU 
Internal Security Strategy (ISS) (Europol, 2014b, 2014c; cf. European Commission, 2010, p. 9). It officially made 
Europol the EU’s central hub for the fight against cybercrime and extended its mandate considerably. Its 
activities within the EC3 were to cover a broad range of topics, including cybercrime by organised criminal 
groups, online child sexual abuse and cyberattacks (European Commission, 2012c, p. 4). However, long 
before the EC3 commenced operations, Europol had begun to develop a capacity with regard to cybercrime 
(see figure 10). In 2002, its mandate had first been extended to this issue area following the French Council 
Presidency’s proposal from 2000. A High Tech Crime Centre (HTCC) had been launched at Europol in the 
same year, although the centre remained very small with only four officials until 2010 (European Union 
Committee, 2010, p. 124). All in all, the creation of the EC3 was primarily driven by interdependencies and 
supranational policy entrepreneurship. Politicisation only played a complementary role as enabler of the 
former two in shifting state preferences towards vertical integration in the cyber domain. This section first 
investigates the role played by interdependence, and then turns to politicisation and supranational 
entrepreneurship. The process towards the EC3 illustrates how these driving factors gradually and jointly 
built political momentum, and influenced state preferences in favour of integration.  
 
INTERDEPENDENCIES: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION AND THE INTERNET 
Growing internal and external interdependencies in cyberspace were key drivers to this end. International 
police cooperation on cyber security was becoming increasingly important in the light of globalisation and 
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digitisation (Interviewees 32, 35, 36 & 39; Maaßen, 2018). These phenomena were more and more connecting 
analogue and digital worlds, and were rapidly transforming social interactions everywhere. Not only were 
the interplay and interconnectedness among humans, physical systems, technology, and cyberspace growing, 
the intensity and professionalisation of emerging networks was unprecedented (Interviewees 11, 32 & 37). 
As a consequence, territorial delimitations were becoming superfluous in many regards; new forms of crime 
and illicit activities online were exploiting this space outside conventional forms of governance. As one 
interviewee stated: “The Internet and especially the Internet of Things have expanded the attack surface of 
nation-states everywhere. They have completely transformed the business model of criminals. Everything is 
cyber nowadays: terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and so on” (Interviewee 28). Empirical 
evidence from the day-to-day operations of domestic police officials was demonstrating the rapid emergence 
of cyber elements across almost all criminal issue areas, and its cross-country magnitude as ‘borderless crime’ 
(Interviewees 36, 37, 38 & 39).  
Increasing interdependencies therefore had a massive impact on police work and by extension on 
the preferences of Member States. Relying on traditional unilateral or informal multilateral models was no 
longer possible to effectively combat quickly evolving “forms of crime that did and could not exist thirty 
years ago” (Interviewee 35). In the cyber realm, illicit actors posed the same security threats and challenges 
to domestic law enforcement authorities, irrespective of the country (Interviewee 37). The growing digital 
and global interconnectedness among countries additionally facilitated an increase in the complexity and 
sophistication of other types of crime. Transnational organised crime benefited tremendously from the rise 
of the Internet and mobile communications technology. Whereas criminal activities in the late 1990s had still 
been carried out by hierarchical, territory-based groups relying mostly on analogue means, from the turn of 
the millennium they were becoming increasingly international, resembling global supply chains in their 
transactional, network-based structures (Interviewees 13, 25, 26 & 44). Moreover, the Internet significantly 
extended the scope of illicit activities online. Requiring comparatively low-cost, low-tech means on the one 
hand, and lacking robust law enforcement and governance structures, it potentially made cybercrime 
available to everybody at any time (Interviewee 28). Unsurprisingly, this was progressively noticeable in day-
to-day policing; security threats were exploiting intensifying global interconnectivity and were no longer 
manageable nationally. 
In addition to external interdependencies, internal interdependencies were likewise rising and 
exerting functional pressure on EU Member States to step up police cooperation. Especially the emerging EU 
structures and systems – not only related to police and internal security cooperation but to the Union more 
generally – were becoming a potential target to malicious cyber activities. Somewhat ironically, the 
professionalisation and digitisation of central cooperation tools originally intended to strengthen EU police 
cooperation were now coming back to haunt practitioners by expanding the attack surface to the EU level 
(Interviewees 16 & 20). Threats from cyberspace were growing along with digital interconnectivity. 
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POLITICISATION: LEARNING FROM CRISIS EVENTS 
Notwithstanding the functional pressure produced by intensifying interconnectivity in the cyber realm, 
politicisation ultimately triggered states to act on their preferences. A series of politicising events in particular 
illustrated just how interconnected countries were becoming, and how exposed governments were to threats 
from cyberspace. These were, once again, 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings one the one hand, as well 
as the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 (see figure 10). The September 11 attacks of 
2001 first brought cyber on the radar of security authorities in Europe and the US. The involvement and 
deliberate use of the Internet in the planning, organisation and execution of this act of terrorism raised the 
salience of cyberspace among practitioners  (Interviewees 27 & 35). Especially the 2004 Madrid and 2005 
London bombings (11-M and 6/6 respectively) acted as key crisis events in the generation of political 
momentum. They made European security authorities drastically aware of the opportunities cyberspace 
offered to terrorists, not only criminals, as well as the chances for networking and cooperation between the 
two of them. What is more, the Internet clearly acted as multiplier of radical and extremist content. 
Recruitment and radicalisation were no longer reliant on mouth-to-mouth propaganda in an age where 
information was freely accessible and diffused online (Interviewee 28; Maaßen, 2018). 
The terror attacks in Madrid and London politicised cyber security ‘by proxy’ and generated 
functional spill-over effects (cf. Carrapiço & Farrand, 2018). They illustrated not only interconnectedness in 
the fields of terrorism and organised crime but also in cyberspace; fighting the former two at EU level more 
and more required combatting cybercrime as well. In this vein, post-crisis momentum and functional spill-
overs helped turn cyber into a field of its own and into a priority for EU police cooperation (Interviewees 27 
& 35). This can be seen in a number of governmental integration initiatives in the early 2000s. In the aftermath 
of the Madrid bombings in 2004, European heads of state or government agreed to develop a strategy and 
action plan to combat radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2005c, p. 
1). The strategy was adopted one year later and included measures to counter terrorist use of the Internet 
(Council of the European Union, 2005a). It especially stressed the importance of collective action at EU level 
and highlighted the role of the European Commission in this context. Following the 2005 London bombings,  
the Commission – upon request from the Council – “announced its intention to explore possibilities of 
tackling of content used to radicalise individuals for terrorism on the Internet” (Council of the European 
Union, 2007, p. 2; cf. European Commission, 2005). At the national level, Member States launched the ‘Check 
the Web’ project at Europol in May 2007 (see figure 10). ‘Check the Web’ was established as central 
information portal and technical platform for the collection and storage of data related to Islamist terrorist 
propaganda and radical content online (Counter Terrorism Unit, Europol, 2012). The original proposal had 
come from the German subnational level, an initiative by the German BKA (Council of the European Union, 
2007; Deutscher Bundestag, 2015, p. 1). The project was first discussed multilaterally within the G6-format in 
the spring of 2006 and thereby outside the EU framework (Interviewees 35 & 40; cf. Spongenberg, 2007). 
Germany deliberately opted for launching the platform as a smaller pilot with only a few Member States, 
because domestic capacities related to cyber security varied greatly across countries (Interviewees 25 & 26). 
It was simply considered easier and more efficient to initially adopt a flexible approach with an avant-garde  
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group of states and circumvent formal intergovernmental or EU channels. The establishment of ‘Check the 
Web’ thus strongly resembles the creation of Prüm and especially EUCARIS, which likewise originated from 
the subnational level and whose initial differentiation was similarly driven by practitioners’ interest to 
quickly advance the project and achieve operational results. Strong asymmetries in existing capacities as well 
as subnational policy entrepreneurship consequently played a crucial role in shaping state preferences in 
favour of (initial) differentiation in the case of ‘Check the Web.’ 
Comparable to the cases of Prüm and EUCARIS, politicisation helped shift preferences towards 
integration and led to the formal transfer of ‘Check the Web’ to Europol, thereby extending it to all Member 
States. The political momentum generated by 6/6 as well as expectations related to the Council Presidency 
that Germany assumed in January 2007 generated significant public pressure on German policymakers to 
act. The same logic of political legacy that influenced Germany to propose the integration of the Prüm Treaty 
into the EU framework also applied to the issue area of cyber. ‘Check the Web’ was subsequently established 
at Europol in May 2007. Although the German Council Presidency initially took a lead in the organisation of 
the expert meetings that would accompany the project through regular reunions, this responsibility was soon 
handed over to Europol (Council of the European Union, 2007a, p. 5). Transferring the project to Europol not 
only formally widened the agency’s functional scope to the area of cyberspace and advanced horizontal 
integration in this issue area by extending cooperation to all Member States, it furthermore strengthened 
vertical integration by giving Europol a key role in the coordination of activities. 
While public pressure and political momentum in the aftermath of the Madrid and London 
bombings certainly triggered the integration of ‘Check the Web’ at Europol, they also illustrated growing 
interdependence and the increasing relevance of the cyber realm as a multiplier thereof. Pro-integration 
preferences were shaped primarily by high and skyrocketing interdependencies in the area of cyber. At the 
respective Council meeting of 22-23 May 2007 that discussed the launch of the project and measures to 
counter terrorist use of the Internet, Member States underlined: 
“It is hardly possible for one individual member state to cover all suspicious terrorism related 
activities on the Internet. [...]In all of this work the activities of the various actors (Member States, 
Commission, Europol, SitCen, et al.) have to be coordinated in a targeted way.” (Council of the 
European Union, 2007a, p. 3) 
Two other crises demonstrated this growing functional pressure to cooperate and thus impacted integration 
preferences in this issue area: the cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively. On 
27 April 2007, Estonia was hit by a series of Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks targeting its critical 
infrastructure. The attacks continued through 18 May, “shut[ting] down the websites of all government 
ministries, two major banks, and several political parties[...as well as affecting] the parliamentary email 
server” (Herzog, 2011, p. 51; cf. Ruus, 2008). Like most other EU Member States, Estonia’s critical 
infrastructure relied increasingly on the Internet and electronic forms of communication and information 
processing. Accordingly, the cyberattacks were able to take down a large share of online services and thus 
significantly disrupt the day-to-day business of government officials and ordinary citizens alike 
(Interviewees 25 & 26).  
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The attacks – unprecedented in their magnitude – were the first to demonstrate the potential pitfalls 
of digitisation, if attackers could exploit cyberspace as entry point to the electronically interconnected 
national infrastructures of entire countries. While 9/11, 11-M and 6/6 had only politicised cyber by proxy, 
the cyberattacks on Estonia illustrated the emerging threat from cyberspace and cyberterrorism. 
Cyberterrorism may be defined as “the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national 
infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a 
government or civilian population” (Lewis, 2002, p. 1). The role of globalisation and digitisation in this 
context seems fairly obvious. With regard to the cyberattacks against Estonia, Herzog (2011, p. 49) asserts 
that both “have enabled transnational groups—such as the Russian diaspora—to avenge their grievances by 
threatening the sovereignty of nation-states in cyberspace.” Indeed, most malicious traffic that hit Estonia 
between 27 April and 18 May 2007 had come from other countries, and directions for targeting Estonian 
websites as part of the DDoS attacks had been distributed online (Ottis, 2008, p. 164). While the cyberattacks 
on Estonia served as “a wake-up call” for European governments (Interviewees 25 & 26), they could have 
been much more serious, had they been able to affect more critical systems and infrastructure, and completely 
halt public and political everyday life (Herzog, 2011, p. 54). Nonetheless, the attacks practically demonstrated 
the caveats of digital interconnectedness and the potential of cyberspace for abuse by criminal and terrorist 
groups.  
While the experience of the 2007 DDoS attacks certainly helped reinforce Member States’ 
determination to better cooperate on cyber matters and created an opening for Germany’s proposal to launch 
‘Check the Web’ at Europol, the cyberattacks against Georgia of August 2008 presented the final political 
flashpoint in the series of politicising events that shaped state preferences in favour of further integration. 
They ultimately enabled the foundation of the EC3. Beginning on 20 July 2008, Georgian servers were flooded 
with malicious traffic (Korns & Kastenberg, 2009, p. 60 ff.; Markoff, 2008). However, a second, considerably 
larger round of DDoS attacks followed only a few weeks later in early August. The initial wave was mainly 
directed towards websites of Georgia’s government and media, whereas later ones targeted the servers of 
banks, corporations and public institutions (Interviewees 18 & 25; Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013, p. 24). 
A large number of servers were shut down by the attacks and continued to disrupt government activities and 
communication throughout August (Hart, 2008; Markoff, 2008). The attacks paralysed Georgia’s banking 
system for multiple days, and thus had an economic impact as well (Corbin, 2009; Shakarian et al., 2013, p. 
27). As a result, the country was increasingly cut off electronically and isolated from the outside world. Yet, 
similar to the Estonian cyberattacks, the result could have been much worse had it not been for “Georgia’s 
limited Internet infrastructure” (Markoff, 2008). 
The 2008 DDoS attacks against Georgia have been described as “the birth of true, operational cyber 
warfare[...and] the most significant development ever seen in the field of information security or cyber 
conflict studies” (I. Thomson, 2008). Whereas the July attacks had still been widely considered cybercrime, 
strong evidence suggested that Russia might have been involved in the August wave, which would make it 
an act of war (White, 2018, p. 9). Indeed, the peak of the DDoS attacks against Georgia in August 2008 
coincided timely with physical Russian military action as part of the Russian-Georgian war (Korns & 
Kastenberg, 2009, p. 60). Moreover, the malicious traffic that was assailing Georgian servers was coming from 
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outside the country and the origin of the malicious software could be traced back to hosting services in Russia 
(Shakarian, 2011; Shakarian et al., 2013, p. 28 f.). The cyberattacks are now widely regarded as a targeted 
cyberoperation within Russia’s information warfare against Georgia in the context of the Russian-Georgian 
war. As such, it presents the first case of hybrid warfare, employing both cyberspace and conventional 
methods alongside each other (ibid.; p. 24 ff.).  
The 2008 DDoS attacks undoubtedly had a tremendous psychological impact on governments 
around the world but especially in Europe and the US. First and foremost, they demonstrated how digital 
interdependencies could threaten the security of entire nation-states and how the Internet was widening the 
attack surface and number of potential attackers from hierarchical, criminal groups to potentially every 
individual online. “The cyberattacks of the Russia-Georgia War provide empirical evidence of the extent to 
which cyberspace empowers third-party non-state actors in modern conflict” (White, 2018, p. 5). Although 
the attacks can still not be clearly attributed to the Russian government, evidence strongly suggests the 
involvement of Russia-based non-state actors (European Union Committee, 2010, p. 11; Nazario, 2009; White, 
2018, p. 6). This included criminal groups, professional hackers and ordinary citizens. Information regarding 
the cyberattacks was freely provided and spread via social media, and according instructions as well as the 
malicious software itself were easily downloadable online, thus enabling private individuals to participate in 
the attacks (Korns & Kastenberg, 2009, pp. 65–66). Additionally, even though the malicious traffic was 
directed at Georgia, global interdependencies made every country or entity with digital ties to Georgia a 
potential target. Insufficient cyber security or independent action of private companies in the face of the 
August 2008 attacks could possibly affect the country where these firms were based. By way of example, the 
emergency transfer of Georgian government websites to the servers of an American web-hosting enterprise 
– in an attempt to escape the DDoS attacks, yet with no involvement of the American Government – suddenly 
extended the list of targets to the US (White, 2018, pp. 9–10). Similarly, the transfer of Foreign Ministry web 
content from Georgia to Google servers in the US heightened the potential for spill-over attacks on American 
entities (Korns & Kastenberg, 2009, p. 67). The 2008 cyberattacks on Georgia thus drastically illustrated how 
the Internet linked previously unconnected parties across the globe and thereby significantly raised the threat 
level emanating from cyberspace.  
The cyberattacks that respectively targeted Estonia and Georgia constituted a wake-up call to 
governments in the EU and beyond. They drastically raised the salience of cyber as an issue area and 
underlined the need for international cooperation in times of globalisation and digital interconnectedness 
(Interviewees 36, 37, 38 & 39). Interestingly, contrary to the crisis momentum generated in the aftermath of 
9/11, 11-M and 6/6, politicisation following the cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia was largely of a 
political nature. Rather than producing public pressure among European constituencies, the incidents 
triggered political pressure at EU and international level to prevent similar attacks in the future (ibid.). “The 
attacks in Estonia and Georgia changed everything. Now cyber is high on the political agenda everywhere” 
(Interviewee 38). This seems to confirm findings from the previous chapter regarding the lack of politicisation 
in the public eye of some issue areas compared to other more ‘high-profile’ ones. Although fields like cyber 
may well become politicised by proxy, that is, in conjunction with other issue areas like terrorism, and thus 
rise in salience among practitioners and government officials, they seem to be less likely to become politicised 
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independently or among individuals and civil society (ibid.; Interviewee 33). Perhaps this is best explained 
by the lack of a clear attribution of legal responsibility for protecting individuals in cyberspace and the limited 
visibility of cybercrime and cyberterrorism as well as their consequences in the everyday lives of citizens 
(ibid.). In contrast to physical attacks like the bombings in Madrid and London that presented a threat to life, 
the cyberattacks on Estonia and Georgia possibly exhibited more of a danger to the functioning and 
sovereignty of nation-states rather than the immediate safety of national citizens. Additionally, the extent of 
the DDoS incidents – illustrating spill-over effects and transnational interdependencies in cyberspace – was 
mostly visible to security practitioners and officials instead of the general public. This might clarify why the 
terrorist attacks of the early 2000s were able to generate relatively higher public salience and pressure 
compared to the aftermath of the cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia.  
The DDoS attacks generated significant political momentum at the national and EU level and shifted 
state preferences further towards integration. Post-crisis expectations at the level of national practitioners 
influenced governments to develop National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSS) that recognised the growing 
transnational and thereby possibly EU dimension in this issue area (Interviewees 21, 22, 24, 27 & 35). Various 
Member States for the first time included cyber security and defence as priority areas in their national security 
strategies, including European and international elements. On the basis of a White Paper on National Defence 
and Security that was adopted in June 2008, France pursued action at EU level in this area as part of its 
national strategy (Interviewees 28 & 31; cf. UK House of Lords European Union Committee, 2010, p. 125). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly coinciding with the French Council Presidency in the second half of 2008, France 
presented an according proposal. As a result, the Presidency tasked Europol with the creation of the ECCP, 
a “platform for reporting offences noted on the Internet” and asked it to “coordinate [the] European response 
to Internet-related crime” (Quillé, 2009, p. 6).  
 
EMERGING SUPRANATIONAL POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE CYBER REALM 
The attacks against Estonia and Georgia opened a window of opportunity for supranational policy 
entrepreneurship (see figure 10). Europol benefitted directly from the political momentum. It not only acted 
on the invitation of the French Council Presidency to establish the ECCP, the agency pro-actively “proposed 
to open a dedicated [Analysis Work File, an] AWF”34 to support domestic authorities in combatting 
cybercrime by organised groups (Quillé, 2009, p. 7). AWFs constitute formal projects at Europol in direct 
support of investigations into related criminal cases in the Member States (Europol, n.d.-b). This effectively 
enables “Europol specialists[...to] prioritise resources” and assume a pro-active, central role in the cross-
national analysis of related data and the coordination of information exchange and operational cooperation 
(ibid.). Opening the AWF ‘Cyborg’ at Europol effectively widened its involvement beyond the mere 
development and hosting of the ECCP technical platform to a pro-active analytical role. In addition to 
Europol, the European Commission leveraged the political momentum in the aftermath of the large-scale 
 
34 Articles 14(1 & 2) of the Council Decision (2009/371/JHA) enable Europol to “store, modify, and use data concerning 
criminal offences” in AWFs “for the purposes of analysis.” They would later be renamed as Focal Points and then Analysis 
Projects respectively. 
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cyberattacks to push state preferences towards EU cooperation on cyber matters. Following the adoption of 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC in December 2008, by which Member States committed to evaluate the need 
for further action to protect European critical (cyber) infrastructure, the Commission presented an according 
EU strategy and action plan to the Council in early 2009 (European Commission, 2009b). In its 
communication, the Commission suggested among other things to prioritise the establishment of Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in all Member States and proposed several actions at EU level. In the 
light of the incidents in Estonia and Georgia, the initiative was positively received and adopted as initial 
“framework for coordination and cooperation ‘to engage Member States, the private sector and civil society’” 
(European Union Committee, 2010, p. 19). 
Despite the positive momentum in favour of EU collective action in the fight against threats from 
cyberspace, not every European government developed a strong pro-integration preference in the wake of 
these crisis events. By contrast, the UK – albeit one of the first Member States to adopt a NCSS – did not 
include in its strategy “a single reference to the EU by name” (UK House of Lords European Union 
Committee, 2010, p. 17; cf. Cyber Security Strategy of the UK, 2009). This national approach to cyber security 
quickly came under fire as British practitioners and political circles increasingly debated global 
interdependencies. An in-depth inquiry was initiated in October 2009 to assess the potential role for the EU 
in the protection against cyberattacks (European Union Committee, 2010). The final report, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, underlined the transnational character of cyberspace and the Internet, and stressed the need 
to strengthen the international outlook in the UK’s NCSS. Nonetheless, the EU was only seen as “second best” 
option, since external interdependencies in this issue area were global in nature (ibid., p. 17). Comparable to 
the rationale underlying the initiation of the TREVI-Group in the 1970s, British policymakers preferred 
universal membership in the common fight against cybercrime and other cyber-related threats. “[T...]he 
Internet operates as a global phenomenon and does not recognise borders,” noted a Government statement 
(ibid.).  
Internal interdependence and path-dependency ultimately trumped the global interconnectedness 
in threats, and swayed the British preference towards the EU format. Yet again resembling the TREVI case, 
cooperation structures at international level were weak at best, often informal and ad-hoc. They did not 
constitute an actual institutional alternative to the rather well-established EU format. Although the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) seemed like an obvious choice, persisting disagreement over common 
definitions and technical standards rendered the prospect of effective cooperation difficult, even unlikely 
(Interviewees 16, 35, 36 & 37; cf. UK House of Lords European Union Committee, 2010, p. 25 f.). What is more, 
institutional interdependencies within the EU were relatively higher and formal cooperation structures 
already in place. Cybercrime had been incorporated into Europol’s areas of competence in 2002 and a number 
of related projects had been successfully launched at the organisation by 2009, including the HTCC, ‘Check 
the Web,’ the ECCP and the AWF ‘Cyborg’ (see figure 10). Accordingly, Member States were increasingly 
internally interlinked by then and relied on each other’s response, defence and resilience capacities 
(Interviewees 1, 18, 23, 25, 26 & 28; Krings, 2018; Münch, 2018; UK House of Lords European Union 
Committee, 2010, p. 6).  
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While high intra-EU interconnectivity paired with the lack of global institutional alternatives in the 
cyber domain account for the horizontal shift of the British preference towards EU police cooperation, 
institutional linkages and path-dependency can potentially explain why Member States ultimately opted for 
deeper integration, including the creation of the EC3. A lack of formalised cooperation produced significant 
collective action problems in the day-to-day work of EU practitioners and generated functional pressure to 
integrate. Whereas the ultimate responsibility for cyber security continued to lie with national governments, 
the majority of cyber incidents were local manifestations of global phenomena. Insufficient cross-border 
coordination and diverging domestic strategies challenged police officials when combatting online threats. 
Different understandings of cyber security and asymmetrical cyber capacities complicated cooperation. 
Although most European NCSS included “general cyber crime and e-spionage type of threats,” they varied 
considerably concerning what constituted a threat, how to define cyber security, and the extent to which they 
emphasised cooperation at EU and international level (Luiijf, Besseling, & de Graaf, 2013, p. 5). Perhaps even 
more importantly, Member States varied greatly in their dependence on the Internet and their cyber security 
and defence capabilities (Interviewees 7, 18, 19, 25 & 26). In an ever more connected landscape of EU 
information systems and electronically interlinked national infrastructures, the potential attack surface of a 
single country was de facto extended to all Member States; a weak cyber security capacity in one country 
posed a risk to all. The British inquiry accordingly concluded that this policy domain indeed presented “a 
legitimate area for the EU to be concerned about, and that it had some role to play[...] as bringing the Member 
States with less developed systems for handling cyber-attacks up to the level of the most advanced” 
(European Union Committee, 2010, pp. 15–16). By 2010, the need for international police cooperation on cyber 
issues had thus become an undisputed reality among politicians and law enforcement officials in view of “an 
exponential growth [of cyber security risks] over the past decade, while the ability to adapt to and counter 
these risks[...was] lagging behind.” (Interviewee 37; cf. Wall & Williams, 2013). 
EU actors exploited this political momentum and substantially contributed to the formation of pro-
integration preferences among Member States. Around 2010, supranational policy entrepreneurship was 
perhaps increasingly enabled by political spill-overs. Integration decisions of the Member States from the late 
1990s and early 2000s were beginning to show effect and facilitate cultivated spill-overs as an influence on 
state preferences. The ECD had granted Europol a new organisational self-concept (Interviewees 5, 10 & 30). 
It could now promote its services and EU collective action from a completely different point of departure 
thanks to its much more stable standing as the EU’s official law enforcement agency. First and foremost, 
however, functional and public pressure opened the floodgates to supranational policy entrepreneurship and 
were strategically leveraged by EU actors in the promotion of vertical integration. In the light of growing 
internal and external interdependence as well as post-crisis politicisation, policymakers were faced with 
public pressure to demonstrate strength and take action on the one hand, and with functional pressure to 
manage intensifying collective action problems in practice. It was politically difficult to justify a national 
course of action in view of these developments (Interviewees 14, 21 & 27). And supranational actors were 
able to capitalise on this situation. Europol for instance continued to reiterate the emergence of new forms of 
crime due to the “increasing ‘technicalisation’” everywhere, and the growing danger of virtual organised 
crime groups and ‘high-tech crime’ to develop “into a principal criminal threat” (UK House of Lords 
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European Union Committee, 2010, p. 124; cf. Europol, 2009a, p. 22). It repeatedly stressed the need for intra-
EU harmonisation with regard to cyber capabilities: “There is clear asymmetrical development; some MS 
[Member States] are forging ahead with great advances in certain areas, whilst other MS lag behind in terms 
of technology” (European Union Committee, 2010, p. 16).  
Not only Europol was lobbying for a stronger focus on the EU with regards to cybercrime and cyber 
security. The Commission likewise played a major role in advocating the EU as primary venue for police 
cooperation. Following the DDoS attacks against Estonia in April 2007, the European Commission published 
a Communication setting out steps “Towards a general policy on the fight against cybercrime” (European 
Commission, 2007a). Although the document acknowledged the legal limitations of the EU’s competence in 
this intergovernmental policy domain, it listed a number of possible measures and actively lobbied 
governments to include the Commission and pursue EU action alongside national measures (ibid., p. 9). Most 
importantly, however, the Commission alluded to the possible creation of a “central EU cyber crime contact 
point” (ibid.), the first formal mention of what would eventually become the EC3. Yet, the suggestion was 
not embraced by national policymakers. Only in 2010 would supranational entrepreneurs be able to generate 
enough momentum to shift state preferences accordingly. 
While no one politicising event can be singled out that sparked the launch of the EC3, EU actors 
leveraged the aggregate political momentum that had built progressively since the early 2000s, particularly 
in the aftermath of the multiple crises mentioned above. By harnessing both functional pressure from 
practical interdependencies and public concerns in relation to cyber security and organised crime, Europol 
and especially the Commission managed to develop a sustainable entrepreneurship that influenced Member 
States’ preferences (Interviewees 12, 13 & 31; cf. Buono, 2012, p. 334). Amidst a series of cyberattacks by hacker 
groups like Anonymous and LulzSec at the beginning of 2011 that showcased the vulnerability of increasing 
electronic interconnectedness among countries (cf. Coleman, 2013), the European Commission stressed to 
Member States that: “[...t]he threat is very much a real one. The number of cyber attacks in the world is on 
the rise and the cost of cybercrime is skyrocketing” (Malmström, 2011, p. 1). Moreover, Commission and 
Europol staff coordinated closely to raise the salience of this topic and build awareness among EU 
governments that the Internet was rapidly digitising crime and offering new business opportunities for 
criminals and individuals alike – “crime as a service” that was easily accessible online (Interviewees 17, 19, 
24 & 28). By highlighting the economic and financial losses and societal costs associated with cybercrime in 
particular, supranational entrepreneurs were drawing the attention of Member States to the physical effects 
of digital causes, the interdependence between cyberspace and the real world (Interviewees 2, 5, 10, 16, 17 & 
18). As a consequence, it was becoming “extremely rare that one ha[...d] to discuss the necessity of 
international cooperation with police officials and national authorities” (Interviewee 35). 
Yet, European governments only chose to pursue concerted action at EU level in 2010 in the face of 
high politicisation. Had growing interdependencies and supranational advocacy sufficed as drivers of state 
preferences, EU action and steps towards deeper integration would have possibly been taken sooner. Member 
States knew that digital interconnectivity was rapidly increasing. Since at least 2006, the Commission and 
other actors had highlighted time and again that the “number of cyber crimes is growing and criminal 
activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated and internationalised” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 
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2). As early as 2004, Europol had reported the evolving “diversification into multi-crime activities” alongside 
the use of the Internet in different criminal areas (Europol, 2004b, p. 11). Years before the DDoS attacks, its 
reports explicitly stressed the relevance of the Internet and technology as “main facilitator[s]” of organised 
crime (Europol, 2006, p. 18).  
This section has already shown how the 2007 and 2008 DDoS attacks had an important politicising 
effect and created the necessary political momentum that led Member States to initiate both the creation of 
the ECCP and the AWF ‘Cyborg’ at Europol. However, they not only provided a window of opportunity for 
Europol to promote itself as central coordination platform, the same post-crisis momentum likewise allowed 
the European Commission to develop its entrepreneurship. The experience of the cyberattacks against 
Estonia and Georgia arguably acted as multiplier of pressure on Member States to further integrate this field 
of EU police cooperation (Interviewees 23, 26, 34 & 35). On the one hand, heightened salience in the aftermath 
of the attacks drew attention to existing interdependencies and re-emphasised functional pressure to 
cooperate. Moreover, politicisation among the media, practitioners and civil society generated additional 
public pressure, which EU actors like Europol and the Commission were debatably able to harness. One 
practitioner described this as: “a PR [public relations] effect reinforced by common sense arguments: there 
has to be tangible progress, it needs to be quick and publicly visible, and it’s simply more efficient to do it at 
EU level. So the EU steps in.” (Interviewee 28). Indeed, the JHA Council Conclusions from 27-28 November 
2008 drew on some of the Commission’s suggestions for a general policy regarding cybercrime. By adopting 
a concerted work strategy for this issue area, Member States formally acknowledged the “continual increase 
in offences observed on the Internet which are increasingly transnational,” identified common priority areas 
and asked the Commission to support EU governments in the assessment of practical measures (Council of 
the European Union, 2008, p. 1 ff.). 
Against this backdrop, the Commission exerted considerable influence on the drafting of the EU ISS 
that was adopted by the Member States in February 2010 (see figure 10). It listed cybercrime as one of the 
“main crime-related risks and threats facing Europe today” and thereby made it a formal priority within the 
EU ASFJ (Council of the European Union, 2010a, p. 2). The Strategy as a whole reflected the same pro-EU 
discourse that the Commission, Europol and other supranational actors had been shaping in this policy 
domain (Interviewees 12, 13 & 15). Cyber security was deliberately framed as common challenge for the EU 
and European police cooperation rather than single Member States or authorities. The ISS accordingly 
described cybercrime as posing a “cross-border, anonymous threat to our information systems and[...] many 
additional challenges for law-enforcement agencies” (Council of the European Union, 2010a, p. 14). In this 
context, the European Commission increasingly harnessed Europol’s practical track record and positive 
reputation to advance integration-friendly discourse and strengthen path-dependency and supranational 
entrepreneurship within EU police cooperation. While Europol also pro-actively sought to raise its own 
profile around 2010, the agency was itself becoming a “tool for raising the visibility of EU policy-making in 
JHA” (Interviewee 35). 
In view of heightened political pressure to adapt national preferences to a more transnational EU 
approach, it is perhaps hardly surprising that a gradual paradigm shift emerged in EU police cooperation to 
follow and reinforce common institutions and herald “an age of EU agencies” (Interviewee 14; cf. Interviewee 
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27). This can be seen in the ISS but possibly even more prominently in the common Action Plan to implement 
the concerted strategy to combat cybercrime that was adopted in April 2010 (see figure 10). In this Plan, the 
Council of the EU asked Europol to “step up strategic analysis on cyber crime,” and invited both Europol 
and the Commission to support Member States in the “consolidation, [...]revision and, if necessary, the 
updating of the functions assigned to Europol's European Cybercrime Platform” (Council of the European 
Union, 2010b, p. 2). Most importantly, however, European governments finally took up the Commission’s 
idea of a “central EU cyber crime contact point” (European Commission, 2007a, p. 9). Accordingly, in 2010, 
the Council tasked the Commission to conduct “a feasibility study on the possibility of creating a centre” and 
to “consider, in particular, the aim, scope and possible financing of the centre and whether it should be 
located at Europol.” (Council of the European Union, 2010b, p. 4). Member States thus not only recognised 
both the Commission and Europol as key entities of EU police cooperation on cyber matters but de facto 
legitimised them as actors in their own right in this issue area. The 2010 Action Plan may therefore be 
regarded as critical moment in the development of a supranational mandate on cybercrime. It acted as 
catalyst on the way towards the creation of the EC3 by reinforcing the ISS as well as the role of the European 
Commission, Europol and other EU actors in this policy domain.  
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Particularly the European Commission progressively produced cultivated spill-overs related to cyber 
security. Its EU Digital Agenda from August 2010 for example directly reacted to the Action Plan in various 
regards (European Commission, 2010c). In this document, the Commission urged Member States to jointly 
counter “the rise of new forms of crime – ‘cybercrime’” (p. 5) and to “[...s]et up or adapt national alert 
platforms to the Europol cybercrime platform” (p. 18). The Digital Agenda not only formally acknowledged 
the ECCP as central tool, it for the first time proposed the establishment of a European cybercrime centre 
(ibid., p. 18). What is more, the Commission explicitly linked this centre idea to the implementation of the EU 
ISS. Among the proposed actions and objectives regarding cyberspace, it boldly announced: “By 2013, the EU 
will establish, within existing structures, a cybercrime centre,[...which] should become the focal point in 
Europe's fight against cybercrime” (European Commission, 2010d, p. 9). This formal declaration perfectly 
embodies the evolving self-confidence of the European Commission and is remarkable for two main reasons. 
First, it by far exceeded the task given to the Commission by the Member States in their Action Plan on 
cybercrime from April 2010. Although they had merely invited the Commission to “draw up a feasibility 
study on the possibility of creating a centre” and assess “the aim, scope and possible financing of the centre 
and whether it should be located at Europol” (Council of the European Union, 2010b, p. 4), the Commission’s 
November Communication reflected a very different understanding and listed the creation of a European 
cybercrime centre as a definite rather than possible action. Second, the Commission declared ownership for 
the initiative rather than presenting itself as mere agent in the technical evaluation of the proposal. This 
becomes manifest in the deliberate wording “the EU will establish” and the linkage to “existing structures” 
(European Commission, 2010d, p. 9). Perhaps even more striking, an accompanying memo to the document 
deviated significantly and read, “the Commission will establish an EU cybercrime centre by 2013” (European 
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Commission, 2010a). The Commission’s discourse and proposed actions testified to its evolving 
organisational emancipation and self-confidence as actor within cyber security. 
In its promotion of the EU as main policy venue for police cooperation in the fight against threats 
from cyberspace, the European Commission increasingly employed a strategy of deliberate politicisation, 
that is, it began to harness and fuel public pressure so as to shape state preferences in favour of strengthening 
common institutions like Europol. Various interviewees emphasised the importance of this recently 
emerging, supranationally driven politicisation of police cooperation and JHA more broadly (Interviewees 6, 
12, 15, 23 & 33). They agreed that this was no new phenomenon as such, and that the trend had already begun 
earlier, roughly at the beginning of the 2000s. At the same time, most respondents concurred that the 
European Commission’s narratives and discursive strategies reached a “whole new quality and dimension” 
in recent years (Interviewee 23). As one senior official phrased it, “politicisation has become a tool of 
legitimisation for the EU in the area of JHA” (Interviewee 27). Indeed, tracing the emergence of the EC3 
reveals an intensifying Commission discourse justifying a central role for itself as well as EU actors more 
generally in the area of cyber. As this section has shown, by 2010, Commission officials were already 
emphasising rising interdependencies as key rationale for cooperation. However, around 2010, this strategic 
politicisation changed in quality and quantity. Whereas previously pro-EU discourse had remained relatively 
vague, underlining the general need to cooperate on a level above the national one in view of globalisation 
and digitisation, it was now becoming much more concrete (Interviewees 6, 32 & 35). Particular emerging 
cyber threats were explicitly framed as collective action problems and complemented by securitisation 
narratives stressing the necessity to move from stand-alone intergovernmental solutions to integrated ‘one-
stop shop’ solutions at EU level (Interviewees 16, 18, 23, 28 & 44). This discursive strategy could likewise be 
observed more frequently in Europol’s statements and the development of its advocacy around 2010 (ibid.). 
Supranational politicisation of police cooperation on cyber matters additionally harnessed public 
pressure. Rationality-focused arguments revolving around the functional need to integrate in this issue area 
were more and more supplemented by arguments about the growing public demand for the EU to act in the 
realm of cyber security and in the fight against cybercrime. The Commission deliberately “instrumentalised 
public opinion polls to push EU involvement” in JHA (Interviewee 27). It for instance began to fortify both 
its integration initiatives by citing Eurobarometer reports and polls about the attitudes of European citizens 
towards security (Interviewees 6, 12, 15, 23 & 33). The long-standing public opinion across Member States 
had been consistently high in favour of EU action rather than national approaches. EU decision-making in 
the fight against organised crime – rather than unilaterally agreed approaches – had been receiving almost 
constantly above 60% public support among European citizens until 2010 (see table 12). The European 
Commission could and did rely on these numbers to strengthen its legitimacy as an actor in this area and by 
extension in cyber security. Its proposed implementing actions for the ISS were accordingly justified: “Four 
out of five Europeans want more action at EU level against organised crime and terrorism“ (European 
Commission, 2010d, p. 2).  
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EUROPOL, COMMON SENSE ARGUMENTS AND PUBLIC PRESSURE 
Supranational actors likewise leveraged public pressure to favourably shape state preferences in the 
discussions on the creation of a European cybercrime centre. Among other things, the Commission 
emphasised the relevance and effect of threats from cyberspace in the everyday life of people living in the 
EU. Once again relying on Eurobarometer data, it stressed that more than 50% of European citizens were 
openly concerned about cyber security (European Commission, 2012a, 2012b; Nunzi, 2012). Officials from 
both the European Commission and Europol continuously underlined the negative effects for private 
individuals and companies produced by cybercrime on the one hand and isolated counter strategies and 
policies within the EU. Consequently, both organisations asserted, networked security and integrated crime-
fighting approaches were adamantly needed to protect citizens in cyberspace, and in turn required central 
actors to coordinate this process at EU level (Bauer-Bulst, 2018; Interviewees 12 & 19). In the words of the 
Commission: 
 “[T...]here has never been any attempt to link together these policies in a coherent and 
comprehensive strategy. [T...]here is now a unique opportunity to take a more strategic 
approach, and to identify and exploit synergies between the various activities.” (European 
Commission, 2010a) 
In this context, it saw a central role for itself in the coordination, harmonisation and even integration of EU 
police cooperation and did not shy away from formulating this in the according Communication (European 
Commission, 2010d). 
Path-dependency and the economic benefits of a central capacity at EU level amplified the effect of 
supranational entrepreneurship on state preferences when the fate of the EC3 was decided in 2012. A 
feasibility study had been conducted independently by RAND Europe for the European Commission and 
had considered four main scenarios, namely “[...m]aintaining the status quo[, ...an] ECC owned by Europol[, 
...an] ECC hosted but not owned by Europol[, ...and a] virtual ECC” (Robinson et al., 2012, p. 2). Maintaining 
the status quo in the fight against cybercrime was not an option, the experts argued, as “[...c]ybercriminals can 
leverage poor co-operation between different countries – this is especially true for those countries that 
“export” cybercrime.” (ibid.). While the remaining three options – a centre owned by Europol, only hosted 
by Europol or the creation of a virtual one – were comparable with regard to their costs, the report found that 
“there were major differences in institutional complexity and the organisational parameters between the 
different options” (ibid., p. 3). In view of the various levels and actors involved in combatting cybercrime, 
and so as to solve collective action problems within the EU, the experts recommended to choose “a model 
that places it [the centre] in the middle of a broad capability to tackle cybercrime, exploiting the strengths of 
each organisation that possesses existing competencies, skills and knowledge” and that this did “not 
necessarily mean setting up a wholly new organisation” (ibid.). The feasibility study thus recommended the 
launch of an EC3 at Europol (ibid., p. 4). 
Europol offered just this: the advantages of an emerging central capacity and economies of scale. 
Since the extension of its mandate to cybercrime in 2002, its competence and involvement in this issue area 
had grown steadily (see figure 10). Platforms like the HTCC, the ECCP and ‘Check the Web’ had been 
launched at the organisation and its analytical capabilities had been boosted through the creation of AWF 
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‘Cyborg.’ By 2012, Europol had been operational for over a decade and managed to establish a positive track 
record as well as build its clientele and organisational reputation among European practitioners and 
policymakers (Interviewees 24, 28, 34 & 35). Member States recognised the practical merit of the agency and 
the functional need to build on the existing structures and expertise of EU police cooperation. Political spill-
overs and path-dependency thus acted as enablers of supranational policy entrepreneurship in the cyber 
domain. EU actors now increasingly expanded advocacy in this field. They deliberately harnessed functional 
and public pressure as well as the practical demand for their unique services to generate input legitimacy one 
the one hand, and showcased their good track record in practice to strengthen output legitimacy. 
 
Table 12. Public Support for EU Action in the Fight Against Organised Crime (1999-2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, based on Eurobarometer Interactive. Retrieved on 18 February 2019 from: http://ec.euro-
pa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/in-
dex.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/10/groupKy/44/savFile/196 
 
 
 
Against this backdrop, the European Commission proposed the creation of the EC3 as “part of Europol 
and[...] focal point in the fight against cybercrime in the EU” in March 2012  (European Commission, 2012c, 
p. 3). It was politically “not feasible to oppose” this proposal or other integration initiatives in this area 
(Interviewee 27). The political climate required Member States to show a willingness to cooperate at EU level 
and strengthen common institutions. Although senior officials agreed that Europol was and remained a tool, 
“an agency in support of the Member States” (Interviewee 28), it had become a credible player in its own right 
and together with the Commission increasingly acted as ‘policy consultant’ for domestic decision- and policy-
makers (Interviewees 12, 33 & 34; Santos Vara, 2018, p. 454). Even before the EC3 was launched at Europol 
and officially made it the EU’s central hub for the fight against cybercrime, “Europol in itself ha[...d] become 
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a driver or at least a very good political advisor” (Interviewee 33). Subsequently, in early June, the JHA 
Council adopted the Commission’s proposal to launch the EC3 at Europol. By accepting to establish it as 
“focal point in the fight against cybercrime in the EU” (European Commission, 2012c, p. 3; cf. Europol, 2013), 
and tasking the Commission and Europol to take the lead in the development of the EC3, Member States de 
facto transferred power to the supranational level, thus advancing vertical integration within EU police 
cooperation on cyber security. The outcome was a rapid institutional set-up of the centre. Barely one month 
later, on 1 July 2012, an EC3 implementation team commenced work at Europol, enabling the centre to be 
launched by January 2013 (Europol, 2014b). 
 In sum, Member States ultimately chose to deepen EU police cooperation with the establishment of 
the EC3 and integrate further in combatting cybercrime. Whereas they had previously possessed a strong 
preference for intergovernmental formats and only involved Europol as technical hosting and coordination 
platform, growing interdependencies and supranational policy entrepreneurship shifted state preferences 
towards integration. Politicisation acted as enabling factor to this end. The borderless nature of cyberspace, 
perhaps more than any other issue area, offered attractive opportunities for criminals and terrorists alike. 
More and more forms of crime were beginning to abuse these online possibilities or at least integrate cyber 
elements; new forms of crime were emerging, and the Internet facilitated interaction and cooperation 
between different criminal and terrorist groups. Countries around the globe were thus faced with a 
skyrocketing phenomenon that posed a serious threat, as the potential attack surface for cybercriminals 
extended to virtually all aspects of life.  
Next to external interdependence, EU Member States were additionally confronted with growing 
internal interconnectedness. Common institutions – including cooperation structures in the area of JHA, such 
as Europol – needed to be protected jointly from cyber risks. More importantly perhaps, EU police 
cooperation suffered from a lack of coordination in this policy domain. Although some technical platforms 
existed and Europol was formally allowed to assist in the fight against cybercrime, law enforcement officials 
and governments suffered tremendously from collective action problems in their attempts to efficiently share 
information and cope with this new criminal area above the national level. Asymmetries in capabilities 
played a crucial role to this end. Not all Member States possessed sufficient domestic capabilities to effectively 
cooperate and protect their own cyber security. Some were simply not as dependent on electronic systems, 
not as well connected digitally or lacked resources. This in turn affected all Member States. Different national 
approaches and asymmetrical capacities hindered effective cooperation at EU level, because information on 
cybercrime was not always available, consistent and shared. Across European countries, a significant skills 
gap was challenging governments in the joint fight against cybercrime. Bluntly put, asymmetric threats from 
cyberspace encountered asymmetric capabilities in cyber security within the EU.  
High interdependencies thus created functional pressure on Member States to solve collective action 
problems in this area. Tasking the EU with central coordination allowed governments to focus on adapting 
their national systems and strategies while being able to benefit from common synergies. What is more, 
Europol and the Commission acted as enforcement mechanisms within EU police cooperation on cybercrime. 
Formalising their mandate and establishing them as principal mediators and ‘watchdogs’ arguably made 
collective action and information-exchange in this area more reliable. Additionally, drawing on the central 
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capacity and financial resources of the EU minimised the costs for individual countries and created 
supranational economies of scale. Europol and the Commission presented a means to pool domestic 
capabilities and multiply benefits, as national authorities could benefit from each other’s experiences and best 
practices. Finally, both were able to provide unique cross-national products and deliver exclusive services 
that Member States could have never generated themselves. All in all, vertical integration offered a way to 
manage internal and external interdependencies related to cybercrime as well as significantly improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of EU police cooperation. 
 Supranational policy entrepreneurs deliberately harnessed this functional pressure to shape state 
preferences. Political spill-overs and a path-dependency with regard to Europol facilitated the impact of 
supranational advocacy on the choices of Member States. The original decision to create Europol had become 
somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy by the early 2000s. Not only did it seem ‘logical’ to continue the path 
of common institutions in EU police cooperation, the agency had itself begun to act as socialisation platform 
among European police and security authorities. Member States were more prone to build on existing 
supranational structures and thus reinforce their legitimacy not only as agents but as actors. This was perhaps 
most notably demonstrated by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which in turn empowered EU institutions to further 
develop their entrepreneurship and actively shape state preferences and decisions. Against this backdrop, 
Europol and the European Commission increasingly asserted themselves as driving forces within EU police 
cooperation on cybercrime. From 2007 onwards, both actively proposed and promoted integration initiatives. 
Next to functional pressure, they also strategically leveraged integration pressure from politicisation. 
Highlighting their positive track records in support of the Member States in this area, Europol and the 
Commission managed to establish a critical degree of output legitimacy. Moreover, they gradually began to 
build a positive reputation among practitioners, policymakers and the public, and thus generate a certain 
justification and demand of their services. Especially the Commission continued to stress public support for 
EU action on cyber security and progressively strengthened its input legitimacy. By deliberately raising the 
salience of the topic among policymakers and proposing integration initiatives in this area, EU actors 
combined functional and public pressure to shift state preferences in favour of cultivated spill-overs. They 
debatably benefitted fundamentally from a first mover advantage. Europol was first to develop a cross-
national analytical capacity and advocated systematic cooperation to combat cybercrime. The Commission 
first proposed the creation of a central European contact point for cybercrime and numerous concrete 
suggestions for concerted action in this field. Supranational policy entrepreneurship thus fundamentally 
shaped state preferences towards deeper integration of EU police cooperation and ultimately the launch of 
the EC3 at Europol. 
 Politicisation only played a complimentary, albeit important role as amplifier of interdependence 
pressure and supranational policy entrepreneurship. The terror attacks of 9/11, Madrid and London 
politicised cyberspace by proxy, as they dramatically exhibited the potential for abuse of the Internet and 
electronic communication technologies. The cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia directly illustrated 
how vulnerable entire countries and governments were to threats from cyberspace. Amidst this crisis climate, 
EU actors like the Commission and Europol were able to position themselves as crisis managers and propose 
measures at supranational level that domestic policymakers found difficult to oppose. Although 
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politicisation did not act as independent driving factor, it enabled heightened interdependencies and 
supranational entrepreneurship to have an effect on state preferences. Both conditions had been present since 
the early 2000s, yet they only substantially shaped the actions and discourse of Member States in the post-
crisis period following the DDoS attacks of 2007 and 2008. From then on, the preferences of European 
governments shifted relatively quickly towards vertical integration in the cyber domain. Politicisation, this 
dissertation argues, raised the visibility of growing interdependencies in the cyber domain and functioned 
as important enabler of supranational policy entrepreneurship. It may not have presented an independent 
driving factor but formed a crucial part of a set of conditions that swayed Member States’ preferences towards 
launching the EC3 at Europol. 
 
The European Counter Terrorism Centre 
Member States had involved Europol in the field of counterterrorism since at least 2000. Yet, the launch of 
the ECTC in January 2016 constituted an unprecedented step towards integration. Not only did the centre 
formalise EU police cooperation on terrorism and consolidate existing functions and projects, it centralised 
information exchange and operational coordination at Europol. Member States thus opted for giving the 
organisation a key role as main broker and hub of expertise in the EU’s fight against terrorism. Their 
preference for cementing and effectively widening Europol’s mandate in this policy domain was primarily 
influenced by politicisation and supranational entrepreneurship. Of course, interdependence in 
counterterrorism mattered as well, especially in countering extremist violence and radical content online as 
well as in dealing with foreign terrorist fighters. However, all these developments did not create sufficient 
functional pressure to ultimately shift Member States’ preferences towards creating the ECTC. This was 
achieved through the public and political pressure generated by terror attacks on the one hand and harnessed 
by EU actors to strengthen their role as policy entrepreneurs. In the following, this section analyses 
establishment of the ECTC and demonstrates in particular how politicisation and supranational advocacy 
interacted in the process to influence state preferences. 
 At the beginning of the 2000s, EU Member States were already involving Europol in the fight against 
terrorism (see figure 11). An AWF (‘Hydra’) on Islamist terrorism had been opened in 2000, even before 9/11 
(Europol, 2009b, p. 10). A counterterrorism task force was launched at Europol shortly after, following the 
initiative from Europol’s Director Jürgen Storbeck and Gilles de Kerchove, Director for Justice and Home 
Affairs at the EU Council General Secretariat, who would later be appointed EU CTC (Europol, 2001, p. 11; 
UK House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008, p. 154). Furthermore, AWF ‘Dolphin’ was opened at 
Europol in September 2003 to collect data and provide operational support on non-Islamist extremist terrorist 
organisations threatening the EU (Europol, 2009b, p. 10). Initially, Europol staff working in these AWFs or 
the task force encountered strong reluctance from European governments and national security officials, who 
were unwilling to share information and cooperate via Europol in the area of counterterrorism (Interviewees 
21 & 29). Nonetheless, this would change rather quickly. While growing transnational interdependencies 
were perhaps making Member States increasingly eager to harness Europol’s analytical capacity, cross-
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border products and services, high levels of politicisation and supranational policy entrepreneurship 
ultimately shifted state preferences towards integration. 
 
2004-2006: TERROR ATTACKS AS WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR EU ADVOCACY 
The 11-M attacks in 2004 significantly raised the salience of counterterrorism among policymakers and the 
public. They acted as critical moment and window of opportunity for supranational entrepreneurship in this 
strongly intergovernmental policy domain. In the aftermath of the attack, the Commission for instance 
prepared a communication on “Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks” (European 
Commission, 2004). This communication fed into the meeting of European heads of state or government on 
25 March. Their Declaration on Combating Terrorism (see figure 11) called for “the development of an EU 
long-term strategy” and the necessity to increase EU involvement in this policy domain (European Council, 
2004, p. 3). What is more, the position of an EU CTC was created to help coordinate collective action among 
Member States and Union bodies (ibid., p. 14). The CTC was to “co-ordinate the work of the Council in 
combating terrorism and[...] maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal with a view 
to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions” (ibid.). The office would 
soon assume a role beyond mere coordination and initiate the creation of the ECTC at Europol.  
 First, however, the London bombings further politicised counterterrorism policy at European level 
and enabled supranational entrepreneurs to influence state preferences in favour of additional integration 
steps. Shortly after the attacks, the European Commission published another communication in September 
2005, this time on terrorist recruitment and radicalisation (European Commission, 2005b). Rather than 
limiting itself to recommendations, the Commission “announced its intention to explore possibilities of 
tackling of content used to radicalise individuals for terrorism on the Internet in order to address the factors 
conducive to violent radicalization” (Council of the European Union, 2007a, p. 2). This was followed by the 
EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment in November, which reiterated the need for action 
at EU level (Council of the European Union, 2005a). In the same month, the Council adopted an EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy on the basis of proposals from the British Council Presidency and the CTC (Council of the 
European Union, 2005b). The Strategy exhibits a first substantial shift of Member States’ preferences towards 
EU police cooperation and more supranational involvement in the area of counterterrorism. While the 
London bombings undeniably provided the political momentum for governments to adopt the Strategy, 
Member States highlighted rising interconnectedness as main driver requiring collective action: 
“The European Union is an area of increasing openness and an area in which the internal and 
external aspects of security are intimately linked. It is an area of increasing interdependence, 
allowing for free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources. This is an environment 
which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives. In this context concerted and collective 
European action, in the spirit of solidarity, is indispensable to combat terrorism.” (ibid., p. 6) 
The Strategy acknowledged the important role of the Commission in the development of according measures, 
and concretely stressed the need to “move from ad-hoc to systematic police co-operation,” “in particular 
through Europol” (ibid., pp. 8 & 13). Not only did this reinforce the EU and especially Europol as key policy 
venues for police cooperation on counterterrorism, it arguably enabled a pro-active role for EU actors. Apart 
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from mere analytical support to Member States, Europol could for example be involved in the creation of JITs 
for cross-border investigations related to terrorism (ibid., p. 13).  
 The previous section and chapter already demonstrated the great importance of the Madrid and 
London bombings as crisis events and producers of public pressure and political momentum. Similar to the 
process leading to the EC3, politicisation likewise presented windows of opportunity for supranational 
advocacy in the area of counterterrorism. Many of the measures adopted within the European or JHA Council 
originated from proposals of the European Commission and the newly established CTC. On the one hand, 
both impacted state preferences as ‘enablers’ of collective action by soft power means; they actively 
advertised venue shopping (Interviewees 9 & 12). EU actors emphasised the prospect of central resources 
and funding being made available for domestic activities as well as the possibility to outsource certain 
administrative tasks and benefit from pooled technical expertise. Additionally, both the Commission and the 
CTC exerted influence and lobbied for more EU involvement by placing items on the Council agenda as well 
as initiating and shaping discussions (ibid.). 
EU actors like the Commission and the CTC harnessed politicisation and public pressure to further 
their entrepreneurship and make themselves increasingly indispensable (Interviewees 23 & 27). Similar to 
the fight against cybercrime, in the realm of counterterrorism supranational actors could rely on steady, high 
public support for EU action. Since 2001, more than 70% of EU citizens across all Member States were 
supporting joint EU decision-making in the fight against international terrorism (see table 13). The relatively 
uncontested role for the EU in this area together with the post-crisis momentum following the terror attacks 
in Madrid and London possibly facilitated the impact on EU governments of supranational policy 
entrepreneurs. Arguing against proposals for EU collective action in the immediate aftermath of the attacks 
was politically hardly feasible for national policymakers (Interviewee 27). The Commission and the CTC were 
arguably able to exploit this public pressure and leverage the salience of the topic to increase their own 
visibility and influence in this policy area. 
While supranational policy entrepreneurs utilised politicising events as windows of opportunity to 
shape state preferences in favour of an EU format, they underlined functional pressure from 
interdependencies in their promotion of Europol as main cooperation venue. Especially Commission officials 
pushed for an expansion of Europol’s competencies as part of a broader strategy to boost EU cooperation 
formats in JHA. “If Member States saw ‘Europol is here,’ this would also send the message: ‘The EU is here,’ 
and by extension that meant the Commission” (Interviewee 35). Subsequently, the Commission’s 
announcement from late 2005 to explore potential measures against radicalisation online was realised in May 
2007. The leverage of functional pressure can be seen in the JHA Council’s conclusions on cooperation to 
combat terrorist use of the Internet (Council of the European Union, 2007a). Member States explicitly 
recognised the need for collective action at EU level in the light of growing interdependencies: “It is hardly 
possible for one individual member state to cover all suspicious terrorism related activities on the Internet” 
(ibid., p. 3). Next to external interdependencies, pressure from rising internal interconnectedness informed 
the shift of preferences towards the EU level: “In all of this work the activities of the various actors (Member 
States, Commission, Europol, SitCen, et al.) have to be coordinated in a targeted way” (ibid.). A first step was 
the launch of the ‘Check the Web’ platform at Europol.  
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Table 13. Public Support for EU Action in the Fight Against International Terrorism (2001-2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   European Commission, based on Eurobarometer Interactive. Retrieved on 18 February 2019 from: http://ec.euro-
pa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/in-
dex.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/10/groupKy/40/savFile/179  
 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCIES AND SPILL-OVER EFFECTS 
Europol’s entrepreneurship began to have a substantial impact on state preferences from 2009 onwards. 
Functional spill-overs enabled the agency to develop an increasingly relevant advocacy role in 
counterterrorism and produce cultivated spill-overs. On the broader EU level, heightened interdependencies 
and supranational policy entrepreneurship had already shifted state preferences towards EU police 
cooperation. The ECD formally recognised Europol as key actor. Similarly, in the area of cyber security, 
functional pressure and cultivated spill-overs shaped Member States’ decision to integrate in this field by 
involving Europol more closely and ultimately launching the EC3. These developments were now producing 
spill-over effects on the domain of counterterrorism. Having significantly expanded Europol’s functional 
scope, including a mandate for cyber security and terrorism, and its de jure powers as central hub for police 
cooperation in the EU, the floodgates had been opened to cultivated spill-overs and a de facto more active role 
for Europol in shaping state preferences. Tracking illicit activities online and collecting information on 
Islamist terrorist propaganda on the Internet through ‘Check the Web’ almost naturally required similar and 
follow-up tasks at Europol in the area of counterterrorism. And Europol was able to convince Member States 
of the functional need to adapt existing projects accordingly and expand its mandate where necessary. By 
2009, it was increasingly seen as sophisticated actor in its own right by European governments and security 
authorities; its solid practical track record and positive reputation progressively allowed the agency to assert 
itself as policy entrepreneur and negotiate with Member States at eye level (Interviewees 1, 14, 31 & 35). 
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Consequently, in April 2009, Europol initiated the transformation of ‘Check the Web’ from mere 
technical platform into an AWF (Bundestag Printed Paper 18/4413, 2015). Similar to the issue area of 
cybercrime where Europol’s advocacy in relation to the HTCC and the ECCP had yielded the creation of 
AWF ‘Cyborg,’ the opening of AWF ‘Check the Web’ likewise created a pro-active, central role for Europol. 
Instead of merely hosting a technical portal where Member States could collect and store data related to 
Islamist terrorist propaganda and radical content online, the organisation had now asserted itself as an actor 
in its own rights in the common fight of terrorist abuse of the Internet. Europol’s success in initiating the 
creation of AWF ‘Check the Web’ not only exhibits the emerging new self-conception of Europol as a policy 
entrepreneur of EU police cooperation, it effectively paved the way for embedding more projects and 
eventually the ECTC in the agency (see figure 11). For example, following the 2010 EU ISS – which identified 
terrorism as one main security challenge – a Focal Point (FP)35 was opened at Europol and gave it a key role 
in coordinating the exchange of financial messaging data between the EU and the US as part of the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) (Council of the European Union, 2010a, p. 13; cf. Europol, 2011, p. 5).  
Europol’s growing entrepreneurship, however, not only extended to the higher political levels in the 
Member States. Through its growing relevance as central actor of EU police cooperation, it directly interacted 
with and lobbied police officers and practitioners at subnational level. As a consequence, Europol’s analytical 
involvement and operational support functions were significantly boosted through subnational advocacy. 
The adoption of a new AWF concept in August 2011 exemplifies how domestic police authorities enabled 
further organisational emancipation, and marked a new level of maturity and sophistication in Europol’s 
‘actorness’ and entrepreneurship within EU police cooperation (Interviewees 5 & 31). In late 2010, the Heads 
of Europol National Units (HENUs) – representing their national law enforcement authorities and effectively 
linking domestic police levels and Europol – initiated a discussion on the structure of Europol’s analytical 
work (Europol, 2012a, p. 4). While the impetus for reform thus came from subnational actors, it had been 
prepared by Europol officials who had continuously lobbied for a more coherent, strategic support role for 
itself (Interviewees 11, 18, 19, 24 & 31). Following the HENUs’ decision to develop a new AWF concept in 
January 2011, a WG produced a concept that was adopted in August. It merged Europol’s existing more than 
20 AWFs into only two, one on serious and organised crime (AWF SOC) and one on counterterrorism (AWF 
CT). Additionally, the new concept introduced the possibility to create FPs and Target Groups (TGs) within 
each AWF (see figure 12). While AWFs presented the main systems to process information on concrete 
criminal issue areas and to provide operational support, FPs could be opened within each AWF to “focus[...] 
on a certain phenomenon from a commodity based, thematic or regional angle” and centrally coordinate EU 
police cooperation on the topic (Europol, 2012a, p. 5). Finally, TPs could be opened at any time as “operational 
project with a dedicated Europol team to support an international criminal investigation or criminal 
intelligence operation against a specific target” (ibid., p. 7). 
 
 
 
35 formerly AWFs, allowing Europol to collect and process data on specific criminal offences for the purpose of analysis. 
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Figure 12. Europol’s New AWF Concept. 
 
Source:   Europol, 2012, p. 10. 
 
 
This step is remarkable for two reasons. First, the possibilities under the new AWF concept for Europol to 
structure and expand its analytical capacity were completely novel and had been single-handedly conceived 
by Europol staff and the HENUs. As the agency itself acknowledged, “[e...]ven though Europol’s legal 
framework does not explicitly foresee Focal Points or Target Groups these definitions developed in 
consultation with the HENUs form a reasonable and legitimate implementation of the term ‘analysis project’ 
in the sense of the ECD” (Europol, 2012a, p. 4). Second, the new AWF concept significantly strengthened and 
extended Europol’s role and powers in the initiation of analytical work and operational support in the 
Member States. Not only did it allow Europol and other EU bodies to initiate FPs, the decision to open the 
latter was placed in the hands of Europol, in consultation with the Member States (ibid., p. 6). In contrast to 
the procedure for opening an AWF, FPs no longer required a feasibility study and thus allowed Europol to 
immediately receive operational information. The introduction of FPs thus constituted a permanent 
‘workaround’ to lengthy legal procedures and was intended to practically facilitate “targeted information 
gathering;” “whenever M[ember] S[tates] are confronted with a new crime phenomenon, they may simply 
send their information to Europol, knowing it will already be processed and assessed by the relevant experts 
at Europol” (ibid.).  
What is more, the new AWF concept empowered Europol alone to decide upon opening a TP, 
although Member States could make suggestions (ibid., p. 7). This arguably constituted a significant gain in 
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power for Europol, because the opening mechanism effectively bypassed national levels in the approval of 
specific operational and analytical activities at Europol (Interviewee 39). Europol was now able to 
independently set operational priorities, allocate resources and develop its expertise. Some might even argue 
that  “by gathering information before punishable offences have even been committed, Europol is assuming 
powers that come close to those of an intelligence service” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012, p. 1; cf. Krings, 2014).  
The adoption of the new AWF concept in 2011 arguably exhibited vertical integration at Europol 
‘from below,’ and as such illustrates the effects of Europol entrepreneurship on domestic police officials. Until 
2010, the gradual emergence of Europol as “the backbone” of EU police cooperation was primarily driven by 
political actors ‘from above,’ that is, at the initiative of national governments or EU actors (see figures 10 and 
11). The previous chapters have demonstrated how subnational actors frequently shaped state preferences in 
favour of differentiation rather than integration. However, around 2010, subnational policy entrepreneurship 
evolved more and more towards integration initiatives. Since the early 2000s, the stance of domestic law 
enforcement officials vis-à-vis Europol had changed significantly. Although bureaucratic resistance remained 
a problem in many areas of EU police cooperation, especially in counterterrorism, Europol’s practical track 
record was beginning to generate more demand from operational levels (Interviewees 15, 22 & 24). 
Particularly among the HENUs – positioned between Europol and national police authorities – Europol was 
gaining acceptance and was increasingly acting as socialisation platform rather than mere coordination 
mechanism (Interviewees 18 & 19). As one Europol representative phrased it: “we have a limited role but we 
can make a difference by identifying operational issues to Member States. It just takes time, especially in low-
profile crime areas. But there is a rapidly growing demand” (Interviewee 32). The new AWF concept 
demonstrates how Europol simultaneously benefitted from and deliberately fuelled an emerging paradigm 
shift among police officials in the Member States from unilateral solutions to common solutions at EU level 
(Interviewees 22 & 23; Münch, 2018). It exhibits how Europol officials circumvented national political levels 
and directly lobbied subnational actors to acknowledge it as ‘one-stop shop’ and central cooperation 
mechanism (Interviewees 14, 23 & 40). To this end, the agency strategically leveraged functional pressure and 
operational needs at the sub-state level to promote vertical integration among the HENUs. 
 
2013-2015: CUMULATIVE CRISIS MOMENTUM AS FINAL TURNING POINT 
While these developments demonstrate the growing opportunities for supranational entrepreneurship in EU 
police cooperation around 2010, Member States only really succumbed to public and political pressure for an 
ECTC from 2013 onwards (see figure 11). Politicisation and policy advocacy on the part of the CTC, Europol 
and the Commission formed key drivers to this end. Similar to the early 2000s, a series of crises presented 
windows of opportunity in two regards. First, they acted as politicising events that raised the salience of this 
issue area and thereby generated public pressure on national policymakers. Second, these politicising events 
produced functional pressure to improve EU police cooperation, because they demonstrated existing 
interdependencies and shortcomings respectively. Supranational actors increasingly leveraged this pressure 
to shape state preferences in favour of deeper integration.  
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 In 2013, the first one of such ‘crises’ formed in the Sahel and Maghreb regions and drove European 
governments to discuss measures at EU level. Against the backdrop of the armed conflict in Mali since early 
2012, Member States were beginning to feel the impact of “trans-national jihadism and cross-border 
migration” (Boserup & Martinez, 2018). This culminated drastically on 16 January 2013 when a group of 32 
militants with links to Al-Qaeda crossed into Northern Algeria from Mali and attacked a joint venture gas 
plant between Algerian and foreign companies near In Amenas (‘Algeria hostage crisis’, 2013; Græger & 
Lindgren, 2018, p. 197). The gunmen held over 800 workers hostage, including 130 foreign nationals, for three 
days until they were finally freed by Algerian security forces and the hostage crisis was resolved (Borger, 
Tokyo, & Macalister, 2013). In the process, 40 hostages had been killed, and the kidnappers had demonstrated 
a concerning “scale and degree of violence [that] led French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian to describe 
the militant action as an ‘act of war’” (Græger & Lindgren, 2018, p. 197). 
Supranational actors were able to strategically position themselves as policy initiators in the wake of 
the In Amenas hostage crisis. Member States were concerned about “the implications of the Sahel / Maghreb 
(crisis in Mali, In Amenas) on EU internal security,” particularly the issue of foreign terrorist fighters 
travelling from the EU to Islamist hotspots in these regions (EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2014, p. 6). 
Accordingly, they tasked the CTC with preparing suitable countermeasures at EU level (ibid.). The result was 
an extensive report comprising a list of 22 measures that were adopted by the JHA Council at its meeting on 
28 June (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p. 8). These included actions towards the assessment, 
prevention, detection and pursuit of (returning) foreign fighters (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 5). 
The proposals had been drawn up by the CTC in cooperation with the Commission and arguably reflect 
significant supranational entrepreneurship in the promotion of EU fora and integration (Council of the 
European Union, 2014d, p. 8). This dissertation has already elaborated on the advocacy role of the European 
Commission. Throughout 2014, it continued to expand this involvement as preference shaper and policy 
initiator. Drawing on evidence from Europol reports and the CTC, a Commission communication on 
preventing radicalisation and countering violent extremism highlighted the rapid evolution and impact of 
increasingly transnational terrorist threats inside and outside Europe (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). 
While it recognised that “terrorism has not affected all Member States directly,” it stressed that cooperation 
at EU level was indispensable, considering that “the threat is persistent and terrorist attacks are 
unpredictable” (ibid., p. 4). 
 Notwithstanding the pro-integration lobbyism of the Commission, in the area of counterterrorism 
the CTC assumed the lead position as increasingly influential “political, strategic, and operational guide” of 
the Member States  (Busch & Monroy, 2017, p. 2). “In his recommendations he constantly call[...ed] for more 
competences and capacities,” including for Europol as central intelligence and coordination hub in the fight 
against terrorism (ibid.). In this context, FP ‘Travellers’ was opened at Europol in April 2014 within the 
organisation’s AWF CT (Avramopoulos, 2015). The FP was created to work on foreign fighters and related 
terrorist networks and was directly aligned with the CTC’s report and proposed measures that had been 
adopted by the JHA Council in June 2013.  
Three more politicising events significantly amplified public and functional pressure on Member 
States to cooperate on counterterrorism at EU level and arguably marked the peak of politicisation and 
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supranational entrepreneurship in this policy domain (see figure 11). The terror attacks in Brussels and Paris 
in 2014 and 2015 respectively triggered a final shift of state preferences, as they presented an opportunity for 
the CTC, the Commission and Europol to frame Islamist terrorism as common challenge and shape political 
action (Interviewees 35, 43 & 44; Münch, 2018). On 24 May 2014, a French national murdered four people at 
the Jewish museum in Brussels. The attacker, Mehdi Nemmouche, had previously fought in Syria for over a 
year for the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Brussels Jewish museum shooting therefore 
had a particular psychological impact as “Europe's first terror attack by an Islamist fighter returning from the 
war in Syria” (‘Brussels Jewish museum shooter’, 2019; cf. Counter Extremism Project, 2017). The attack 
triggered political action among Member States and EU actors. A sub-group of EU governments most affected 
by the foreign fighters phenomenon – led by Belgium – stepped up the exchange of information, best practices 
and ideas for enhanced cooperation throughout 2013 and 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014b, p. 4). 
At EU level, the European Council reaffirmed the conclusions adopted on the basis of the CTC’s report in 
June 2013. It called for the swift implementation of the package of measures, emphasising that the “rise of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL...]is a major threat to European security and that determined action 
to stem the flow of foreign fighters from Europe is needed” (Council of the European Union, 2014c, p. 1). The 
Council of the EU reiterated this call on 9-10 October. It additionally underlined the need to improve 
information-sharing and strengthen Europol, particularly cooperation through FP ‘Travellers’  (Council of 
the European Union, 2014b; European Council & Council of the European Union, 2018). These calls were 
complemented roughly one week later by the EU counterterrorism/foreign fighters strategy that focussed on 
Syria and Iraq and cooperation with third countries (Council of the European Union, 2015c). Similar to many 
of the ongoing discussions and proposals it was based on drafts of the CTC and the Commission. 
Even half a year after the Brussels Jewish museum shooting, public pressure and political 
momentum remained high and continued to fuel a multi-level policy debate among EU actors and Member 
States how to best cope with the threat from Islamist terrorism. Amidst this process a second terror attack hit 
Europe and caused the salience of EU counterterrorism policy to skyrocket even further (see figure 11). 
Between 7-9 January 2015, 17 people were killed in a series of attacks across Île-de-France and Paris (‘French 
terror attacks’, 2015). These included the shooting of 12 at the headquarters of the French satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo, the murder of a policewoman in a Paris suburb and a hostage situation at a Jewish supermarket 
in which the attacker murdered four of the 19 victims. The terror attacks were finally brought to a close 
following a major manhunt in which the perpetrators were shot dead (‘Charlie Hebdo attack’, 2015). They 
had been French nationals of Algerian and Malian descent with ties to the MENA region and radical Islamist 
circles (‘2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack’, 2018; Chrisafis, 2015). What is more, they had not been unknown to 
security authorities due to an existing criminal record, including arrest for attempted travel to Syria and Iraq 
(Chrisafis, 2015). Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack, 
while the third attacker claimed to be pledged to ISIS (‘2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack’, 2018; Meichtry, Bisserbe, 
& Faucon, 2015). He likewise declared to have coordinated with the gunmen who had committed the Charlie 
Hebdo shooting (Counter Extremism Project, 2017a; cf. Onyanga-Omara, 2015). 
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THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR’S PROPOSAL FOR AN ECTC 
Politicisation in the aftermath of the January 2015 Paris attacks arguably presented a window of opportunity 
for supranational policy entrepreneurs to shift state preferences towards integration in the area of police 
cooperation on counterterrorism. The terrorist incident sparked significant public shock among citizens and 
policymakers. In France alone, around 3.7 million people participated in a march against terrorism, and the 
slogan ‘Je Suis Charlie’ was repeated around the world in a show of global solidarity (‘2015 Charlie Hebdo 
Attack’, 2018; Devichand, 2016). A number of initiatives were proposed by EU actors in the following weeks 
and months, and adopted by the Member States for the most part (see figure 11). The CTC prepared an 
according input for the informal meeting of JHA ministers in Riga on 29 January. It comprised a large range 
of measures at EU level, including action to prevent radicalisation online and to improve information 
exchange on counterterrorism (EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2015). Referring to the example of the 
UK’s Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), the CTC suggested to step up the role of the EU and 
especially Europol in monitoring and flagging terrorist and extremist content online. The CTIRU did just this 
and comprised a special social media platform within the counterterrorism unit (Interviewee 28). In a similar 
vein, the CTC proposed, “Europol's Check the Web project could be beefed up to allow for monitoring and 
analysis of social media communication on the internet“ (ibid., p. 3). Unsurprisingly perhaps, he received 
direct support from the UK, which placed the possibility of an EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) on the agenda 
of the informal Council meeting in Riga (Interviewee 28). Additional agenda items included some of the other 
measures proposed by the CTC. Among these was – arguably the first explicit mention of – the “creation of 
a European Counter-terrorism Centre at Europol, [which] like the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), would 
allow Europol to translate existing capabilities into operational impact quickly” (EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, 2015, p. 7). Europol thus directly benefited from the EU CTC’s visibility and involvement in the 
aftermath of the January 2015 Paris attacks (Farnung, 2018). 
The impact of the CTC’s entrepreneurship did not only become manifest in subsequent changes at 
Europol, it was already reflected in the Riga joint statement of JHA ministers and subsequent discourse of 
European governments. The document formally acknowledged growing interdependencies and the need to 
integrate in the face of this “multidimensional threat involving different areas of crime” (Riga Joint Statement, 
2015). This adoption of pro-integration or securitisation narratives and show of political action arguably 
mirrored a substantial shift in governmental preferences towards EU police cooperation (Interviewees 21, 38 
& 43; cf. Bebe, 2015, p. 40). While the Riga joint statement acknowledged the terror attacks as clear evidence 
for the interconnectedness of Member States in the fight against terrorism and the importance of coordination 
and coherence in EU police cooperation, the sudden shift in preferences was arguably not primarily driven 
by interdependencies. Rather, post-crisis politicisation, spiralling salience and public pressure influenced 
governments to openly favour centralising cooperation and further strengthening Europol. Interdependence 
in the fight against international terrorism had arguably been consistently high for years; “the threat had 
always been there” (Interviewee 44; cf. Interviewee 43). Yet, the degree of interdependence in the fight against 
terrorism varied across Member States and strong asymmetries in this issue area prevented a universal shift 
and convergence of national positions towards EU police cooperation. Functional pressure was thus not able 
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to single-handedly move state preferences towards integration in counterterrorism. Politicising events like 
the Paris terror attacks ultimately corroborated this need across Member States by powerfully illustrating 
existing linkages and producing widespread public and political preferences for EU integration as necessary 
means to countering international terrorism. “Arguably, today nobody doubts anymore that centralisation is 
essential in the fight against terrorism” (Marx, 2018; cf. Interviewees 12 & 19; Maaßen, 2018; Ratzel, 2018; 
Schweickardt, 2018). 
In the light of crisis politicisation and supranational policy entrepreneurship, JHA ministers decided 
to expand EU action on foreign terrorist fighters, particularly through Europol’s FP ‘Travellers,’ and agreed 
to assess the development of “Internet referral capabilities, also through Check-the-web,[...] within Europol” 
(Riga Joint Statement, 2015; cf. European Council & Council of the European Union, 2018). The Riga 
conclusions were reiterated by European heads of state or government on 12 February. They concretely 
echoed the need to strengthen collective action at EU level and called for “specific counter-terrorism 
measures” (European Council & Council of the European Union, 2018). Consequently, on 12 March 2015, the 
JHA Council formally asked Europol to “develop the ‘Check the Web’ project into an EU Internet Referral 
Unit (EU IRU)” by July (Council of the European Union, 2015d, p. 4). European ministers thereby directly 
acted on the January proposal of the CTC (Bundestag Printed Paper 18/4413, 2015). What is more, in 
justifying the creation of an EU IRU, they applied many of the same security and threat narratives that EU 
actors had employed to securitise cybercrime policy (Bebe, 2015). Their decision to mandate Europol with the 
development of the IRU not only provided the agency with a lead role in designing the degree of 
centralisation and functional scope but with an opportunity to shape state preferences in this area. Member 
States had de facto recognised the organisation as sophisticated actor that could initiate policy changes and 
mould EU police cooperation (Interviewees 35 & 44; cf. Europol, 2015a). The CTC’s report additionally 
shaped the decision of JHA ministers to make the improvement of EU information exchange and operational 
cooperation a top priority in the fight against terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2015d). In this 
context, they invited Europol to prepare suggestions for the improved use of its platforms and services (ibid., 
p. 6). Although the Council acted on the CTC’s proposal for an EU IRU, the idea of an ECTC was initially 
nowhere to be found in the declarations and conclusions of EU governments. Especially Germany opposed 
the establishment of a counterterrorism centre at Europol (Haber, 2015, p. 2). Only later, the 2016 Berlin 
Christmas market attack would change this preference, and Germany – driven by police officials at the BKA 
– would even explore the possible expansion of Europol’s ECTC (Busch & Monroy, 2017, p. 4). 
 
CONVINCING THE MEMBER STATES: THE COMMISSION AND EU ADVOCACY 
Supranational policy entrepreneurship ultimately shifted state preferences towards the launch of an ECTC at 
Europol. The proposal was tabled again in April 2015 in the context of the Commission’s ‘European Agenda 
on Security,’ which prepared the ground for the renewal of the EU ISS (European Commission, 2015b, p. 13). 
While the Commission could of course only advise Member States to create such a centre, it arguably strongly 
leveraged public and functional pressure to this end. The mere act of formally including the proposal in the 
security agenda created pressure on national governments. What is more, the Commission explicitly 
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underlined that “[c...]itizens and Member States expect the EU's support in fighting terrorism and 
radicalisation and facilitating coordination and cooperation between relevant authorities” (ibid.; cf. table 13). 
Moreover, it highlighted the need to further integrate in view of growing institutional links and 
interdependencies in this area. Europol, the Commission emphasised, had become a key venue for EU police 
cooperation on terrorism and could help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the latter: 
 “[B...]ringing together its anti-terrorism law enforcement capabilities, pooling resources and 
maximising the use of already existing structures, services and tools [...would] achiev[...e] 
economies of scale [that...]could be brought together as a European Counter-Terrorism Centre 
within Europol” (ibid.). 
Concretely, the European Commission suggested to bring together, amongst others, the FPs ‘Travellers’ and 
‘TFTP’ as well as the newly created EU IRU (European Commission, 2015, p. 13; cf. figure 11). Through its 
‘European Agenda on Security,’ the Commission was arguably able to assert itself and the CTC’s proposals, 
and thereby ultimately shift state preferences in favour of an ECTC within Europol. Various interviewees 
confirmed the “considerable growth” of the Commission’s role as a policy initiator and agenda-setter in JHA 
over the past decade (Interviewees 6, 15, 23 & 33). They underlined in particular the evolution of its 
supranational entrepreneurship within EU police cooperation since the ECD and its subsequent gain in 
influence vis-à-vis the Member States. By 2015, the European Commission had arguably established itself as 
key player and legitimate principal in the area of internal security, especially regarding Europol and 
counterterrorism. Its proposals within the ‘European Agenda on Security’ reflect this organisational self-
confidence. Not only did they mirror the Commission’s “integration-friendliness” in a rather 
intergovernmental policy domain, they likewise demonstrated the institution’s growing influence on state 
preferences (Interviewee 15). The European Commission was in a favourable position to initiate policy and 
shape preferences on EU police cooperation in high-profile areas of internal security; Member States could 
not afford to simply dismiss its proposals, and had to at least argue why not to adopt Commission initiatives 
(Interviewee 14). 
 Unsurprisingly, elements of Commission entrepreneurship and its security agenda increasingly 
showed in government positions (European Commission, 2015, p. 5; see figure 11). The growing influence of 
supranational policy advocacy becomes evident throughout the Council’s renewed ISS (2015-2020), for 
example in the prioritisation of terrorism, radicalisation and recruitment alongside organised crime and 
cybercrime – three priorities first identified by the Commission (Council of the European Union, 2015d, p. 5 
f.). More concretely, the Commission’s reiteration of the CTC’s proposal for an ECTC was likewise included 
and finally embraced by the Member States. In June and July 2015, the JHA Council even facilitated further 
pro-EU input by tasking a number of integration-friendly actors with the implementation of the EU ISS and 
particularly the ECTC. Work was carried out at mixed intergovernmental and EU levels on the one hand, and 
supranational levels on the other. Both lobbied for deeper integration. Concerning the former, the Council’s 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) was requested to prepare – 
together with the Commission – an implementation plan for the renewed ISS (ibid., p. 10). Next to senior 
officials from national interior ministries, COSI moreover comprises Commission representatives and allows 
for the participation of Europol observers amongst others. This further opened the floodgates to 
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supranational policy entrepreneurship, particularly with regard to the ECTC, which COSI was tasked with 
overseeing (Luxembourg Presidency, 2015, p. 6). Additionally, Member States attributed a central role to the 
Council’s Working Party on Terrorism (TWP), a body focused on the operational aspects of EU police 
cooperation and thus complementing COSI’s strategic and policy guidance (ibid., pp. 11 & 35). Consisting of 
national experts, the TWP – even more closely than COSI perhaps – liaises with the CTC and Europol 
(Consilium, 2018). These mixed intergovernmental and supranational work settings had arguably produced 
political spill-overs and now increasingly acted as pro-EU socialisation platforms; a majority of officials 
working at these levels were united in the belief that EU collective action was indispensable in most areas of 
police cooperation (Interviewees 3, 31, 33, 34 & 35). 
Member States’ preferences were additionally shaped in favour of EU integration through the 
growing role of EU actors in the implementation of the EU ISS (2015-2020) and the development of the ECTC. 
Particularly the Commission, the EU CTC and Europol were especially able to influence state preferences in 
the process. The CTC for instance worked closely together with the Council Presidency and helped shape the 
JHA Council’s agenda and conclusions (Europol, 2015c). On the basis of his reports and input, the Member 
States charged supranational actors as well as mixed policy venues consisting of (sub-)national and EU levels 
with the development of the ECTC (Interviewees 5, 10 & 15). This particularly benefitted Europol as well, 
which was tasked with a central role in this regard (Europol, 2015c, pp. 3–4; Presidency & EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator, 2015a). In contrast to the Commission and the CTC’s often highly visible and public 
entrepreneurship, Europol primarily used the working level and mixed intergovernmental-supranational 
channels to promote itself and advance deeper integration in the area of counterterrorism. Nonetheless, its 
influence in the development of the ECTC was considerable, particularly through its input at COSI and the 
TWP on the one hand, and its reports to the Council and cooperation with the Commission and the CTC on 
the other. By 2015, Europol had effectively expanded its role from mere provider of operational and analytical 
support to strategic and political adviser of the Member States. This ‘function creep’ arguably allowed it to 
shape state preferences through pro-EU lobbyism as well as concrete policy input, for example concerning 
the ECTC. One senior official summarised this development as follows: “We’re now having discussions with 
and at Europol that were unthinkable ten years ago when Europol was still in a situation where it had to beg 
to be involved. Now Member States come to Europol to discuss prioritisation and Europol has to decide for 
which areas it can offer in-depth support” (Interviewee 35). 
Although the process towards the launch of the ECTC at Europol was well underway, the Paris 
attacks of 13 November 2015 additionally strengthened supranational entrepreneurship and public pressure 
on state preferences to accelerate integration in the area of counterterrorism (see figure 11). An 
“unprecedented wave of terror attacks,” for which ISIL claimed responsibility, killed more than 100 people 
and injured over 350 in the French capital  (Europol, 2015c, p. 4). Although the series of coordinated attacks 
perhaps exhibited a new degree of sophistication that took security officials by surprise, it did not mark a 
quantitative increase in the threat more generally across Europe (Interviewees 43 & 44). What is more, 
contrary to public perception, the terror incident of 13 November was not unprecedented in its scale of 
violence. By comparison, the 11-M attacks in Madrid in 2004 had claimed the lives of 191 people and injured 
close to 2,000. By 2015, interdependencies among Member States facing the terrorist threat had arguably 
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remained at a similar level. Yet, politicisation in the aftermath of the Paris attacks effectively shifted state 
preferences towards collective action and further integration of EU police cooperation on counterterrorism. 
Previous terror attacks and politicising events had already generated a growing sense of security crisis and 
loss of control among the public and policymakers (Interviewees 23, 24, 30 & 32). The Paris attacks of late 
2015 – as second-largest terror incident since 11-M with an accordingly high media coverage and widespread 
psychological effect – finally tipped the scale with regard to state preferences (Interviewees 13, 14, 19 & 44). 
Various interviewees emphasised that politicisation formed a key driving factor; it possibly mattered less at 
the time whether interdependencies and external threats were ‘real’ but rather that European politicians as 
well as the media and public believed they were and called for swift action (Interviewees 41 & 42). And they 
did. Some even claim that the attacks of November 2015 changed the “status quo in the European security 
paradigm” (Brisard, 2015, p. 5). 
EU actors were yet again able to harness this high salience and post-crisis momentum in order to 
impact the positions of Member States in favour of integration. Amidst significant public pressure on national 
governments to demonstrate action and control, supranational entrepreneurs presented EU police 
cooperation as effective solution to do just this: solve practical coordination problems in the fight against 
terrorism (Interviewees 24, 27 & 35). More importantly perhaps, their proposals for dealing with these threats 
at EU level de facto provided an effective means of venue shopping for policymakers in the management of 
citizens’ concerns and domestic shortcomings (Interviewees 27 & 44). In advance of follow-up discussions to 
the Paris attacks, the CTC and the Luxembourg Presidency jointly prepared a note detailing measures to 
enhance counterterrorism capabilities at EU level (Presidency & EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2015b). 
This note formed the basis for an extraordinary COSI meeting as well as an emergency Council meeting 
(Europol, 2015c, p. 4). The conclusions of both reflected and reiterated the points contained in the CTC’s note, 
most importantly the need to cooperate with and via Europol on counterterrorism and increase information-
sharing and exchange through the agency. This included the swift launch of the ECTC and rapid connection 
of national authorities to the centre (Presidency & EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2015b, p. 3). 
Additional calls to further develop Europol more generally – provide it with “adequate resources,” expand 
its functional scope within counterterrorism and widen its access to common databases – were likewise 
echoed by the Member States and would later help shift their preferences in favour of a new legal framework 
for the agency, namely the Europol Regulation (cf. Jones, 2015).  
Next to the CTC, the European Commission similarly leveraged the post-crisis momentum from the 
Paris attacks (C. Jones, 2015). Following the attacks, it again called on Member States to improve EU collective 
action and react to the functional integration pressure this terror incident had supposedly exhibited (cf. Bigo 
et al., 2015). Concretely, the Commission stressed the need to advance existing structures and accelerate the 
adoption and implementation of current proposals and integration initiatives. This included Europol’s ECTC 
and EC3 but also other EU instruments such as Prüm (ibid., p. 5). Finally, the Paris attacks provided an 
opportunity for advocacy by Europol itself. A Europol report submitted on 17 November – a mere four days 
after the terrorist attacks – framed the incident from a securitisation angle. It emphasised the “[c...]lear 
international dimension in the planning and coordinating of attacks, involving a network (not group of lone 
actors)” and the high probability and serious threat of more attacks. Europol thus underlined the need for 
Chapter 7 │ Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation and Beyond 
227 
collective action at EU level and positioned itself as key player and central cooperation venue in this regard 
(Europol, 2015c, p. 13 f.). In the light of substantial supranational entrepreneurship and high politicisation in 
the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the JHA Council on 20 November 2015 ultimately committed itself to 
strengthening “the EU response to terrorism” (European Council & Council of the European Union, 2018). 
Member States decided the improvement of law enforcement cooperation and information exchange, and 
reinforced the launch of the ECTC at Europol as of 1 January 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2015a). 
The Centre indeed commenced operations less than one month later on the envisioned date  (Europol, 2018). 
In sum, supranational policy entrepreneurship in conjunction with politicisation constituted the 
main drivers of state preferences with regard to expanding Europol’s competence in the area of 
counterterrorism and establishing the ECTC. Interdependencies in the fight against terrorism mattered 
comparatively less. External interdependence arguably remained at more or less the same level throughout 
the 2000s, although the quality of the terrorist threat was evolving. More importantly, perhaps, internal 
interdependence progressively produced practical need for centralisation. Political spill-overs from early 
police cooperation via Europol were now making it increasingly relevant to manage the growing institutional 
interconnectivity and complexity. Concretely, collective action problems generated a need for central 
coordination mechanisms, thus moving state preferences towards path-dependency if not deeper integration. 
Moreover, growing positive experiences with EU police cooperation were gradually shifting Member States 
and security officials towards favouring supranational levels and particularly Europol as preferred policy 
venues for combatting terrorism, be it as a solution to domestic problems or as a consequence of Europol’s 
growing entrepreneurship, including acting as socialisation platform. 
Yet, functional pressure from interdependence did not suffice to independently sway state 
preferences. Supranational policy advocacy and politicisation ultimately influenced EU governments to 
support creating the ECTC at Europol. Particularly the European Commission, the EU CTC and Europol 
increasingly assumed a role as pro-active integration entrepreneurs in the area of counterterrorism since 2004. 
They strategically emphasised and leveraged both the consistently high functional pressure to manage 
collective action problems, as well as politicisation and public pressure in the aftermath of crisis events. All 
three succeeded in significantly expanding their visibility, organisational reputation and role within EU 
police cooperation. Nevertheless, they were only able to finally push Member States in favour of launching 
the ECTC in 2014 and especially 2015. Supranational policy entrepreneurship succeeded in driving 
integration preferences for two main reasons. First, multiple politicising events had cumulatively raised the 
salience of counterterrorism and fuelled public pressure on policymakers to act at international level. The 
Paris attacks of November 2015 arguably produced the final post-crisis momentum in a series of such 
incidents. Politicisation – both as an aggregate of multiple crises and the result of single large-scale events – 
played a significant part in facilitating supranational policy entrepreneurship. Each terror attack served as a 
‘crisis’ and window of opportunity for EU actors to harness public and functional pressure and thus 
incrementally shift state preferences towards integration. Second, spill-over effects additionally enabled the 
Commission, the CTC and Europol to promote EU venues for police cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism. Spill-overs from previous integration steps, most notably the Lisbon Treaty and the ECD, were 
increasingly empowering supranational actors as principals rather than agents since at least 2010. They were 
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gaining more influential, pro-active roles vis-à-vis the Member States, including in the area of JHA and 
particularly within EU police cooperation and counterterrorism. What is more, as time progressed, 
supranational institutions and policy venues in this area likewise served as socialisation platforms, effectively 
expanding their own involvement and often transforming subnational entrepreneurs into lobbyists for action 
at EU level. By harnessing existing functional and public pressure, EU actors were thus capable of ultimately 
impacting state preferences and producing sustainable cultivated spill-overs in the field of counterterrorism, 
most prominently the ECTC. 
 
The European Migrant Smuggling Centre 
The EMSC was launched at Europol in February 2016, shortly after the ECTC. Rather than mere coincidence, 
the close temporal proximity of the two centres was a result of similar driving forces shaping state preferences 
in both issue areas (see figure 13). First and foremost, politicisation and crisis momentum played key roles. 
The same terror attacks that had generated public pressure to cooperate in the realm of counterterrorism 
likewise impacted the stance of EU governments on migrant smuggling, as did the crisis in the Sahel and 
Maghreb region and most notably the recent refugee and migrant crisis. Next to politicisation, policy 
entrepreneurship mattered greatly as well for swaying state preferences towards the EU level in the area of 
fighting facilitated irregular migration and trafficking in human beings. Whereas subnational actors played 
an initial role by promoting the EU level as adequate policy venue for solving domestic problems, 
supranational actors presented the main entrepreneurs to this end. Once more confirming findings from the 
ECTC, the European Commission and Europol especially acted as pro-EU lobbyists and were able to 
influence state preferences accordingly. Finally, interdependencies were similarly present and rising – a trend 
that was featured prominently by politicising events and policy entrepreneurs. However, interdependence 
did not act as primary driver of state preferences in the case of the EMSC. In the following, this section 
elaborates how these factors shaped government stances in favour of integration, and ultimately produced 
the EMSC. It first sketches the role of sub- and supranational policy entrepreneurs in paving the way for 
further centralisation at Europol, and then turns to the impact of politicisation on the formation of state 
preferences.  
 
PAVING THE WAY FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION: FIRST OPERATIONAL IMPULSES FROM THE 
PRACTITIONER LEVEL 
Already in the late 1990s, preventing and fighting both illegal migrant smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings had formed part of Europol’s initial tasks under the Europol Convention (Art. 1(2)). Nevertheless, 
strengthening Europol’s powers and widening its involvement in this issue area was not necessarily a priority 
for EU Member States in the early 2000s. This only changed gradually until the migrant and refugee crisis of 
2014 and 2015 provided the final impetus for integration in this EU policy domain. Policy entrepreneurs 
arguably paved the way to this effect. Interestingly, a first intensification of EU police cooperation via Europol 
was a direct result of subnational rather than supranational policy entrepreneurship (Interviewees 4, 6 & 12). 
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For example, the European Commission’s advocacy in favour of “empower[...ing]” Europol in the common 
fight against illegal facilitated immigration and trafficking of human beings derived from the impulse of 
national police officials (European Commission, 2002a, p. 32). The EU Police Chiefs Operational Task Force 
arguably shaped the Commission’s proposal for a comprehensive plan that was adopted by the JHA Council 
on 28 February 2002. The body had only been launched a few years earlier in the light of building an AFSJ to 
“exchange, in co-operation with Europol, experience, best practices and information on current trends in 
cross-border crime and contribute to the planning of operative actions” (European Council, 1999). As such, 
the task force arguably quickly developed a life of its own and was increasingly able to consolidate its 
informal entrepreneurship with the operational development of EU police cooperation (Bunyan, 2006a; Van 
Buuren, 2012). In March 2001, the police chiefs concretely suggested to strengthen Europol’s role by 
expanding its involvement and giving it “more operative powers” (European Commission, 2002a, p. 32). 
These proposals were directly included in the Commission’s 2002 comprehensive plan to combat illegal 
immigration and trafficking of human beings. A common AFSJ, both asserted, similarly produced a common 
crime area with new opportunities for criminal groups (Interviewee 22). Growing interconnectedness 
therefore seemingly required better coordination at EU level in related issue areas (European Commission, 
2002a, p. 26). Supra- and subnational policy entrepreneurship thus effectively leveraged functional pressure 
and reinforced one another to enhance EU police cooperation.  
Although this did not immediately effectuate deeper integration, it arguably initiated a gradual shift 
of state preferences and prepared the ground for future changes. To this end, subnational policy 
entrepreneurs instigated the first de facto centralisation tendencies at Europol: the opening of AWF ‘Maritsa’ 
on trafficking of human beings from and through Bulgaria (see figure 13; Europol, 2012b, p. 1; cf. Rijken, 2006, 
pp. 108 & 112). The analytical project team with designated experts was launched in 2003. It followed directly 
from the EU Police Chiefs Task Force action plan on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, 
which likewise concentrated on Bulgarian networks, victims and perpetrators (Dingelstad-Frankova, 2013, p. 
9; Europol, 2012, p. 1). A particularly intense criminal interconnectedness with Bulgaria in this issue area 
arguably explains why preferences formed in favour of launching AWF ‘Maritsa’ with its rather narrow 
focus. Issue-specific interdependencies thus primarily shaped the police chiefs’ preference in favour of 
collective action at EU level, while persisting asymmetries explain the topical diversity and venue shopping 
approach within subnational policy entrepreneurship. The task force’s agenda and action plans for instance 
reflected a wide range of issues, including general criminal developments as well as very narrow threats and 
trends challenging only a few if not single Member States. This ‘shopping list’ seems contrary to the 
simultaneous emphasis on the functional need to develop Europol as a means for coherent, effective action. 
It reflects asymmetrical interdependence pressure at domestic operational levels. In view of the 2004 Eastern 
enlargement round, Austria, Germany and Finland for example initiated action plans under the theme of 
illegal immigration at the task force’s meeting of May 2003 (Bunyan, 2006a, p. 5). This was perhaps 
unsurprising because all three countries shared borders with the future new members and therefore expected 
to experience the highest levels of interdependence. 
Notwithstanding the limitation of centring on Bulgarian-based networks, the AWF effectively 
constituted the first formal focal point of Europol’s analytical and operational support activities in the area 
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of trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration. Although subnational policy entrepreneurship 
remained overall deliberately informal and thus neither involved political levels nor directly impacted state 
preferences, the bottom-up process that led to the opening of ‘Maritsa’ may be argued to have presented a 
first institutional stepping stone for further integration at Europol. Within a few years, the mere existence of 
the AWF would arguably itself generate further demand for enhancing EU police cooperation. In this vein, 
the venue shopping of subnational actors – concretely, domestic police chiefs – produced a political spill-over 
effect on governments. 
 
NURTURING PATH-DEPENDENCY: SUPRANATIONAL POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
Supranational policy entrepreneurs harnessed this effect in their advocacy as well as functional pressure as 
entry point for influencing shape state preferences in favour of integration. Similarly in view of the 2004 
Eastern enlargement round, EU representatives continued to reiterate heightened criminal interdependencies 
and the practical need to enhance police cooperation (Interviewees 29 & 30). Europol itself stressed the 
“growing problem of illegal immigration in the Member States,” although it particularly highlighted the 
growth in relevance of China as country of origin rather than the new Member States (Europol, 2004a, p. 11). 
Public-political discussions at national level likewise reflected this widespread discourse of potentially 
importing crime into the EU (Interviewees 29 & 30). Rather than impeding integration, politicisation and 
public pressure thus moved state preferences in this issue area towards favouring EU policy venues in 
response to related security threats (Interviewees 14 & 21). Member States accordingly named (facilitated) 
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings one of five Europol crime priority areas for 2004 
(Europol, 2004a, p. 6).  
Despite high politicisation the Eastern enlargement round did not substantially impact state 
preferences, and failed to trigger deeper integration in EU police cooperation in the area of illicit immigration 
and trafficking in human beings. In contrast to the politicising events discussed above for the cyber domain 
and counterterrorism, the 2004 enlargement round did not similarly illustrate or heighten functional pressure 
from interdependencies, and was not considered as having a substantial security impact among domestic 
practitioners (Interviewee 7; cf. Storbeck, 2004). Police cooperation arrangements had been in place for some 
time, including through Europol and AWF ‘Maritsa,’ and transition arrangements for the integration of the 
new EU members arguably additionally softened the effect of the horizontal widening (Interviewees 14, 22, 
29, 30 & 31). Salt and Almeida (2006, p. 169) likewise conclude: “the issues raised by irregular migration, 
especially migrant trafficking and human smuggling, have risen on the political agenda[...], however, the 
rhetoric has run ahead of the research. There is a fundamental lack of hard evidence relating to most aspects 
of the problem” (cf. Morehouse & Blomfield, 2011, p. 7). On the contrary, this issue area debatably 
experienced “relative stability” since 2000; “available data in irregular migration flows d[id...] not support 
the view that irregular migration is on the increase” (Salt & Almeida, 2006, p. 171). This seems to confirm that 
politicisation alone may not suffice to affect government preferences, but rather that politicisation – as 
complementary driving factor present in a set of conditions – acts as relative enabler or enhancer of 
interdependence and policy entrepreneurship.  
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This mechanism can likewise be observed in 2006, when a sufficient level of politicisation in relation 
to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq interacted with significantly rising interdependence and was leveraged 
by supranational policy entrepreneurs to shift state preferences towards concrete action via Europol. Two 
AWFs would be opened at the agency as a consequence, one on facilitated illegal immigration and one on 
trafficking in human beings (see figure 13). In 2006, the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq reached a 
new level and likewise  impacted  the  EU (Interviewees 21 & 31).  Although violence had been gradually 
escalating since 2004, the number of refugees leaving both countries skyrocketed from 2006 onwards (see 
table 14). Refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq amounted to almost half of all refugees worldwide, leading to 
an according peak in asylum applications and irregular border-crossings (Amr & Ferris, 2009, p. 6; Parusel & 
Schneider, 2011, p. 10; Van Mol & de Valk, 2016, p. 37). While the increase in violence became most noticeably 
manifest in the rising number of refugees leaving Iraq, Afghanistan’s security situation likewise deteriorated 
significantly in the light of a violent Taliban resurgence and spiking attacks (Council on Foreign Relations, 
n.d.; Ferris, 2009, p. 23; Gall, 2006). Notwithstanding the spiralling salience and refugee numbers in relation 
to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the actual impact at EU level was arguably relatively small compared to 
many other asylum and destination countries (Ijeoma & Hyperakt, n.d.; Koser & Schmeidl, 2009, p. 10; 
UNHCR, n.d.). Yet, between 2004 and 2007, Afghanistan and Iraq were consistently among the top countries 
of origin of refugees coming to the EU (Ijeoma & Hyperakt, n.d.; UNHCR, n.d.). Particularly in Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – the main destination countries in the EU – Afghan and 
Iraqi refugees remained high on the political radar, and featured continuously among the top three or top 
five origin countries (ibid.). 
Supranational actors harnessed this political momentum. In early 2006, the European Commission 
prepared a communication on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country 
nationals (see figure 13). While this document built on the AFSJ priorities that Member States had adopted in 
November 2004,36 it stressed the renewed importance of further developing cooperation because of a recently 
growing need to react to “mounting migratory pressure at the EU’s external borders” (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 2). Notwithstanding existing arrangements with neighbouring and Balkan countries, 
the Commission concretely advocated the improvement of cooperation via Europol and the enhancement of 
Europol’s coordination role in the fight against facilitated illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings 
(ibid., p. 11). Europol itself likewise actively promoted its services in this context, both at practitioners’ and 
governmental levels (Interviewees 3, 21 & 29). As a consequence, AWF ‘Checkpoint’ was opened at Europol 
in October and focused on facilitated illegal immigration into and within EU Member States, with an initial 
emphasis on Iraq and Afghanistan as countries of origin (Europol, 2009b, p. 10).   
Supposedly growing interdependencies in this issue area, as repeatedly voiced by supranational 
actors, also instigated the revision of AWF ‘Maritsa’ (Interviewees 3, 7, 14 & 21). Its narrow focus on Bulgarian 
trafficking networks “seemed no longer suitable and fit for purpose” (Dingelstad-Frankova, 2013, p. 10). 
Subsequently, in June 2007, the Member States launched AWF ‘Phoenix’ at Europol, which targeted 
trafficking in human beings more generally and allowed for the involvement of the agency for any related 
 
36 contained in The Hague Programme 
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“forms of criminality[...] affecting at least two Member States of the European Union by Organised Crime 
Groups as well as any associated criminal activities[...] uncovered in the course of the investigation into these 
criminal networks” (Europol, 2009b, p. 10; cf. European Commission, 2008, p. 7). Furthermore, Europol joined 
the Commission’s group of experts on trafficking in human beings (Europol, 2012b, p. 1).  
 
 
Table 14. Global Refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq (2004-2008). 
 
Source: Author, based on UNHCR population statistics. Retrieved on 27 March 2019 from: 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern and from The Refugee Project, retrieved from: 
https://www.therefugeeproject.org/  
 
 
Notwithstanding the discourse of growing interdependence that framed EU police cooperation as necessary 
response to a rising functional need, politicisation and supranational policy entrepreneurship primarily 
drove state preferences towards integration. Admittedly, the number of ‘apprehended aliens’ – especially 
irregular migrants coming to the EU from Iraq and Afghanistan – rose sharply between 2005 and 2007 
(European Commission, 2009a, p. 29 ff.). Yet, the overall impact on the EU arguably remained relatively small; 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not significantly alter Member States’ interdependence in the fight 
against facilitated illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings (Interviewees 14, 22, 29, 30 & 31). The 
military interventions in the region would actually have presented a much more pressing opportunity to 
address persisting drug trafficking networks that likewise operated in the EU (ibid.). However, this aspect 
did not raise similar salience or public pressure, and lacked supranational advocacy. It was therefore unable 
to push Member States towards action at EU level (Interviewees 10, 21 & 29). Instead, the strategic leverage 
of politicisation by supranational policy entrepreneurs in the area of illegal migration and trafficking on 
human beings shifted state preferences towards further strengthening Europol through opening AWFs 
‘Checkpoint’ and ‘Phoenix.’  
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BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE AND LACK OF TRUST AS PERSISTENT OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION 
At the same time, the relevance of these developments should also not be overstated in their significance. On 
the contrary, EU police cooperation in this issue area remained far from perfect. Not only was participating 
in AWFs not mandatory for Member States, bureaucratic resistance continued to hinder information 
exchange and cooperation via Europol (European Union Committee, 2008, pp. 24 & 34). Notwithstanding a 
gradually emerging acceptance at political level, even preference, of Europol as central policy venue, 
domestic security officials and practitioners at the operational levels often still lagged behind (Interviewees 
14, 22, 32 & 33; cf. Irrera, 2018; Ziercke, 2018). This likewise held true for the domain of illegal immigration 
and trafficking in human beings, where Europol had not previously played a substantial and systematic role; 
only with the opening of the AWFs, the agency officially positioned itself as coordinator and actor in this 
issue area. However, it was only just beginning to function as socialisation platform. One interviewee 
observed: “Europol was still in a situation where it had to beg to be involved” (Interviewee 35). In a similar 
vein, Augustin Diaz de Mera, Member of the European Parliament and rapporteur for the draft ECD, 
concluded: “It is not a problem of the Member States, but rather of their special services not being able to 
trust each other as much as they should. The key is trust” (European Union Committee, 2008, p. 24). 
In addition to lack of trust, bureaucratic resistance likewise derived from a lack of path-dependency; 
no precedent existed for Europol involvement in this issue area. The organisation was still working on raising 
its visibility and building a positive track record as the “only restricted level for the [systematic] sharing of 
confidential information between European law enforcement agencies” at the time (ibid., p. 35). In contrast 
to national policymakers, many police officers were yet to be convinced of the practical benefit of engaging 
Europol in cross-national cases instead of using their own networks. Many practitioners feared that 
submitting data to the agency would merely produce additional bureaucratic effort and yield few or 
unsatisfactory results. It was simply considered quicker in the short run to continue a known and reliable 
modus operandi – that effectively prioritised national cases – instead of investing in a new external and 
unfamiliar mechanism whose merit was unclear (Interviewees 21, 24 & 27). This would change as more and 
more Member States joined AWFs at Europol and the more tangible analytical output and operational 
support by the agency became as a result; migration and its illicit manifestations were after all phenomena 
that affected most Member States in one way or another, regardless of how asymmetrical interdependencies 
were between different countries (Interviewees 32 & 35). 
While policy entrepreneurship and politicisation had initiated first steps towards deeper integration 
and the extension of the functional scope at Europol, they likewise provided the ultimate impetus that shifted 
state preferences towards establishing the EMSC. After numbers of irregular migration to the EU had risen 
in 2006 and 2007, they abated again in the following years. Nevertheless, this decline was rarely reflected in 
public discourse. On the contrary, “based on media reports alone, one has the impression that Europe’s 
borders are increasingly porous” (Morehouse & Blomfield, 2011, p. 14). What is more, irrespective of the 
decline in absolute numbers related to irregular migration, interdependencies in the fight against trafficking 
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in human beings remained high and continued to exert functional pressure on Member States to cooperate. 
In July 2012, Europol concluded accordingly:  
“Trafficking in human beings (THB) remains a serious problem in the EU. It is likely that every 
single EU Member States is affected by THB in one form or another with a number of Member 
States clearly favoured by traffickers as the main ‘market places’.” (Europol, 2012b, p. 1) 
The agency additionally stressed that interdependencies were changing in two main ways. First, they were 
growing quantitatively within the EU as a consequence of the borderless Schengen Area, the AFSJ and recent 
EU enlargement rounds (ibid., p. 2 ff.). Second, they were evolving qualitatively, as criminal networks were 
becoming more sophisticated and more closely intertwined across Member States (ibid., p. 5). In the light of 
these changes, Europol argued, EU governments needed to widen local and national crime-fighting and 
policing to transnational and particularly European approaches, including the systematic involvement of 
Europol (ibid., p. 7). Nonetheless, Europol’s advocacy could not substantially mitigate persistent bureaucratic 
resistance from subnational practitioners or lack of trust among Member States. The levels of public and 
functional pressure did possibly not yet suffice to provoke a shift of state preferences towards taking further 
integration steps within EU police cooperation. Neither the sustained salience of illegal migration and 
trafficking in human beings among policymakers and the public nor supranational policy entrepreneurship 
highlighting existing interdependencies were able to instigate such a change at the time. 
 
THE 2014-2015 REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS AS CRITICAL MOMENT 
The 2014-2015 refugee and migrant crisis presented a watershed moment in this context (see figure 13).  2014 
and 2015 constituted historic peaks in the number of refugees worldwide and travelling to the EU since World 
War II (AFP, 2015). Not only has it therefore been called the EU’s “greatest challenge since the debt crisis” 
(Park, 2015), at the height of the crisis in August 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “[...t]he 
issue of asylum could be the next major European project, in which we show whether we are really able to 
take joint action” (AFP, 2015). Indeed, over the course of 2014 and 2015, the number of third-country asylum 
seekers alone rose sharply from 431,100 in 2013 to 1,322,800 (see table 15). The number of illicit border 
crossings into the EU likewise peaked in 2014 and skyrocketed even further in 2015 (see tables 16 and 17). 
While the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU exhibited rising interdependencies, and produced functional 
pressure on European governments to cooperate, politicisation mattered even more as driver of state 
preferences. The increase in arrivals to the EU was highly politicised in all EU Member States and received 
significant press coverage. Although political discourse and public framing varied across and within 
countries, a number of common patterns may be identified. First, all public debate reflected “high levels of 
public anxiety about immigration and asylum across Europe” (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2016, p. 4). 
Second, the mass media played an important role as agenda-setter and framer of the crisis and public opinion. 
While press coverage overall framed the arrival of refugees and migrants as mostly negative, some incidents 
were likewise reported with great empathy and sparked declarations of solidarity, such as the appearance on 
the Turkish shore of the lifeless body of a three-year-old Syrian refugee who had drowned while his family 
attempted to cross into Europe via the Mediterranean Sea (ibid., p. 5). However, both negative and positive 
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media reports similarly contributed to building public pressure in line with a sense of crisis, urgency and the 
need to act – be it in order to protect ‘Fortress Europe’ or so as to save lives. Third, the EU – rather than 
national levels – was consistently deemed and highlighted as main policy venue for collective action and key 
crisis manager (ibid., p. 10). Fourth, and perhaps most important in the context of shifting state preferences 
in favour of launching the EMSC at Europol, from early 2015 onwards, the refugee and migrant crisis was 
increasingly securitised and framed in terms of security threats to the EU, particularly migrant smuggling 
(ibid., pp. 9-11). The subsequent shift of public-political discourse across European countries towards 
securitisation frames thus presented not only a reaction to rising interdependence in the fight against 
facilitated illegal immigration, it arguably constituted a political reaction of domestic policymakers to public 
anxiety on the one hand, and an attempt at blame-shifting by EU political elites on migrant smugglers (ibid., 
p. 11). In many regards – ironically perhaps – populism and politicisation thus boosted the involvement of 
the EU in the management of the refugee and migrant crisis, as Member States sought ways of responding to 
growing public pressure and ultimately favoured strengthening Europol and EU police cooperation in this 
issue area as a means of venue shopping (Interviewees 32, 33 & 34). 
 Public pressure, political momentum and securitisation frames were arguably exacerbated by the 
terror attacks of 2015 (see figure 13). The Paris attacks of January and November 2015 not only illustrated 
interdependencies in the EU’s fight against terrorism, they likewise provided (or were framed as) evidence 
for a growing crime-terror or asylum-terror nexus amidst the on-going refugee crisis, that is, links between 
facilitated irregular migration and terrorism (Interviewees 14, 15 & 22; cf. Rekawek et al., 2018, p. 8). The 
combined crisis politicisation in the face of the Paris attacks and unrelenting migratory flows into the EU 
further boosted the level of public pressure experienced by national policymakers. The salience and framing 
of migrant smuggling as a threat to European security quickly became the focal point of public and political 
debates concerning the on-going  refugee  and  migrant  crisis  (Berry et al., 2016; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 
2017). Some even claim: 
“The refugee crisis in Europe c[ould...] no longer be understood as separate from the crisis of 
terrorism after the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015. In fact, the two crises were never really 
separate in the nationalist imaginary to begin with. [...W]hat was only implicit in the European 
response to the Syrian refugees has now become explicit in the response to the tragic attacks in 
Paris: that migration is understood to be a form of barbarian warfare that threatens the European 
Union” (Nail, 2016). 
In other words, the refugee and migrant crisis alongside the terrorism crisis together produced sufficient 
public pressure to push Member States to prioritise the issue areas of migrant smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings. Although migration had been on the EU’s agenda for a while, it only became a “hot topic” 
among national governments in the light of these crises and skyrocketing politicisation (Interviewees 33 & 
34). Growing salience and public pressure thus constituted the main impulse for Member States to promote 
collective action at EU level and employ securitisation frames in the management of the refugee and migrant 
crisis. Rather than driven by operational input from police levels, this shift in preferences presented a political 
reaction to public fears (Interviewees 14 & 15). Accordingly, on 12 February 2015, the European Council 
decided  to  strengthen  the  common  EU  approach  in  the  area  of  countering  foreign  fighters  and  terrorist 
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Table 16. Illegal Border Crossings into the EU by Third-Country Citizens. 
 
Source:   European Parliament, 2015, p. 1.  
 
Table 17. Total irregular arrivals to the EU (2008-2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Council of the European Union/Frontex, 2019. 
 
 
travellers, particularly with a view to preventing a strong security impact from external crises and conflicts 
(European Council, 2015a). 
 
TIPPING THE SCALES: EUROPOL’S GROWING ACTORNESS 
Politicisation additionally opened a window of opportunity for renewed supranational policy 
entrepreneurship. In 2015, EU actors began to increasingly harness public pressure to likewise impact state 
preferences  in the direction of  deeper integration in the area  of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings (Interviewees 2, 5, 10, 33 & 34). Especially Europol developed a strong pro-EU entrepreneurship 
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(ibid.). In March 2015, the Joint Operational Team (JOT) MARE had been launched at Europol to fight 
facilitated illegal migration to the EU via the Mediterranean Sea (see figure 13; cf. Europol, 2016b). 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the initial participating countries were France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – 
all among the top ten destination countries within the EU, where functional and public pressure were 
arguably relatively high (‘Migration to Europe in charts’, 2018; Schröder, 2015, p. 2). Although not even ten 
people coordinated JOT MARE at Europol at first, it presented a stepping stone for enhancing Europol’s 
involvement and thereby further integration of EU police cooperation in this issue area (UK House of Lords, 
2015, p. 72). 
Europol’s policy entrepreneurship primarily harnessed politicisation of growing criminal threats in 
relation to irregular immigration rather than utilising public anxiety centring on the migration-terror nexus. 
Amidst the unfolding refugee and migrant crisis in 2014, it reported that such instances had been observed 
in various Member States, where irregular migrants or criminal groups engaged in the facilitation of irregular 
migration had developed links with terrorist groups. Nevertheless, Europol commented very hesitantly on 
the extent and long-term sustainability of such cooperation (Europol, 2014a, pp. 13 & 22). Instead, the agency 
highlighted the functional need to respond jointly to the unprecedented increase in the number of irregular 
immigrants arriving to the EU (Interviewees 14, 24, 27 & 35). It for instance stressed the growth of this number 
by 332% from 2013 to 2014, and underlined the parallel rise in use of smuggling services by many illegal 
immigrants after their entry of the EU (Europol, 2015, p. 13; cf. Europol, 2016a, p. 2).  
Additionally, Europol tied in with functional pressure and the shadow of the future if policymakers 
did not support European solutions to the refugee and migrant crisis. Europol officials repeatedly stressed 
the “profound impact” of the refugee and migrant crisis on “Europe’s criminal landscape” (Europol, 2016c, 
p. 2). First and foremost, Europol officials highlighted the negative economic and security effects in relation 
to the emergence of sophisticated migrant-smuggling networks that operated across borders within the EU 
and were making significant profits from their criminal enterprises (ibid.; Interviewees 27 & 35). They 
especially stressed interdependencies in this regard, as every single Member State was to some extent affected 
by migrant smuggling to and within the EU (see figure 14). Of more than one million migrants arriving to 
the EU in 2015, over 90% had employed smuggling services, a trend and criminal market that Europol 
claimed was only going to continue in 2016 (Europol, 2016a, p. 2; cf. Europol, n.d.-a). In this context, the 
agency presented and promoted itself as ‘suitable remedy’ (Interviewee 15). Its central position at the heart 
of police cooperation in this area as well as its emerging capacities within the AWFs and JOT MARE arguably 
made it the ideal policy venue to counter rising internal and external interdependencies (Interviewees 24, 27 
& 35). National policymakers could not very easily refute this “common sense argument” in the midst of on-
going crisis politicisation and calls from subnational police officials for improving efficiency in cross-national 
cooperation and information exchange (Interviewees 34, 42 & 43). On the contrary, prioritising supranational 
policy venues allowed Member States to explain governance failures as a result of collective action problems 
at EU level. National governments and Europol alike thus framed strengthening Europol as effective solution 
for domestic problems and security threats (ibid.). 
 
Chapter 7 │ Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation and Beyond 
240 
Figure 14. Migrant Smuggling to and within the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Police Office (Europol), n.d.-a. Retrieved on 8 April 2019 from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-
europol/european-migrant-smuggling-centre-emsc  
 
 
The combination of politicisation and supranational policy entrepreneurship consequently drove European 
governments to adopt securitisation measures at EU level. While reinforcing internal and external borders 
marked the initial phase of collective action in 2014, from early 2015 onwards Member States increasingly 
focused on and favoured EU police action targeting migrant smugglers and human traffickers. The renewed 
salience and political momentum in this issue area can be seen at the European Council (Berry et al., 2016, p. 
9). At its meeting on 23 April 2015, European heads of state or government recognised the urgent need to 
respond to the refugee and migrant crisis and committed themselves to “strengthen [...]presence at sea, to 
fight the traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility” 
(European Council, 2015b). Concretely, they highlighted the role of Europol in relation to combatting 
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trafficking and smuggling networks and encouraged active engagement by both the agency as well as the 
European Commission. 
Against this backdrop, the European Commission presented its Agenda on Migration in May (see 
figure 13). In line with the general political and media discourse, the Commission emphasised the “need for 
swift and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean” (European 
Commission, 2015c, p. 3). It harnessed existing securitisation frames by stressing that the fight against 
migrant smuggling should be a key priority for the Member States. Europol, the Agenda stipulated, “will 
immediately strengthen its recently established joint maritime information operation (JOT MARE) – and its 
focal point on migrant smuggling” (ibid., p. 3 f.; cf. European Commission, 2015d, pp. 3–4). Thereby, the 
Commission envisioned the transformation of Europol into a “single entry point for inter-agency cooperation 
on smuggling” (ibid.; cf. Europol, n.d.-a). Similar to the EC3 and the ECTC, the first mention of such a central 
contact point – the predecessor of the EMSC – was thus proposed by an EU actor, the Commission. Its EU 
action plan against migrant smuggling reiterated this endeavour. Although the document still did not 
explicitly mention the idea of establishing an according centre at Europol, it stressed the need to develop 
Europol into an “EU information hub for migrant smuggling” (European Commission, 2015d).  
Europol strategically built on the Commission’s entrepreneurship to promote its services and lobby 
for further development and institutionalisation of EU police cooperation. Appearing before the UK’s House 
of Lords in August 2015, Europol Director Rob Wainwright for example stated that, to sustainably combat 
migrant smuggling, “Europol’s role[...] may be instrumental” (UK House of Lords, 2015, p. 78). To this end, 
he underlined that the organisation’s resources and competencies in this area required significant boosting, 
including the creation of 25 new posts at Europol until 2017 – a demand repeated to the Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament (ibid., p. 79 ff.). The relevance of Europol’s direct advocacy in 
front of the British House of Lords should not be underestimated. The UK had likewise been the main initiator 
of JOT MARE in March 2015.  
Furthermore, the line of argumentation of Europol’s Director is representative of Europol’s overall 
advocacy vis-à-vis the Member States at the time (Interviewees 24, 27, 33, 35 & 40). Drawing on public 
perception and political momentum in the wake of the refugee and migrant crisis, he underlined the 
functional need to strengthen police cooperation. A previously neglected “critical area,” he asserted, was the 
“identif[...ication] and target[ing of] the criminal networks behind the smuggling trade,” as criminals were 
currently still able to exploit internal interdependencies (UK House of Lords, 2015, p. 68 f.). Although Europol 
had, according to Wainwright, been emphasising this need for a while, only the entrepreneurship of the 
Commission through its Agenda on Migration had finally placed the issue on the top of the radar of national 
policymakers (ibid.). Finally, his mention of bureaucratic resistance to cooperation via Europol bears 
testimony to the top-down political nature of preference-formation in this area rather than an impetus from 
subnational levels. The levels of “trust and operational engagement with the relevant authorities” were still 
not optimal in the opinion of Europol’s Director (ibid., p. 74). 
Consequently, as a result of supranational policy entrepreneurship – most notably by the 
Commission and Europol – Member States decided to accept the proposal to merge Europol’s analytical 
projects in this issue area within a new-to-be-launched centre (Interviewees 6, 31, 32 & 43). Even before the 
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Paris attacks of 13 November, 2015, the JHA Council had invited Europol to “accelerate the establishment of 
the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) to strengthen its capacity to support Member States in 
better preventing and fighting against migrant smuggling” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p. 5). 
While state preferences had already shifted towards prioritising integration in this field, and the decision to 
create the EMSC at Europol had already been taken, politicisation following the terrorist attacks in Paris 
significantly boosted the preferences of Member States to this end (Interviewees 22, 27 & 40). The EMSC was 
subsequently launched at Europol in February 2016, one month after the creation of the ECTC (Europol, n.d.-
a; cf. Europol, 2016a, p. 14; Europol, 2017a, p. 12). 
In sum, the EMSC presented a direct reaction of EU Member States to the combined impact of crisis-
politicisation from the refugee and migration crisis on the one hand, and supranational policy 
entrepreneurship harnessing public and functional pressure. Although interdependencies were relatively 
high as well and arguably rose in the course of 2014 and 2015, functional pressure alone did not suffice to 
shift state preferences towards deeper integration. This was only achieved through politicisation reaching a 
critical level and the pro-active advocacy of EU actors, primarily the concrete proposals from the European 
Commission and Europol. While these results match the findings from the previous sections, the following 
part concludes this dissertation’s analysis of the explanatory factors and further tests the results with regard 
to the adoption of the Europol Regulation. 
 
 
7.2 The Europol Regulation  
The Europol Regulation effectively replaced the ECD on 1 May 2017, not even ten years after Member States 
had chosen to transfer Europol to the EU framework and making it the Union’s official law enforcement 
agency. While the importance of the Regulation for the institutional development of the organisation and EU 
police cooperation should not be overstated, it debatably “has continued the trend to extend the powers of 
the agency” (Santos Vara, 2018, p. 447). Among other things, it gives Europol more of a say and leeway in the 
initiation of operational cooperation and joint analytical projects, and generally strengthens the role of the 
EU vis-à-vis the Member States in the agency’s governance. Especially the European Commission gained 
considerable influence through the new legal framework, including in the management of Europol’s external 
affairs, institutional and budgetary oversight as well as strategic guidance and priority-setting (European 
Parliament, 2019; Europol, 2017b). However, Europol to date remains a decentralised EU agency whose main 
purpose is to “support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States” as well as 
“cooperation among law enforcement authorities” in the EU (Art. 3(1) & 1(1), Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 
2016). Rather than presenting a significant change in the integration of EU police cooperation, this dissertation 
argues, the adoption of the Europol Regulation demonstrates a recent culmination of supranational policy 
entrepreneurship in this field, particularly the Commission’s pro-integration influence on state preferences. 
Political and cultivated spill-overs played a primary role as drivers of Member States’ resolve to replace the 
ECD with a Regulation. Interdependencies arguably mattered very little by comparison, while politicisation 
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created windows of opportunity for the entrepreneurship of EU actors and was leveraged strategically by the 
latter to multiply pressure on governments. 
 
SPILL-OVER EFFECTS AND PATH-DEPENDENCY AS CRUCIAL ENABLERS 
The previous sections have illustrated that interdependence in and among different issue areas was 
permanently on the rise and continues to grow in recent years. Yet, state preferences on the Europol 
Regulation were first and foremost shaped by political spill-overs from earlier integration decisions, most 
notably, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. The Regulation itself recalls: “Article 88 of the Treaty provides for Europol 
to be governed by a regulation to be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure” (recital 
2 in the preamble, Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016). By the time the ECD was adopted, it was arguably 
already overhauled (Interviewee 29). Or, as another EU official phrased it: “with the Regulation, Europol was 
‘lisbonised’ from an institutional point of view” (Interviewee 34). Although the Treaty provided the EU with 
legal personality and explicitly stipulated the adoption of a regulation as Europol’s legal framework, it took 
the European Commission six years before it first presented a draft regulation to the Member States in early 
2013 (European Commission, 2013). Next to the obvious political spill-overs – or perhaps unintended 
consequences – of the Lisbon Treaty, the proposal for the Europol Regulation came amidst a larger integration 
trend in JHA: from stand-alone intergovernmental solutions to integrated “one-stop shop” solutions at EU 
level (Interviewees 28, 30, 31, 34 & 44). This trend was for instance reflected in the Commission’s Common 
Approach on EU decentralised agencies or its ISS.  
Path-dependency and functional pressure from spill-overs played key roles in shaping state 
preferences towards further integration and ultimately in favour of the Regulation. On the one hand, Europol 
had been emerging as central hub of EU police cooperation for over a decade, and now increasingly presented 
a reliable institutional platform and trust basis for law enforcement authorities to work together (Interviewees 
13, 22, 23 & 24). Additionally, Member States faced an increasing demand for the continuity of these channels 
and had themselves developed an interest in EU initiatives in this area. Domestic political expectations 
alongside positive experiences with Europol’s operational output and track record constituted the main 
driving forces in this regard (Interviewees 12, 14, 22 & 27). Consequently, most European governments at the 
time preferred to continue EU police cooperation and extend the benefits generated in single issue areas to 
more domains of policing and internal security. Thus, Europol and EU police cooperation more widely 
benefited directly from functional and political spill-over effects that ultimately shifted state preferences 
towards a new regulatory framework with more powers for the EU level.  
 
COMMISSION ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CULTIVATED SPILL-OVERS 
Against this backdrop, and perhaps even more importantly, cultivated spill-overs influenced Member States 
– especially integration initiatives from the European Commission. The Commission’s power in the policy 
domain of JHA has arguably been growing consistently and considerably over the past decade, partially 
because of the general development of the EU, and in part thanks to the Commission’s proactive integration 
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advocacy and promotion of supranational policy venues in the area of security (Interviewees 6, 15, 23 & 33). 
As this chapter has demonstrated, Commission representatives frequently pushed for more centralisation, 
and concretely, a larger role for the Commission itself in the coordination of related policies and initiatives. 
Very often, as this dissertation has likewise shown, Commission entrepreneurs successfully justified this 
position through a supposed functional need to counter growing interdependencies and collective action 
problems. However, in line with the adage “who has the information has the power,” institutional self-
interest perhaps played an even more important motivating factor in this regard (Interviewee 46). The 
Commission’s uniformity initiative with regard to decentralised EU agencies presents one such example. 
Whereas the institution’s influence in centralised EU agencies was already overall quite considerable, the 
adoption of a common approach on decentralised ones offered an opportunity to further extend its mandate 
and power vis-à-vis the Member States (Interviewees 15, 29 & 46). Increasingly centralising information 
exchange at Europol and databases of EU police cooperation entailed a gain in the powers of EU actors and 
especially the European Commission. Replacing the ECD with a regulation arguably presented an 
opportunity to this end, including the strategic expansion of Commission actorness and entrepreneurship in 
this policy domain.  
The process leading to the adoption of the Europol Regulation in May 2016 – and the various draft 
versions – provide evidence in this respect. Preceding the formal regulation proposal in early 2013, 
Commission officials had conducted scoping talks with Member State representatives and EU actors in 2010 
and 2011  (European Commission, 2013, p. 4). Yet, the first draft version embodies a significant number of 
changes at Europol and within EU police cooperation that bear testimony to the strong negotiating position 
as well as institutional self-interest and investment of Commission representatives. Some of these proposals 
were rejected by the Member States, while others succeeded in being integrated in the final legislative text, 
even against the will of European governments (Interviewees 27, 29, 34 & 35). Europol and its new legal 
framework in various ways presented an entry point for Commission entrepreneurship and an opportunity 
to expand the latter’s role in EU JHA and its influence within the still strongly intergovernmental realm of 
police cooperation (ibid.). This was reflected by the first draft regulation, which would have strengthened the 
powers of EU actors and diminished the ones of the Member States in various regards. 
First, on a general note, the European Commission originally suggested a much more significant 
degree of formalisation and centralisation of Europol (Interviewees 6, 27, 29 & 34). Although Member States 
acknowledged the Lisbon Treaty’s requirement to replace the ECD, they did not see the need for additional 
formalisation less than a decade after the last legislative framework had entered into effect. Amongst others, 
they disagreed on the extent to which the Commission should be involved in the organisation’s governance, 
and how far the uniformity initiative for EU agencies should apply to Europol (ibid.). In this context, the 
European Commission had lobbied for the merger of Europol and the European Police College (CEPOL) – a 
move that would have even further increased the Commission’s influence, not just in one agency (Art. 1(2), 
European Commission, 2013; cf. European Parliament, 2019). However, Member States quickly rejected the 
Commission’s primarily budgetary and efficiency arguments. The suggestion to consolidate both 
organisations was deleted at the beginning of 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014a). 
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By contrast, another pro-integration proposal of the European Commission was included in the final 
regulation. The Lisbon Treaty had formally empowered it to conclude cooperation agreements with third 
parties/countries on behalf of the EU (European Commission, 2013, p. 74; cf. Europol, 2016a, p. 41). 
According preparations for the extension of Europol’s external relations and partnerhsips were already under 
way even before the regulation was adopted and Member States faced considerable pressure from the 
European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to provide the EU level with more 
leeway in the new legal framework, the Regulation (Haber, 2017, p. 8; cf. Storbeck, 2018). A similar stipulation 
in the first draft regulation foresaw relative autonomy for Europol in setting operational priorities without 
having to rely on national decision-making or endorsement. To this end, it built on the previous efforts of 
supranational policy entrepreneurs and acknowledged the “possibility to develop [EU] centres to fight 
specific forms of crime” (European Commission, 2013, p. 7 f.). This proposal was included in the final 
Regulation, effectively allowing the agency to establish “Union centres of specialised expertise” (Art. 4(1)(l), 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the success of Commission advocacy in some respects, a few highly ambitious 
suggestions were vehemently opposed by the Member States. The Commission for example originally 
recommended to include the option of down-sizing decision-making within Europol’s Management Board 
in urgent cases by establishing a “small-sized Executive Board” (European Commission, 2013, p. 10). 
Comprising the Management Board’s chairperson and three other members as well as one Commission 
representative, such an Executive Board would possibly have significantly reduced the power of the Member 
States and relatively strengthened the Commission’s position (Art. 22(4), ibid.). In the words of Germany’s 
Management Board member: “This proposal failed due to opposition from a majority of the Member States, 
above all because such a committee would provide only selective representation” (Schlatmann, 2016, p. 44 
f.). Concerning decision-making and relative power distribution within Europol’s strategic oversight and 
guidance, the Commission was not able to assert itself and shift state preferences; supranational advocacy 
subsequently lost against governmental sovereignty concerns (Interviewees 6, 27, 31, 33 & 34).  
The same held true with regard to monitoring and evaluating Europol’s performance and police 
cooperation at the organisation. In 2013, the European Commission had envisioned a much stronger role for 
itself and EU actors in this area (European Commission, 2013, p. 75). The first draft regulation contained an 
article titled “Member States’ cooperation with Europol” (Art. 7, ibid.). It stipulated the preparation of an 
annual report by Europol on “the quantity and quality of information provided by each Member State[...] 
and on the performance of its National Unit” to “[...]be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission and national parliaments” (Art. 7(10), ibid.). Here again, efficiency arguments and an emphasis 
of the functional need to counter collective action problems resulting from insufficient data submission lost 
out against governmental sovereignty concerns and a lack of political will on the part of the Member States 
(Interviewees 15, 23, 24, 27, 33 & 40). The equivalent section in the Europol Regulation that was adopted in 
2016 is now titled “Europol national units,” and reads: 
 “Europol shall draw up an annual report on the information provided by each Member State 
[...] on the basis of the quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria defined by the 
Management Board” (Art. 7(11), Regulation (EU) 2016/794, 2016). 
Chapter 7 │ Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation and Beyond 
246 
SUPRANATIONAL ADVOCACY ON THE RISE: THE REGULATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CHANGING 
TREND? 
Whereas the policy process of the Europol Regulation demonstrated strong supranational entrepreneurship 
– particularly efforts by the European Commission to expand its own influence and actorness in EU police 
cooperation – “the Member States won on crucial points” (Interviewees 29 & 35). At the same time, a number 
of concessions possibly demonstrate the growing strength of supranational advocacy. These include the 
stronger involvement of EU actors in Europol’s governance, particularly on data protection, parliamentary 
oversight, operational priority-setting, budgetary planning and external relations (Interviewees 15, 21, 27, 31 
& 33). Next to functional spill-overs from the overall development of EU integration and path-dependency 
within police cooperation, the Commission benefited tremendously from an early mover advantage in this 
respect. As key initiator of the Regulation, it was debatably in an ideal starting position to shape the interests 
and preferences of Member States on the further institutional development of Europol.  
What is more, supranational entrepreneurship regarding the Europol Regulation leveraged 
functional and especially public pressure in order to affect state preferences positively towards deeper 
integration. The European Commission already framed its first proposal accordingly in 2013. Contextualising 
the draft version, it emphasised that “the EU has seen an increase in serious and organised crime as well as 
more diverse patterns in crime” and that Eurobarometer data consistently demonstrated crime to be “one of 
the five main concerns of EU citizens” (European Commission, 2013, pp. 2 & 3). This approach perhaps 
successfully impacted state preferences for two main reasons. First, the functional or common-sense 
argument to continue developing Europol arguably applied to more or less every Member State (Interviewees 
14, 25, 26, 31, 34 & 35). From a practical and operational point of view, rising internal and external 
interdependencies required additional professionalisation or centralisation of EU police cooperation. 
Moreover, Europol and other EU actors could offer unique cross-national products and services, including 
access to funding and pooled resources (Interviewees 27 & 35). In view of previous integration steps and 
investments in the agency, “it simply made sense in every way” to further strengthen collective action and 
activities at EU level and establish institutional clarity among the different actors involved (Interviewee 34). 
The tools and services of Europol and the Commission had become key instruments of EU police cooperation 
whose evolving role and growing institutional complexity needed to be managed. 
Second, political expectations and politicisation made Member States highly susceptible, if not 
vulnerable, to these common-sense arguments and supranational policy entrepreneurship in favour of 
further formalising Europol. In a manner of venue shopping, European governments frequently “use[d] the 
EU to sell things to their constituencies which they would not otherwise have been able to sell” in the domain 
of internal security and policing (Interviewee 40). This deliberate pro-EU politicisation of domestic security 
issues and the strategic employment of the EU level as multiplier of attention given to threats challenging the 
Member States now in turn created public-political pressure on national policymakers to continue this path 
(Interviewees 14, 15, 21, 27 & 43). Where governments had previously presented and discursively justified 
Europol and the EU as preferred policy venues for police cooperation, it was difficult to suddenly argue 
against further strengthening both. In the negotiations on the Europol Regulation – as on other issues – the 
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European Commission harnessed this public perception to affect state preferences. Deliberate politicisation, 
that is, the instrumentalisation of public opinion, had been emerging for some time as “tool of legitimisation 
for the EU in the area of JHA” (Interviewee 23). Especially the Commission had increasingly been positioning 
itself as protector of internal security and developed effective narratives and discursive strategies to this end 
(Interviewees 25, 26, 34 & 35). Member States, against it, had to offer few or relatively weak ‘counter 
narratives’ to the strong pro-integration advocacy of supranational policy entrepreneurs.  
Additionally, the lack of a homogeneous preference situation and existence of a divide among 
Member States with regard to the Europol Regulation arguably opened a window of opportunity for 
Commission entrepreneurship. Contrary to EU actors, European governments did not demonstrate a unified 
position on EU police cooperation (Interviewees 27, 29 & 33). Their preferences varied greatly in line with the 
extent to which individual countries felt affected by interdependencies or prioritised concrete issues. 
Asymmetries thus played a crucial role in diversifying states’ positions on the degree of formalisation at 
Europol around 2013; countries with the highest levels of interconnectedness preferred deeper integration, 
while those with comparatively less interconnectivity or sufficient national networks favoured a weak draft 
regulation or even differentiated models of integration (Interviewees 12, 14, 22, 23 & 24). Especially the most 
recent EU enlargement had further increased the institutional complexity within JHA and among European 
Member States. It possibly additionally reduced the like-mindedness and similarity in preferences of EU 
governments (Interviewees 21, 27 & 29). While this did perhaps not allow supranational actors to 
substantially shift state preferences, it certainly enabled Commission and EU officials to successfully push 
some of their proposals, even against the will of governments. This included for example the larger role for 
the European Parliament in relation to Europol, likewise part of the broader ‘Lisbonisation’ development 
(Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, 2014). The concrete proposal for the JPSG originated from the Parliament 
itself. It was jointly promoted together with the Commission and was ultimately included in the final 
regulation despite remaining reluctance from some Member States (Interviewees 14 & 34).  
Supranational policy entrepreneurship, leveraging functional and public pressure, can arguably 
explain how the Europol Regulation came about. Against the backdrop of spill-over effects and path-
dependency, EU actors – first and foremost the European Commission – used political expectations to assert 
pro-integration positions in the draft and strengthen supranational levels within EU police cooperation. Post-
crisis politicisation generated by the terrorist attacks in Paris added momentum and pressure in this respect. 
Although the key points had arguably been negotiated by then, it should be observed that Europol actively 
sought to harness these politicising events to achieve further concessions from the Member States. In the 
aftermath of the November 2015 attacks for instance, the agency noted that “Europol’s future legal framework 
(the Europol Regulation) should be analysed to ensure that the needs arising from the counter terrorism 
policy response (post the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks) is adequately reflected. This concerns, in particular, 
the exchange of personal data with the private sector and a firm legal basis in relation to the EU IRU tasks” 
(Europol, 2015c, p. 16). Post-crisis salience and supranational entrepreneurship thus possibly account for the 
shift in state preferences towards strengthening Europol’s position and autonomy in the direct receipt of 
personal data amongst others (Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, 2014). While this change may appear minor, 
Chapter 7 │ Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation and Beyond 
248 
increased access to data – the “raw material” of police – debatably likewise meant increased power (Storbeck, 
2018; cf. Interviewee 46). 
Compared to previous institutional developments and integration at Europol, state preferences did 
not significantly change in the policy process leading to the adoption of the Europol Regulation. However, 
the process illustrates the growing influence of supranational advocacy in EU police cooperation and at 
Europol in particular. Although the European Commission did not essentially shift state preferences towards 
deeper integration, it succeeded in determining the negotiations on a number of points and thereby 
strengthen and extend the influence of EU actors. The Europol Regulation exhibits the deliberate 
instrumentalisation of political expectations and public pressure by supranational policy entrepreneurs. 
While this strategy perhaps succeeded in actually moving the preferences of EU governments in some regards 
– including towards centralisation in information-exchange, more operational leeway for Europol and a 
larger role for the Commission – it more often functioned as “political blackmail” in the negotiations on the 
Regulation (Interviewee 27; cf. Interviewees 15, 24, 33 & 40). In an age of EU agencies, European governments 
could politically hardly oppose supranational initiatives for collective action and the further development of 
common institutions (ibid.). Although the importance of the Europol Regulation should not be overstated, it 
has possibly brought Europol one step closer to being an increasingly important, autonomous platform 
connecting local, national and global levels. Or, in the words of one interviewee: “Operationally, Europol 
remains largely driven by the Member States and close to developments on the ground. Institutionally, it is 
developing more and more towards the EU and a certain autonomy” (Interviewee 31). 
 
  
7.3 Institutional Choice in a Nutshell: State Preferences on the Three Dimensions 
of Differentiated Integration 
Although relatively little time has passed since the adoption of the ECD in April 2009, the process leading to 
its replacement with the Europol Regulation in 2016 exhibits striking and on-going changes in the influence 
of driving factors on state preferences within EU police cooperation. Whereas supranational policy 
entrepreneurship already increased in its relevance in the early 2000s, the advocacy and power of EU actors 
in this area has arguably risen even further until today. Next to Europol, particularly the European 
Commission succeeded in extending its role and establishing itself as an accepted, well-respected entity. 
Functional and political spill-over effects facilitated the maturation of supranational policy entrepreneurship 
– most notably from the Lisbon Treaty. Politicisation formed a crucial part in enabling the growing influence 
of EU actors on state preferences. The deliberate and strategic leverage of public pressure often created the 
necessary political momentum in the Member States to boost the stance of supranational integration 
advocates and their proposed initiatives.  
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Vertical Integration 
The establishment of operational centres at Europol and the adoption of the Regulation form the most recent 
events in a chain of developments towards deeper integration of EU police cooperation. While the legal and 
practical changes towards formalisation should not be overstated, they have clearly situated Europol amidst 
the European agencification trend and strengthened the role of supranational actors in JHA. The importance 
of increasingly centralising the information flow and exchange at EU level should not be underestimated 
either. With the creation of a centre approach at Europol and the replacement of the ECD with a regulation, 
Europol and the European Commission have effectively broadened their influence in vertical decision-
making. As in the previous case studies, internal and external interdependencies acted as important drivers 
of state preferences to this end. However, supranational policy entrepreneurship mattered even more. This 
chapter has shown how EU actors successfully harnessed functional pressure from high interdependence to 
produce cultivated spill-overs. Member States were accordingly influenced to favour additional 
centralisation and ultimately establish the EC3, the ECTC, the EMSC – an observation that likewise partially 
holds with regard to the Europol Regulation. 
At the same time, the institutional changes and developments at Europol between 2009 and 2016 
demonstrate a simultaneous growth of vertical integration and differentiation tendencies within EU police 
cooperation. While the establishment of operational centres at Europol and the adoption of the Regulation 
have certainly contributed to the organisational consolidation and formalisation of processes at the agency, 
some issue areas, tools and functions remain below or outside the EU level. Technological, strategic and 
operational standards continue to differ in many regards, as does the political will of Member States and law 
enforcement authorities to cooperate via Europol. Informal networks and sub-groups often parallel but also 
complement the work done at EU level and in formal policy venues. In fact, most interviewees stressed the 
importance of smart division of labour and the need for ‘coalitions of the willing’ to advance cooperation and 
integration in the long run (Interviewees 6, 12, 24, 26, 29 & 43). Asked about the drivers of state preferences 
in this respect, respondents agreed that two factors could primarily explain DI and primarily determined 
whether European governments were willing to join an avant-garde group or not. On the one hand, 
asymmetrical levels of interdependence and affectedness debatably matter tremendously as shapers of 
Member States’ political will to integrate further. The case studies in this and previous chapters clearly 
confirm that high degrees of interdependence form a necessary condition for pro-integration preferences. 
Thus, strongly asymmetrical levels of interconnectivity might be able to account for diverging state 
preferences and the emergence of avant-garde groups in some issue areas and even within formal 
cooperation fora. Second, subnational policy entrepreneurship can explain the persistence of informal 
horizontal networks and modes of governance within EU police cooperation, including at Europol. Where 
formal channels cannot satisfy operational needs for speed and efficiency, or in areas where policymakers 
are unwilling to pursue centralisation, domestic security and police officials may emerge as trailblazers 
themselves and initiate the creation of informal sub-groups at working level to manage common threats. In 
contrast to this positive instigation of differentiation, subnational entrepreneurs may also resort to informal 
networks and coalitions because of insufficient trust in formal channels and only slowly progressing 
Chapter 7 │ Snowballing into the Future? The Europol Regulation and Beyond 
250 
‘socialisation’ to EU police cooperation. Irrespective, subnational policy entrepreneurship often drives 
differentiation, be it as a means of flexible integration or bureaucratic resistance (Interviewees 13, 24, 40, 41 
& 42). As a mix of formal and informal modes of governance, EU police cooperation and Europol thus 
continue to present examples of DI to date. 
 
Functional Scope 
Europol’s functional scope did not change significantly after the ECD. However, the creation of three 
operational centres strengthened the involvement and mandate of the agency in the issue areas of cybercrime, 
terrorism and migrant smuggling. Issue-specific interdependencies played a key role in the formation of state 
preferences to this end. Whereas they were most relevant as driver of national positions in the cyber domain, 
politicisation and crisis momentum – rather than functional pressure – primarily shaped Member States with 
regard to terrorism and migrant smuggling. In all cases, supranational policy entrepreneurship harnessed 
both to successfully generate cultivated spill-overs. Especially politicisation presented a window of 
opportunity for EU actors to shift governments towards integration initiatives. The deliberate use of 
functional and public pressure is likewise reflected in the emergence of according discursive strategies, as 
can be seen in the employed frames by the European Commission and Europol. 
 
Horizontal Integration 
While Europol’s membership had comprised all EU Member States from the beginning, it continues to be 
marked by internal and external horizontal differentiation. With the Europol Regulation, the Commission 
and Europol gain powers in the conclusion of cooperation agreements with third parties. Both have on 
various occasions announced their intentions to widen cooperation with third countries, private parties and 
other international actor coalitions. This includes perhaps most importantly the exchange and receipt of data 
from non-EU entities. Here again, EU actors cite interdependencies as creating a functional need for such 
external differentiation. While EU police cooperation has become more tightly integrated horizontally over 
the past decade – equipping Europol with a better, tighter framework as main criminal intelligence hub of 
and amidst all Member States – de facto integration still widely differs from what is envisioned de jure. Despite 
universal EU membership, domestic data submission for instance remains a key obstacle to reaching 
Europol’s full potential as horizontal connector between EU countries in practice. 
 What is more, internal differentiation continues to mark EU police cooperation at the agency. As the 
section on vertical integration has shown, networks and sub-groups – both at formal and working levels – 
exist in parallel to cooperation settings that include all Member States. Asymmetrical interdependencies and 
bureaucratic resistance from subnational policy entrepreneurs arguably drive the emergence and persistence 
of internal differentiation at Europol. However, in line with the findings of the previous chapters, more often 
than not, subnational avant-garde groups seem to benefit overall integration in the long run, even if DI was 
not intentional. 
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This chapter on the Europol Regulation and the establishment of operational centres at Europol has 
confirmed various hypotheses and preliminary results. First, high interdependencies were present as a 
necessary condition in every case. Even where they did not constitute the primary driver of state preferences, 
for example concerning the Regulation or the EMSC, functional pressure to integrate mattered as motivating 
force at highest political levels. Second, supranational policy entrepreneurship emerged as one key driving 
factor of state preferences after the ECD. Benefitting from path-dependency and spill-over effects, the 
influence of EU actors was growing visibly. What is more, supranational actors deliberately began to extend 
their pro-EU advocacy and integration initiatives in the realm of EU police cooperation. The Europol 
Regulation as well as all operational centres at Europol originated in one way or another from supranational 
proposals. Finally, politicisation was frequently present as complementary driving force alongside 
interdependence and/or supranational policy entrepreneurship.  
The role of crises should be particularly stressed in this respect. Recent terror attacks and the 2014-
2015 migrant and refugee crisis arguably presented windows of opportunity for a shift in the preferences of 
Member States towards further integration at Europol. On the one hand, they exhibited (or were framed as 
exhibiting) existing and insufficiently managed interdependencies. As a result, each crisis was seen as the 
consequence of collective action problems, calling for collective solutions. Especially supranational actors 
overwhelmingly employed this argumentation to shape national interests and produce cultivated spill-overs 
at Europol. Additionally, these politicising events generated public pressure and political momentum that 
could likewise be leveraged by EU actors. The ECTC and the EMSC for instance may be argued to have 
primarily presented political ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to public pressure rather than operational responses to a 
functional need as perhaps in the case of the EC3. This might support the findings from the previous chapter. 
Similar to the 11-M attacks and the London bombings, the Brussels Jewish museum shooting and Paris attacks 
triggered a wave of Member States’ action. Those countries with the greatest apparent responsibility and 
visibility, that is, Council presidencies and affected Member States, unsurprisingly took the lead and often 
pushed EU initiatives. This in turn played into the hands of supranational policy entrepreneurs. Regardless 
of the particular integration preference – whether governments had an actual interest in long-term integration 
of EU police cooperation or merely prioritised EU action as a form of venue-shopping in an attempt to evade 
domestic pressure and contestation – supranational actors could arguably build on this post-crisis 
momentum to advance political and cultivated spill-overs. 
While interdependence continued to matter after 2010 as necessary driver of state preferences 
towards integration, supranational policy entrepreneurship and crisis politicisation gained significant 
influence and primarily shaped the priorities of Member States concerning Europol and EU police 
cooperation. Europol’s operational centres and its new legal framework, the Regulation, bear testimony to 
this increasing influence of EU actors. While Europol had only been accountable to the intergovernmental 
Council under the Convention, the ECD already significantly altered the role of the EU in the agency’s 
governance. In line with integration developments since the Lisbon Treaty, the Europol Regulation 
perpetuated this trend; it strengthened and expanded the involvement of supranational actors in EU police 
cooperation, including Europol’s own leeway. In this context, differentiation – or rather flexible integration 
– has possibly become a vital part of supranational policy entrepreneurship and the long-term strategies of 
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EU actors. At the same time, regardless of the strength of driving forces and political resolve in the Member 
States, integration at Europol still faces many obstacles to date. Although more and more domestic officials 
are familiar with the agency and Europol has increasingly developed into a socialisation platform, lack of 
trust and persisting bureaucratic resistance remain key problems in practice. Whether Europol and EU police 
cooperation continue to struggle or strategically manoeuvre between differentiation and integration could 
ultimately depend on supranational policy entrepreneurship and the extent to which EU actors manage to 
connect both. What is clear, irrespective of the concrete institutional development and future of Europol, is 
that EU police cooperation is here to stay. And although Europol is unlikely to evolve into Kohl’s vision of a 
European FBI anytime soon, growing interdependencies and security crises will undoubtedly continue to 
motivate Member States to cooperate at European level and further develop police cooperation in the EU.
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8. Conclusion and Discussion 
This dissertation has set out to investigate the driving forces behind integration in the field of EU police 
cooperation so as to shed light on the paradoxical simultaneity of seemingly contradictory trends in this 
policy domain: the parallel existence and evolution of informal and formal cooperation, soft and hard modes 
of governance, as well as processes of differentiation and integration. This appeared puzzling in the light of 
recent terror attacks that demonstrated persisting collective action problems, and it seemed surprising in 
view of consistently high political momentum and public support across Member States for better 
coordination and cooperation at the EU level. EU police cooperation to date remains a long way from full 
integration. Intergovernmental settings and sovereignty concerns continue to collide with multi-level 
governance and the initiatives of EU actors. Nonetheless, over time, Member States have increasingly opted 
for moving this issue area into EU policy venues and have equipped supranational actors with more and 
more powers in the process. The evolution of European police cooperation and particularly the institutional 
development of Europol demonstrate progressive integration on all three dimensions of DI, a trend that is 
still on-going: a gradual ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of EU police cooperation and an extension of its 
functional scope (see figure 15).  
On the basis of the empirical and theoretical literature, this dissertation has sought to investigate 
how and to what extent interdependence, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship shape the integration 
preferences of Member States in EU police cooperation. It has traced the influence of these driving factors 
throughout the policy processes predating four consecutive milestones in the institutional development of 
the latter: (1) the 1976 Trevi Group; (2) the 1995 Europol Convention establishing Europol; (3) the 2009 
Europol Council Decision naming Europol official EU agency; and (4) the 2016 Europol Regulation. All these 
arguably constitute significant qualitative ‘quantum leaps’ in the integration of EU police cooperation (see 
figure 15). In this context, differentiation initiatives – rather than deriving from anti-integration sentiments – 
provided temporary strategies of Member States to cope with cooperation pressure in areas where full 
integration was not possible. More often than not, they presented means of advancing integration in the long 
run. The asymmetrical effects of driving factors thus explain why governments opt for venue shopping and 
avant-garde approaches in single issue areas. In this light, it seems less puzzling that diverging modes of 
cooperation, governance and integration continue to exist and evolve alongside one another in EU police 
cooperation. While the explanatory power of drivers varies across these case studies, that is, over time and 
issue areas, a number of common findings emerge. 
 
Interdependence, Politicisation and Policy Entrepreneurship: Drivers of State Integration Preferences 
and their Causal Mechanisms 
First, high interdependence seems to always positively impact the integration preferences of Member States 
and seems to present a necessary condition for the latter; the causal mechanism at work here is functional 
pressure. The higher the interconnectedness in concrete issues, the less able single governments are to 
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manage problems unilaterally and the more they experience a practical necessity to cooperate with other 
countries. This functional need often becomes manifest in the growing inability of domestic levels to cope 
with threats and safeguard internal security, or the increasing occurrence and frequency of coordination and 
collective action problems. The research thus confirms hypothesis H1. The higher the interdependence in 
security issues, the more likely Member States are to favour EU police cooperation and integration (see table 
18). In this context, it appears to matter less whether interdependencies arise from an external 
interconnectedness in common threats and challenges, or from internal institutional linkages. Both types 
produce functional pressure on Member States to cooperate if not integrate. Since the 1970s, internal 
interdependence has especially increased in line with the development of the EU and progressively 
reinforced, perhaps even overtaken external interdependence as pro-integration driver within EU police 
cooperation.  
 Second, politicisation appears to constitute a sufficient condition for pro-integration preferences only 
in conjunction with one of the other factors. This dissertation has not found strong evidence for the 
independent impact of politicisation. Instead, its analysis demonstrates the complementary role of public 
pressure and salience as amplifiers of other causal mechanisms. Particularly crises and shocks present critical 
moments or ‘windows of opportunity’ to this end. When politicising events suddenly raise the visibility of 
particular issue areas, they often ignite a public-political debate on the appropriateness or consequences of 
policy choices. This in turn creates public pressure on policymakers to act in order to prevent societal 
contestation, and thereby generates political momentum. While politicisation may act as both enabler and 
impediment to EU police cooperation, the case studies more often exhibit a positive effect of high salience 
and public pressure on integration preferences. Especially the combination with high interdependence or 
supranational policy entrepreneurship caused Member States to favour EU police cooperation and 
integration (see table 18). Where politicising events illustrate existing interdependencies, as in the case of 
terror attacks, they reinforce integration pressure by raising the public visibility of existing functional needs 
to cooperate. This makes it considerably more difficult for governments to argue against enhancing EU police 
cooperation – an effect that was often successfully harnessed by supranational actors to shift state preferences 
towards further integration. Consequently, this dissertation concludes that high politicisation tends to act as 
amplifier of other pro-integration drivers in the area of internal security and policing. It may not produce an 
independent effect on state preferences, but the single or aggregate effects of politicising events generate 
public and political pressure to act that renders governments more vulnerable to the influence of 
interdependencies or policy entrepreneurship. Hypotheses H2.2 and H2.3 may thus be cautiously rejected. 
 Third, supra- and subnational policy entrepreneurship increasingly matter as shapers of pro-
integration preferences on EU police cooperation. They both harness functional and public pressure in their 
advocacy of cooperation at the EU level. In the light of a quickly expanding interconnectedness in common 
threats and institutions, they frame integration and securitising measures at transnational level as a necessary 
– if not the only – response to growing problems of coordination and collective action. On the other hand, 
policy entrepreneurs deliberately leverage public pressure to shift state preferences towards ‘more’ rather 
than less EU; they invoke a public demand for European cooperation or integration, and frame politicising 
events like terror attacks accordingly. Whereas subnational actors have arguably evolved from bureaucratic 
 255 
resistance to cautious integration enthusiasts since the 1970s, their role and influence is largely asymmetrical 
across Member States and hinges on the respective national system and security tradition. By contrast, 
supranational actors – especially the European Commission and Europol – present steadily growing drivers 
of pro-integration preferences on EU police cooperation. Benefitting from path-dependency and spill-over 
effects, their influence has expanded visibly, especially over the past decade. EU actors have increasingly 
leveraged politicisation to this end. The findings of this dissertation therefore strongly confirm hypothesis 
H3, the positive relationship between high policy entrepreneurship and pro-integration preferences. 
Concerning the potential impact of subnational advocacy on differentiation preferences, the case studies 
provide no sufficient evidence to validate hypothesis H4 (see table 18). 
 
Driving Factors Across Issue Areas and Time 
A number of issue- and time-specific conclusions may be drawn. The case studies illustrate that politicisation 
may have the largest effect on state preferences – even if indirectly as a window of opportunity – in high-
profile issue areas of police cooperation. Amongst others, terrorism and illegal migration arguably generate 
relatively more public pressure and higher salience, and crises or shocks tend to be more visible in these 
fields. By comparison, low-profile or more technical areas like vehicle-related crime and cybercrime 
debatably spawn less politicisation. In these issue areas, the effects of politicisation on state preferences are 
thus rather limited, and integration is perhaps primarily pushed by functional pressure from 
interdependence. This diverging impact of driving factors across issue areas  is  likewise  reflected  in  the 
discursive strategies  of  policy entrepreneurs. The discourse of the European Commission in high-profile 
policy domains for instance strongly harnesses public pressure and political momentum from politicising 
events. Against it, frames and narratives within more operational settings and issue areas rather focus on 
functional needs to advance EU police cooperation. 
 Two more observations can be made regarding the influence of driving factors over time. First, 
interdependence has steadily grown from the early days of European police cooperation in the 1970s until 
today, and has consistently shaped government preferences in favour of integration. Particularly 
globalisation and digitisation have increased external interconnectedness of EU Member States, while their 
internal or institutional linkages have skyrocketed in line with the general development of the EU and have 
become progressively more relevant as driving factors. However, the impact of functional pressure on state 
preferences has arguably flattened somewhat recently. Although interdependencies remain a necessary 
causal condition of governmental pro-integration stances, they have been sidelined by other, increasingly 
more important influences on state preferences like supranational policy entrepreneurship. 
 Changes in the nature of policy entrepreneurship over time constitute the second observation. 
Whereas supranational policy entrepreneurship was barely or not at all present in earlier cooperation stages, 
it has emerged as key shaper of state preferences on EU police cooperation in recent years (see table 18). 
Especially the European Commission and Europol have progressively assumed roles as strong pro-
integration lobbyists, most notably since the Lisbon Treaty and the ECD. Growing path-dependency 
alongside functional and political spill-over effects increasingly enabled cultivated spill-overs and the success  
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of integration initiatives, as illustrated by the Europol Regulation. This seems to confirm NI tenets that 
preference formation and EU integration have become more and more interconnected since the 1990s (cf. 
Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015). At the same time, supranational policy entrepreneurs have also become 
more flexible in their advocacy, again supporting a NI-hypothesis; EU actors indeed appear to “act 
strategically” in their integration initiatives, not per se promoting full-fledged integration but embracing 
opportunities for entrepreneurship as they arrive (ibid., p. 712). The case studies demonstrate that 
supranational institutions may even support differentiation and avant-garde groups with a view to 
producing cultivated spill-overs in the long run. 
The effect of subnational policy entrepreneurship on state preferences on EU police cooperation 
likewise changed between the 1970s and 2016. While domestic security and police officials initially supported 
cooperation but resisted integration, they have perhaps become cautious integration enthusiasts in some 
regards today. The early 2000s still demonstrate a strong advocacy in favour of differentiation and 
decentralisation, as can be seen in the launch of EUCARIS, Prüm and other initiatives (see table 18). 
Nevertheless, path-dependency and the functional benefits of common institutions like Europol may now be 
increasingly transforming bureaucratic resistance into pro-integration advocacy at operational levels. 
Supranational policy entrepreneurship and a certain socialisation at European level have further boosted this 
development. At the same time, the role of subnational actors and their influence on state preferences in the 
integration of EU police cooperation is only changing gradually. More research is thus needed to confirm this 
observation. 
 
Shaping Preferences Across the Three Dimensions of Differentiated Integration 
Next to  this dissertation’s general  findings and the  issue- and time-specific effects of driving factors, the 
strength of their impact on state preferences appears to vary across the three dimensions of DI. While the case 
studies clearly demonstrate interdependence as necessary causal condition for pro-integration preferences 
on all dimensions, it possibly acts as strongest interest shaper on the functional scope of EU police 
cooperation, complemented by subnational policy entrepreneurship. By comparison, politicsation and 
supranational advocay seem to primarily drive state preferences on vertical and horizontal integration. 
Asymmetrical effects of these factors across Member States and integration dimensions possibly explain 
instances of DI. When the causal mechanisms at work are significantly stronger in some countries than in 
others, the resulting functional or public pressure may push a sub-group of governments to favour and 
advance integration amongst themselves. 
Concerning the effect of interdependencies on state preferences across the three dimensions of DI, 
the analysis of EU police cooperation between 1976 and 2016 exhibits a particularly strong influence with 
regard to the functional scope. High external, issue-specific interdependencies seem to primarily push 
governments towards expanding cooperation to more issue areas. At the same time, internal or institutional 
interdependencies complement this effect and additionally act as drivers of centralisation preferences. In this 
context, subnational policy and security officials arguably often play a key role. Although subnational policy 
entrepreneurship may not be a key explanatory factor of pro-integration preferences on the functional scope 
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of EU police cooperation. However, the findings of this dissertation confirm the NI hypothesis that “problems 
in domestic preference formation have become standalone inputs into the European integration process” 
(Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 714). Where subnational actors are faced with national constraints to manage 
heightened security threats – often arising from growing interdependencies – they tend to promote venue 
shopping at EU level (cf. Guiraudon, 2000, 2003). Particularly the early 2000s illustrate how subnational policy 
entrepreneurship frequently shapes state preferences in favour of police cooperation on more and more issue 
areas, and even centralisation. At the same time, strong asymmetries among European law enforcement 
authorities often result in the promotion of DI or even differentiation. Differences in the institutional 
interconnectivity, the degree of influence on the respective government, and the predominant threats at 
operational level may explain why some subnational policy entrepreneurs advocate integration and 
successfully contribute to an according preference of their national government, while others prefer 
differentiation or fail to impact higher political levels at home. 
Against it, politicisation and supranational advocacy matter most as interest drivers on the 
dimensions of vertical and horizontal integration. Whereas interdependencies have to be present as well for 
Member States to prioritise the latter two, high salience and public pressure perhaps more importantly shape 
preferences towards formal, publicly visible cooperation formats. Highly politicised issue areas related to 
policing and internal security more often yield pro-integration attitudes among affected governments than 
not. Additionally, the analysis of the case studies finds that the office of the Council presidency potentially 
has a positive impact on integration preferences. Holding the Council presidency possibly particularly 
exposes governments to public and political expectations, and the influence of pro-EU pressure. 
Nevertheless, further research is needed to validate this conclusion and determine the significance of the 
Council presidency as actual interest shaper of Member States or mere ‘enabling factor’ for the impact of 
other drivers. Irrespective, this dissertation finds that politicisation alone does not suffice. Instead, it seems 
to act as window of opportunity for the impact of supranational policy entrepreneurship. EU actors seem to 
harness the momentum and public pressure arising from politicising events to shape state preferences in 
favour of vertical and horizontal integration. Especially since the early 2000s, this could be observed in the 
aftermath of multiple crises. The impact of supranational policy entrepreneurship on centralisation 
preferences has grown significantly until today; it has arguably begun to replace interdependence as primary 
driver in this respect.  Although interdependencies continue to matter as necessary driver of state preferences 
towards integration, supranational policy entrepreneurship and crisis politicisation gained significant 
influence as shapers of the priorities of Member States concerning Europol and EU police cooperation since 
at least 2010. Europol’s operational centres and its new legal framework, the Regulation, bear testimony to 
the increasing influence of EU actors.  
At the same time as integration, differentiation – or rather flexible integration – has possibly become 
a vital part of EU police cooperation (see figure 15). Interestingly, the case studies seem to suggest that 
differentiation initiatives in this area tend to be moved into EU policy venues in the long run. Rather than 
impeding integration, it appears, DI approaches are often adopted by Member States as deliberate integration 
strategies or to overcome political deadlock and institutional obstacles. Additionally, this dissertation finds 
that asymmetries in the impact of different driving factors can explain this phenomenon, as they yield 
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diverging preferences across countries and on the three dimensions of DI. The analysis of EU police 
cooperation between 1976 and 2016 shows that the respective strength of single drivers ultimately determines 
not only preference formation on vertical and horizontal integration as well as the functional scope of 
European police cooperation but also the probability of preference di- or convergence among Member States. 
 
The Road Ahead: Outlook into the Future 
EU police cooperation has changed considerably since its inception as the Trevi Group in 1976. It has 
developed from a semi-formal intergovernmental platform outside any EC/EU structures to an official EU 
law enforcement agency and central hub for information exchange among Member States. Although police 
cooperation remains a core state powers and governments still dominate governance at Europol, they are 
possibly losing control over the process. The early 2000s illustrate this. While EU governments deliberately 
opted for enhancing Europol’s role, they did not originally intend to integrate it into the supranational 
framework. Yet, the more issue areas Member States added to its responsibilities and the more powers they 
gave to the agency, the more path-dependency and spill-overs they created that increasingly justified Europol 
as an actor itself. Notwithstanding explicit integration preferences and initiatives of some Member States, 
unintended consequences of initial cooperation decisions have thus contributed significantly to shaping 
future integration.  
At the same time, functional pressure to cooperate, if not integrate, continues to rise. Next to an 
interconnectedness in threats through digitisation and globalisation amongst others, intra-EU 
interdependencies continue generate a need to work together across borders. Particularly structures, systems 
and procedures developed in the area of internal security and policing now produce progressive internal 
linkages that challenge Member States with new coordination and collective action problems. In this context, 
EU actors matter more and more as central administrators, brokers and coordinators, as demonstrated by the 
on-going efforts to improve the interoperability of EU information systems amongst others. This trend is 
likely to continue. Especially Europol and the European Commission have developed an expanding policy 
entrepreneurship in the past years and will certainly sustain their support of the Member States in the future 
as well as the pro-active promotion of EU policy venues.  
Regardless of the strength of driving forces and political resolve in the Member States, integration at 
Europol still faces many obstacles to date. Although more and more domestic officials are familiar with the 
agency, and Europol has increasingly developed into a socialisation platform, lack of trust and persisting 
bureaucratic resistance remain key problems in practice. Whether Europol and EU police cooperation 
continue to struggle or strategically manoeuvre between differentiation and integration could ultimately 
depend on supranational policy entrepreneurship and the extent to which EU actors manage to connect both. 
This is perhaps even truer in the light of ‘Brexit’ and a growing Euroscepticism across European governments 
– a political climate that likewise poses challenges to the area of police cooperation. The tension between EU 
collective action, if not integration, in this field and national sovereignty concerns will undoubtedly continue 
to matter and shape its further institutional development. Against this backdrop, differentiated integration 
is highly likely to form an integral part of EU police cooperation in the future. The role of avant-garde groups 
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and flexible integration might become an even more important tool for Member States to cope with the 
domestic manifestations of cross-national interdependencies in areas where integration preferences fail to 
converge. Their role as trailblazers for long-run integration will likewise continue to matter and affect state 
preferences as well as the further development of Europol. Irrespective of the concrete shape this will take, it 
seems clear that EU police cooperation is here to stay. Although Europol is unlikely to evolve into Kohl’s 
vision of a European FBI anytime soon, growing interdependencies and security crises will undoubtedly 
continue to motivate Member States to cooperate at European level and further develop police cooperation 
in the EU. Time will tell. 
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Annex A 
Categories and Criteria of Qualitative Structured Content Analysis. 
CATEGORY DEFINITION CODING RULES 
I1: high 
interdependence 
High conviction or certainty of dependence 
on others in given issue area or activity 
(implicit or explicit), i.e. 
• conviction of general and/or specific need 
for collective action, and/or 
• recognition of excessive demands on single 
government efforts/unilateral solutions, 
and/or 
• recognition of relevance of cooperation for 
obtaining a national goal and/or joint 
policy outcome 
Significant or various mentions of 
high interdependence, no comment 
should doubt the high level of 
interdependence 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
interdependence” 
 
I2: medium/ 
neutral 
interdependence 
Partial, incoherent conviction of 
dependence on others, or uncertainty about 
interdependence 
No or only sporadic and isolated 
mentions of interdependence that 
do not qualify as either “high” or 
“low” 
I3: low 
interdependence 
High conviction or certainty of 
independence from others (implicit or 
explicit), i.e. 
• conviction of no general or specific need 
for collective action, and/or 
• conviction of satisfying response from 
single governments and unilateral 
solutions, and/or 
• conviction of irrelevance or low importance 
of cooperation for obtaining a national goal 
and/or joint policy outcome 
Significant or various mentions of 
low interdependence or high 
independence, no comment should 
doubt the low level of 
interdependence 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
interdependence” 
 
I4: level of 
interdependence 
not deducible 
Mention of the defined aspects, but 
comments do not clarify nature of 
relationship between different actors 
 
P1: high 
politicisation 
Strong conviction or certainty of high 
politicisation (implicit or explicit), i.e. 
• significant saliency through considerable 
media, public and political interest, or 
politicising events (e.g. terror attacks), 
and/or 
• significant direct or indirect 
public/political pressure on policymakers 
from home and abroad (e.g. (in-)directly 
arising from the saliency of an issue, public 
opinion polls, citizens’ and interest groups’ 
demands), and/or 
• deliberate politicisation by policymakers, 
e.g. securitising moves by government and 
opposition 
Significant or various mentions of 
high politicisation, no comment 
should doubt the high level of 
politicisation 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
politicisation” 
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P2: medium/ 
neutral 
politicisation 
Partial, incoherent conviction of 
politicisation, or uncertainty about public 
pressure 
No or only sporadic and isolated 
mentions of politicisation that do 
not qualify as either “high” or 
“low” 
P3: low 
politicisation 
Low conviction of public pressure, strong 
certainty of low or absent politicisation 
(implicit or explicit), i.e. 
• lack of media, public and political interest, 
or politicising events (e.g. terror attacks), 
and/or 
• lack of direct or indirect public/political 
pressure on policymakers from home and 
abroad, and/or 
• deliberate de-politicisation by 
policymakers 
Significant or various mentions of 
low or no politicisation, no 
comment should doubt the low 
level of politicisation 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
politicisation” 
P4: level of 
politicisation not 
deducible 
Mention of the defined aspects, but 
comments do not clarify nature of 
politicisation 
 
E1: high influence 
of policy 
entrepreneurship 
Strong conviction or certainty of high 
influence of supra-/subnational policy 
entrepreneurs (implicit or explicit), i.e. 
• strong general presence and involvement 
in the decision-making and policy process, 
and/or 
• significant passive engagement of through 
procedural, legal or institutional settings, 
and/or 
• significant (pro-)active engagement in the 
stages of preference formation, negotiation 
or institutional choice, and/or 
• significant consultation by governments, 
and/or 
• transnational networks and synergies 
between supra-/subnational actors: 
interest groups coalition-building 
Significant or various mentions of 
high influence of supra-
/subnational policy entrepreneurs, 
no comment should doubt the high 
level of influence 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
influence of supra-/subnational 
policy entrepreneurs” 
 
E2: medium/ 
neutral influence of 
policy 
entrepreneurship 
Partial, incoherent conviction of influence of 
supra-/subnational policy entrepreneurs, or 
uncertainty about their role 
No or only sporadic and isolated 
mentions of supra-/subnational 
policy entrepreneurs that do not 
qualify as either “high” or “low” 
influence 
E3: low influence 
of policy 
entrepreneurship 
Low conviction of the influence of supra-
/subnational policy entrepreneurs, strong 
certainty of no or limited influence (implicit 
or explicit), i.e. 
• low or lack of general presence and 
involvement in the decision-making and 
policy process, and/or 
• insignificant or no passive engagement in 
procedural, legal or institutional settings, 
and/or 
Significant or various mentions of 
low or no influence of supra-
/subnational policy entrepreneurs, 
no comment should doubt the low 
level of influence 
 
Otherwise code “medium/neutral 
influence of supra-/subnational 
policy entrepreneurs” 
 297 
• little or no (pro-)active engagement in the 
stages of preference formation, negotiation 
or institutional choice, and/or 
• little or no consultation by governments, 
and/or 
• lack of transnational networks and 
synergies between supra-/subnational 
actors: few or no interest groups coalition-
building 
E4: level of 
influence of policy 
entrepreneurship 
not deducible 
Mention of the defined aspects, but 
comments do not clarify nature of influence 
of supra-/subnational policy entrepreneurs 
 
 
Source:   Author. 
